







# Contents

- Report & Prospects for establishing  
a steam communication  
between Europe & India 17  
Steam communication to India by the  
Suez in letter to Lord Dunsington  
The East India Company's new  
steam to India 18  
Proposal by Sir John Lubbock for forming  
a Company to communicate with the  
East Indies by steam navigation 19  
Letter to Sir John Lubbock M.P.  
on steam navigation with India 20  
Observations on steam communica-  
tion between India & Hong Kong 21  
Reply to Crawford's observations on  
steam communication between India  
& Suez 22  
Observations on the prospects of steam  
communication between England  
and India by way of the Suez 23  
Four specimens of the quality of the  
writing 24





# **REPORT AND PROSPECTUS**

**FOR ESTABLISHING**

**A**

**STEAM COMMUNICATION**

**BETWEEN EUROPE AND INDIA.**

**READ AND APPROVED OF**

**AT A PUBLIC MEETING**

**OF THE**

**EUROPEAN AND NATIVE INHABITANTS OF BOMBAY.**



**BOMBAY:**

**PRINTED AND PUBLISHED AT THE COURIER PRESS,  
BY SORABJEE DORABJEE.**

---

**1837. .**



# REPORT

*Of a Committee appointed to ascertain the feasibility of establishing a Steam Communication between India and Great Britain.*

The Committee appointed to determine the best mode of effecting the Establishment of a regular steam communication between Bombay and Suez, and from Alexandria to Malta, or some other part in the Mediterranean, after carefully considering the valuable information given them by Captain Wilson, of the Honorable Company's Steamer *Hugh Lindsay*, and that obtained from other sources, are unanimously of opinion that the communication if opened and persevered in, will be eventually profitable.

The Committee therefore recommend an appeal to the British and Native community of India, to raise by voluntary subscription, a sum equal to the cost of one Vessel, as the only means now left of accomplishing a regular and effective communication by steam. The Committee are of opinion, that until a constant steam communication with Suez has been fairly set on foot, any expectation of establishing the connecting link betwixt Alexandria and Malta would be premature, but the tenor of the correspondence between parties in England and the public authorities, recently published in

the Bombay Courier, warrants an assurance on the part of the Committee, that this measure would speedily follow on the success of the plan now submitted.

The Committee have not thought it proper to make any application to Government for the assistance which will be required from them, until their plans are more matured ; but they rely with confidence on meeting with every assistance and support from the authorities in India. The great increase of revenue in the post office Department, from the postage of letters from different parts of India, will alone be a matter of some importance, but at the same time, the smallest of the many advantages which the Indian Government will reap from the proposed Establishment of steam communication. From the information the Committee have obtained, they have every reason to believe that a most efficient vessel will not cost more than the sum stated in the accompanying prospectus, and judging from the distinguished liberality of the Indian community the Committee anticipate little difficulty in raising funds sufficient for the objects in view. The annual expenditure will scarcely under any circumstances exceed the sum named, as it allows a large amount for the current repairs and expences of the vessel, and any unforeseen accident is guaranteed by the Insurance proposed to be effected.

The estimate of the annual receipts, the Committee consi-

der as near the mark as such a calculation will admit of, subject as it must be to the support of the public. At the same time, the Committee cannot omit stating it as their firm opinion that the receipts of the Boat will rapidly increase with good management and regular voyages, and that in the course of time many sources of profit will spring up which at present are little anticipated.

Of these the principal may be found in the conveyance of respectable native Pilgrims to and from Judda, and in the numbers of Civil and Military officers of this country, who will gladly avail themselves of a regular and certain communication with the Red Sea Ports, to visit on furlough the attractive and healthy regions of Egypt and Syria from November to March. No where else, within the limits prescribed by the absentee Regulations, can so extensive and beneficial a change of climate be attained in so agreeable a manner, or on so economical terms, after having spent little more money than would have been required for a Passage to the Cape, not to say any thing of the return passage, and the enormous expences of living there, contrasted with the difficulty of spending money in Egypt. By remaining during one intermediate trip of the Steamer to Egypt, the whole country from the borders of Abyssinia to Aleppo, with the splendid monuments of antiquity of Syria and Egypt, Damascus, Palmyra, Balbec, Jerusalem, Cairo and the Pyramids, Dendera, Thebes,

Phile, and Mount Sinai might be visited for one tenth part of the expence, with far less danger, and in nearly the same period that would be necessary to cross the continent of India from Bombay to Calcutta, and back again, or for a visit to the Neilgheeries. During the whole of which, the Absentee's Indian time of service will not only be untouched, but he will continue to receive his Indian allowances.

When all the advantages afforded by this communication are taken into consideration, the Committee feel confident that there is scarcely an individual of the British Community on the Indian continent, who will not give his mite towards its establishment, and that their present appeal to the Public will meet with that liberality, which a measure of such importance deserves. To the Native Population of India a steam communication will afford the most decided advantages, as it must bring them into so much closer contact with Great Britain; the Committee therefore, trust they will come forward in support of the present plan with the liberality and public spirit characteristic of the wealthy and well informed portion of this respectable body.

# ESTIMATE FOR THREE VOYAGES EACH YEAR, TO AND FROM SUEZ.

## ANNUAL EXPENDITURE.

Cost of 1,260 Tons of Coal, calculated to be used in 3 double trips at an average of 10 tons per day, and 42 days Steaming—

500 tons at Rs. 20 }	.....	40,400
760 " at 40 }	.....	
Pay of Captain, 2 Mates, 3 Engineers, and crew and firemen: in all Rupees 2,000 per month.....		24,000
Expences of victualling the crew.....		2,000
Table money at Rupees 6,000 per double voyage.....		18,000
Insurance on 3 voyages at 9 per cent.....		13,500
Godowns and Storekeepers at 3 Ports.....		5,000
Expences of Landing and Shipping.....		4,000
Coals, Pilots and small charges at Rupees 200 per voyage..		600
Charges of Management, and on receipt of $1\frac{1}{2}$ Lacs at 5 per cent.....		7,500
Small repairs of Machinery and Vessel, and cost of Oil, Tallow, &c.....		5,000
Interest on cost of coals &c. and unforeseen expences, probably.....		10,000
	Rupees	<u>1,30,000</u>

## ANNUAL RECEIPTS.

Passage money of 75 Passengers, or an average only 25 Passengers each double trip, at Rs. 1,000.....	75,000
--	--------



Postage of 5,000 Letters at the low rate of Rs. 2 per single Letter of 15,000 Letters, per annum.....	30,000
Government Dispatches, Newspapers, freight of Specie, Extra Luggage of Passengers, &c. &c.....	15,000
Supposed Profits beyond the Cost of Coals arising from short trips in the neighbourhood of Bombay, Freight of specie to the Northward, &c. &c.....	10,000
	<u>Rupees 1,30,000</u>

The following is the amended Prospectus differing in some points from that formerly published.

PROSPECTUS of a plan for raising by voluntary Donations a sum sufficient for the purchase of a Steam Boat to navigate between Bombay and Suez.

Cost of 2 Forty Horse power Engines, Copper Boilers and spare Machinery, which it will be necessary to have in case of accident £8,000, or about .....	Rs. 90,000
--	------------

Expence of freight and putting up the Machinery in Bombay £1,800, or about.....	Rs. 20,000
---	------------

Cost of building a Vessel of 270 tons in Bombay ready for sea with stores, &c.....	Rs. 55,000
	<u>Rupees 1,65,000</u>

To cover the approximate cost of a Steam Boat it is supposed that subscriptions can be raised at the three Presidencies equal to the following amount.

20	Subscribers	at	1,000	Rs. each.....	20,000
50	do	at	500	do.....	25,000
300	do.		100	do.....	30,000
400	do.		50	do.....	20,000
1,000	do.		20	do.....	20,000
5,000	do.		10	do.....	50,000
					<hr/>
					Rupees.....1,65,000
					<hr/>

To avoid delay as much as possible it is proposed that whenever the subscriptions in India reach the sum of one Lac, orders should be forwarded to England for the purchase of the necessary Engines, &c. or of a Steam Boat ready for sea, as may be considered best for the Interest of the public by the Committee, which the subscribers,—at a General Meeting to be held for that purpose—may hereafter appoint. In either case whether the Boat is built in Bombay or in England the difference in the cost cannot be great. The Committee are of opinion that the subscriptions which may be raised in Europe will more than compensate for any possible deficiency in the Indian subscriptions. As an inducement for the public to subscribe liberally toward the support of so desirable an object, it is proposed that subscribers of Rupees 100 and upwards, shall be considered as Proprietors of the property in the proportion of each individual subscription, of and above that, and further, that all subscriptions in India, of Rupees 1,000 or upwards, will give a claim to one free

passage to or from Suez, provided those subscriptions are paid before the 1st September in India, and within three months after the publication of this prospectus in England. Such an arrangement would encrease the subscribers very considerably without affecting the receipts of the Steamer. All subscriptions are to be invested in Company's paper when the amount is Rupees 5,000, and to be repaid to the subscribers in case it may be found impracticable to carry the present or some other plan into execution, deducting the expense of the management.

---

#### AT THE MEETING.

The Secretary of the Committee noticed the alteration which has been introduced into the Prospectus and Estimate of Receipts and Disbursements since they had appeared in the journals of the Presidency, and proceeded to explain on what grounds the Committee looked to the letters as a principal source of profit. They had fixed the average number of letters on the lowest computation at 15,000 annually, when the export and import of European correspondence of Bombay alone amounted annually to more than 70,000—and the whole Indian correspondence to and from Europe to above 500,000; and it was plain, if this communication was established, it must force all this correspondence into this channel. ~~At~~ meeting however, objections which might still be urged, the most

essential thing to be noticed was, that whatever money might be subscribed, must be safe up to a certain point. The Public would not be subscribing to support the experiments of any adventurer—nor throwing away their money as a premium for any successful individual enterprise. Whatever might be subscribed, would be entrusted to the control of gentlemen well known among them, and the money would be recoverable, if this plan was not, or no plan was commenced on: but the moment the vessel was built, launched, and on her way to Egypt, they must abide the result for any return to their subscription—it would then take the form of a donation, given to accomplish one of the greatest achievements of modern enterprise and civilization. If it was an object, which it certainly would be, for subscribers to realize again the sums which they would liberally bestow, he had not the slightest doubt but that they would be most amply repaid.

---

#### RESOLUTIONS PASSED AT THE MEETING.

1st.—Moved by Mr. DeVitre and seconded by Mr. Adam,—That the Report just now read, be adopted, as containing the sentiments of the present meeting, who unanimously approve of the plan for carrying on the Steam communication, set forth in the Committee's Prospectus.

2d.—Proposed by Mr. Farquharson and seconded by Mr. Nicol,—That the following Gentlemen form the effective Com-

mittee, who, with the subscribers of 500 Rupees, or upwards as Donatory Members, shall have the entire uncontrolled management of this undertaking, with power to fill up any vacancy occurring in their body, or to add to their number, using discretionary powers to carry into effect the proposal of the Prospectus or not.

Mr. Wedderburn,	Col. Frederick,
Capt. Cogan,	Mr. G. Adam,
Mr. Hadow,	Mr. Greenhill,
Mr. L. Grant,	Capt. McGillivray,
Mr. C. Stewart,	The Superintendent of the
Mr. Menzies,	Indian Navy.
Capt. Wilson, I. N.	Dr. Wallace,
Dr. Walker.	Mr. Money,
Mr. Bax,	

Nowrojee Jamsetjee } Ship Builders.  
Cursetjee Rustomjee }

3d.—Proposed by Captain Wilson, and seconded by Captain Cogan,—That the Head authorities at the different stations under the three Presidencies be addressed by the Committee, who shall send them copies of the Prospectus, soliciting their aid in obtaining and forwarding subscriptions to the Treasurers.

4th.—Proposed by Mr. Bruce, seconded by Mr. M. West,  
—That Remington and Co. be Treasurers.

## LIST OF SUBSCRIBERS.

(THE FOLLOWING SUBSCRIPTIONS WERE OBTAINED AT THE MEETING.)

Sir Herbert Compton...	.....	.....	...	Rs. 1,000
Jagonnathjee Sunkersett.....	.....	.....	...	1,000
Manuckjee Cursetjee...	.....	...	...	100
Bomanjee Hormasjee and Brothers...	...	...	...	500
Jamsetjee Jeejeebhoy by C. J....	...	...	...	1,000
Cursetjee Jamsetjee...	...	...	...	500
Mahomed Alee Rogay...	...	...	...	1,000
Dhackjee Dadajee J. Beckwith and Co. }	.....	.....	.....	500
Davidass Hurjeevandass...	...	...	...	500
Cursetjee Rustomjee...	.....	...	...	500
Nowrojee Jemsetjee...	...	...	...	500
Cusetjee Ardaseer and Co....	...	...	...	500
Mahomed Ibraheem Mukba...	...	...	...	200
Editor of the Hulkarn and Vurtman...	...	...	...	100
Major T. Powell...	...	...	...	100
R. C. Money... ..	...	...	...	100
J. Farish...	...	...	...	500
Captain J. H. Wilson...	...	...	...	150
J. Walker... ..	...	...	...	200
Furdonjee Limjee, for Dinshaw Furdonjee with the proviso } of a free Passage...	...	...	...	1,000
C. T. Weber...	...	...	...	100
Dan Macleod...	...	...	...	100
Col. Barr.....	...	...	...	200
Major Hicks...	...	...	...	100
V. Kemball...	...	...	...	150
Capt. Biden...	...	...	...	100
Chas. Fitzroy...	...	...	...	100

Remington and Co....	...	...	...	...	...	1,500
Adam Skinner and Co....	...	...	...	...	...	1,500
R. Wallace...	...	...	...	...	...	500
J. G. Griffith,...	...	...	...	...	...	100
Capl A. H. Tracy...	...	...	...	...	...	100
Gisborne, Menzies and Co....	...	...	...	...	...	1,000
G. Ashburner...	...	...	...	...	...	300
Forbes and Co....	...	...	...	...	...	1,500
G. Simpson...	...	...	...	...	...	100
Colonel Sullivan...	...	...	...	...	...	100
W. Calvert...	...	...	...	...	...	100
Capl Cogan...	...	...	...	...	...	200
Captain Swanson...	...	...	...	...	...	100
James Henderson, by J. Wedderburn...	...	...	...	...	...	500
W. R. Morris, by Do...	...	...	...	...	...	500
D. Greenhill, by Do...	...	...	...	...	...	100
J. Wedderburn...	...	...	...	...	...	500
W. C. Bruce...	...	...	...	...	...	100
J. D. DeVitre...	...	...	...	...	...	300
M. West...	...	...	...	...	...	100
L. R. Reid...	...	...	...	...	...	100
Ritchie Stewart and Co...	...	...	...	...	...	1,500
Thomas Jefferies...	...	...	...	...	...	500
F. Leggett...	...	...	...	...	...	100
Roger De Faria and Co....	...	...	...	...	...	500
Shapoorjee Sorabjee Ruttonjee Patell...	...	...	...	...	...	500
George Smyttan...	...	...	...	...	...	100
Lewis Collett...	...	...	...	...	...	500
C. S. Stewart...	...	...	...	...	...	1,000
J. Crawford, I. N...	...	...	...	...	...	250
E. Frederick...	...	...	...	...	...	200

J. Scott...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	100
Thomas McCarthy...			...		...	...	...	100
W. Nicol and Co....			...		...	...	...	1,000
Jahangeer Nusserwanjee Wadia...				...		...	...	500
D. L. Burn...	...	...		...	...		...	500
Arthur Hornby...	...		...		...	...	...	100
McGregor Edmond and Co...			...		...		...	500
Fergusson Turner and Co...			...		...	...	...	1,000
H. F. Owen...	...	...		...	...		...	100
Manackjee Nowrojee Wadia...				...		...	...	500
P. W. LeGeyt...	...	...		...	...		...	100





**STEAM COMMUNICATION**

WITH:

**I N D I A**

**BY THE RED SEA ;**

ADVOCATED IN

**A L E T T E R**

TO

THE RIGHT HONORABLE

**LORD VISCOUNT MELBOURNE.**

---

BY

*DIONYSIUS LARDNER, LL. D., F. R. S.*

---

L O N D O N :

PRINTED FOR ALLEN AND CO., LEADENHALL-STREET  
1837.

---

M A D R A S :

Re printed at the Male Asylum Press, Mount Road, by GEORGE CALDER,  
and published by EDMUND MARSDEN.

1837.



MY LORD,

Nearly three years have elapsed since a select committee of the House of Commons, after receiving a voluminous mass of evidence, declared in their report, "that, steam navigation between Bombay and Suez having in five successive seasons been brought to the test of experiment, it was expedient that measures be immediately taken for the regular establishment of steam communication with India by the Red Sea, the expense of the establishment to be shared equally by the East India Company and His Majesty's Government; that steam communication with India by the Persian Gulf and the Euphrates was *not* brought to the test of experiment; that it was desirable it should be brought to such test, and that a grant of 20,000*l.* be made by Parliament for that purpose."

Of these two suggestions of the select committee, the latter alone has been acted upon by Government; the untried route has been brought to the desired test,—the experiment has been made, and the result has not been satisfactory. Meanwhile the leading recommendation of the committee, that immediate measures should be taken for the regular establishment of steam communication with India by the Red Sea,—that route having been repeatedly and successfully tried,—has been suffered to remain a dead letter.

From the beginning the great body of the commercial community in the East was averse from the route by the Euphrates. From their local knowledge they were impressed with the persuasion that such an experiment could not be attended with permanent success. But even were such a course practicable, they felt that it would not attain those purposes which such an establishment, should fulfil. Nevertheless the result of that experiment has been patiently awaited, an anxious solicitude being entertained that in the mean while measures would be taken to establish that line of communication of the practicability of which the committee did not express, and in fact could not entertain any doubt. Although, in the long interval which has elapsed, they observed month after month and year after year to roll on, and His Majesty's Government still passive, they have been most reluctant to believe that it was intended to disregard the recommendation of parliament, and to leave the means of intercommunication with the East in the same state in which the early enterprize of the Portuguese had placed them.

They feel now, however, that they ought not to continue longer silent sufferers from this state of inaction or neglect. They feel that it is due, not to India only, but to Great Britain itself, to urge by all the means within their power the immediate realization of the recommendation of the parliamentary committee of 1831, by "the establishment of a regular line of steam communication with India by way of the Red Sea."

In addressing your Lordship on this subject, I do not presume to think that personally I have any title to expect your attention. But when I assure your Lordship that the measure which I now advocate is the object of the most anxious wishes of the whole mercantile community of India, I feel that I have a claim to your attention which you will not overlook, and that claim will not be rendered less strong by the consideration, that those sentiments and wishes are shared by the whole population of India, native as well as British.

There are some measures which government will adopt only when

the feeling of those to be affected by them is strongly expressed in their favour. If the present be one of them, abundant manifestation of the sentiments of the people of the East, as well as of those at home who are connected with India, has been furnished. For thirteen years has the commercial community of Calcutta supplicated for this improvement; and extensive subscriptions have been raised in aid of it, to which native princes and merchants have liberally contributed in common with our own fellow subjects.

It is impossible even for a moment to contemplate this measure without being impressed with the number, variety and magnitude of the advantages which would arise from it. Our empire in the East contains one hundred millions of souls, the subjects and dependent allies of Great Britain. By the present means of communication, their distance from us is not less than two thirds of the circumference of the globe. By the proposed measure that distance would be reduced to less than one-third of its present amount: a virtual change of geographical position would be effected.

A commerce amounting (exclusive of the China trade), to nine millions annually, would receive that stimulus which commerce always receives from increased facility of communication. A correspondence, the daily amount of which (exclusive of larger despatches), is, even under the disadvantage of being carried round more than half the globe, not less than a thousand letters, would be expedited and proportionately augmented. An army of three hundred thousand men in British pay, now removed beyond those limits which admit of that communication with home which is necessary for the due maintenance of discipline, would be brought under the beneficial influence and immediate control of the home government.

But great as these advantages may be, they are not the most important national results which would ensue from the proposed measure. The same means by which correspondence with the East would be expedited, will also afford equally increased facilities for personal intercourse. A voyage of several months, exposed to all the dangers of the Southern Ocean, and to the inclemencies of protracted tropical navigation, is a barrier to personal intercourse between distant people, which will be overcome only in cases of extreme need. But when the road to India lies along the shores of Europe, over the quiet waters of the Mediterranean, and amid the splendid monuments of antiquity which adorn Egypt; and when, withal, the time of the passage shall be almost reduced from months to weeks; great indeed would be the comparative extent of personal intercourse which must ensue. That every increased expedition and facility given to the transport of passengers is followed by a more than proportionally increased amount of intercourse, is a fact so generally established that it may be considered as assuming the character of a distinct statistical law. The effect produced by the establishment of steamers between various points on the coasts of these countries, as well as between this country and different parts of the continent, may be adduced as an example of this. But by far the most remarkable instances are those afforded by the effects of railway communication, compared with the previous communication upon turnpike roads. In every case without a single exception where a railway has been constructed between two distant places, the intercourse in passengers has increased in a proportion of not less than four to one; nor can this be ascribed to the reduced cost of transport alone, since in cases where the cost has been increased, the same increase of intercourse has taken place. It is, in

fact, ascribable to the inducement which increased expedition presents to persons who would otherwise attain their object by correspondents and agents. If, then, analogy derived from unvaried experience be of any value, and if inferences from it be justifiable, I would here be entitled to assume not only that all those who now pass between this country and India by the route of the Cape would, on the establishment of steam communication by the Red Sea, adopt the latter route, but that vast numbers who now never attempt the voyage at all would perform it; that an enormously increased number of persons would pass between the two countries; that the wealthy and enlightened classes of the native population of India would visit this country, and that a reciprocal desire would be manifested among ourselves to visit the East. Much of what is now transacted in each country by correspondence would be then transacted personally; and that diffusion of knowledge, and that spread of liberal principles would ensue, which always attended the intercourse of a less, with a more civilized people.

These are topics which it might be expedient to enlarge upon were it my purpose merely to excite public feeling in favour of the measure. In addressing your Lordship the slightest allusion to them is sufficient.

If we except the recent application of the steam engine to the transport of passengers on railways, there is none of the numerous ways in which that machine has ministered to the uses of the human race which has undergone a more steady and rapid course of improvement than its application to the propulsion of vessels over the sea. There are even now in a progressive state several important improvements, by which its efficiency in navigation will be materially augmented; and if the committee of 1834, from the evidence then laid before them, and from the fact of voyages being made by the *Hugh Lindsay* during five successive seasons, saw reason to be satisfied of the practicability of the measure, how much more forcibly would they now impress their recommendation on Government having before them the extended and improved state of the art of steam navigation, and the fact that the voyages by steam between India and Egypt have continued to be successfully made, under the disadvantages of inadequate vessels and defective arrangements at the necessary stations and depôts.

Nothing but that state of passive acquiescence generated by a long habit of following a certain course, could reconcile a people so commercial and so locomotive as the English to be confined to the route to India by the Cape, since the art of transport by land and water has received those astonishing accessions which have been recently conferred upon it by the steam engine. The distance from Falmouth to the nearest port of India by the Mediterranean and the Red Sea is 8500 miles, of which there are not 200 miles of land, and that through the dominions of a friendly power. The distance usually traversed by sailing vessels in the voyage by the Cape is about 16,000 miles. How strong must be the force of habit, which reconciles us to such a circuit to reach a place not 6000 miles distant!—How overruling must that necessity be which sends persons and correspondence a voyage equal to two-thirds of the circumference of the globe, to carry them less than one-fourth of that space! *Prima facie*, then, my Lord, the question is not, why persons and correspondence should be sent direct to India by the Red Sea, but why for such a purpose the present preposterously circuitous route should be still persevered in.

In order to place in a clear light the practicability of establishing a regular and permanent line of steam communication with India by

the Red Sea, and to explain the arrangements which will best contribute to attain the object sought by the great bulk of the commercial community, it will be necessary to consider the relative position, the comparative commerce, the amount of correspondence, and extent of personal intercourse with the different points in India with which a communication with this country is at present maintained. The points are,—

*First*,—The chief presidency and the seat of the supreme government, CALCUTTA, situate at the northernmost point of the eastern coast of India.

*Secondly*,—MADRAS, situated also on the Eastern coast, 765 miles south of Calcutta.

*Thirdly*,—BOMBAY, situated on the western coast, in a direction nearly due east from the southernmost part of the Red Sea, and therefore the nearest port of India by that route. And

*Fourthly*,—The Island of Ceylon, situated south of the most southern point of India.

Of these, by far the largest amount of intercourse of every kind is maintained, as may naturally be expected, with Calcutta. Of 309,000 letters, which pass annually through the post office between Great Britain and India (including Ceylon), 170,000 are with Calcutta, 71,000 with Madras, 54,000 with Bombay, and 12,500 with Ceylon. Of about 3200 passengers annually between Great Britain and India, about 1450 are with Calcutta, 1050 with Madras, 6000 with Bombay, and 100 with Ceylon. Estimating the Commerce at nine millions annually, the amount with Calcutta may be taken at five millions and a half, with Bombay two millions and a half, and with Madras one million.

These results may therefore be fairly assumed to represent the exigencies of the different ports of India for the improved means of communication with this country now proposed.

#### THE COMPREHENSIVE SCHEME.

As in Europe, and more especially in Great Britain, the transport of persons and despatches can generally be effected with greater expedition by land than by sea, it might be inferred that the most effectual arrangement by which the desired ends could be attained would be to establish a line of steamers communicating with Bombay, that being the best harbour in India, and the nearest port to the Red Sea. As such an arrangement has been already contemplated, and would necessarily and justly be countenanced and approved by all parties unacquainted with the peculiar circumstances attending inland travelling in India, it will be necessary here to lay before your Lordship the objections to it. Indeed, I feel that I may distinctly and emphatically assure your Lordship, that such an arrangement would be regarded by the whole mercantile community, save the limited number whose interests are confined to the particular port of Bombay, with feelings of the most unmixt concern and disappointment.

Nothing can be more defective than the means of internal communication by land carriage in India. The country is scantily intersected by roads, and the few which exist are of the very worst description. Neither is there any ground for hoping that future improvement will remove this defect. The climate opposes so many and serious obstructions to land travelling, that even if good roads were constructed little increase of intercourse by them could be expected. At one season, the periodical rains would totally obstruct travelling; and at another, the intol-

rable heat would render it impossible, except at night. These are difficulties which neither art nor wealth can remove or mitigate, and which will always give the preference to transport by sea.

The only inland communication which now exist between the presidency of Bombay and the eastern presidencies of Calcutta and Madras, is by the Dāk, or foot post. Single letters or light despatches may be thus transmitted, subject to the many causes of uncertainty and insecurity arising from their transit through the territories of various native powers not under the direct control of the British Government or the India Company. The time of the Dāk between Calcutta and Bombay is thirteen days. Now I shall presently show that the time from the Red Sea to Calcutta *for correspondence* by this route would be greater than by a line of steamers touching at Ceylon and Madras; with this further difference, that while single letters or light despatches only could be transmitted by the Dāk, and even these subject to insecurity and a heavy inland postage, all correspondence, passengers, and even certain descriptions of merchandise, could be transmitted by the steamers.

On the other hand, to send the correspondence of Bombay to Calcutta would be as inconvenient and absurd as to send the commercial communications of the great majority of East Indian merchants to Bombay, the port of India most remote and inaccessible to them. If the line of improved communication be established at all, let it be carried to all these ports, which, as I shall prove, there can be no difficulty in accomplishing. It was a principle adopted by the India company, and by the parliamentary committee, when this question was under discussion in 1834, that "*if the measure were undertaken, it ought to be executed on a large and efficient scale; and that between doing it efficiently and not doing it at all, there is no advisable medium.*" In this principle the mercantile body of the East most cordially concurs.

But, even if Calcutta were not, as it is, the place of greatest commerce and correspondence as well as the seat of supreme government, its position would render it a point to which the extension of the line of steam communication would be attended with the greatest advantages to the interior of the country. Calcutta is situate at the mouths of the Ganges, the finest and most extensive inland water route in India. The steamers which have been for some years established on this river, communicate with the interior at present as far as Allahabad, and are intended eventually to be carried to Agra; being more than a thousand miles of uninterrupted inland navigation. On the banks of the Ganges between Calcutta and Agra are numerous places, from which convenient communications with the interior will be established.

While the communication with the interior westward from Calcutta is thus maintained upon the Ganges, an equally easy and certain means of communication by river steamers may be made northwards on the Burmahpootee, extending nearly to the frontiers of China, and intersecting the country of Assam, where the cultivation of the tea-plant has been recently introduced.

No means of inland water communication of any extent is presented on the western coast of India. The mouths of the Indus are at the northern most point of the coast near the frontiers of Persia. This river would be navigable for steamers, and if a communication were established by steam-vessels between Hyderabad and the Red Sea, the waters of the Indus would afford means for continuing the line of Steam communication to the northern provinces, and to the Persian provinces of Beloochistan and Afghanistan, as well to the Punjab, Cashmere, &c.



From the position which it holds between India and the Red Sea Socotra is a place of great importance in this enquiry. Without it as a station and place of rendezvous, it is not easy to see how the proposed line of communication could be established with that efficiency which would be necessary for its success. This island, therefore, demands our especial attention.

It has been stated that the island of Socotra is so unhealthy, that it would be unfit for a station or a depôt. I do not find, however, that there is any other ground for this report, save the accident of some agents of the India Company being placed there during an extraordinary wet season: it would be as unreasonable to denounce England an unhealthy station because of the prevalence of the recent influenza.

The route between Calcutta and Socotra might be conveniently resolved into three stages; the first from Calcutta to Madras 765 miles; the second from Madras to the harbour of Galle in Ceylon 530 miles; and the third from Galle to Socotra 1630 miles.

\* \* \* \* \*

Assuming, then, that it is expedient that a communication with India by steam vessels shall be established;—that this communication shall from the beginning be placed upon the most efficient footing, with respect to the magnitude, power, and accommodation which it will afford;—that it shall throughout be under one system of management and a single responsibility;—that it shall be unconnected with any other line of communication already established with the Mediterranean or elsewhere; and that it shall extend not to one presidency only, but to all the three, besides the Island of Ceylon;—I shall endeavour to show how, according to my view, the project may be carried into effect, so as to ensure permanency, regularity, and expedition, as well for despatches as passengers, and in short for all such objects as will admit of easy transhipment, and bear the charge of transport which must necessarily be imposed where great expedition is attained.

This, my Lord, is precisely one of those cases where a stinted outlay in the first establishment will be bad economy. Large and powerful steam ships will afford such extensive and luxurious accommodation for passengers, as, united with the greatly increased expedition, cannot fail to withdraw a very large proportion, if not all the most respectable and affluent class of passengers, from the route by the Cape. But, independently of this, steam ships of great tonnage will always be the most efficient means of transit on those long sea voyages. This is consonant with all the experience we possess in steam navigation—by far the fastest and safest vessels now existing being among the very largest class of steamers. It is on this ground, and for other reasons which it would be tedious here to detail, that I would strongly recommend in the establishment of this line of communication, the adoption, from the first, of large and powerful steam ships.

Such an arrangement will of course increase the amount of the first outlay; and also augment, though in a much smaller proportion, the annual expense of maintaining the proposed line of communication; but, on the other hand, certainty—regularity—security—and despatch will be absolutely ensured. To spare a few thousand pounds in the first outlay for such a project would be the less excusable, because the objects, in which chiefly fixed capital would be invested, are of a nature which would be sure to re-produce the capital sunk in them. Efficient steam ships will, for a long period of time, find a market, even if it be

necessary or advisable that the government should dispose of them; but, independently of this, the exigencies of the state will, from year to year, require such a supply of these vessels, that there can be no reasonable apprehension of being over stocked by a few powerful steam ships in the event of the abandonment of this project.

A mistaken desire to cut down the probable expense of the project to the lowest practicable limit, has induced the parties interested in this measure, to recommend a class of vessels for it of a power and a tonnage decidedly inferior to that which such voyages would render most advisable.

Not affected, therefore, by the apprehension that I shall scare your Lordship's administration and the Honorable Company by the scale of expense of the establishment which I shall recommend, I shall advise at once the adoption of steam ships of a thousand tons burthen, and two hundred and fifty horse power. One of these should be appropriated to the passage between Calcutta and Point de Galle, touching at Madras; a second should perform the stage between Point de Galle and Socotra; a third between Bombay and Socotra; a fourth between Socotra and Camaran; and a fifth between Camaran and Suez, touching at Kosseir. These vessels should be built of the same magnitude,—upon the same model,—and should correspond to each other, with the last degree of precision, in every particular, nautical and mechanical; so that any part of one would admit of being interchanged for a similar part of one another. Thus, any part of the machinery or stores, for any one of these vessels, would be fitted for any other. The berths and other conveniences provided for passengers would precisely correspond. The first steamer would convey its freight from Calcutta to Madras: it would there take in the Madras passengers and despatches, and convey the whole to Point de Galle. In average weather, the time from Calcutta to Madras (765 miles) would be four days; and the time from Madras to Point de Galle (530 miles) would be three days; and allowing a day at Madras, the time of the passage from Calcutta to Point de Galle would be eight days. The first steamer would there transfer its contents to the second, and would rest for the purpose of cleaning the boilers, machinery, &c. The second steamer receiving in addition to the passengers and despatches from Calcutta and Madras, those of Ceylon, would proceed to Socotra; and, except in the south-west monsoon, would make the passage in eight and a half days. At Socotra she would meet the steamer plying between Bombay and that place. This latter voyage (1210) miles would, except in the monsoon, be performed in six days. For this stage a steamer of less power and tonnage than that which we have mentioned, would perhaps be sufficient, the number of passengers and despatches to and from Bombay being less in a considerable proportion than the other ports of India. But a convenience would be obtained from uniformity in all the steam ships which would more than counterbalance any increased expense which would arise from the greater size and power of the Bombay steamer. Independently of this, another material advantage would result from the greater power of the vessel of larger tonnage to encounter the monsoon: small vessels with the same or a greater proportion of power cannot resist adverse weather as effectually as larger ones: a vessel, for example, of 600 tons and 150 horse power would not be as efficient against the monsoon as one of 1000 tons and 250 horse power,—although the proportion of power to tonnage would be in both cases the same.

The steamers coming from Point de Galle and Bombay would deliver to the fourth steamer at Socotra their passengers and despatches; and the latter would convey them from Socotra to Camaran (790 miles) in four days. At Camaran the passengers, &c., would be transferred to the fifth and last steam ship, by which they would be brought to Suez (1065 miles), touching at Kosseir (815 miles), to land such passengers as might prefer the route through Egypt by Luxor, or Kennah and the Nile. The time from Camaran to Kosseir would be 4 days, and from Kosseir to Suez 2 days.

Thus the time of the passage from Calcutta, Bombay, Madras, and Ceylon to Suez, respectively, allowing for the necessary delay, would be as follows:—

*Time from Calcutta to Suez.*

	Days.
Calcutta to Madras	... 4
Delay at Madras	... 1
Madras to Ceylon	... 3
Delay at Ceylon	... 1
Ceylon to Socotra	... 8½
Delay at Socotra	... 2
Socotra to Camaran	... 4
Delay at Camaran	... 0½
Camaran to Kosseir	... 4
Delay at Kosseir	... 0½
Kosseir to Suez	... 2

Time from Calcutta to Suez 30½ Days.

*Time from Madras to Suez.*

	Days.
Madras to Ceylon	... 3
Delay at Ceylon	... 1
Ceylon to Socotra	... 8½
Delay at Socotra	... 2
Socotra to Camaran	... 4
Delay at Camaran	... 0½
Camaran to Kosseir	... 4
Delay at Kosseir	... 0½
Kosseir to Suez	... 2

Time from Madras to Suez 25½ Days.

*Time from Ceylon to Suez.*

	Days.
Ceylon to Socotra	... 8½
Delay at Socotra	... 2
Socotra to Camaran	... 4
Delay at Camaran	... 0½
Camaran to Kosseir	... 4
Delay at Kosseir	... 0½
Kosseir to Suez	... 2

Time from Ceylon to Suez 21½ Days.

*Time from Bombay to Suez.*

	Days.
Bombay to Socotra	... 6
Delay at Socotra	... 2
Socotra to Camaran	... 4
Delay at Camaran	... 0½
Camaran to Kosseir	... 4
Delay at Kosseir	... 0½
Kosseir to Suez	... 2

Time from Bombay to Suez 19 Days.

Steam ships, of the power and tonnage already described, and constructed in all respects in the best manner, would continue throughout the year to accomplish their passages in the average time I have here computed, with the exception of the season during which the south-west monsoon prevails, that is from June to September. During this season the passages to India would be shorter than those above stated; but the passages in the contrary direction would be longer.

THE PRACTICABILITY OF STEAMING AGAINST THE SOUTH-WEST MONSOON.

In the Indian seas there are two periodical atmospheric currents, which prevail with greater or less force in contrary directions during different seasons of the year. The north-east monsoon prevails from the autumn to the spring; and the south-west monsoon from the spring to the autumn. The north-east monsoon offers no serious obstruction to steam navigation in any direction; but, from the middle of June to the middle of September, the force of the south-west monsoon is such as, in the opinion of some persons, to present a serious obstruction to

steam navigation when the course of the steamer lies in immediate opposition to it.

The prevailing direction of this wind being nearly from W. S. W., it would be in direct opposition to the course of a steamer proceeding from Bombay to Socotra ; but it would not present the same direct opposition to a steamer proceeding from Ceylon to that point.

The force of this wind is described by nautical men as such, that a sailing vessel exposed to it would double reef her topsails. A powerful steam ship, as is well known to all who are conversant with the most efficient class of steam vessels now constructed, would make way against such a wind, but would, of course, proceed at a diminished rate of speed.\*

To determine the practicability of accomplishing the passage from Bombay to Suez during the monsoon, it will be necessary to consider the limit which is imposed on the length of a trip by the power of the vessel to carry fuel. The Admiralty steamers between Falmouth and the Mediterranean, which are by no means the most efficient steam ships, are capable of carrying  $1\frac{1}{2}$  ton of coal per horse power ; but the larger class of steam vessels, such as the *Medea*, the *Rhadamanthus*, the *Dec*, and others, would, if disencumbered of their guns, carry about  $1\frac{1}{2}$  ton per horse power, without being materially affected in their trim. Now I have found, from an investigation of the performance of the frigate *Medea*, for above 10,000 miles, that, in average weather, a ton of coals per horse power will carry her a distance of above 2000 miles ; a ton and a half would, therefore carry her a distance of 3000 miles. Let us suppose, then the *Medea* stationed at Bombay, and attempting the passage to Socotra in the monsoon. She would carry fuel for a voyage in average weather of 3000 miles, having a passage of only 1200 miles before her. Supposing then her speed against the monsoon to be less than her average speed, in the proportion of 1200 to 3000, or of 2 to 5, she would still have fuel sufficient to accomplish the passage. The average rate of the *Medea*, derived from 10,000 miles of her performance, I have found to be about eight miles an hour : if, therefore, by the force of the monsoon her rate were reduced to  $3\frac{1}{2}$  miles an hour, the accomplishment of the passage would be practicable.

This reasoning proceeds upon the supposition that the monsoon would blow with its extreme force throughout the whole passage. Such a supposition is, however, not tenable. The monsoon is liable to lulls, during which the vessel would acquire a very much increased speed ; and a proportional increase of speed would take place with every change of the force of the wind. It is not admissible, then, that through the whole trip, the speed of the vessel would be reduced to the extreme extent I have just assumed.

In the investigation which took place on this subject before the committee of the Commons in 1834, it was admitted by the nautical authorities most opposed to the project, that the passage from Bombay to Socotra, during the monsoon, was *practicable* ; but it was denied that it could be permanently profitable. It was contended that, by facing the monsoon for a continuance, the vessel and machinery would be subject to such rapid wear, and the consumption of fuel would be so great in proportion to the distance travelled over, that the expense would be enormously disproportionate to the advantage. In this opinion I agree, if it be

\* It will not be understood that the steamer would face the monsoon. She would *tack* like a sailing vessel.

meant that those voyages made against the monsoon and *no others* are considered. These voyages unquestionably would be attended with considerable expense. But it is to be remembered that, in a monthly communication, there will be twenty-four passages in the year between Bombay and Socotra; three of which only, or at the utmost four, will be subject to this objection. The question, therefore, is, whether the extra expense of these passages being only an eighth, or at most a sixth of the whole annual performance of a steamer, would be disproportionate to the advantage of maintaining an unbroken monthly communication.

In considering the objections depending on the south-west monsoon, all parties concerned in the inquiry appear to have forgotten to take into account the benefits which, on the other hand, will be derived from it. During this monsoon, if efficient steam ships be provided for the purpose (and none others should be adopted), the passages from Socotra to Bombay will be made *under sail only*; the fuel, therefore, appropriated to the passages *with the monsoon* will be altogether saved, besides a corresponding proportion of the wear and tear of the machinery. This item will go far to counterbalance the disadvantages which have been so magnified on the other side.\*

*The monsoon will not produce the same obstruction to the passage from Ceylon or the Maldives to Socotra. The direction of these passages will be nearly the N. W.; while the direction of the monsoon is W. S. W. It is well known that an efficient steamer can keep her course, though much nearer to the wind than this. Add to which, that, if a station be established at the head of the Maldives, to be resorted to occasionally in stress of weather, the distance from thence to Socotra will be 200 miles less than between Bombay and that place.*

#### FUEL AND COST OF VESSELS.

Those who have been opposed to this project have dwelt with much force on the excessive expense of fuel in India. It should be remembered, that a market for that article is scarcely yet created in that country; and that when such a regular and extensive demand for it is produced, it will become an article of regular import, and will attain a more moderate price. But, even at present, its cost has been greatly exaggerated. Both British and American ships† now go to India in ballast; these would of course, if a demand for coals existed in the East, carry them out; and I have ascertained that those taken by our ships would be delivered at the ports of India for about fifteen shillings per ton above their price in this country. Assuming, then, what we know to be the case, that the coals will be delivered hand-picked in the vessels on our

\* The frigate *Medea* furnishes a striking proof that a steamer may be also an excellent sailing vessel. The present is one of the few cases in which it would be advantageous occasionally to use a steam ship as a sailing vessel. I am far, however, from concurring in opinion with those who think that long sea voyages may be profitably made with vessels in which steam machinery shall be used alternately with sails. If a voyage cannot be resolved into stages, each of which is within the distance for which the vessel can carry fuel, supposing her to steam the whole stage, it is, in my opinion, more advantageous to adhere to sailing vessels, at least until some further improvement shall be made in the application of the steam-engine to navigation. In the present case, also, it must be remembered that there neither is, nor can be, any competition with sailing vessels, and cargo is not contemplated. In a communication with New York there would be the competition of the finest sailing vessels that ever crossed the ocean, capable also of profiting in no inconsiderable degree by cargo.

† Abundance of good steam coal is obtained in America, which would doubtless, be taken as ballast by American vessels.

coasts at less than ten shillings a ton, their price in India would not exceed twenty-five shillings. This would be increased by transporting them to Socotra and Camaran; but still their price, at those places, could not amount to from sixty to eighty shillings, the rate at which they were estimated before the committee in 1834.

\* \* \* \* \*

The chief stations for fuel, exclusive of those at the presidencies, would be the islands of Socotra and Camaran, and it would be advisable to place in their respective harbours large hulks of old vessels, as depôts for coals, so that the steamers lying beside them might receive their compliments of fuel. Besides these, however, depôts for occasional supply should be established at Suez and Kosseir. The upper decks of these hulks should be fitted up with a smith's forge, together with the tools and other implements necessary for the repair of those parts of the machinery which are most liable to derangement.

There might also with advantage be deposited at the several stations duplicates of the various smaller parts of the mechanism; and as I have recommended that all the vessels, including their machinery should be precise counterparts of each other, these duplicates would be fitted for any of them.

The five steamers which I have recommended would probably be sufficient to work the whole line of communication between India and Suez, because on occasions when any one of them would require to be refitted, the line might be worked by the remaining four: thus the distance between Socotra and Suez could be worked for a short time by a single steamer, although it would be too much for a continuance. It would, nevertheless, be expedient to provide a sixth steamer, to be either laid up at Galle, or used for the purposes of the company or government in India, which might occasionally take the place of any vessel on the line requiring to be refitted.

From a careful examination of the performances of the Admiralty steamers I find that a well constructed vessel, supplied with the most efficient machinery (such, for example, as the frigate *Medea*), will be propelled in an average whether a distance of 2150 geographical miles by a ton of coals for each horse power in her machinery. The *Medea* is a vessel of 8000 tons burthen, with 220 horse power, and bears a close analogy to the steam ships of 1000 tons burthen and 250 horse power, which I have recommended.

I shall be therefore justified in assuming that on an average 250 tons of coals will transport such vessels of 2150 miles. The fuel which will be consumed on the several stages is therefore a matter of easy arithmetical calculation.

*Estimate of Coal to be consumed per Passage between India and Suez:—*

	Distance in Miles.	Fuel in Tons.
Calcutta and Madras.....	765	88
Madras and Ceylon.....	530	62
Ceylon and Socotra.....	1660	192
Bombay and Socotra.....	1210	140
Socotra and Camaran.....	790	92
Camaran and Suez.....	1065	124
	<u>6020</u>	<u>698</u>

It appears, therefore, that each complete passage between Suez and the several ports of India, will consume 698 tons of coals; now if we contemplate a monthly communication, there will be 24 such passages per annum; and consequently the annual consumption of coals on the eastern side of Egypt will be about 17,000 tons; but to allow for contingencies let it be taken at 18,000 tons.

I have stated that the cost of fuel in India, at the places where vessels would take it in ballast, or otherwise, would be about 25s. per ton: at Socotra, Camaran, and Suez, it could not on the average exceed double that price.

It may be assumed, that of the whole amount of fuel necessary to work the line between Suez and India, one half will be supplied in India, and the other in Socotra and the Red Sea; the average price, therefore, would be 37s. 6d. per ton, which, for 18,000 tons, would give, for the total annual expense of fuel on the eastern side of Egypt, 33,750*l*.

The first cost of a steam ship of 1000 tons, with machinery of 250 horse power, well appointed in every respect, and supplied with the very best machinery complete for sea, would be 30,000*l*.\* Taking the duration of the vessel at fifteen years, the following statement will show the annual charge of maintaining such a vessel, exclusive of the fuel, the officers, and crew:—

Capital sunk annually, on vessel and machinery, the vessel to last for 15 years, ... ..	£2000
Interest on capital at 4 per cent. ... ..	1200
Insurance at 7½ per cent. on half the capital ... ..	1125
	<hr/>
	£4325

The annual expense for maintaining six vessels would therefore be 25,950*l*.

To this must be added the salaries and wages of the officers and crew, the engineers, stokers, &c. together with the repair of machinery, &c., as follows:—

Commander ... ..	£	400
First mate ... ..	200	
Second mate ... ..	130	
Third mate ... ..	66	
First engineer ... ..	300	
Second engineer ... ..	200	
Third engineer ... ..	150	
Eight stokers ... ..	400	
Ten seamen and twenty lascars ... ..	720	
Maintenance of officers and crew ... ..	1380	
Engine room stores ... ..	400	
Ship stores ... ..	300	
Repairs of vessels and machinery and contingencies ... ..	1864	
	<hr/>	
	£6500	

\* Steam ships built in the Thames would exceed this estimate; but equally efficient vessels can be built in the outports for the sum I have stated.

The whole annual cost of the establishment between India and Suez (exclusive of stations), would therefore be as follows :—

Maintenance, &c. of five working vessels and one spare vessel	£25,950
Fuel	33,750
Salaries and maintenance of officers, crew, &c., and repairs of vessel machinery, and contingencies for five working vessels	32,500
	<hr/>
	£92,200

\*                      \*                      \*                      \*

#### PASSAGE THROUGH EGYPT—RAIL ROADS.

There are two ports on the Red Sea, Suez and Kosseir, from which the passage through Egypt may be effected. The city of Cairo lies nearly in a direct line between Suez and Alexandria, the distance from sea to sea, by this route, being about 170 miles. From Suez to Cairo the road is chiefly through the desert; but it is tolerable hard and smooth, and is throughout its whole extent very nearly a dead level. It is even in its present state better than many of the roads which intersect the continent of Europe, and is fitted for omnibuses, diligencies, or other strong wheeled carriages. Indeed it is not unfrequently traversed at present by wheel carriages.\* The want of water is the only serious obstacle to converting this road into a route as convenient for travelling over as any road in Europe, and various expedients would be readily presented to mitigate that inconvenience, if other arrangements were adopted to carry on our intercourse with the East through this channel.

Those who have speculated in the construction of a railroad between these places are little acquainted with principles on which such undertakings must be founded.

A railroad is a powerful instrument of communication, and, like all other very powerful machinery, can be successful only where there is a proportionate amount of work for it to perform.

No one could think of constructing power looms to produce a few thousand pieces of cloth per annum, nor should so powerful and expensive a means of transit as an iron railway worked by steam engines be applied, except where the intercourse is much greater and more continuous than it is likely to be between Great Britain and India. There is besides less occasion for it in the present instance, since at a very trifling cost an excellent stoneroad may be made between Cairo and Suez. There is neither cutting nor embankment to be formed. With the exception of a slight detour to round the base of some elevated ground approaching Suez, a crow line may almost be carried to that place, which will be for all practical purposes a dead level. The chief and the only inconvenience of difficulty attending this route is the badness of the water, and its deficient supply.

If steamers were provided suitable to the Nile, passengers might ascend that river to Kennah, a place which is distant about an hundred and twenty miles across the desert from Kosseir on the shores of the Red Sea.

Kennah is in the immediate neighbourhood of the splendid ruins of Luxor and Thebes, which would present to travellers a great inducement to adopt that route in preference to Suez.

\* The mother of the present Pacha travelled from Cairo to Suez in her carriages, and several instances have lately occurred of large families of ladies and children crossing both by this route, and that between Kennah and Kosseir, without inconvenience.



The road across the desert to Kosseir is equally good, and possesses as much capability of improvement, as that from Cairo to Suez; it is also free from the objection of the want of water, as there are springs at convenient stations between its termini.

The harbour of Kosseir, also, is tolerably convenient for steamers; and in the homeward passage there would be this advantage, that the slowest and most difficult navigation of the Red Sea, from Kosseir to Suez, would be avoided. There blows almost constantly throughout the year a steady north wind through this part of the Red Sea, and, as far as the coral reefs may be regarded as presenting any difficulty, they more abound in that part of the navigation than elsewhere.

On the whole, however, after the most diligent inquiry, I am satisfied that the route through Egypt, whether by Kosseir or Suez, will present no obstacle or inconvenience even to the safe and comfortable transport of females and children.

The enlightened spirit and friendly disposition of the present sovereign of that country, as well as of his probable successor, and the deep sense of self interests, which must be entertained by whatever sovereign may govern it, will be a strong guarantee for the security and permanence of the Egyptian establishment. It is doubtless also in the power of the British government to establish such diplomatic arrangements as will give further facility and security to passengers.

I have a letter addressed to me by an officer, who is well acquainted with the interior of Egypt, from having repeatedly passed through it, and who is also thoroughly conversant with the navigation of the Red Sea. He says:—

“The annual overflowing of the Nile does not at any period impede the communication between Suez and Cairo. You are aware, that when highest, it fills the canal extending from that city to the river, and that by this canal, the communication is maintained at other seasons of the year. In the present state of Egypt I see no possibility of difficulties or dangers occurring to families in passing the desert between Suez and Cairo. An omnibus would be the best vehicle, and could carry water for the party. The soil is a hard gravel, and the road as level as macadamisation could make it.”

“When the communication between India and Great Britain is regularly established by way of the Red Sea, I am inclined to think that the route by the Cape will be almost wholly abandoned, not by individuals only but by families. To speak to the point: if I had a wife and children, I would certainly take them by the Red Sea steamers in preference to the route by the Cape.”

Owing to the annual overflowing of the Nile there would be great difficulty in maintaining a road fitted for wheel carriages between Alexandria and Cairo. But the river is at all times navigable by boats of the same description as those by which the Ganges has been successfully navigated for the last three years. Iron boats, which with a very light draught of water carry considerable cargo, are tracked by a steam tug-worked by the light oscillating engines of Messrs. Maudsley and Field. Such boats, of from forty to fifty tons burthen, would navigate the river with perfect security and certainty even in its lowest state.

As a steamer, at present, passes monthly between Alexandria and Malta, it might appear that the communication with India now proposed might be completed by establishing a connection with the Admiralty steamers plying between Falmouth and Malta. But any such arrangement would be attended with inconveniences so serious, that it could hardly be persevered in. The time of departure of the Malta mails could not be made always to correspond with the arrival of the mails from India; and it would occasionally happen, that the mails from the East would have to remain nearly a month at Alexandria or Malta, without being forwarded home.

Again, if, as there is reason to expect, the number of passengers coming by this route should be considerable, the Malta packet may be pre-occupied, so that they might not obtain, and certainly could not ensure accommodation in it.

For these and other reasons which will readily present themselves, it is contended, that an independent line of steamers should be established between Alexandria and Falmouth, to continue the line of communication which, on the eastern side, will terminate at Suez. By such an arrangement, a steamer should start monthly between Alexandria and Falmouth: such steamers could, if it were thought advisable, take up and deliver the Mediterranean mails at Malta, so that they would, in effect, assist in the duty of the Mediterranean Steamers, and would render the reduction of part of that establishment practicable. At all events, whether this connection between the eastern line of steamers and the Mediterranean mails be adopted or not, it is quite essential that the whole line of communication between Great Britain and India, should be one enterprize, and under a single responsibility; so that passengers or parcels might be *booked* in England for India, or in India for England, without the hazard arising from their transfer from one agency to another, and from the chance of having to wait for other independent means of transport on their road.

Valuable packages and parcels will doubtless, by such a route, be sent in considerable number, requiring more than ordinary security. Without a single agency throughout, it is contended, that this security could not be obtained. Suppose a parcel of jewels or pearls to be conveyed from Calcutta to Great Britain: it is committed in Calcutta to the care of persons who undertake to convey it to Suez or Alexandria; arriving there, it is transferred to other hands and under other responsibility. It is obvious that under such circumstances the safe delivery of such packages in England could not be ensured.

Under the existing arrangements respecting quarantine, some difficulty might be found in rendering Malta an intermediate station for passengers, inasmuch as it might impose upon them the necessity of performing quarantine at that place, and thus delaying their arrival in England. This, therefore, so far as it has any force, and so far as regards passengers, is an additional reason for rendering the communication between Great Britain and India independent of the Malta steamers. The question of quarantine would be attended with no difficulty, as it might be performed at St. Just's Pool, Falmouth.

It might be found also that correspondence might be forwarded to Great Britain from Egypt with greater dispatch by landing it at Marseilles, and sending it by land to Calais. It is possible, but not certain, that a few days might be saved by this expedient.

Passengers departing from Alexandria would have an extensive choice as to the route they would pursue; for besides the steam ships proposed to be provided, at present the Mediterranean is intersected in every direction by lines of steamers, a considerable number of which have lately been established by the French government, so that passengers at Alexandria would be enabled to land at almost any port on the European side of the Mediterranean.

With a commerce in extent considerably inferior to ours, the government of France has nevertheless considered it their duty to facilitate mercantile operations by providing a most efficient branch of their post-office administration in the Mediterranean. Regular lines of steamers have been established between Alexandria, Athens, Civita Vecchia, Constantinople, Leghorn, Malta, Marseilles, Naples, Smyrna, and Syra. A communication takes place between every two of these places by French steam ships three times a month, and letters are conveyed between them respectively, at a postage of *one franc* for distances not exceeding 250 leagues, and *two francs* for greater distances. Accommodation is likewise provided in those vessels for passengers of every description at very moderate fares; so that, if the line of steam communication were now established between India and Egypt, the communication will actually be continued to England by French agency instead of British.\*

#### GENERAL ESTIMATE OF TIME AND EXPENSE.

Assuming that suitable wheel carriages are provided for the transport of passengers between Suez and Cairo, (to which, as I have stated, there is at present no physical obstacle, and to which the ruler of Egypt is understood to be favourably disposed), the journey between these places may be performed with ease and certainty in five or six days, and with despatches alone would be effected by a courier in much less time. But by whatever means this part of the communication may be made, it is absolutely essential that it should be conducted under the same management and the same responsibility as the remainder of the route for the reasons already stated.

The distance between Alexandria and Falmouth is 2800 miles, which might be performed by a steam ship of the same tonnage and power as those which I have recommended for the eastern side of the Isthmus. It would be necessary (if the same vessel be continued through the whole passage from Alexandria to Falmouth) that she should take in coals at Gibraltar. This vessel would effect the passage between Alexandria and Falmouth in about fifteen days in average weather; and if one day be allowed either to take in coals at Gibraltar, or if it were thought more advisable to transfer the passengers, &c. to another vessel, the total time between Alexandria and Falmouth would be sixteen days.

Thus the whole time, allowing for the necessary stoppages between the several ports of India and London, would be as follows:—

#### *Time between Calcutta and London.*

Days.

Calcutta to Suez.....	30½	
Suez to Alexandria.....	6	· ·
Alexandria to Falmouth.....	16	
Falmouth and London.....	1½	

Time between Calcutta and London 54 Days.

\* These vessels are so constructed that they can be immediately converted into war steamers if necessary.

*Time between Madras and London.*

	Days.
Madras to Suez.....	25½
Suez to London.....	23½

Time between Madras and London...49 Days.

*Time between Ceylon and London.*

	Days.
Ceylon to Suez.....	21½
Suez to London.....	23½

Time between Ceylon and London...45 Days.

*Time between Bombay and London.*

	Days.
Bombay to Suez.....	19
Suez to London.....	23½

Time between Bombay and London...42½ Days.

These estimates of the time of the passage are of course to be taken as average calculations. In the height of the south-west monsoon, the outward passage would probably be shorter by several days than the times given above, while the homeward passages would be proportionally longer. During the north-east monsoon the homeward passages on the other hand would be occasionally several days shorter than the time computed, while the outward passages would be on the contrary longer.

The maintenance of the communication between Alexandria and Falmouth, with the necessary regularity and certainty, would require three steam-ships. As, however, it may be presumed, that a portion of the passengers arriving from India at Alexandria would adopt other routes, vessels might be adapted for this passage of less capacity and power than those proposed on the Asiatic side of Egypt. I would propose, therefore, to establish between Alexandria and Falmouth three vessels of 800 tons burthen and 200 horse power. The fuel consumed by such vessels in making 24 passages, computed upon the principles already explained, will be 6500 tons; the cost of which may be taken at 8000*l*.

The annual expense and the maintenance of these three working vessels would be about 2400*l*. calculated upon the same principles, which have been already applied to the steamers on the eastern side of Egypt. Thus the total annual expense of maintaining the establishment on the most efficient scale, exclusive of the stations, would be as follows :—

Annual expenses already estimated on the eastern side of Egypt. ...	£92,200
Expenses of agency in Egypt.....	2,000
Expenses of establishment of steamers between Falmouth and Alexandria, including fuel, &c....	32,000
Total	£126,200

The adoption of vessels of inferior magnitude and power would somewhat lessen the estimated expense, but would in a far greater proportion diminish the efficiency of the establishment and increase the chances of its failure.

I am aware that the estimate which I have made of the cost of coal in India and the Red Sea is below the present estimated price of fuel in those places: 30s. a ton would perhaps be a fair price for coals in India at present, and twice that would assuredly be the utmost cost of depositing them at Socotra and Camaran. But it may fairly be presumed that when a regular market for coals shall be established in India, and when a regular supply of them will be required at Socotra and Camaran, their price will be somewhat reduced; and, in assuming their price in India at 25s. a ton, and at Socotra and Camaran at 50s. I feel quite assured that I am now below their cost.

It will be observed that the total quantity of steaming necessary for the completion of one monthly passage for a single vessel, according to the above statement, is 52 days' work, and for a monthly communication both outward and homeward would consequently be 104 days' work. This being divided among nine steam ships, three on the European and six on the Asiatic stations, would give to each ship on an average less than twelve working days per month, so that each vessel would work less than half her time, and by the arrangements which I propose the periods of work and rest would be alternated with such short intervals that the machinery would be kept in the best possible condition.

#### ESTIMATED RETURN AND CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS.

A steam ship of 1000 tons burthen will afford accommodation for about 100 first-class passengers, equal to that which is supplied by the sailing vessels in which passengers are conveyed by the Cape. The sum paid for a passage in these vessels by each passenger is about 120*l*. If it be assumed that the same fare would be paid by the line of steamers, and that the actual expense of the board, &c. of each passenger, including the cost of the journey through Egypt, would not exceed forty pounds, there would remain a profit of eighty pounds per head, for passengers between Falmouth and India.

The number of persons who now make the voyage annually by the Cape is three thousand two hundred. The greatest number which could be conveyed in twenty-four monthly passages by the establishment of steamers which I have proposed would be two thousand four hundred, or three-fourths of the whole present intercourse. That number would yield an annual revenue of 196,000*l*.

Besides passengers, however, there are other objects, the transport of which would contribute to the support and profit of the establishment. These may be classed as follows: 1st, Letters, such as are commonly transmitted through the post office. 2d, Newspapers, journals, and periodicals. 3d, Government despatches; and, 4th, such light articles as will bear transshipment, and can pay for swift transport.

The number of letters which pass annually through the post-office between Great Britain and the different parts of India is 309,000. Some portion of these are private soldiers' letters and others not subject to postage; but it is calculated that the number of paying letters is about 220,000. It will not be regarded as an unfair estimate, if I assume that half this number would be sent by the Red Sea, charged with a postage of two shillings and sixpence in preference to the longer route by the Cape. This would amount to 13,750*l*.

It will be a moderate estimate if I assume the number of newspapers, periodicals, and similar printed packages at 1000 per monthly passages, and at the average posted or carriage of six pence per parcel, this would amount annually to 3100*l*.

To all this must be added the conveyance of government despatches, besides such merchandise as would bear such a means of transport. It would not be easy to form a probable estimate of the amount of revenue to be derived from these sources; but it will be, I think, apparent that the revenue from passengers alone could more than cover the expenses of the establishment, and consequently leave all the revenue from other sources clear gain, whatever its amount might be.

Supposing, then, that the line of steam ships were supplied with their full complement of passengers, and carried the amount of correspondence above mentioned, the annual revenue of the establishment from these sources would exceed 213,000*l.* by the amount at which the conveyance of government despatches, and such objects of merchandise as would be suited to this species of transport, will be estimated, while the expenses of the establishment would not exceed 126,000*l.*; the difference, therefore, will remain to be placed against the expenses of stations on the Red Sea, at Socotra, &c.

If, however, the number of passengers, instead of being the full complement which the vessels would be capable of transporting, amounted only to 1400 annually, being less than half the actual annual intercourse in passengers, which now takes place between Great Britain and India, the revenue of the establishment would cover its expenses, exclusive of the expenses of stations, which might fairly be placed against the advantage of the transmission of government despatches, &c.

It has been contended that the measure should not be regarded as one to be determined merely upon a calculation of profit; that on the contrary it is one with which great political and social interests are so closely interwoven, that it ought to be adopted, even though its entire cost should have to be defrayed by the nation. This principle has been implicitly admitted in the resolutions of the select committee of 1834 and it has been explicitly avowed by the late Governor General, by several honourable members of the legislature and of your lordship's administration. But it is a principle, which I think it unnecessary to discuss in the present case: because there is no proposition, however self-evident, which carries to my mind a more clear conviction than I have, that this measure, if efficiently carried into operation will more than return its own expenses. In arriving at that conclusion, I put aside all conjectural estimates as to postage, despatches, packages, and merchandise—assuming that it is morally certain that, subject to the same cost, more than one half the number of persons passing between Great Britain and India, will prefer the shorter to the longer route—and admitting the extremely improbable supposition, that increased facility and expedition without any increased expense, will not be attended with any corresponding increase of intercourse.

But as I have already shown, it is utterly at variance with every analogy derived from experience to suppose that the increased expedition would produce no corresponding increase of intercourse. If the substitution of steamers for sailing vessels have increased in a ten-fold proportion the intercourse between Great Britain and the continent of Europe;—if the substitution of locomotive engines on a railway at thirty miles an hour, for horse-coaches on stone roads at eight miles an hour, have increased the intercourse between places so easy of reciprocal access under any circumstances, as Manchester and Liverpool, Newcastle and Carlisle, Dublin and Kingstown, &c., in a four-fold proportion;—is it reasonable or probable that the intercourse between Britain

and the greatest of its dependencies, now as far removed as pole from pole ; between families and kindred heretofore separated by a barrier deemed for ordinary social purposes all but impassable ; between a mother country in the full pride of wealth and in the meridian of civilisation, and her distant children aspiring to her arts and science, and gasping for knowledge ;—is it I repeat reasonable or probable on any grounds on which inference may be raised, that in such a case the shortening of the distance from sixteen thousand miles to six thousand ; the shortening of the time from four or five months to six or seven weeks ; the subjugation of the powers of wind and water by the omnipotence of the greatest mechanical agent which science has ever presented to art ;—that these innumerable other inducements which crowd upon the mind when the two routes are considered, would not cause an enormously increased intercourse with home ? It may not do so. The event may contradict my anticipations. Our friends and relatives in India may love the weary waste of the Atlantic, and court the dangers of the Southern Ocean ; they may love the scorching sun of the tropics so much as to go sixteen thousand miles round for the pure pleasures of twice crossing the line ; they may prefer to be confined to their wooden prisons for four or five months to a release at the end of a few weeks :—this may all happen, and the steam ships may be left to carry despatches, and a few curious and eccentric adventurers ; but if such be the event, I can only say that a more single instance of a violation of all that analogy and uniformity by which the conduct of masses of people has been heretofore observed to be governed cannot be produced in the whole history of the human race.

I have the honour to be,

Your Lordship's obedient Servant,

DION. LARDNER.

**THE EAST INDIA COMPANY**

VERSUS

**STEAM TO INDIA.**

---

THE TRUE POSITION AND PROSPECTS

OF A

**STEAM COMMUNICATION**

WITH

**INDIA,**

CONSIDERED AS REGARDS THE INTERFERENCE OF THE

**EAST INDIA COMPANY.**

A

**LETTER**

ADDRESSED TO THE EDITOR OF "THE TIMES," AND INSERTED IN  
THAT JOURNAL ON MONDAY, 23<sup>d</sup> JANUARY, 1837.

**LONDON:**

**SMITH, ELDER, AND CO., CORNHILL.**

---

1837.



LONDON :  
J. UNWIN, ST. PETER'S ALLEY, CORNHILL.

# STEAM COMMUNICATION,

*&c.*

SIR,

A very considerable portion of your space has been recently occupied by Correspondents on the subject of Steam communication with India, evincing a most laudable zeal in promoting that desideratum; but let me also add, very little discretion in applying it: which appears to me principally to result from a general ignorance of the measures now in progress for carrying their desires into effect on the one hand, and for frustrating them on the other.

As I happen to be familiar with what is going on in certain quarters, and see with regret the termination, which, unless a timely direction is given to the public movement on the subject, is likely to be the result of all our hopes and aspirations, allow me to enlighten your readers as to what is the present state of the question; so that all who are anxious to exert themselves to promote the good cause, may have the opportunity afforded them of doing so the most effectually.

The public feeling on the question is now so sensibly roused, that the fear no longer is, whether the project will be carried into effect, but if, when done it will be well done. Neither is there any doubt as to which route will be adopted, that by the Red Sea being so clearly proved to be the only eligible one, that I conceive it to be a mere waste of argument, and a misdirecting of public attention from the real difficulties of the case, to canvass or compare the merits of any other. My fears for the failure of our wishes spring from none of these sources, which are indeed only intended to divert the public mind from the true nature of the opposition which has to be encountered; and whilst your Correspondents are fighting against shadows, wasting their time and your columns in arguing about the folly of persisting in the Euphrates route, or in ridiculing the lately broached idea of forwarding the mail-bags by messengers along its banks, or lastly by steaming round the Cape, the enemies of the measure are silently and unobservedly maturing their plans for defeating it by stratagem. It will perhaps appear almost incredible that there should be any enemies to a measure which has been proved beyond contradiction to be an inestimable benefit both to the giver and receiver, to Britain and to India; and it will sound still more strange to many to hear, that the Directors

of the East India Company, the very parties who ought to be foremost in promoting the object, are those who have been all along most adverse to it! and who will, even now, if not overruled by better counsels and by public opinion, thwart and render nugatory all the efforts of those warm friends of India, who are ready at every sacrifice to themselves, to establish the much wished-for communication.

A very brief retrospect will, however, suffice to prove these assertions, and from the experience of the past let us learn wisdom for the future; discriminate between our friends and foes, and thus unite our forces and direct our energies, so as to strengthen the hands of the former, and disappoint the insidious attempts and deceptive counsels of the latter.

Two years since this question was so powerfully agitated, that a Committee of the House of Commons was granted to the Petitioners for Steam communication with India, who recommended its *immediate establishment*; and also that aid should be given towards the Euphrates Expedition under Colonel Chesney, for the purpose of testing the merits of that route. Previously to the passing of that Resolution, the East India Company opposed the establishment of Steam communication with India without the slightest disguise; their disingenuous object being to prevent so ready and rapid

a channel of communication to India, and thus strengthen the barrier which time and space presented to complaints from India being referred for redress at home. In short, their own natural timidity and desire to govern with as much ease as possible, led them to resist the measure so long as they could do so with a good grace, or even at all. The resolutions of Parliament, however, derived as they were from a most able Report, and voluminous evidence on the subject, led them so far to defer to the public wish as to give an apparent sanction to the project. They were naturally the parties who were then looked to, to carry out the recommendation of that Committee to establish Steam communication with India, *via* the Red Sea, into effect, and to take the lead in maturing, in conjunction with Government, a measure that would fully realize that suggestion. But their enmity to it could not be entirely overcome, even by the unanswerable evidence adduced in its favour, and whilst they "flattered us to the ear, they disappointed us to the hope." Finding they could no longer utterly oppose, they resolved to temporise, and by selecting what they thought of two evils would prove the least, they, with the almost certain conviction of its failure, patronised the Euphrates expedition; by which means they postponed the settlement of the grand question, and soothed public

feeling on the subject, by letting it be supposed that they were seriously desirous to establish an overland communication with India, and were cordially testing the merits of the Euphrates route with that view.

To the public generally it mattered little how the communication was established ; to them the details and minutiae of the advantages of either route were not familiar, and since the difference in point of time between the two was not material, they were quite content with the Company's pretended wish to bide the event of Colonel Chesney's expedition, and thought it but reasonable that its results should be ascertained before uselessly agitating the subject again. There were others, however, who saw clearly that the route by the Red Sea was the line which must ultimately be selected ; that the Euphrates one was liable to objections and beset with difficulties, which would render it always uncertain, and lead to its being eventually abandoned. But even those who saw this, and who at once detected the actual motives of the East India Company, whilst deeply regretting the needless delay which this experiment must inevitably produce, in retarding the fulfilment of the real object in view, felt no little interest in the success of Colonel Chesney's attempt, as one that would set the Euphrates

question, as a route to India, to rest at once, and thus leave that by the Red Sea free from all competitors. . Agreeably to their anticipations, that expedition has proved a complete failure, as far as its object of establishing a communication with India was concerned ; and on this result being ascertained beyond a doubt, men's minds naturally turned to inquire what was next to be done? and why the resolutions of the House of Commons recommending the Red Sea route had been so utterly neglected? But expectation waited in vain for some demonstration from the East India Company, or the Government, that such reasonable hopes would be realised. It was very far from the Company's intention to come forward in its support ; and if no fresh stimulus had been given to the subject, gladly would they have let it sink altogether, with the unfortunate Tigris Steamer, in the river Euphrates.

At this period, however, a new era in the history of this struggle for the attainment of Steam communication with India happily began to dawn upon us, and a powerful impetus to be given to it, for which the East India Company were little prepared ; and in dealing with which they have been compelled to change their whole system of tactics. This stimulus presented itself in the form of an Association lately established,

for the purpose of carrying on Steam communication with India on such a basis, as to embrace in equal advantages, not only all the three Presidencies of India, but also China and Australia. Are your Correspondents aware of the existence of such an Association? if not, let them now learn that there has been brought forward a well-matured plan for extending to all India the benefit of Monthly Steam intercourse, *via* the Red Sea; that its members consist of the leading East India merchants, who have subscribed such a sum as has already enabled them to lay their proposals before Government, and the East India Company; and to offer, on certain conditions, and under due restrictions, to take upon themselves the entire fulfilment of a Monthly Steam communication from London to Bombay, Galle, Madras, and Calcutta. These conditions are, that Government give up their present line of packets, in the Mediterranean, and contract for £40,000 per annum, (far less than the sum which it at present costs them,) with the proposed Company, for the carriage of the mails, by their line of boats, from hence to Alexandria; and that the East India Company grant them £25,000 per annum, in return for which they will carry their despatches monthly, under the charge of their own messenger, to and from the places above-named. The remaining expenses of



the concern they propose to defray from the receipts of postages on private letters to India, and from passengers.

Such offers as these placed the East India Company in a new and unlooked-for dilemma. Hitherto they had been magnifying the expense of the communication, and making the state of their finances, and the injustice of saddling the poor natives of India with such a heavy annual charge as it would require, the principal grounds for opposing the question. But this offer at once deprived them of that argument ; for £25,000 per annum, they could not deny, was but a small payment for the services tendered by the new Steam Association in return. In another point of view, also, this proposal of the New Company was *most unwelcome to the Directors ; it was a point d'appui*, round which all the honest and sincere advocates in favour of Steam to India could rally, and concentrate their strength, to force the measure to completion in the way proposed, or to demand some no less satisfactory substitute ; and the plans which the Association promulgated, fortunately embraced many hitherto conflicting views and interests, by benefitting alike the residents on the eastern and western sides of the continent of Hindoostan. To meet this new and unexpected feature in the question, the East India Company have had recourse to

other means than those hitherto so successfully employed for postponing its adjustment. Formerly, their calculations went to prove the great expense which such a measure would cause them to incur. Now, their advocates have the unblushing hardihood to assert that their former data were all false! that it can be carried into effect on such a scale as will repay itself! and that the offer of the Steam Association should not be accepted, because it can be performed cheaper by the East India Company! And whence, let me ask, is this new light so suddenly derived? To what motives are we to attribute this sudden zeal, and increased knowledge on the part of the East India Company, to show how trifling is the pecuniary sacrifice required at their hands? Can any one for a moment doubt the *animus* which prompts it? Is it not to furnish a reason for their declining the offer of the Steam Association, and for retaining to themselves the power of the management, or, rather *mismanagement*, of the measure, since they find that it will be carried into effect by others, if not by them. Happy should I be, could I think otherwise; for I freely admit that they are the parties to whose care such operations should have been consigned. But when I know that from the first they have opposed the measure, and would, Heaven forgive me for the uncharitable thought if it be otherwise! only now step in and undertake

it, to prevent its being an instrument for good in the hands of others, and to retain to themselves the power of mismanaging, and when occasion offers, of abandoning it, I say that their agency and their motives are both alike to be distrusted.

Let the public, therefore, watch the present measures and their tendency with unceasing jealousy. They have a right to demand from the East India Company, if they will now insist on carrying them into effect themselves, arrangements no less ample than those offered by the Steam Association, and guaranteed by the respectable names who form its Committee; and let them apply this test to the Directors, and thus judge of the sincerity of their sudden conversion. It is proposed by the supporters of the East India Company, that the packets necessary for keeping up the communication between India and Suez shall form part of the Bombay marine, a Steam flotilla! But if so, what dependance can be placed on the permanency of the communication? Will their vessels not be liable to be called away to any other service connected with the marine? and is it to be believed, that with such unwilling agents as the East India Company prove themselves to be in the cause, that such occasions will not readily be found to crush the utility of the measure as a channel of correspondence, and

render it an uncertain route? No such doubts can exist in the case of the Commercial Association proposed. They offer to provide a certain number of Steam vessels best adapted for speed and for Passengers, for *this service alone*, and to extend the communication by branch Steamers to all the three Presidencies. Whether the East India Company, with their Bombay flotilla, will do this, I leave the public to judge: without the most undeniable security, I would not trust them.

You will thus perceive that the position which the East India Company have hitherto occupied in the question is most materially changed. They are now driven from their former obstinate opposition to one of three things: they must either treat with the Steam Association, or undertake the plan themselves, or refuse to do both the one and the other. Not being prepared to incur the odium which this last would entail upon them, they will probably refuse the first, and adopt the middle course. The duty of the public, therefore, I conceive now to be, to unite in using every effort to compel them to close with the offer of the Association; or, if they decline that, and retain to themselves the onus of accomplishing the measure, to insist on its being one as full and complete in all its details and ultimate prospects, as that offered to us by the Steam Association. Now is not the time that we ought to accept less

at their hands. We have been waiting for years for such an arrangement, humbly supplicating for its being conceded in any form, but in vain; whilst the East India Company has played the dog in the manger, neither doing it themselves nor suffering it to be adequately undertaken by others. And now, when a full and complete measure is offered to us by private enterprize, is it to be longer endured that we should be deprived, by the jealousy of the East India Company and their supporters, of such a consummation, and allow a half-and-half measure of their own to be substituted? I am by no means interested in the Association, excepting as one of that body of the public who are ardently desirous of seeing the best and most effectual means of Steam-communication with India adopted, and will, therefore, leave the question whether such arrangements would be best intrusted to such an Association or to the East India Company, *wholly uncommented upon.* There are many arguments on both sides, which may be advanced by the parties themselves as claims for public confidence, whenever it suits them to do so: suffice it for my present purpose to say, that the members of the Association are too influential to allow any suspicion to attach to their proposals being viewed as chimerical, and that, coming from such a quarter, the public may, without arguing the

respective merits of the two competing bodies too nicely, fairly compare them on equal grounds. In this light, then, let us call upon the East India Company, if they refuse to sanction the proposal of the Association, to produce a measure themselves, in all respects as perfect and complete ; and it is to this end I would now wish most earnestly to direct the public attention.

The proposal of the Association to His Majesty's Government is not likely to meet with any opposition in that quarter, unless influenced by the East India Company ; because the principle of contracting for the carriage of mails is one already fully recognised by Government ; and if acted upon in the instance of the General Steam Navigation Company, for the transit of the mails to Hamburgh, Holland, &c., why not for those in the Mediterranean ? Neither on the score of expense are His Majesty's Ministers likely to object, because the offer of the Association, if accepted, places them at no more outlay than they incur at present ; while the same observation is quite as applicable to the East India Company. The reasonableness of the demand made, may be tested by the disbursements on account of the "*Atalanta*" and "*Berenice* ;" a fact requiring more subtlety than has yet been displayed to disprove it. Is Ministerial patronage to stand in the way of a

national benefit? If that be the difficulty, let them surmount it by making it one of their conditions with the merchants to retain the appointment to the command of the Mediterranean Steamers; a proposition which would be reasonable in itself, and perhaps be considered an additional security to the public. However, Sir, the various tools that have been employed to stave off the accomplishment of this object are now very nearly worn out; and it being high time the public should know the real causes of past delay, thus have I detailed them.

Here I pause, then; and, in the anxious hope that these unstudied suggestions may accelerate the attainment of the object we all have so much at heart,—

I remain,

SIR,

Your obedient Servant,

P. S.

CORNHILL, January 19th, 1837.

# PROPOSAL

BY

LIEUT. J. H. JOHNSTON, R. N.

FOR

THE FORMING OF A COMPANY

TO COMMUNICATE

WITH

THE EAST INDIES

BY

**Steam Navigation.**

LONDON:

PRINTED FOR KINGSBURY, PARBURY, AND ALLEN,  
LEADENHALL-STREET,

*Booksellers to the Honourable East-India Company.*

---

1824.



L O N D O N :  
PRINTED BY COX AND BAYLIS, GREAT QUEEN-STREET.

**PROPOSAL**  
**FOR THE**  
**FORMING OF A COMPANY**  
**FOR**  
**ESTABLISHING A COMMUNICATION WITH INDIA**  
**BY**  
**Steam Navigation.**

IN March 1823, I circulated a Prospectus (Appendix, No. 1), setting forth the advantages likely to result from the establishment of a communication with our Indian possessions by Steam Vessels.

The merits of the scheme were discussed in a Committee appointed from the East-Indian Trade Committee, and the result was favourable to it. The estimates as set forth were approved; but it was deemed expedient to await the result of Mr. Perkins' experiments on High-pressure Steam Engines; as, if his expectations had been fulfilled, the necessity of making dépôts of coals would have been rendered unnecessary.

Mr. Briggs, who favoured the Committee with his presence, and gave much useful information respecting the passage of the Isthmus, quarantine, &c., was requested to make inquiries on his arrival in Egypt, and to communicate to the Committee the result of such

inquiries, and likewise the sentiments entertained by the Pacha, with respect to the projected passage of the Isthmus. No. II. is a copy of a letter from Mr. Briggs to the East-India Trade Committee.

Concluding that several months must elapse before Mr. Perkins' projected improvements could be applied with safety, I left England for Calcutta, with the view of forming a Company there to co-operate with a Company in England, in establishing the proposed communication.

I arrived in Calcutta at an inauspicious moment. A small vessel of 32 horse power, and considerably over-built, was launched at an immense expense, and was supposed to be adequate to the towing of large ships up the river Hoogly, against a current, running during that season at the rate of seven miles per hour. She was, as might have been expected, inadequate to this service, and her failure created a general disinclination amongst the merchants to engage in steam speculations.

*Finding that there was no chance of inducing the Houses of Agency to unite in the establishment of a company, and that the gentlemen of the civil and military services were, by the regulations of their respective departments, prevented from engaging in any mercantile speculations, I circulated an address (No. 3), in which I proposed two means of raising the sufficient funds, and I obtained the signatures of more than thirty of the principal gentlemen in the civil, military, and commercial departments, requiring the Sheriff to convene a meeting of the Inhabitants of Calcutta, for the purpose of considering the practicability of*

establishing a communication with Europe by means of Steam Navigation.

The meeting took place in the Town-hall of Calcutta, and, after some discussion, it was resolved to offer a premium of £10,000 for the encouragement of steam communication with India, under certain restrictions (No. 4). Several discussions took place in the Committee between the 10th November and the 17th December, when a second meeting of subscribers took place at the Town-hall, regulations for the distribution of premiums were finally determined on, and a Committee of Management was appointed, (No. 5).

Having made arrangements for obtaining information respecting Socotra and Mocha, and for keeping up a correspondence with Mr. Salt and Mr. Briggs, I left Calcutta in February, and arrived in England on the 23d of July.

I now present myself to the public to propose the formation of a Company to communicate by Steam Navigation with the East-Indies generally; and as my present project will differ somewhat from the plan proposed in my *Prospectus of 1823*, it is proper that I should assign reasons for a departure from my first opinions.

As the profits to accrue to the proposed Company must depend on the number of passengers who may sail in their vessels, the probability of obtaining a sufficient number must be duly considered.

The number of passengers who leave Calcutta and Madras annually may be estimated at from 400 to 500, including children. I have an extensive ac-

qualitance in both the presidencies, and wherever I have visited, the conversation has turned on steam communication with Europe. Much prejudice exists, which must be removed. Little confidence is placed in the safety of Steam-vessels, or in their adequacy to resist the storms off the Cape of Good Hope. Nautical men are referred to for their opinion, and it is not likely their decisions should be in opposition to their interests.

With respect to the passage by the Red Sea and Isthmus, though it will be my object ultimately to establish the communication by that route, I am persuaded of the necessity of relinquishing that route for the present; for, besides the prejudice against Steam-vessels, would exist the more formidable one against Plague, Quarantine, and incommodious land-conveyance: the latter might easily be removed, but the two former present greater difficulty, increased by the objection of the Pacha to El Arish, as a port of debarkation; as, during a voyage on the Nile from Alexandria to Cairo, it would be impossible to prevent communication and contact with the natives; and the extent of the land journey afterwards to Kosseir, would be in length nearly equal to that between El Arish and Suez.

Persons, after residing for a few years in India, become wedded to their comforts, and are, by the effect of climate, unfitted for submitting to inconveniences; and Indians returning to Europe will not, in general, be induced to relinquish the comfortable round-house of an Indiaman, until equal convenience and safety, united with superior speed, can be secured to them.

I am convinced there are few persons who return from India, who would not prefer passing a whole month at sea, in the prosecution of a voyage, to remaining ten days in port under the restrictions of quarantine.

This Company must, then, in its infancy, endeavour to unite speed and safety with undiminished comfort, and, looking to the passage of the Isthmus as a remote object, direct their inquiries immediately to the passage *via* the Cape of Good Hope; and I am of opinion, that the most probable means of accomplishing the object, will be by furnishing a large ship (say one of from 600 to 700 tons) with a small steam-power, available in calms; the rigging of the ship, with respect to masts, sails, &c. to remain unaltered: and I feel convinced that a fast-sailing vessel, so provided, might depend on making a passage within a period of eighty days.

The expense of fitting out one vessel on this principle would, on an outside estimate, not exceed £18,000. An intelligent and interested person, one of high energies and of a persevering character, should be selected for the command; and leaving to him considerable discretionary power with respect to route, &c., he should be instructed to keep a minute log or journal of each day's occurrence, to communicate by every opportunity with the Committee, who, from his report, would determine on the expediency of sending out other vessels, under similar or improved arrangements.

Lest the proposal should subject me to the imputation of confined or over cautious views, or probably

be considered as experimental only, I will declare, that I have not the least doubt of the success of the undertaking, but that I consider a large outlay in the first instance unadvisable, for the following reasons :

First, that as the ultimate object is to establish a communication *via* Suez, it will be unnecessary to invest a large capital on the equipment of a greater number of ships to navigate by the Cape of Good Hope than may be required, after the Egyptian arrangements have been made, to supply coal to the different dépôts; and such a number will be sufficient to establish with the Indian public a confidence in vessels propelled by steam.

Again, I believe that very considerable improvements will take place in the application of a propelling power to vessels, for which the present engine would be unfitted ; and these improvements will, I fancy, be experimentally applied in the course of a few weeks.

With respect to the ultimate object, the passage of the Isthmus, I am prepared to shew the very great pecuniary advantages to be expected from such an establishment ; but it can only be commenced after the following points shall have been ascertained :—

First, and principally, the application of the quarantine laws at Malta, in France, and in Great Britain; as also the means that will be assured in the Pacha's dominions of avoiding contact with his subjects, when such precaution shall be deemed necessary by the Director of Caravans at the ports of embarkation. On this material point I have much to propose, which cannot enter into a Prospectus.

I have already, in my Prospectus and Address in the Appendix, set forth the expenses and profits to be contemplated, and my subsequent inquiries have not induced me to alter my statements on these points.

The expenses and earning of a ship to proceed *via* the Cape, will probably be as follows :

A ship of 700 tons fitted for sea and insured at 60s. per cent. ....	£18,000
Wages of seamen and artificers for six months ....	2,500
Coals, sails, and cordage .....	600
Pilotage and port dues .....	1,500
Interest and depreciation, 10 per cent. on 26,000 ..	2,600
	<hr/>
	£25,200.

The Returns would probably be :

Freight out, 600 tons at £3 .....	1,800
Passage money net. ....	2,000
Freight home, 600 tons at £7 .....	4,200
Passage money net. ....	5,000
	<hr/>
Earning.....	13,000
Expense, including 5 per cent. interest on money invested .....	25,200
	<hr/>
	£12,200

Or, at the expiration of the first voyage, the Block would be reduced from £18,000 to 12,200, about 33 per cent.

JAMES HENRY JOHNSTON,  
Lieutenant, R. N.

N.B. During my absence from England, several Advertisements respecting Steam Navigation, inserted in the public Prints, by Captain J. E. Johnson of the E. I. Company's service, have led many of my friends to identify me with that Gentleman. I beg to assure them, however, I have not been in any way concerned with that Gentleman, nor have I the honour of his acquaintance.



# APPENDIX.

---

## No. I.

*PROSPECTUS for establishing, by means of Steam Navigation, a Communication with Calcutta and the East-Indies generally, via the Mediterranean, Isthmus of Suez, and the Red Sea ; the Voyage out and home to be completed within 120 Days.*

I DEEM it unnecessary to dwell upon the efficiency of steam vessels to navigate upon the open seas, and to encounter severe gales, even with greater advantages than those provided only with masts and sails. Persons who entertain doubts on this point, will be best answered by a perusal of the different Reports of the Committees of the House of Commons.

It would be superfluous also to attempt to demonstrate that which is in itself evident, I mean the very great advantage that would accrue to merchants individually, and to the public generally, by the means of speedy communication with our Asiatic dominions.

How this desirable object may be attained with the prospect of a fair remuneration to those who are its promoters and supporters, I will endeavour to shew, advancing always my opinions with diffidence, and inviting information from gentlemen whose experience on some points, or whose data on others, may enable them to detect inaccuracies or suggest improvements.

The difficulties to be surmounted are of different degrees, and present themselves in a natural succession, in which I propose to discuss them.

And, 1st. The route up the Mediterranean, across the Isthmus of Suez on Camels, up the Red Sea, round Ceylon, and up the Bay of Bengal to Calcutta, appears the most direct.

2d. The convenient places to touch at for the purpose of replenishing fuel, with the distances between each, are probably as follows :

	Miles.	Days.
Sailing from Plymouth (to which port passengers may be conveyed from London by the Plymouth steam packet)		
to Gibraltar .....	about 1,150	7
From Gibraltar to Malta .....	1,000	6
From Malta to El Avish.....	1,000	6
Across the Isthmus to Suez, on camels, 120 miles.....	0	6
From Suez to Mocha, or the island of Perim.....	1,200	8
From Mocha to Isle of Socrota .....	600	5
From Socrota to Cochin .....	1,350	8
From Cochin to Trincomalee* .....	600	5
From Trincomalee, touching at Madras, to Calcutta ....	1,020	6
Making the whole distance by sea .....	<u>7,920</u>	<u>57</u>

In round numbers 8,000 miles ; of which 3,200 are on the north and west side the Isthmus, and 4,800 on the south and east.

We have next to consider the capability of a vessel to carry fuel for the greatest distance, that between Socotra and Cochin, of 1350 miles. And although, in calculating the expense of Coal, I shall assume that a vessel of 400 tons, with an Engine of 100 horse power, may obtain nine miles of speed from the consumption of nine bushels of coals ; or that the

\* It is supposed that a passage may be found over the Devil's Bridge, through Palk's Straits ; which will shorten the distance 600 or 800 miles, between Cochin and Calcutta.

expense of coals will on an average be equal to one bushel per mile; still I think the vessel should at each dépôt complete to at least 60 chaldrons, which on the greatest distance would admit of their making as little as five miles and a half per hour, for the whole passage; and on the distance between Plymouth and Gibraltar, where at some seasons the greatest resistance may be expected, 60 chaldrons would be sufficient, at the rate of four miles and a half per hour. And if the calculation be made on ten complete voyages in the year, at the greatest consumption, *i. e.* supposing 60 chaldrons to be supplied from each dépôt at each demand, we shall arrive at a quantity that may be considered as sufficient for the first supply to the different dépôts, to be afterwards kept up according to the actual expense. And it will be

	<i>s.</i>	<i>£.</i>
From Plymouth..... 10 of 60 chaldrons = 600 at 40 =	12,000	
Gibraltar, 10 out, 10 home.. 20 of 60 .. do .. = 1,200 at 90 =	5,400	
Malta..... do .. do... 20 of 60 .. do... = 1,200 at 100 =	6,000	
Syria, 10 home ..... 10 of 60 .. do .. = 600 at 110 =	3,300	
Making..... Chaldrons	<u>3,600</u>	<u>£15,900</u>

Or take the average at £4. 10*s.* per chaldron, or 2*s.* 6*d.* per bushel.

On the south-east side of the Isthmus there will be required,

	Chaldrons.
At Suez ..... for 10 voyages out, 0 home..... 10 of 60 =	600
Mocha..... 10.... do. .... 10 do. .... 20 of 30 =	600
Socotra ..... 10.... do. .... 10 do. .... 20 of 60 =	1,200
Cochin..... 10.... do. .... 10 do. .... 20 of 30 =	600
Trincomalee ..... 10.... do. .... 10 do. .... 20 of 60 =	1,200
Calcutta ..... 0.... do. .... 10 do. .... 10 of 60 =	600
Making in all....	<u>4,800</u>

Which may be calculated to average at the different dépôts 2*s.* 4*d.* per bushel. The price of coals at Calcutta, brought from Burdwan, exchanging 2*s.* per rupee, is 8 anas, or 1*s.* per maund of 84*lbs.*, equal to one English bushel, or it is 36*s.* per chaldron.

Next is to be considered the passage of the Isthmus : and, until negociations are entered into and arrangements actually made, we must be contented with a calculation of the expenses on a scale which will certainly exceed the reality.

A camel capable of travelling a distance daily of 30 miles, with a load of 4 cwt., may be procured for from 10 to 12 dollars ;—say £3.

Estimate keep and attendance, at per annum, say £3.

Present to the Pacha, for escort, &c., each caravan 400 dollars.

Present to attendants, &c., 50 dollars ; and suppose 50 tons of cargo, and 30 persons with baggage, 400 camels would be the least number required, at £3 each ..... £1,200

Their food and keep for 12 months ..... £1,200  
 ————— £2 400

Interest, 5 per cent. ; wear and tear, 20—25= £600.

600 divided by 20 (the number of passages across) is for each passage ..... £30 0

Present 450 dollars, at 5s. .... 112 10  
 Or, in round numbers, £150. ————— £142 10

The wages of seamen may be estimated at £2 per month ; their victualling at £2 more ; and, although the wages of seamen and the expense of victualling them is much less in India than in Europe, yet as a larger number is required in those seas, it will be fair to calculate on the same expense in making an estimate, Commanders and artificers, employed on the south-east side of the Isthmus, must receive more wages than those employed on the home station.

It unfortunately happens, that the three fairest months in the British Channel and Atlantic are the worst in the Bay of Bengal and the Arabian Sea, and *vice versa* ; the south-west monsoon being strongest from the middle of June to the middle of August ; whilst December, January, and February bring fine weather in those seas. I am of opinion, however, that vessels may make passages for ten months in the year, the steam-boats, during the prevalence of the south-west monsoon, leaving the Hoogly by Lacom's Channel, and keeping the Orixá and Coromandel coasts close on board.

To perform the contemplated service, it will be necessary to have at least three, and perhaps four vessels on each side the Isthmus. They should be of four hundred tons, of the strongest build, and of one hundred horse power, with latteen sails, or lug fore-sail, and schooner-rigged abaft. But the experiment of the latteen sails should be made; because, when the yards are down, the masts present less surface to the wind than those of any other rig.

The vessels should be fitted for the accommodation of twenty-five passengers, and from fifty to one hundred tons of cargo; to be manned with a crew of twenty men, including mates and artificers; to be completed to twenty days provisions and water; and to sail on the first day of every month from Plymouth and Calcutta.

The vessels may readily be contracted for, and built under inspection, for 20% per ton; and the engines will cost, probably, 5,000% each; or, in round numbers, the vessel may be completed for 14,000%.

The estimate of the outlay and receipt for the first twelve months, may be—

Six vessels, of 400 tons and 100 horse power, at £14,000 each ..	£84,000
Invested in coals at the dépôts .....	36,060
Invested on camels .....	1,200

Capital invested.....	<u>£121,260</u>
-----------------------	-----------------

---

Insurance on £121,260 at 10 per cent. ....	£12,126
Wear and tear of engines £30,000 at 20 per cent.....	6,000
Ditto on wood and iron £54,000, at 15 per cent. ....	8,100
160,000 miles of fuel, at 2s. 6d. per mile .....	20,000
Grease, stuffing, and packing for six engines .....	1,000
Six principal engineers, at £70 per annum.....	420
Thirty-six engine men and stokers, at 35% per annum .....	1,260

Carried forward....	<u>£48,906</u>
---------------------	----------------

	Brought forward . . . . .	£48,906
Six commanders, at £200 . . . . .		1,200
Twelve mates, at £48 . . . . .		576
Seventy seamen, at £24 . . . . .		1,680
Victualling 106 men, at £20 per annum . . . . .		2,120
Port charges, a rough estimate, the Calcutta pilotage being exceedingly heavy, a great reduction may be expected : say each voyage £50 for 20 . . . . .		1,000
Passage of the Isthmus . . . . .		3,000
Mess . . . . .		10,000
Commission 2½ per cent. . . . .		1,712
	Total Outlay . . . . .	<u>£70,194</u>

It is not being too sanguine to suppose that the number of Passengers will be complete every voyage, from the three Presidencies ; those from Bombay may join at Cochin by an auxiliary packet ; and the price fixed at £200 is the lowest usually paid for an inferior accommodation on board a ship trading to India. To the individual, a great saving in equipment will result, from the shortness of the passage, and the necessity of limiting the quantity of baggage ; whilst the gain of time, and the pleasing prospect of setting foot on land once in eight or ten days, will be strong inducements for preference to this route.

Twenty-five passengers for twenty voyages will yield, at 200 <i>l</i> . each . . . . .	£100,000
Less Commission 2½ per cent. . . . .	2,500
50 + 20 = 1,000 tons of cargo, at £15 . . . . .	} 14,625
Less commission 2½ per cent. . . . .	
Net proceeds of 20 voyages . . . . .	112,125
Amount of Outlay . . . . .	<u>70,194</u>
Profit on this Estimate . . . . .	<u>£41,931</u>

Which I do not think exaggerated ; and I feel convinced, that after one or two voyages the rate of passage may be

lowered to 150%. fixing the interest at 12 per cent., and setting apart a sum for redeeming the capital, for experimental purposes, and for constructing a carriage-road across the Isthmus, with proper halting-places ; a point which, by the judicious application of one or two thousand pounds, might be effected through the Pacha of Egypt.

Having, I trust, demonstrated the advantage likely to result from the proposed Establishment, it only remains to devise the means best calculated to promote it. And I can speak positively to the cordial co-operation that will be given by our Asiatic friends.

In the foregoing Prospectus I have calculated on an expense which would be adequate to the establishment of a number of Vessels sufficient to keep up a constant communication with India. But as prejudices are to be overcome, it will perhaps be prudent to begin with only Two vessels, one on each side the Isthmus, and to increase the number as the confidence of the public becomes established.

In making this Estimate, it would have been unfair to calculate on contingencies ; but there can be little doubt that the expense for Fuel might be very considerably reduced. Ships proceeding to the Mediterranean, and which now frequently go in ballast, would, if a demand existed, be glad to deliver Coals at an advance of from 10s. to 15s. on the shipping price in the river.

The Insurance and Wear and Tear are also estimated at a very high rate ; whilst, on the other hand, no profit has been anticipated on the carriage of letters and dispatches, which would certainly accrue, since the Post-office could never afford to establish an independent conveyance.

## No II.

(Copy.)

To J. H. Palmer, Esq., King's Arms Yard, Coleman-street.

SIR,

IN compliance with the request of the Committee (of which you were a member) I wrote to my house at Alexandria, to obtain the consent of the Pacha of Egypt to the establishment of a steam-packet communication between England and India, through his country; and by the enclosed extract you will perceive the Pacha is disposed to give it every protection, should the project be carried into execution.

I will trouble you to communicate this information to the other gentlemen of the Committee, whose names are not known to me; and should any further steps be desirable, I shall be glad to attend to their wishes.

I am, Sir,

Your very obedient Servant, .

42, Coleman-street,

(Signed) S. BRIGGS.

16th March 1824.

*Extract of a Letter from Messrs. Briggs and Co., of Alexandria,  
18th November 1823.*

“With respect to the project for a steam-packet communication with India, through this country, the Pacha seems averse to the forming of a station at *El Arish*, as, not being properly within the limits of his command, he could not be responsible for the safety of the caravans going to and coming from that place; but as he is determined to extirpate the plague in Egypt, the advantage proposed by the selection of *El Arish* may be obtained at *Alexandria*, combined with greater safety, and better accommodation for travellers.”



## No. III.

*AN ADDRESS to the Gentlemen interested in promoting a communication with Great Britain by means of Steam Navigation, and who have favoured me with an assurance of their attendance at the Town Hall, should a Meeting on this interesting subject be convened.*

---

Gentlemen :

In the Prospectus which I have circulated, I have gone into the detail of expense that would probably be incurred by an establishment of steam vessels, adequate to ensure a monthly communication with Great Britain.

With the fullest confidence of the ultimate success of this project, I would not, if funds were at my disposal, embark at once to the full extent. I think the preferable mode would be to begin on a small scale, say, two vessels on each side the Isthmus, of such a size as might be available for other purposes, should the scheme by any chance fail. This size would probably be from 300 to 350 tons, with 100 horse power; such vessels would be useful, as tug-boats, or to carry on a communication with Madras, in which abundant employment would be found at all seasons.

In the calculations, however, that will follow in this paper, I shall confine myself to the original proposal of vessels of 400 tons.

The first measure necessary to the promotion of the object in question, is to obtain adequate funds, or the certainty of procuring them when required.

The second is, arrangement for the passage of the Isthmus.

The third, the establishment of a co-operating company in England.

The funds necessary for the small establishment of two

boats on each side the Isthmus would probably not exceed three lacs of rupees, and to raise this sum the most desirable mode would be to establish a Company, and to subdivide the amount required into a given number of shares.

From a participation in this plan, however, the most interested persons would find themselves excluded: I mean gentlemen of the civil and military establishments, who are prohibited from engaging in any mercantile speculation.

Another means which may be resorted to, is that of soliciting a loan from the public, and of taking the whole responsibility on myself; and this I am willing to do, from the confidence I have in the ultimate success of the undertaking.

In soliciting the loan, I would suggest that the amount individually subscribed be confined to such a sum as the subscriber would willingly give as a premium, for the promotion of this desirable object, from which such great benefits would be derived.

It would be most satisfactory that a Committee of Management should be appointed from the civil, military, and mercantile interests, and this for many reasons; one, not the least, is, that application to the government for aid in various ways, going from a Committee, would carry more weight, and meet with more attention than if preferred by an individual.

It would next be necessary to visit Egypt, with a view to making arrangements with the Pacha, and I am of opinion that this arrangement ought to be of a private and commercial nature, as that made some years ago by Mr. Briggs, for the conveyance of goods from Kosseir to Cairo, when the Pacha engaged to furnish any number of camels with an escort, at the rate of two dollars per camel, and one dollar per camel load of eight cwt. as duty.

Of course such an arrangement must be made through the Consul, Mr. Salt, to whom letters should be procured from this Government, and from the Presidency of Bombay.

These two arrangements effected, I may, on my arrival in England, present myself with confidence to the Committee, or to the public, saying

Gentlemen,

The European inhabitants of India, being anxious to establish a communication with this country by means of steam navigation, have subscribed funds to the amount necessary for commencing the establishment.

Deputed by their Committee, I have succeeded in making arrangements with the Pacha of Egypt, for the safe passage across the Isthmus, and I now invite you to form a Company for the purpose of co-operating with the Indian establishment.

The result of such an application is not to be doubted ;—reverse the circumstances, and say, how would such an appeal be received here?

Previously to calling a general meeting, I am anxious to ascertain the opinions of gentlemen who have favored me with a promise of their attendance or support on this mode of proceeding, and founded on which some of the following Resolutions may be proposed, and perhaps adopted.

**At a General Meeting of Persons interested in establishing a communication with Great Britain by means of Steam Navigation.**

*On the supposition of a Company being formed.*

1. Resolved, that this meeting is of opinion, that the establishment of a Company, for the purpose of carrying into effect a communication with Great Britain, by means of steam navigation, is most desirable.

2. Resolved, that a Committee be appointed, to consist of at least twelve members ; any five to be competent to form a board, to conduct the affairs of the proposed Company.

3. Resolved, that the sum of 330,000 Rupees be raised by shares of                      each.

4. Resolved, that a book be immediately opened to receive the names of such gentlemen as are desirous of holding shares. and in which the number of shares intended to be taken by each person shall be noted.

5. Resolved, that this book be kept open for a term of three months, unless the subscription be previously filled.

6. Resolved, that, should the subscription lists be incomplete at the expiration of three months, the Committee be authorized to extend the term, or to declare the project to be abandoned.

7. Resolved, that the Committee be empowered to call a general meeting, whenever they may deem it necessary.

*On the supposition of a Loan being made.*

At a general meeting of persons interested in establishing a communication with Great Britain, by means of steam navigation.

1. Resolved, that this meeting is of opinion, that such an establishment is practicable and most desirable, and that very great benefits are likely to be attendant on the success of the undertaking.

2. Resolved, that as the capital required is of considerable amount, this meeting does approve and recommend the mode proposed by Mr. Johnston to raise funds by loan.

3. Resolved, that a Committee be appointed, to consist of at least twelve persons, any five of them being competent to form a board; the Committee to be considered as the trustees of the subscribers, to correspond, and to assist in the undertaking.

4. Resolved, that the loan be made for ten years certain, to be without interest for the first two years, and for as long

a term as the establishment shall not clear a profit. But that any profit which may accrue shall be applied as interest on the capital, as far as six per cent., and any further surplus shall be applicable to the redemption of the capital; the Committee to have the right of inspecting all accounts, and of determining on the question of profit or loss.

5. Resolved, that a book be immediately opened to receive the names of subscribers.

6. Resolved, that the different houses of agency in Calcutta be invited to receive subscriptions, and to hold the sums subscribed at the disposal of the Committee.

7. Resolved, that the money subscribed be invested in Company's paper, or in other good security, as the Committee may determine, until it is required for outlay; but that, in the interim, the dividends of interest shall be at the disposal of the Committee, for the purpose of making preliminary arrangements with the Pacha of Egypt, or otherwise, as to the Committee may appear advisable.

I am of opinion that the first boats employed should be built and fitted in England, and be sent to India, round the Cape of Good Hope.

On an outside calculation, two vessels of 400 tons each, with 100 horse powers, delivered in India, would cost

The vessels, complete, with engines, £28,000 . . . .	Rs. 280,000
Coals to India . . . . . 2,000 . . . .	20,000
Wages and victualling of 40 seamen and artificers . . . . . 480 . . . .	4,800
Artificers, stokers, &c. . . . . 800 . . . .	8,000
Commanders and mates . . . . . 800 . . . .	8,000
Insurance on £32,000 at 4 . . . . . 1,280 . . . .	12,800

---

Sa. Rs. 3,33,600

---

About three lacs and thirty thousand rupees, supposing they brought neither freight nor passengers.—Let us now

calculate the cost for twelve months, supposing the two vessels to make together eight complete voyages to and from Suez, to consume the whole quantity of coal, and to obtain only twelve passengers each trip.

Insurance on 3,30,000, at 10 per cent. ....	Sa. Rs. 33,000
Wear and tear, at 15 .....	49,500
Coals, for 8 voyages.....	90,000
Packing, &c.....	4,000
Two engineers, at 2,000 per annum .....	4,000
Twelve engine men, at 60 per month .....	9,640
Twenty-four seamen, at 25....	7,200
Victualling .....	4,000
Table .....	5,000
Commander, at 300 per month .....	7,200
	<hr/>
	2,02,540
Receipts on 12 Passengers for 8 Voyages, at 1,200 Rupees each	2,30,400
	<hr/>
Balance in favour of Steam .....	27,960

Or about 8 per cent. and this without taking into the calculation what may reasonably be expected for carriage of Letters and Packets, which to and from this Presidency alone amount to more than 100,000 annually.

J. H. JOINSTON.

#### No. IV.

*PROCEEDINGS of a Public Meeting convened by the Sheriff, and held at the Town hall, Calcutta, on Wednesday, the 5th of November, 1823.*

A considerable number of the British inhabitants of Calcutta having assembled at the Town-hall, in pursuance of the notice issued by the sheriff on the 29th ultimo, between ten and eleven o'clock Mr. Macnaghten, the sheriff, took the chair, and stated the object of the meeting, as contained in the following letter, addressed to him on the 24th ultimo.

*To W. H. Macnaghten, Esq. Sheriff of the Town of  
Calcutta, &c. &c. &c.*

SIR,

WE, the undersigned, being desirous of promoting the general discussion of the feasibility of establishing a communication with Great-Britain, by means of steam-navigation, request that you will convene a meeting of the public at the Town-hall, for that purpose, on the 5th day of November next, at ten o'clock in the forenoon.

We are, Sir,

Your obedient Servants,

J. H. Harington,  
J. Pattle,  
C. Lushington,  
H. Shakespear,  
J. Shakespear,  
I. Paton,  
Holt Mackenzie,  
John Hayes,  
Wm. Bruce,  
J. P. Larkins,  
R. Saunders,

Wm. Arrow,  
H. Hobhouse,  
J. Palmer,  
B. Roberts,  
G. J. Gordon,  
G. Ballard,  
Nath. Alexander,  
Robt. McClintock,  
C. R. Lindsay,  
G. Mackillop,  
Alex. Colvin,

D. Clark, .  
Jas. Calder,  
J. Cullen,  
C. Blaney,  
Thos. Allport,  
W. B. Bayley,  
W. Patrick,  
J. Hunter,  
R. Boon,  
Saml. Ashmore,  
J. Mellis.

The sheriff then requested that the meeting would proceed to elect a chairman, who should bring forward and conduct the business of the day; and Mr. J. H. Harington having been elected for this purpose, took the chair accordingly.

Mr. Harington, after soliciting the indulgence of the meeting, in the discharge of a duty to which he had been unexpectedly called, submitted for consideration a general statement of the purpose for which the meeting had been convened, and referred for particulars to a gentleman present, whose prospectus, published in England, as well as at this presidency, "for establishing, by means of steam-navigation, a communication with Calcutta, and the East-Indies generally, *via* the Mediterranean, Isthmus of Suez, and the Red

Sea," had, with an address recently circulated by him, led to the measure now adopted, with a view to discuss the practicability of establishing a communication between England and India by steam-vessels, and the best means of carrying the same into effect.

Lieutenant Johnston, of the royal navy, the gentleman referred to by the chairman, addressed the Meeting at length on the very interesting subject discussed in his prospectus, and was followed by Mr. Mackillop, Mr. Larkins, and Mr. Mackenzie, who respectively offered their sentiments on the question under consideration.

The following resolutions were then moved by Mr. Larkins, seconded by Mr. Mackenzie, and unanimously adopted.

"That it is desirable to encourage the establishment of a communication between England and India by steam navigation, by the offer of a premium, or bonus, to those who may first establish it on a permanent footing, rather than by any direct attempt of so large and miscellaneous a body as the Indian community, to form themselves into a society for the purpose.

"That a Committee be appointed to consider and prepare the rules and restrictions under which the premium shall be granted, to obtain subscriptions, and to adjust the other necessary details."

It was further resolved, that the following gentlemen be elected to constitute a committee for the purposes above stated:

Mr. J. P. Larkins,	Lieutenant Johnston,	Mr. J. Grant,
Mr. H. Mackenzie,	R. N.	Mr. G. Mackillop,
Mr. J. H. Harington,	Capt. Forbes, of the	Mr. D. Clark.
Mr. J. Pattle,	Engineers,	Mr. J. Hunter,
Mr. C. Lushington,	Captain J. Jackson,	Mr. W. H. Hobhouse,
Mr. J. T. Shakespear,	Capt. Schalch,	Mr. J. Gordon,
Hon. C. R. Lindsay,	Mr. W. P. Muston,	Mr. A. Colvin,
Commodore Hayes,	Dr. J. Hare, M. D.	Mr. C. Blaney,
Capt. Bruce, Bom. Mar.	Dr. J. Mellis, M. D.	



The thanks of the Meeting were then voted to Lieutenant Johnston, to the chairman, and to the sheriff; after which the meeting was adjourned for six weeks, viz. till Wednesday, the 17th December, or such other day as may be fixed by the Committee, and notified in the Calcutta newspapers.

J. H. HARINGTON.

*Chairman.*

## PROCEEDINGS OF THE COMMITTEE.

*Proceedings of the Committee appointed to carry into effect the Resolutions passed at a public Meeting, held at the Town hall, Calcutta, on the 5th November, 1823.*

At a Meeting of the Committee, on Monday, the 10th November, 1823,

*Present*—Mr. HARINGTON, *Chairman.*

Mr. Larkins,	Lieut. Johnston, R.N.	Mr. Mackillop,
Mr. Mackenzie,	Captain Forbes,	Mr. Clark,
Mr. Pattle,	Captain Jackson,	Mr. Hunter,
Mr. Lushington,	Mr. Muston,	Mr. Hobhouse,
Mr. Shakespeare,	Dr. Hare,	Mr. Gordon,
Capt. Bruce,	Mr. Grant,	Mr. Blaney.

The Committee having taken into consideration the rules and restrictions which appear to be advisable, for regulating the grant of the premium, or bonus, referred to in the resolution passed at the Public Meeting held on the 5th instant, viz. “That it is desirable to encourage the establishment of a communication between England and India by Steam Navigation, by the offer of a premium, or bonus, to those who may first establish it on a permanent footing”—and keeping in view the object of the intended premium, with the expediency of rendering the conditions of it at once simple and and specific, agree to adopt the following rules, subject, of

course, to the approval and confirmation of the General Meeting appointed to be holden on the 17th day of December next.

*First.*—That the proposed bonus, or premium, be offered for the establishment of a communication between England and Bengal by steam packets, navigating by either of the two routes, of the Red Sea, or the Cape of Good Hope.

*Second.*—That the amount received, under a subscription to be opened for this purpose (deducting therefrom any disbursements authorized by a General Meeting, or Committee of the subscribers), be assigned as a premium to any individuals, or Company, being British subjects, who may first establish a communication by steam vessels between England and Bengal, by either of the routes above-mentioned, before the expiration of the year 1826.

*Third.*—That the communication required for the premium above stated shall be considered to have been established on the completion of two voyages from England to Bengal, and two voyages from Bengal to England, by the vessel or vessels of any individuals, or company, being British subjects, within a period not exceeding an average of seventy days for each of the four voyages; provided further, that such vessel, or vessels, be not of a less burthen than three hundred tons.

*Fourth.*—That if the full premium be not earned by any individuals, or company, under the foregoing rules, by the completion of two voyages out and two home, as required, within the limited period; but one voyage from England to Bengal, and one from Bengal to England, shall have been performed, in conformity with the preceding rules, before the expiration of the year 1826; a moiety of the stated premium shall be assigned to the individuals, or company, being British subjects, by whose vessel, or vessels, such two voyages, out and home, shall have been so performed.

*Fifth.*—That the amount subscribed for the purposes above stated (with an exception to authorized disbursements, as provided for in the second rule), be lodged, as received, or as soon afterwards as may be convenient, in the hands of the government agents; to be invested in public securities of the remittable loan; the accruing interest upon which, until the principal be called for, to be invested in the same manner; and the aggregate to be assignable as above, in whole, or in part, to the persons who may be entitled to the full premium, or a moiety of it.

*Sixth* —That all claims to the premium receivable under the foregoing rules, or to any part thereof, be finally determined by a Committee of Managers, to be elected at the general meeting of subscribers to be held on the 17th December next; and in the event of any part of the amount subscribed remaining unappropriated in the hands of the government agents at the expiration of the year 1826, and of no persons being entitled to receive the same, that the balance so remaining be returned to the subscribers, or their representatives, in proportion to their respective subscriptions, unless otherwise disposed of by the unanimous vote of a General Meeting of subscribers.

The Committee having thus performed such part of the duty entrusted to them by the public meeting of the 5th instant, as required them to consider and prepare the rules and restrictions under which the proposed premium should be granted, proceed to carry into effect the further object of their appointment, viz. “to obtain subscriptions;” and with that view, pass the following Resolutions:—

1st. That a subscription be opened for the purposes stated in the resolution passed at the public meeting held on the 5th instant, and in the rules above specified, for carrying the same into effect, or such as may be finally

adopted at the general meeting of subscribers to be held on the 17th December next; and that the Bank of Bengal, and the several agency houses in Calcutta, be requested to open subscription books, as well as to receive any subscriptions that may be tendered to them respectively; the amount to be hereafter paid into the hands of the government agents.

2d.—That the principal civil and military officers, at the several stations in the interior of the country subject to this Presidency, be also invited by the Chairman to open books of subscription; and to remit any sums that may be received by them, with a List of the Subscribers, to the Bank of Bengal; or to any of the Calcutta houses of agency.

3d.—That for the purpose of communicating the proceedings of the public meeting held on the 5th Inst and those of the Committee of the present date, to the civil and military officers who may be addressed by the Chairman, in pursuance of the above Resolution, as well as for the distribution of copies of those proceedings by the Members of the Committee, five hundred copies be printed, with any additional number that the Chairman may find requisite.

4th.—That the Bank of Bengal be authorized and requested to answer any draft from the Chairman for expenses incurred in the execution of these Resolutions.

5th.—That copies of the proceedings of the public meeting held at the Town-Hall on the 5th instant; and of the proceedings of the Committee on the present date, be submitted by the Chairman, for the information of the Right Honourable the Governor-General in Council, and that he be solicited to instruct the postmaster-general to pass, free of postage, any letters on the subject of those proceedings, which may be so certified by the superscription of the Chairman.

6th.—That the Right Honourable the Governor-General in Council be at the same time respectfully requested, in the

name of the Committee, to confer the patronage of Government upon the plan adopted for encouraging the establishment of a communication between England and India by steam navigation; and to favour it with such pecuniary support as his Lordship in Council may deem proper, on consideration of the public benefits, in addition to those of a private nature, which may be reasonably expected from its success.

(Signed) J. H. HARINGTON, Chairman.

### No. V.

*Proceedings of a General Meeting of Subscribers to the Fund for encouraging a permanent Communication by Steam-Vessels, between Great-Britain and Bengal; held at the Town-Hall, Calcutta, on Wednesday, the 27th December 1823.*

Mr. HARINGTON, Chairman of the Committee, elected at the public meeting of the 5th ultimo, having been requested to take the chair, after briefly stating the object of the present meeting, as held in pursuance of the adjournment agreed to at the public meeting above-mentioned, proceeded to read the following report on the part of the Committee then appointed.

“The Committee, appointed at the public meeting held on the 5th November 1823, for carrying into effect the resolutions passed on that date, with a view to encourage the establishment of a communication between Great Britain and India by steam navigation, have now the pleasure of reporting the proceedings for the information of the subscribers to the proposed bonus, or premium; and, at the same time, submit a copy of their correspondence with the Right Honourable the Governor-General in Council.”

“ It will appear from this correspondence, that the apprehensions of hazard attending an attempt to navigate steam vessels between Great-Britain and India, which, from the want of sufficient explanation on the part of the Committee, were entertained by Government in the first instance, have been entirely removed by the Committee’s letter of the 26th ultimo ; and that Mr. Secretary Lushington’s letter in reply, dated the 4th instant, expresses ‘ the cordial disposition of his Lordship in Council to promote an enterprize promising so much benefit to the state, and to the community,’ with his Lordship’s consequent resolution—‘ to place at the disposal of the Committee the sum of twenty thousand rupees, as a contribution towards the attainment of the object in question.’

“ The conditions attached to this liberal grant, specified in the letter above-mentioned met the ready concurrence of the Committee, as stated in their chairman’s answer of the 16th instant ; and the modifications therein proposed of the rules contained in the Committee’s proceedings of the 10th November, for regulating the grant of a premium to those who may first establish on a permanent footing a communication between Great-Britain and India by steam navigation, having been considered by the Governor-General in Council (as intimated in the concluding letter from Mr. Secretary Lushington) ‘ perfectly satisfactory,’ the rules, so modified, are now submitted for the final consideration, and adoption, if approved, of a general meeting of subscribers.”

The correspondence, referred to in the above report, was then read, as well as the proceedings of the Committee ; after which the several rules proposed by the Committee for regulating the grant of a premium, or bonus, to those who may first establish a permanent communication between Great-Britain and Bengal, by steam navigation, were unanimously adopted, with a few verbal amendments, in the following terms.

*First.*—That the proposed bonus, or premium, be offered for the establishment of a permanent communication between Great Britain and Bengal, by steam-packets, navigating by either of the two routes, of the Red Sea, or the Cape of Good Hope.

*Second.*—That the amount received, under the subscription opened for this purpose, (deducting therefrom any disbursements authorized by a general meeting, or Committee of the subscribers,) or if the nett receipts from the subscription shall exceed the sum of one lac of sicca rupees, so much thereof as shall amount to that sum, be assigned, as a premium, to any individuals, or company, being British subjects, who may first establish a communication by steam-vessels between Great-Britain and Bengal, by either of the routes above-mentioned, before the expiration of the year 1826.

*Third.*—That the communication required for the premium above stated, shall be considered to have been established on the completion of two voyages, or passages, from Great Britain to Bengal, and two voyages from Bengal to Great Britain, by the vessel or vessels of any individuals, or company, being British subjects, within a period not exceeding an average of seventy days for each of the four voyages; provided further, that such vessel, or vessels, be not of a less burthen than three hundred tons; or three hundred and fifty tons, whilst the Act of Parliament, which requires that burthen, for British ships proceeding to India, shall remain in force.

*Fourth.*—That if the full premium be not earned by any individuals, or company, under the foregoing rules, by the completion of two voyages or passages out and two home, as required, within the limited period; but one voyage from Great Britain to Bengal, and one from Bengal to Great Britain, shall have been performed, in conformity with the preceeding rules, before the expiration of the year 1826; a moiety of the stated premium shall be assigned to the indi-

viduals, or company, being British subjects, by whose vessel, or vessels, such two voyages, out and home, shall have been so performed.

*Fifth.*—That the amount subscribed for the purposes above stated (with an exception to authorized disbursements, as provided for in the second rule) be lodged, as received, or as soon afterwards as may be convenient, in the hands of the government agents, to be invested in public securities of the Remittable Loan ; the accruing interest upon which, until the principal be called for, to be invested in the same manner ; and the aggregate, provided it shall not exceed the sum of one lac of Sicca Rupees, the stated limitation of the premium, to be assignable as above, in whole, or in part, to the persons who may be entitled to the full premium, or a moiety of it.

*Sixth.*—That all claims to the premium receivable under the foregoing rules, or to any part thereof, be finally determined by the Committee of Managers, to be elected at the present general Meeting of subscribers ; and in the event of any part of the amount subscribed remaining unappropriated in the hands of the government agents, at the expiration of the year 1826, and of no persons being entitled to receive the same, that the balance so remaining be at the disposal of a general Meeting of subscribers, for any purpose connected with the object of promoting a permanent communication, by steam vessels, between Great Britain and Bengal ; either by a partial reimbursement of expense incurred in a meritorious, though unsuccessful attempt to establish steam packets as proposed, or by any other application of the unappropriated funds in hand to the purpose above stated which may appear just and proper. If any balance remain which may not be so applied, it shall be returned to the subscribers, or their representatives, in proportion to their respective subscriptions.



The meeting next proceeded to the election of a Committee of Managers, in pursuance of the last rule above stated; and it being understood that the Chairman of the late Committee, as well as several members of it, on account of their public or other engagements, wished to decline being re-elected to the permanent Committee of Management, it was resolved that this Committee shall consist of thirteen members, any five of whom to form a quorum, with a discretion to fill up vacancies, in the event of any of the members quitting the Presidency; and to call a General meeting of the subscribers when required.

It was further resolved—That the Committee of Managers, to be now elected, shall possess full power to carry into effect the whole of the Rules and Resolutions passed at this meeting; as well as to complete the subscription for the proposed bonus, or premium, which has been opened by the Committee appointed on the 5th ultimo; and to adopt such measures as may appear proper for extending the same to the Presidencies of Fort St. George and Bombay, and to the Island of Ceylon.

The following Gentlemen were then elected to constitute a Committee of Managers, for the purposes above stated:

J. P. Larkins, Esq.	J. Palmer, Esq.
Holt Mackenzie, Esq.	G. Mackillop, Esq.
J. Pattie, Esq.	D. Clarke, Esq.
C. Lushington, Esq.	J. Gordon, Esq.
Commodore Hayes,	A. Colvin, Esq.
Capt. Bruce, of the B. M.	C. C. Sutherland, Esq.
Capt. Forbes, of the Engrs.	

The Chairman laid before the meeting a book of subscriptions to the Steam Navigation Fund, by which it appeared that, including the donation of twenty thousand rupees from the Right Honourable the Governor-General in Council, the amount ascertained to have been subscribed exceeded the

sum of sixty-two thousand rupees. The Chairman, at the same time, informed the meeting, that in compliance with the resolutions of the late Committee, he had transmitted copies of their proceedings, with an address from himself, to the principal civil and military officers at the several stations in the interior of the country subject to this Presidency, and that he had received returns from Moorshedabad and Lucknow only. The subscriptions at the latter place amount to Lucknow Sicca Rupees three thousand four hundred and fifty, of which two thousand have been contributed by his Majesty the King of Oude; and five hundred by his prime minister the Nawab Moatummudoo-dowlah.

On the motion of Mr. McClintock, seconded by Capt. Hodgson, it was resolved, that the thanks of this meeting be given to the Chairman and members of the Committee appointed on the 5th ultimo, for their able and satisfactory discharge of the trust committed to them.

Also, that the best acknowledgments of the meeting, and of all persons interested in the establishment of a communication by steam vessels between Great Britain and India, are due to Lieutenant James Henry Johnston, of the Royal Navy, for his active and zealous exertions, in promoting that object.

Lieutenant Johnston, in a short address to the meeting, expressed his sense of the honour conferred upon him by this public acknowledgment, with his cordial wishes for the successful accomplishment of an object, which engaged his attention in England; and which he had the satisfaction of bringing forward in India.

The proceedings of the meeting were then closed with the usual vote of thanks to the Chairman.

J. H. HARRINGTON, Chairman.

LONDON:  
PRINTED BY COX AND BAYLES, GREAT QUEEN-STREET.

# A LETTER

TO THE RIGHT HON.

SIR JOHN CAM HOBHOUSE, BART. M.P.

PRESIDENT OF THE INDIA BOARD,

ETC. ETC. ETC.

ON

STEAM - NAVIGATION WITH INDIA,

AND

SUGGESTING THE BEST MODE OF CARRYING IT INTO EFFECT

VIA THE RED SEA.

---

BY

CAPTAIN JAMES BARBER, H.C.S.

---

LONDON :

PELHAM RICHARDSON, 23, CORNHILL.

---

1837.

“Among the various ways in which the Steam-engine has administered to the social progress of the human race, none is more important and interesting than the aid it has afforded to Navigation.”—LARDNER.

# A LETTER,

ETC. ETC.

*London, January.*

SIR,

FROM the high and responsible station you have the honour to hold in the councils of our beloved Sovereign,—presiding over the destinies of India, and charged with the honourable but arduous duties of promoting her welfare, by an equitable and just administration,—it must be a source of the most sincere gratification to you that the time has now arrived which puts the opportunity within your power of bestowing, not merely upon her people, but upon a very large portion of the inhabitants of the globe, benefits whose greatness is beyond calculation, whose limits no man

can foresee, and which would awaken towards this country feelings of the deepest gratitude and attachment in the hearts of the numerous millions of the East. If ever there was a nation blessed with the means of conferring great advantages on mankind,—that nation is England;—and nothing will so much tend to preserve to her the pre-eminent station she at present holds amongst the kingdoms of the earth, as by her following up those opportunities for universal improvement which a Divine Providence has placed within her reach.

The importance of approximating, by means of steam-communication, our possessions in the East to the mother-country is at present engaging the earnest attention of the mercantile community of Great Britain; and it is to call your particular consideration to this great object that I now, Sir, do myself the honour to address you. That I may not, however, intrude too much upon your time, I will confine my observations within as narrow bounds as the subject will permit; though in discussing so momentous and gigantic a question, arguments will naturally present themselves, which might carry me far beyond the limits of a letter.

I will here premise however, that I am not advocating any merely speculative plan, but that it is my object to further the adoption of a practical measure, whose advantages are beyond computation, and which, by promoting the general advancement of industry and science abroad, will bring to our own shores wealth and prosperity.

There can be no doubt, Sir, that you have reflected on such an undertaking, and that the combined petitions and memorials regarding it, from every part of India, bearing the signatures of all classes and all castes, have not only attracted your attention, but have also met with that consideration which, from the nature and importance of the subject, they unquestionably merit.

It ought to be borne in mind, that objections on account of supposed insuperable physical obstructions viâ the Red Sea are no longer tenable,—for practical proof has been given to show, that the objects so earnestly prayed for in the petitions just alluded to can easily be accomplished: and the British public are truly anxious to lend their co-operative aid, in furtherance of so desirable a project..

The success of the Euphrates scheme was from



the first problematical, and the failure of the expedition has proved the impossibility of adopting that line of communication; at the same time it has increased the desire for opening a regular intercourse with India by the way of Egypt and the Red Sea, the practicability of which has been so amply and so publicly testified, that I feel it quite unnecessary here to adduce any proof upon that point, particularly to a gentleman so highly distinguished as yourself for depth of enquiry and soundness of judgment. Taking then the practicability of the communication by way of Egypt and the Red Sea as an established fact, I will endeavour to show why delay in carrying it into execution is no longer admissible either with policy or justice. But before going further, I here beg leave to preface my argument by quoting the opinion of your immediate predecessor, the present Lord Glenelg, on this subject. In the debate on Steam, 1834, Mr. C. Grant is reported to have said—

“ The importance of a rapid communication with India was evident, it was of the utmost consequence by this means to bring India nearer to this country, and thereby to remove the obstacles that at present existed to the closer and more advantageous con-

nexion between England and our Indian territories. It was most desirable to do away with the obstacles which now tended to perpetuate prejudices, and which stood in the way of a free and rapid communication of improvements of all kinds. Greater security would result to our Indian empire from the course proposed to be adopted; and, in short, it was equally our interest, policy, duty, and glory to bring India more and more intimately in contact with this country by every means in our power (hear, hear.) It was our duty to confer on India every possible advantage in consequence of its connexion with Great Britain, and he appealed to the House with confidence, and called upon it to lend its assistance to this important object (hear, hear). In conclusion he should only add, that it was equally the duty and interest of England to watch all the modes of access to India with a view to the political and commercial prosperity, and the mutual advantage of both countries."

Even Mr. Hume, who above all others is the most careful of the public purse, and who never can be induced to consent to open it unless the object be of much more than ordinary importance, said also upon the same occasion, that he

" Hoped that what the committee had just heard was only a prelude to those advantages and that assistance which India had a right to expect at our hands. The state of the communication between India and England had long been a reproach to this

country, and the interference of the Post Office in charging postage of letters from India, notwithstanding there was no line of packets between the two countries, did not admit of excuse—a quick communication would be as useful to us as to the inhabitants and residents of India.”

Lord William Bentinck, who is no mean authority, has thus recorded his sentiments upon this question.

“ I have been a zealous supporter of the cause of steam-communication with Europe from the strongest conviction, confirmed by every day's further reflection, of its vast importance to innumerable interests, both national and commercial. I cannot command the opportunity of forwarding its future success, but if within my reach you may depend upon my most earnest efforts to promote its prosperity, and to obtain for India an advantage so great in all its direct and indirect consequences, that in my opinion it would be cheaply bought at any price.”

It would be easy to multiply opinions and declarations equally strong to the foregoing, in favour of this subject, but enough have been quoted for my purpose. Here let me ask what has been done? what has been the result of these legislative deliberations and resolves? It is true it has

been proved that a river with camel-fords and shifting sands is not adapted for steam-navigation—but has not that knowledge been purchased at somewhat too high a price? What information has the late expedition furnished that could not have been obtained by a simple survey of the Euphrates, which would not have cost more than a tithe of the expense? and how much more advantageously would the money that has thus been expended have been laid out on such an undertaking as the one here advocated, of the practicability of which no doubt can be entertained, and its immediate commencement only requires that countenance and support from His Majesty's Government and the East India Company which has been so reasonably sought at their hands.

The perseverance, skill, and enterprise displayed by Colonel Chesney and his gallant band are *beyond praise*; they led a forlorn hope, and have fully achieved all that could have been expected. I also respect, and would render due credit to the authorities that sanctioned the expedition under the Parliamentary recommendation; but I may be allowed to

ask, why the following Resolution, passed by the same Committee in 1834, has not yet met with similar encouragement and support ?

“ 4th. Resolved, That it is the opinion of this Committee, that the experiments which have been made have been attended with very great expense ; but, that from the evidence before the Committee it appears, that by proper arrangements, the expense may be materially reduced : and, under that impression, it is expedient that measures should be immediately taken for the regular establishment of Steam Communication with India by the Red Sea.”

Thirteen years have rolled over our heads since the first meeting at Calcutta put forth entreaties for steam-communication ; and to shew how earnestly it was then desired I may mention that 80,000 rupees were subscribed at that Presidency alone. It is well known to you, Sir, and to the British public, that since that time, the whole community of India have often repeated their ardent supplications, and munificent donations ; the result of these efforts has proved to the previously prejudiced and incredulous how weak and untenable were the objections urged, and has shewn that assistance from the Mother

Country was only required to establish a permanent intercourse by way of the Red Sea.

The time has arrived when there can be no just reason offered for further delay. The practicability of the measure has been tested—its utility was never doubted. It may, nevertheless, be right to take a brief view of some of the advantages that will arise from the undertaking, and perhaps it will be more in order to divide them into three sections, viz.—political, commercial, and moral; combined under one head they might be termed national.

The political reasons for adopting the line proposed, I shall but briefly advert to, though you, Sir, as a Statesman, know how powerfully they might be urged. The pre-occupation of the line pointed out must, at no distant period, be of paramount importance. The combustible materials of which Europe is composed make the continuance of peace problematical, and surely it would be sound policy to improve the opportunity we now possess to render our Eastern possessions secure from foreign aggression.

The ambition of France has been checked, but

not suppressed. She is now no less jealous than formerly of our supremacy in the East. Her alliance with Russia (and such a thing has been) would make it a formidable task, with our present means, to combat an invasion from the north upon our Indian territories; and however distant such a period may be, the best security for peace is to be prepared for war. Egypt at all times forms a main link in the chain connecting us with India; and, in the event of such a rupture, a friendly relationship with her Ruler would contribute in no small degree to render even the combined efforts of our enemies powerless. It behoves us, therefore, to lose no time in forming a closer and stronger alliance with the Pacha. Steam communication passing through his dominions would certainly confer vast benefits upon his country, and he, sensibly alive to the interests of his people, would be very desirous to continue to us the advantage of an uninterrupted intercourse with India. By thus approximating the latter country we should always be able to send troops to the field of action with even more facility than the Autocrat himself could

command; but it is evident, if we neglect permanently to establish a line of communication across the Isthmus of Suez and down the Red Sea, and should any other nation—France or America for example, who are multiplying their steamers in every quarter—seize the advantage of which we shall have omitted to avail ourselves, and should war arise, and that passage be closed against us, we shall then find out our error too late; we shall discover, that we have let slip the best means that would have enabled us to set at defiance all designs on our eastern dependencies.

Holding as we do such immense possessions in the East, and looking also to the increasing importance of Egypt, there is nothing of which we should be more desirous than to maintain and strengthen our good understanding with that power; and let me ask, what will tend more to forward that object than a mutual interchange of benefits? and which this undertaking would so essentially promote. America, always careful of the present and watchful for the future, has already paid several diplomatic visits to the



countries bordering on the Red Sea, to cultivate a friendly and commercial relationship, knowing it is *that* which forms the prop of *our* national wealth, and the peculiarity of our national character; and shall the skill and capital of Britain be superseded by the energies and enterprise of her child?

It may be argued that steam-communication *via* the Red Sea will also assist in cementing our relations with Persia; for it cannot be doubted but the same agency will be applied in the navigation of the Indus so soon as the *first* line of intercourse shall have been adopted. The Court of Persia would then feel an increased confidence in the ability of England to protect her from Russian oppression, and knowing that we were able to convey rapidly troops and *materiel* to our north-western frontiers would satisfy her that our power was equal to our inclination.

The “ progress and present position of Russia in the East ” has recently been well explained by a writer of no mean talent, who evidently possesses official data on which his statements are founded; and as some of the ar-

guments he uses to prove the policy of our maintaining the independence of Persia are apposite to my subject, I shall take leave to bring them before you.

“ The invasion of India by the army of Russia setting out from her present frontier to force a passage to the Indus, and overturn our empire by a ‘ coup de main,’ may be assumed to be impracticable, or at least to demand so large an expenditure and so vast a preparation as to put the attempt beyond all probability. But the difficulties of the enterprise arise chiefly from the distance which intervenes between her frontier and ours, the facility with which we could multiply impediments on so long and difficult a line, and our power to throw troops into India by sea [*how greatly would it be increased by the assistance of steam-agency ?*] in a shorter time than Russia could march them by land. Every approach of Russia towards the south is, therefore, an approach towards removing these difficulties ; and as soon as the resources of Persia shall have been placed at her disposal, and Herat shall thereby have become her southern frontier, there will no longer be any insuperable impediment to the invasion of India.” “ From the moment that she occupies this position it will become necessary so to augment our army in India, especially the European part of it, as to be prepared for the contingencies that may arise out of her proximity. This would be a large addition to our national expenditure, which would become permanent ; because if Russia were at Herat, we could no longer send out troops by sea as quickly as she could march them by land.”

“ Independent of these military considerations there are others no less important. From her present frontier, Russia not only cannot invade India, but she cannot exert in that country her disturbing influence, which is confined to Persia and Afganistan, and does not penetrate beyond them ; but, where she established at Herat, the influence she would exert in India, even in time of peace, would be such as to render the government of that country much more delicate and difficult than it now is. Those who best know India, not merely the presidencies, but the provinces, will comprehend the change that would be effected in our position there by the presence, within such a distance as to make a collision probable, of any power equal to our own. Rebellions would become more frequent and more formidable. The revenue would in many places be collected with difficulty, and in some the full amount would not be paid. The minds of all men would be unsettled, and every disturbance in the north-western provinces, every movement on the Indus or beyond it, would assume a new character, from the connexion it would or might have with the new and powerful neighbour, to whom all the disaffected would have recourse. If our financial embarrassments in India are even now a source of abundant anxiety, what would be our situation when our revenue would be diminished and our expenditure increased by some millions annually ?”

Further he states, and does so with truth,

“ The whole Mahommedan population of Central Asia dreads the power of Russia, and looks for countenance from England. It is while the first line of defence is entire, not under the fire of the

enemy's guns, that we can prepare a second. Our commercial relations are hourly extending in all that continent, and goodwill and kind feeling towards Great Britain are growing warmer and more general as that intercourse improves. It is known that our object is to defend, not to attack,—to preserve, not to overturn. Independently, therefore, of the danger of actual invasion, the advance of Russia as far as Herat, that is, the entire command of the resources of Persia, would disturb the whole system of government in India, even were she to act towards us with more forbearance and good faith than she has hitherto done, and send fewer secret agents into India than she has hitherto sent."

To keep our Indian territories free from an invasion by Russia ; the necessity for not only a close alliance with, but also for preserving the independence of Persia, is clearly proved by the foregoing arguments, and I would submit, that connecting India with England by steam communication *vid* the Red Sea, would be a powerful auxiliary to maintain the one and to insure the other. Once establish such a communication, and a fleet of merchant steam-vessels would soon be found on the Indian seas, which might at any time be made available for the transport of troops and warlike stores. Did we command such resources, Russia would be careful to avoid collision with Persia,

we should secure the co-operation of a desirable ally, and thus purchase continued peace, at a less outlay to the state than attended the war-contingent expenses of a single day during our rupture with the Burmese.

I am aware, Sir, that many more observations equally in point might be advanced in support of this part of the subject, but, for reasons already assigned, I will not pursue it further, but turn to the commercial advantages that are likely to result from the adoption of this measure. These are so numerous and embrace so wide a field of operation, that volumes might be written on that particular topic alone. However, to a reflecting mind it is not necessary to prove that a country strictly commercial requires the greatest facility of intercourse with every part of the world, and that a superiority in that respect over rival States is one of the best and most certain means of promoting her prosperity. This truism is shewn by every day's experience; whether we look to a state, a province, or a city, we perceive that the most zealous and enterprising is the most prosperous. Glasgow and Liverpool demonstrate it in our own country, and if we look to foreign nations we shall find the same result.

The present mode of communication with the East, from the time it requires, and perhaps still more from its irregularity, is so injurious to commerce that any method by which these inconveniences could be remedied must be productive of incalculable advantage, not only to the inhabitants of this country, but also to the people of British India. Demand is generally supposed to regulate supply, but the length of time that must elapse before information on these subjects can reach this country by the present manner of communicating, renders the trade to India extremely hazardous ; the markets being either over-stocked or insufficiently supplied. And from the same cause the price of East-India produce fluctuates in our home markets more perhaps than that of any other country. Not a few improvident speculations would have been prevented had it been possible to obtain prompt advices. Speedy communication will, no doubt, reduce the probability of inordinate profit, but it will also diminish the chance of serious loss ; and though the present route may not be suitable for the conveyance of general merchandize, yet it will serve for the transport of bullion ; and should adventitious causes

derange the exchanges, to have the means of supplying a remedy, which cannot be applied by the ordinary channel of conveyance, would be of great advantage to the commercial community. The desire of the merchants of England to obviate the existing evil is strongly evidenced by the names to be found in the list of subscribers to a Company now forming, and whose respectability furnishes a solid guarantee for its effectual working.

India is no longer a manufacturing country but a producing one, and now that her products are released from unjust and oppressive fiscal enactments, she only requires that facility of intercourse which the agency of steam, if rightly applied, would bestow, to develop her capabilities, and to become in a much greater degree more valuable to England than she is at present. Stimulated to industry by a just encouragement for the fruits of their labour, the people of British India will soon bring their commodities to vie with similar productions of those colonies whose exclusive privileges have hitherto secured to them an undue advantage. The quality of her staples, cotton, sugar, silk, &c. will be improved, and their quantity increased ;

the revenue will be augmented, and the population being prosperous will be restored to a condition that will enable them to purchase in much greater quantities than they have the means to do at present, the fabrics with which Great Britain can so abundantly supply them.

I have before slightly alluded to the navigation of the Indus, and it would not be difficult to prove that, if *this* line of communication were adopted, the Isthmus of Suez would be the only interruption to a direct navigation from the centre of inland commerce in Asia to the port of London, but I could weary your patience were I here to dilate on the vast importance of securing to this country the extended commerce that would result from a steam-navigation of that mighty river, running upwards of nine hundred miles through countries capable of taking off considerable quantities of British goods, and which have valuable productions to offer in return. Moreover, by navigating this magnificent river, we may obtain access to the extensive marts of the Punjab, Caubul, Cachmere, Afghannistan, Beloochistan, &c. which now draw a few supplies from Bombay and Calcutta, though nearly five months are occupied in conveying them, with much



expense and danger in transit, from the latter city to Umritsir ; and almost half the time is necessary to transport them from the first-named presidency to the same place ! It is natural, that under these circumstances none but the costlier sorts of our fabrics are carried there ; for burdened with the additional charges incidental to such circuitous and tardy conveyance, the commoner kinds of our manufactures cannot, under such disadvantages, compete with those of Russia, who has consequently almost the monopoly of those markets, though our cloths, chintzes, cottons, and hardware, are much esteemed there. Were a direct communication with these places established, and that such will be the case is one of the probable effects of steam intercourse, *viâ* the Red Sea, with India, our manufactures would be introduced into the very heart of Central Asia at almost the same cost, and in nearly as short a time as they are at present laid down in Bombay or Calcutta ; the inhabitants of those countries being thus enabled to procure them at a cheap rate, their consumption would be extended, and though now esteemed luxuries, they would then come into general use.

Do not the people of the East merit every bene-

fit at our hands? Is not India one of the brightest gems in the British crown? It is true that it has been kept too long in its old-fashioned setting, but the day is not far distant when it will shine forth with tenfold additional lustre, eclipsing the numerous but minor jewels that encircle the diadem of England.

But, Sir, it is not on India alone that this proposed undertaking would confer such advantage. The highway from Ceylon to New South Wales is through seas particularly adapted for steam-navigation, and it is bordered on either side by islands and countries, some of which at this time consume large quantities of our merchandize. China, Leucania, Australia, New Zealand, and the whole eastern world would benefit from the contemplated measure.

But to come something nearer home, Syria, Abyssinia, Arabia, and the eastern coast of Africa all promise increased outlets for the industry and enterprise of the British manufacturers, who will share in a pre-eminent degree the advantages to be derived from an object as beneficial in the result as it appears vast in the consideration. We have heard much of Indian colonization, but where is it to

be found? Let us here look at the numerical strength of the European population in our Eastern empire.

Company's servants, civil and military	10,000
Ecclesiastical.....	180
His Majesty's forces ..	22,000
European inhabitants.....	4,820

Thus the total number is 37,000, exclusive of women and children. What an insignificant fraction when compared to the 100,000,000 of natives that are subject to our sway. What prevents a rapid yearly increase, now settlement is permitted under the present charter?—the immense distance—let us approximate India to England by means of steam communication; let a passage of 7,000 miles, or sixty days, be substituted for the present tedious and uncertain voyage of four months, over about 14,000 miles, and European residents in Asia would soon be multiplied.

It has been said a great influx of Europeans to India would embarrass the executive; the assertion would carry with it the inference of the insufficiency of the Government. So far, however, from respectable European settlers (and the supe-

rior advantages which other Colonies offer will deter mere adventurers from resorting to India) obstructing the Government, the reverse would be the fact, for then having a permanent interest in the soil, and having every thing to lose and nothing to gain by anarchy, they would not only zealously co-operate with the Government in promoting the welfare of the country, but as strenuously oppose measures injurious to its prosperity. The philanthropist, the man of science, the merchant, will have fresh scope for their pursuits : how large a number of the native portion of the human family need the care of the first ! vast is the prospect for the observations and discoveries of the second ! and extensive marts are already established for the wares of the last.

Now then let us consider, Sir, the moral consequences to the people of India, that are likely to result from this steam communication, and not to the people of India alone, but to a very large portion of our fellow-creatures hitherto but little known to the Christian world.

When we reflect how little comparatively has been done to raise the moral character of millions subjected to our rule, I fear that the sin of

OMISSION will stand prominent against us as a nation, that "has received much but given little."

At this time, as in the darkest ages of the past, the same prejudices, superstition, and idolatry prevail; while therefore it is matter of painful and serious consideration to every reflecting mind, it more becomes the Statesman to enquire after the readiest and best means to remove the cause of such long-continued ignorance and error.

The moral principle of a people, which is the key-stone to their happiness and prosperity, mainly depends upon laws wisely framed and justly administered. To enact wise laws it is necessary to have a pre-knowledge of the wants and conditions of the governed, and that they may be justly administered, a ready and easy access to the governors is also requisite. That little has been known of India in our legislative councils is generally admitted, but not the less to be deplored. How is this evil to be corrected? by approximating the two countries—and to do so it is only necessary to appropriate to that object the knowledge which Providence has placed in our hands for the use and benefit of mankind. Let me ask what has hitherto prevented the higher and better educated classes of India from more

frequenting a country, with which their best interests are associated?—a long sea-voyage is the answer, to which they have objections, inseparable from their customs, and repugnant to the observances of their religion. What mode, then, can we adopt to bring them into contact with a nation whose advance has so far outstepped their standard of human improvement? Is not this worth enquiry? Remove the barrier that obstructs the way; give the people of India greater facilities for coming to England; afford them the means of becoming acquainted with the finest feelings of our nature, our moral ties, our social habits, and our principles of government;—receive them as brethren, not as aliens; as fellow-subjects, not as foreigners, and more will be done in a few years to effect a happy change in misguided millions, than we can hope to see accomplished in ages, if we still suffer them to depend for improvement on the inconsiderable though zealous, and persevering efforts of those only whom philanthropy, ambition, or necessity, may lead amongst them.

This again is evidenced by comparing the intellectual attainments of native gentlemen who have visited foreign countries, with the contracted ideas

of their (so called) well educated countrymen, whose orbit, from their own and kindred's prejudices, has been confined to the narrow circle of their native province, or perhaps even to the place of their birth. That much may be expected from the natives of India by an increased intercourse with Europeans is satisfactorily proved by the mental acquirements of the late celebrated but ill-fated Rammohun-Roy, and by those of other native gentlemen who are met with at the presidencies of India ; while in the provinces, where the opportunity of associating with Europeans is less frequent, the natives of high rank are by comparison but meagrely informed.

It is then fair to assume that nothing would tend more to the civil and moral improvement of the people of India, than the great and rapid intercourse a Steam-Packet Establishment would create between Europe and Asia.

And, Sir, I shall take leave to place before you the sentiments delivered by the Lord Bishop of Calcutta on this subject :—

“ I make no apology for taking a deep and intense interest in that which is the most grand, benevolent, scientific, and wonderful project that has occurred to my observation either in Europe

or during the short time I have been in the country, and if there be any one point of the present state of the civilized world which must fix the attention of the man of science, the man of literature, the man of philanthropy, and the man of benevolence, to say nothing of the most sacred cause of religion, I say if there be any one point that can unite more than any other the feelings and anxieties, it is the consideration of how we may accomplish an union between two most distant countries; and what has been said to the matter as relates to the arts and sciences and to the other objects with which it has connection—what is it that delays and is an impediment to them? Distance—what is it that is to unite them? Approximation—I should like any gentleman to say, of those who are well acquainted with such subjects, what in his opinion has been discovered of late that so much opens the access to future improvement as the present project?

“I think it fortunate that a friendship of twenty-five years which I have had the happiness of enjoying with the President of the Board of Control, Mr. C. Grant, whom I mention with feelings of veneration and love, has put me on a footing with him that has enabled me to employ the ties and claims of friendship and long encouraged sympathy to recommend to his mind in my private correspondence the important interests engaged in the design at home, and I have not the slightest doubt any more than I am standing here that he will give the petition of the Governor its full weight, and that you will have your two lacs of rupees a year.”

The revenue we derive from India is large—the benefit she receives from our protection is also



great, but it cannot be denied that we have not assisted her to the extent that is due.

I will here quote another high authority, who says, *speaking of India*,

“ We have nothing to give to the natives but our superior knowledge. Every thing else we take from them—the revenues—the honours—the private emoluments of their country. In fact the greater proportion of the advantages which their own country affords go into our hands—We have however *our knowledge* to give them in return, and if this obligation is properly fulfilled, all the advantages which we derive from them will in the end be most amply repaid.”

The same gentleman goes on to observe that,—

“ While thousands of our countrymen are sent out to carry on the civil and military government of the country,” very few have been “ deputed to communicate the light of superior knowledge ; but it is not too late, and we may be assured that this mode of spending a portion of the public revenue will contribute more to improve the intellectual and social condition of the natives and to make them faithful and attached subjects than any other mode that could be adopted.”—

The passage round the Cape of Good Hope may offer the best channel for the conveyance of goods ;

to continue it for the transmission of letters and passengers is to maintain a barrier between ourselves and the natives of India; it is to exclude them from the advantages to be derived by an *assimilation of customs, manners, and character; in short, it is to preserve ignorance and to perpetuate prejudices by causing the estrangement of those kindly feelings towards the people of the East, which nothing but the immense space between us and them prevents being manifested and exercised.*

I have said we must not, in estimating the moral influence that steam-power will confer, confine our views to India; it will indeed bless all lands and countries through which its benevolent stream may flow, irrigating the soil, and uprooting those rank weeds which are the common growth of human nature, thereby preparing the mind to receive that good seed which, under proper cultivation, would produce in due season a bountiful harvest. This assumption is beautifully carried out by Mr. Money, who said, at a meeting for promoting Steam-Communication at Bombay,

“ He hoped soon to see one more line drawn, when the great communication was opened, which would stretch from the heart and centre of civilised Europe—our own country—to the re-

most part of the world, connecting in its extent climes and regions utterly disconnected before, and linking people together who were as separate in their habits and prejudices as they were in complexion." " Let us," continued Mr. Money, " view the subject with the unprejudiced eyes of philanthropy. Had Christian civilization spread over the world that no parts remained unreclaimed from the degrading influence of ignorance or the ferocity of savage life? and could we suppose that the inhospitable shores of Arabia, the wild deserts of Egypt, and the sacred land of Syria would reap no benefit by being shut in as it were between two enclosed hemispheres? Would they form the thoroughfare for the passenger and traveller only, and pick not up one crumb of the many blessings which these enjoyed, but be condemned to feed on the husks of ignorance for ever? Would Britain and India add to their own influence, and these the immediate regions continue to be trodden under foot as they had been for centuries past? And should strangers wonder at the monuments of their ancient splendour and glory, and be unmindful of their fallen state, and of the depravity and misery around them? No. Wherever commerce and rapid intercourse stretched their arms Christian civilization must follow, and while we gloried in our thousand modern discoveries and in our rapid march of intellect, we could not come in contact with such interesting nations as these, and not communicate to them a large portion of the blessings that we enjoy." " Let none then," added Mr. Money, " throw a damp over an undertaking fraught with so much promise, and favoured by so many anticipations; if the plan appeared to some persons too magnificent to be achieved, let them remember that great ends must have great aims in those that would attain them ;

that none of the wonderful works of modern days would ever have been completed if the energy of man had found a stumbling-block in the objections of the timid and the blindness of the narrow-minded."

In concluding this part of my subject, Sir, I trust that the benefit which will result from a more easy and expeditious access to our eastern possessions is too apparent to require the cause of steam-communication to be set forth as a project to allure speculators by holding out promises of immediate and exorbitant pecuniary profits ; it requires not the aid of deception to enlist supporters. Its promoters advocate it on nobler principles, and base their arguments on humanity, equity, and truth.

Having therefore the power to do good, shall we withhold it ? Shall we expend millions in liberating the bodies of our slaves in the West, and shall we refuse to avail ourselves of the means that will emancipate the minds of our free subjects in the East from the prejudices and errors by which they are at present shackled ? Shall we as stewards bestow on a few those blessings which the Divine Almoner has entrusted us to dispense to the whole ? Shall we only use our

supremacy in the East for our own aggrandisement, or shall our country be ennobled in the records of posterity by the title of the Just?

*Brief and imperfect, Sir, as are the foregoing remarks, still enough has been advanced to induce a reflecting mind to deliberate on the important subject on which I have done myself the honour to address you. I hope I have successfully proved that steam communication between this country and India will be advantageous to both, and that when permanently established it will unite our kingdoms, strengthen the government, ameliorate the governed, improve our colonies, increase our revenues, extend our alliances, weaken the competition of our rivals, give us priority in distant markets, confirm our reputation for humanity, redound to our honour, and reflect the lustre of our national glory.*

Having offered a few observations on each of the sections into which I have divided my subject, and though sensible that I can have brought forward no new incentive to urge you to sanction and adopt, by your recommendation, this grand yet simple undertaking, I might now conclude; but I cannot close my present address without availing my-

self of the opportunity respectfully to offer my opinion on that which I consider the best plan of carrying into effect this much desired communication by steam.

*Three modes present themselves to my mind by which it may be accomplished—by His Majesty's Government—by the East-India Company—or by a private association.* You, Sir, are the better judge how far His Majesty's Government would be sanctioned in forming a packet establishment for Colonies of which the Crown has delegated the rule to a chartered company that receives their revenues and sways their destinies. It cannot be denied that His Majesty has the power, but it may be questioned how far it would be expedient, under present circumstances, for the Government to use it. The Chancellor of the Exchequer has recorded his opinion, and according to my judgment it is a sound one; that it is more beneficial to the state to avail itself as a contractor of the capital and productive genius of the people than to outlay the public funds as a capitalist on experiments and adventures which, however desirable or feasible, are generally better worked and more prudently and economically managed by private individuals. I will content

myself with this view of the subject, and though evidence taken before a Committee of the House of Commons estimates the expense of keeping up a communication between Suez and India once in two months at a sum for the outlay of which all parties might not be disposed to vote in unison,—no such opposition can be expected to a contract which, for a moderate and specific charge, (*scarcely exceeding a moiety of that which was deemed requisite to maintain a mail every two months for half the distance,*) would ensure a regular monthly packet through the entire route.

The arguments of the Minister of Finance are as justly applicable to the East-India Company as to the Crown; for if it would be more advantageous to the latter to be the passive instruments in such an undertaking, it is not too much to infer that no pecuniary benefit would accrue to the former by becoming the active agents in the same measure. Were there a large accumulating fund on which the Directors could draw for the outlay necessary to establish and to keep in work the proposed line of packets, they might be able to compete on more equal terms with a private company formed for the sole object, and

having abundant capital ; but while the revenues of India are barely sufficient to meet the current expenditure, a question may arise with the Proprietary how far it would be judicious to allow the large sum to be expended the Directors have stated to be necessary, and which has hitherto prevented this undertaking being carried into effect ; neither must it be forgotten that, even should the East-India Company establish packets, the public could not unhesitatingly rely that they would be continued in that service. The indisposition of the Honourable Court to employ for that purpose the vessel they have long had in commission in India, does not augur favourably for the future regular or permanent continuance of such accommodation by them. It might also be shewn that the East-India Company are not the fittest instruments for planning the proposed operation or for carrying it into execution ; but it is needless to occupy your time or attention for that purpose, as it is difficult to believe that they will reject the moderate offer that has been made to them, which will give them the benefit of having their despatches and messengers, regularly, expeditiously, and safely conveyed, and relieve them from the anxiety and



probable loss that would attend the undertaking if worked by themselves.

This brings me to consider a plan of which the Prospectus lies before me for carrying this international communication into effect by a chartered company.

In doing so I must suppose that there have been insurmountable objections to prevent the Crown and the East India Company carrying into effect the recommendation of the House of Commons, or the measure would not have been so long delayed, fraught as it would be with so many advantages to the State, and as equally calculated to bestow prosperity and happiness on the millions subjected to her rule; while, on the other hand, the arrangement of the project under consideration offers no valid or reasonable objection, or at least none but what might be easily overcome, in the settlement of the detail should His Majesty's Government be pleased to entertain it.

It appears by the prospectus, that

“ The Annual Expenditure is estimated at £136,500, and includes a charge of £25 per cent. on the outlay, for wear and tear,

Insurance, Interests to Subscribers at £5 per cent. on Capital paid up, and a Fund to perpetuate Property."

Forty thousand pounds annually are asked from the State for services to be performed ; viz.—conveying by contract the Post-office monthly mails to Cadiz, Gibraltar, Malta, and Alexandria, *and despatches from the Crown to and from India.*

As the net cost of the packets employed by His Majesty's Government on that particular service, as far as the Mediterranean, must greatly exceed the amount here required, it will be in fact a reduction of expenditure, so that, I presume, no objection can be made on that head.

Twenty-five thousand pounds per annum are also solicited from the East India Company. The service tendered for such a sum being that of carrying from them monthly despatches to and from India ; and though even this sum must be taken from the revenues of India, yet surely there would be no opposition to the grant, seeing that the people who contribute the money will obtain at this moderate charge a *complete packet establishment*, the object they have so long and so earnestly sought for in vain.

The difference between the foregoing amounts

and the sum estimated to be necessary, by the proposed Company, to cover the expenses of a packet establishment, is computed to be, I perceive, seventy-one thousand five hundred pounds, and this risk it appears the Proprietary are willing to take upon themselves, calculating that it will be met by the postage of letters to and from India, passengers, and other contingencies.

I must admit that since this measure claimed my *serious attention*, the object I first had in view has been very much enlarged. Daily investigation has *developed new interests*, and careful consideration has convinced me that such an undertaking can only be effectually matured by the *undivided attention* and skill of a board of practical men, and after the scheme shall have been brought into operation, in order to continue its working with success, it will still require from its growing importance the same concentrated superintendence. In short, Sir, it is my firm opinion, which however is deferentially given, that the adoption of any other mode than the one I have just alluded to will terminate either in failure and disappointment, or prove a drain on the public purse unwarranted because unnecessary.

On the other hand, it may be urged with some reason, that before committing a measure of such vast and gigantic importance into private hands, the Government should pause, and be careful to require security sufficient to protect the public rights, and to ensure a due performance of the contract. On that head I need only to remark that the principle and expediency of this undertaking being once admitted, its details will be of easy arrangement. It must be remembered, that this proposed association or chartered company will be chiefly composed of the mercantile interests of the country, mustering in its ranks many persons of the greatest commercial wealth and influence. In fact, Sir, it will be composed of parties so deeply interested in the efficient working of the scheme, that the greatest reliance may be placed on their carrying it into effect to its fullest extent, and at the least possible charge consistent with safety, expedition, and regularity.

In conclusion, it becomes me to observe, that though I have taken leave thus prominently to address you and to place before you in the foregoing observations my own sentiments on this subject, I claim no merit beyond an honest zeal for the general good. I must not, however, omit to

pay—for it is as much my inclination as it is my duty—a just tribute of respect to the talent, enterprise, and exertions of Major Charles Franklin Head, to whom the public are much indebted for the progress that has already been made towards the accomplishment of this object, and who I am proud to be permitted to call my friend. His merits have long been before the public, and though tried by the pointed shafts of criticism, they have passed the ordeal with distinguished honour to himself, and satisfaction to his friends.

Finally, Sir, I have taken leave to annex a copy of a letter written by Lord William Bentinck, when Governor-General of India, which breathes forth the most comprehensive ideas, and with a master-mind grapples with this question. I also add a copy of a Circular from the people of Calcutta—and, Sir, with many apologies for having thus far trespassed on your attention, and earnestly hoping that you will give this subject that consideration which it so justly deserves, I have the honour to subscribe myself most respectfully,

Your very obedient and humble servant,

JAMES BARBER.

*Letter from the Governor General to G. Norton, Esq.*

*Ootacamund, 11th of April, 1834.*

DEAR SIR,

I beg you will express from me to the Subscribers of the Madras Steam Fund, the gratification which I have received from the extract of their Resolutions, communicated in your obliging letter of the 31st March: concurring entirely in the opinion of that meeting, “that this project opens vast and incalculable benefit to our own country and *mankind*,” I could not do otherwise than warmly participate in the general feeling of India, and I have not therefore hesitated in recommending, as far as a prudent regard for the finances would allow, a liberal aid being afforded by Government to the common effort.

I confess that my anticipation of the expected benefit goes far beyond the more obvious results, great as those undoubtedly would be,—of improved government, of the welfare of the people as effected by such improvement, of the promotion of commerce,—and of what may be considered of minor importance, of the comfort of our own numerous countrymen, separated by such great distance of time and place from all connection with their dearest interests. The limit assigned by the Resolution is expressed by the large term of *mankind*, and in my judgment appropriately and correctly; because the great want of this eastern world,

India, China, &c. may be comprehended in the single word "knowledge." If the moral condition and happiness of the most enlightened countries suffer from this cause, it can be easily conceived that on this great space, where the human mind has been buried for ages in universal darkness, the task must be hopeless unless the same means which have alone accomplished the object elsewhere are brought into action, and these means increased and enforced with all the encouragement the governing authority can bestow. *I look to steam navigation as the great engine of working this moral improvement.* In proportion as the communication between the two countries shall be facilitated and shortened, so will civilized Europe be approximated, as it were, to these benighted regions, and in no other way can improvement in any large stream be expected to flow in. Past experience shows what we have to expect for the future. I shall take the liberty of enlarging upon this topic.

For much more than half a century the British dominion has been established at the three presidencies over a great extent of territory with a large dependent population. Examining attentively the intellectual condition of these numerous communities, it cannot be denied that little progress comparatively has been made in the acquisition of useful knowledge. There prevail throughout, as in the darkest ages of European history, the same ignorance and superstition; the same belief in witchcraft; the same confidence in charms and incantations; the same faith in astrology and omens, the practice of human immolations of all sexes and ages, and many other barbarous customs opposed to true happiness and repugnant to the best feelings that Providence has planted in the human breast. Again, also, in the arts and

sciences, in every branch of useful attainment, the ancient usages and learning retain their unimpaired sway. In medicine and surgery, in chemistry, in hydraulics, in mechanics, in civil engineering, in painting, sculpture, and music, we observe them all, with exception of a few individuals of superior talents and ambition, remaining stationary in their primitive rudeness and ignorance, and yet, during this long interval, thousands of well-educated Europeans deeply versed in all these branches of knowledge, have been succeeding each other, and domiciliated for years in the country. Why, it will be asked, had all this science, this learning, and this ability to impart instruction passed away, without leaving any trace or impress on the mind of India, although in no other part of the world does there exist greater quickness of intellect, a more eager thirst after knowledge, or superior aptitude to acquire it? The answer to this question is plain and obvious. The cause is to be found in the past principle of our rule, of rigidly precluding the free admission of Europeans to India, the direct consequence of which, whatever in other respects may have been its advantages, has been to dam up in a great degree the main channel of improvement into India. It may be assumed that  $\frac{1}{20}$ th parts of the importation of Europeans have consisted of the Company's servants. They have had of course other duties to perform, occupying the whole of their time, and the fault lies not with them, if they have contributed little or nothing to this object. The Government, indeed, may perhaps be accused of omission, and of not having done as much as they might, but I doubt, even with more exertion on their part, whether, while the same system lasted, much progress would have been made.



All the improvements of the description to which I have been adverting are exclusively due to the skill and enterprise of individuals, aided by the capital of the Houses of Agency. Every indigo and coffee plantation, the Gloucester mills, the works of every description that are moved by steam, the iron-foundries, the coal-mines worked after the European fashion, and the other great establishments that we see around us in Calcutta, are so many great schools of instruction, the founders of which are the real improvers of the country. It is from the same sources that we must expect other schoolmasters of new and improved industry. The new Charter will remove many obstacles, but steam-communication far more.

But, with the opinion I entertain, that the extent of colonization (as it is misnamed) and the effects of it have been very much overrated, I am convinced, that the knowledge and instruction so much needed by India can never be sufficiently provided by European colonists and speculators only. The natives themselves must be encouraged to go to Europe, there to study in the best schools of all the sciences. This opinion I know to be entertained by some of the intelligent members of a Committee now sitting in Calcutta to consider the best means of educating the natives in the higher branches of medicine and surgery. The Pacha of Egypt has given a noble example in this respect to the rulers of rude and unlearned nations.

The circumstances that have hitherto operated as a complete barrier against the intercourse of the natives with Europe, except the classes of sailors and of menial servants, have been, 1st, Certain customs as to food prescribed by the Hindoo religion; and 2dly, and mainly, the length, the expense, and the appre-

hension also of so long a voyage. In respect to the first of these obstacles, Ram Mohun Roy, who will be of illustrious memory among his posterity, has broken the ice ; and I know that some, and I have no doubt that other, rich and well educated natives are preparing to tread in his footsteps, with the same laudable desire of seeing what India *may become* by what Europe, and especially England, *is* ; and of raising their country by the same means from the moral and political degradation in which she is plunged. With respect to the second obstacle, which makes the attempt almost impossible to the great class of students, however willing ; to those who are to be the practical operatives and the introducers of the new arts and sciences, and will become the best teachers of their countrymen, steam-navigation, with the aid of Government and of those interested in India's welfare, will go far to remove it. I was happy to learn from the same members of the Medical Committee that natives thoroughly acquainted with the English language would, if assisted, be ready to embark immediately in that pursuit, and necessarily in others of the same utility.

I will therefore conclude this too long detail by saying, that it is " knowledge " that is needed. Knowledge alone can raise this country to a higher standard among the nations of the world : and with the sentiments I have expressed of the best and most effectual mode of attaining these great purposes, the Steam Committee are amply borne out, according to my firmest conviction, in their resolution, " that this project opens vast and incalculable benefit to our country and to *mankind*."

I have the pleasure of transmitting the copy of a Minute, recommending to the favourable consideration of the Honourable

Court the plan of the Steam-Committee in Bengal for establishing a direct communication between Suez and the ports on the eastern side of the Peninsula. You will perceive in this paper a repetition of the assurance which I had the pleasure of expressing to you at Madras, that there existed no intention of sacrificing in any manner the interests of Bombay. The questions are, which is the most useful line in India in general, and will the benefit be commensurate to the expense? There can exist no more difficulty in establishing a steam-communication with Calcutta than with Bombay. The Forbes and Hugh Lindsay may be unequal to the undertaking, but it will be easy to procure steamers of adequate power for the purpose: and as for the south-west monsoon, I believe, upon very good authority, that even during the period, which is very short in duration, when it is at its height, the weather is not worse than that which is constantly overcome by steamers in the English and Irish Channels.

I remain,

Dear Sir,

Your faithful servant,

(Signed)

W. C. BENTINCK.

*The following Circular, dated 9th April, 1836, has been addressed by the Committee in India for promoting Steam Navigation, to the People of England. It requires no comment.*

“ To those who have spent any portion of their lives in this country, and have returned to their native home, nothing need be said touching the value and importance, in every point of view, of shortening that interval one-half.

“ To those who have never experienced the anxiety arising from such a separation from their dearest connexions, and to those who may hitherto have had occasion to give the subject any consideration at all, it may be necessary briefly to notice the vast importance of the establishment of a thorough and complete steam communication between England and all parts of India.

“ The value of such a communication to natives of the British isle, whose lot is cast in India, from the Governor-General himself to the humblest individual, has been referred to; and there are many in England who will, from the experience of their own anxiety, readily concur in feeling the value of such early information.

“ But great and important as may be the advantages of such a communication to such persons, including every single individual, male and female, of British birth, they are in reality nothing in the scale of advantages which must necessarily result to both countries from steam communication between England and *all*

*parts of India*, if established on those principles alone which have in the like cases been found to answer, namely, speed, regularity, security, and the junction of all places of importance interested in the mutual intercourse.

“ A reference to the incalculable benefits which have arisen in England during the last seventy years, from the increased facilities of intercourse, derived from : first, the establishment of mail-coaches, and their extension to all the most distant parts of the country, with the consequent improvement of the roads ; then the canals, and finally, the establishment of steam-vessels, as well for coast as inland navigation, and above all that of railroads, is alone sufficient to shew the truth of Lord William Bentinck’s opinion, that the advantages direct and indirect of a steam communication between England and India are so great that they ‘ would be cheaply bought at any price.’

“ If the general shortening of the time required for intercourse, personal and written, between the several places in England having mutual relations, has been productive of such great advantages, it is easy to see that a similar reduction in the periods of intercourse between two such countries as England and British India cannot fail to induce like advantages, in the ratio of their far more extended and far more important mutual interests and duties.

“ To India England is indebted for wealth, for fame, and in some degree for the prominent station she holds among the nations of the world. In return she has a duty to perform to the countless millions subject to her sway—a duty which never can be performed as it ought to be until the barrier which upholds their mutual ignorance, and thence fosters their mutual prejudices, is broken down.

“ That barrier once removed, can it be for one moment doubted that the arts, the sciences, the civilization, the capital of England would rapidly find their way to India? Their very nature is to extend. They only require a road, and when that is made easy to any place needing their presence they cannot but go—India does need them, and England can furnish them—and it is her duty to do so.

“ It is her bounden duty to open wide the doors of India for the entry and spread *emphatically* of the KNOWLEDGE of Europe. It is the one thing needed in India to enable her to advance as *under the dominion of England* she ought to do in the scale of Nations, and this can only be done effectually by approximating the two countries in the manner proposed.

“ Among the advantages to England would be more ready employment of capital with consequent extension of Commerce, and the greater security of the Indian Empire ; but it is of course impossible in an address of this nature to point out minutely the advantages of such a communication. To those who give attention to it, these advantages become more and more apparent, and nothing would appear to be wanting to ensure that communication being established, as it ought to be on the most enlarged and perfect scale, but a similar general expression of the public desire of the British Islands as has now been long declared through all parts of India ; and in the hope of inducing that expression this appeal is made.”

THE END.



**OBSERVATIONS**  
**ON**  
**STEAM COMMUNICATION**  
**BETWEEN**  
**INDIA AND SUEZ,**

**BY**  
**J. H. CRAWFORD, Esq.**

**PUBLISHED BY THE BOMBAY STEAM FUND  
COMMITTEE.**

**BOMBAY.**

**PRINTED AND PUBLISHED FOR THE PROPRIETORS,  
AT THE COURIER PRESS, BY SORABJEE DORABJEE,**

**No. 9, Church Lane.**



**1834.**





# GEORGE ASHBURNER, Esq.

*Secretary to the Bombay Steam Fund Committee,*

BOMBAY.

SIR.—I have the honor to enclose sundry papers (vide margin) connected with the Plans, that have been laid before the Public, during the last twelve or fifteen months, for the establishment of a regular and permanent Steam Communication between India and England, viâ Suez, which I am hopeful, may not be without use at some future period, and which you will oblige me, by laying before the Bombay Steam Fund Committee, to be dealt with as they may think fit.—I have thought it right, to submit another copy of these papers, to the consideration of the Right Hon'ble the Governor General at this place, and I shall forward a third one, to the Chairman of the Subscribers to the Madras Steam Fund, as soon as practicable.

The circumstances to which the observations now transmitted, owe their rise, are sufficiently explained, in the first and second paras. of those first noticed in the margin, and the grounds of my opinions and conclusions, sufficiently detailed, I hope, in the course of them, to relieve me from the necessity of making more than one or two remarks, in this place.

The estimates of the Committee of the New Bengal Steam Fund, in respect to the extent of correspondence, public and private, that is likely to arise, in the infancy of Steam Communication, appear to me to be much too large, to rely on, as a criterion of the Receipts to be expected from Postage, in the outset; ei-

1. Observations on Capt. Wilson's pamphlet on Steam communication with Suez—and on that of Mr. Green-laws.

2. Observations on the letter from the Bengal New Steam Fund Committee to the Supreme Government, &c

3. Tables of postage, distance, &c. referred to in the observations above mentioned.

ther under the Bombay Plan, or their own more comprehensive scheme : and although, I have adopted their estimates, in the 26th para. of my Observations, on the Committee's letter to the Supreme Government of the 28th January last, when treating of the Receipts and Expenditure by the Bombay route, I would be allowed to say, that I do not look for so satisfactory a result from the Bombay plan, at any very early period, as that estimate has enabled me to exhibit: though I do, from every consideration I have been able to give the subject, firmly believe, that the Receipts will from the commencement, bear a greater proportion to the necessary disbursements between India and Suez by Bombay, than they could be made to do, under the Bengal plan, or by any other practicable route.

If the limited correspondence anticipated by the Bengal Committee, viâ Bombay, in their 14th para. 50,000 single letters each way annually, could be depended upon, and the Public Dispatches be guaranteed to reach the amount, noticed in their 13th para. 25,000 each way annually,—which the Committee consider the most limited scale the latter should be taken at, or if in other words, the Committee's apprehensions in respect to the insufficiency of this route, for the purposes of private and public correspondence, could happily be realized, and their discouraging estimates—discouraging I mean in their view of the case—be confided in, we might start at once in full confidence of success, for the receipts would exceed the expenditure, and capital soon be found, to establish

the intercourse between India and England, viâ Suez on a firm and permanent basis.

It has been my endeavour, in the comparisons I have drawn, between the two plans under consideration, to adopt the data of Mr. Greenlaw and the Bengal Committee, to the utmost practicable extent, and when obliged by circumstances, to have recourse to data of my own (the Tables of Postage, Distance, &ca. for instance) I have been willing to derogate in some degree, from the advantages of the Bombay plan; by concessions in favor of the Bengal one, rather than incur the imputation of unfairness in any way:—should I, however, contrary to all intention on my part, have dealt uncandidly with any part of the Bengal statements or arguments, I shall be ready to rectify my error on being made sensible of its existence.

I have the honor to be,

Sir,

Your most obedient servant,

J. H. CRAWFORD.

*Ootacamund, Neilgherry Hills, 24th July, 1834.*

# **·OBSERVATIONS ON CAPTAIN WILSON'S PAMPHLET ON STEAM COMMUNICATION WITH SUEZ, AND ON THAT OF MR. GREENLAW.**

Reasons for undertaking this examination of the different plans that have been proposed for introducing a regular Steam communication, between India and England, viâ Suez, detailed.

Captain Wilson's pamphlet on Steam communication between Bombay and Suez, and his Supplementary Observations annexed.

Mr. Greenlaw's observations on the proposed communication between

**PARA. 1.**—The interest I always felt in the successful establishment of a regular Steam Communication, between India and England, viâ Suez, and of which it is known to my personal friends in Bombay, and many others in its neighbourhood, I was one of the earliest and warmest supporters, has led me even at this distance from the several Presidencies, to be as attentive an observer of the discussions that have taken place on this important subject, during the past twelve months, as the irregular receipt of information through the Calcutta, Madras, and Bombay Newspapers, would permit:—but, it is only within the last few days that the possession of the several documents named in the margin has enabled me to obtain a clear, and connected idea, of the different plans that have been proposed for the attainment of this most desirable object, and a knowledge of the grounds on which each has been recommended to the support of Government and countenance of the public.

**2.**—In the belief that a review of these Plans, or rather such notice of them, as a careful perusal of the publications above referred to, has suggested to my mind, may not be altogether without interest, even at this time, and that some of the observations that have occurred to me, may be found useful at a future period, I have been induced to throw the

England and India, by way of the Red Sea.

Mr. Waghorn's address to the British public in India, Ceylon, the Straits and China—and Addenda.

Letter from the Committee of the New Bengal Steam Fund to Government, of the 26th January 1834, published in the India Gazette of the 16th April.

Circulars No. 1, 2, and 3—addressed to various Merchants and others in England, by the Secretary to that Committee.—India Gazette 17th April,—and—Letters No. 1, 2, 3—and 4 to the Honorable the Court of Directors—the Colonial Secretary—the Secretary to the Board of Controul—and Secretary to the General Post Office—from the latter paper (17th April.)

various memoranda, originally made for my own satisfaction, into a more intelligible shape, for the eventual consideration of those, with whom the final arrangements for Steam Communication, between India and England, viâ Suez, may hereafter rest.

3.—I am aware that the details on which I am about to enter, will occasion surprize to those, who have not taken the trouble to look minutely into the Bengal Plans:—disappointment also, perhaps to some—but, as I have only one wish myself on the subject, and am willing to believe, that all who have taken part in this discussion of late, entertain a similar one, I will merely say, that this wish resolves itself into an earnest desire, for the eventual adoption of that course in regard to Steam Communication with Suez, as shall on full and mature consideration, promise to secure the greatest extension of the benefits of Steam Navigation, to “all India,” that a due regard to the cost of such extension, shall seem to justify.—To make this benefit permanent, the returns must be, if not immediately, at least prospectively, commensurate with the expense.—How far they are likely to be so on the Plans submitted from Calcutta, it is my present purpose, to endeavour to ascertain.

4.—The unfortunate failure of the *Forbes* Steamer to get to Suez, against the early part of the S. W. Monsoon, in the Bay of Bengal, affords time to all parties in India, for further reflection on this subject, and the day is yet sufficiently distant, when the whole Machine is to be set in motion, to allow of the observations I shall now make, being weighed with Temper, and judged of with Impartiality.—In thus adverting to the *Forbes*’ failure, let it not be supposed for a moment, that I do so in exultation or derision, for though I have always thought the decision, in respect to

Circumstances out of which the recent endeavours to establish a regular intercourse with England by Steam, via Egypt, arose—and a summary of Capt. Wilson's plan given.

her intended voyage at this season, injudicious, and the general arrangements of the Bengal Committee premature, that decision having been taken, I could have wished to see the experiment of a passage from Calcutta to Suez, against an adverse monsoon, fairly tried, and do sincerely and honestly regret, this disappointment in the outset.

5.—The recent endeavours to establish a regular intercourse with England by Steam, via Egypt, owe their rise to a public meeting held at Bombay, in the month of May, 1833.—About the middle of the following month (June) Captain Wilson printed his Pamphlet, on Steam Communication by that route, containing much valuable information, and many interesting details on the subject in questions but the following summary of his plan, is all that seem; necessary for my present purpose.—“ Having pointed out,” says Captain Wilson, “ the class of Vessels (270 tons with two 40 Horse Engines) and mode of dividing the voyage, which in the writer's opinion, are most likely to lead to satisfactory results, it remains but to show, the lowest scale on which a Packet establishment could be permanently useful. —With two Steamers a communication from the 1st of October, till the end of May, might be maintained as follows ; —The first vessel leaving Bombay on the 1st October, would return there about the 25th November:—allowing the month of December to pass, to admit of persons in all parts of India receiving their letters, and dispatching replies for the second Steamer, which should leave on the 1st January, the letters by which vessel, in reply to those from Europe by the first Steamer, which would have left about the 5th October, would be received in England, about the 19th of February;—thus having completed an interchange of communications with England in four months and

a half, at a season when vessels are sometimes five months, on the passage to Bombay:—the second Steamer would return to Bombay about the 21st February, bringing answers to letters dispatched from Bombay, by the first Steamer in October.—The remainder of February and March, being allowed to pass, to receive return correspondence from all parts of India, the first Steamer which had been in Bombay since the 25th November, would again start on the 1st April, and return about the 25th May.—Thus with two Steamers, three Trips in the season would be made, insuring three interchanges of correspondence with Europe.”

6.—The data on which the above periods of absence are founded, are as follows, according to two different plans submitted by Captain Wilson for dividing the stages.

FIRST PLAN.		MILES.	DAYS.
Bombay to Mocha.....		1795....	11.
Stay at Mocha ... ..	2		
Mocha to Suez.....	...	1187....	9½
Detention at Cossier on passage up to } land passengers. }	1		
	3	2982....	20½
Steaming Bombay to Suez.....			20½
Ordinary detention.....			3
			23½
Allowed for taking Shelter from bad weather.....			3
			26½
			22
Detention at Suez to take in Coal 2½ days.			
Suez to Mocha.....		1187....	9
Stay at Mocha .....	2		
Mocha to Maculla.....		104....	3
Stay at Maculla .....	1½		
Maculla to Bombay.....		1397...	9½
Detention at Cossier, on passage } down to receive passengers. }	1½		
	4½	2982	21½



Steaming Suez to Bombay.....	21½
Ordinary detention.....	4½

	26
Allowed for taking Shelter from bad weather.....	3

Probable Maximum days.....29

Minimum probably 25 days.....

SECOND PLAN		MILES.	DAYS.
Bombay to Maculla.....		1391	9
Stay at Maculla.....	1½		
Maculla to Judda.....		961	6
Stay at Judda.....	2		
Judda to Suez.....		630	6
Detention at Cassier to land Passengers.....	1		
	4½	2982	21

Steaming Bombay to Suez.....	21
Ordinary detention.....	4½

	25½
Allowed for taking Shelter from bad weather.....	3

Maximum.....28½

Minimum probably... 24

Detention at Suez to put Engines to rights.—No Coal being taken in there in this plan 2 days.

Suez to Judda.....	630	4
Stay at Judda.....	2	
Judda to Maculla.....	961	8

\* In ordinary cases under Steam out and home.... $20\frac{1}{2} + 21\frac{1}{2} = 42$   
Ordinary detention.... $3 + 4\frac{1}{2} = 7\frac{1}{2}$

Stay at Suez.....	49½
	2½

	52
Detention by bad weather both ways.....	6

Probable Maximum ...58

Probable Minimum--out ...22

Do.....do....home...25

	Days....47
Stay at Suez.....	2½

Probable Minimum days ...49½

Stay at Maculla.....	2½		
Maculla to Bombay.....		1391....	9½
	4½		
Detention at Cossier on passage down to receive passengers.....	1		
	5½	2982.	21½
Steaming Suez to Bombay.....			21½
Ordinary detention .....			5½
			27
Allowed for taking Shelter from bad weather.....			3
	Maximum probably .....		30
	Minimum probably.....		25
In ordinary cases under Steam out and home..	21 + 21½ =	42½	
Ordinary detention.....	4½ + 5½ =	10	
			52½
Stay at Suez.....			2
			54½
Detention by bad weather both ways.....			6
	Probable Maximum†.....		60½

7.—This plan was found fault with by many persons in Calcutta, as not being sufficiently comprehensive, for the interests of India at large, and as conferring undue advantages on Bombay, particularly on the Commercial part of its community.—A Pamphlet appeared shortly afterwards, from the pen of Mr. Greenlaw, exposing the defects of Captain Wilson's proposed arrangements, according to the view entertained of the subject in Calcutta, and recommending others, of which in connexion with his objections to Captain Wilson's plan, I shall now proceed to examine the validity.—In doing so, I shall have occasion to quote largely from

† Probable Minimum out.....	24
Do.....do.....home.....	25
	Days....49
Stay at Suez.....	2
	Probable Minimum....51

Captain Wilson's plan found fault with in Calcutta as not sufficiently comprehensive for the Interests of India at large &c. Mr. Greenlaw's objections thereto, and his own ideas on the subject, as laid before the public in his Pamphlet,—noticed to his 10th para: inclusive.

Mr. Greenlaw, and may swell this notice of the Steam question, to a greater extent than I could desire, and than I fear will be generally acceptable:—but, I prefer even the charge of prolixity, to the risk of misrepresenting Mr. Greenlaw's sentiments, by any abstract report of them myself.

In PARA. 6—He says,—“ *If indeed it was simply the abstract proposition, of connecting England with India, Bombay as the nearest port in the latter, would doubtless be the place to be preferred, and it is to be regretted, that the question has been hitherto considered, too much in that abstract light—that the means of simultaneously and equally spreading the benefits of that connexion, throughout India, have been neglected or overlooked, in the magnitude of the main object*”—and in para. 7.—the disadvantages that would attend the conveyance of Passengers, Parcels, and Letters by land from other parts of India to Bombay, “ *situated at one extreme of our Indian possessions*” are strongly urged as a sufficient, if not insuperable objection to that place, as the sole port of arrival and departure in this country.

8.—Mr. Greenlaw's 8th. Para : and the note appended to it, I must give in his own words.

“ *At present, the intercourse is proposed to be only quarterly and beyond that, it can never be expected to pay from Bombay, whenever the Bonus is withdrawn. But a quarterly communication by way of Bombay, is almost useless, as a means of commercial correspondence, by question and answer, between Calcutta and London. It is not merely, that the merchants of Bombay, will have the advantage of the constant earliest Intelligence from England, whereby to shape their commercial Transactions, but they will, after the most unfavorable voyages, have ample time to make all the necessary arrangements, required by that Intelligence, as well as counter-communications with their correspondents, by the return steamer, sending even*

*musters of purchases made, consequent on orders just received:—whereas, the merchants of Calcutta, will not only have later Information, but will have just thirty two, days less time, than the Bombay merchants to answer the English Letters, and will not infrequently, have to wait three months before they can reply.\*—Of course, the same inconvenience will arise to all Individuals, at a distance from Bombay, who desire to make speedy replies to Letters received from England: to the latter, it may, as regards a portion, be only inconvenient, to many it may be occasionally detrimental—but to the whole commercial Interests of Calcutta, and to a certain degree Madras, it will be a regular, constant, irreparable Injury.—But, there is also this great disadvantage in making Bombay the only Port for the Steamer, viz. the other two Presidencies cannot receive or send their more voluminous despatches, records and large Box Packets, across the whole continent of India, but at an immense expense and the greatest inconvenience, and certainly not with due speed."*

9.—To get rid of these disadvantages to the commercial community of Calcutta, it is proposed, under a course of

\* In reference to this paucity of time for reply under any circumstances, and the occasional loss of opportunity by the return steamer, entailing a delay of three months as here stated, and in allusion to Capt. Wilson's first Idea of connecting the steam navigation, from India to Suez, with a steamer from Alexandria to Malta. Mr. Greenlaw, observes as follows, in the note, appended to this para:

*"If the communication is to be maintained by linking in with the Malta Packets, which as I shall show hereafter, is objectionable in the highest degree, but if it is made so to do, the merchants in Calcutta would be wholly unable to reply by the return steamer. They would have to wait three months for the steamer, to admit of the despatches reaching Malta in time, must leave Bombay so as to have to wait 12 days at Suez. Allowing 25 for the Passage, 62 out of the quarter of 91 days would be consumed, during her absence, leaving only 29 days for the conveyance of the letters to Calcutta from Bombay, and for the answers to go back. However important might be a despatch to Government from home;—however urgent the requisition for immediate reply, it could not under such circumstances be given from Calcutta."*

reasoning which it is unnecessary to recapitulate here (for a summary of the advantages follows in the next para :) to look to Galle on the Island of Ceylon, as a fit point, of easy and simultaneous distribution of the Passengers, Packets and Mails from England, to the three Presidencies, by means of branch Steamers which are to bring the homeward-bound Passengers and Mails to Galle, in time for the Red Sea Steamer's departure. This proviso being founded on a previous postulate that Galle is for all present purposes, to be "*supposed for one moment a place of Importance in the Indian administration ; and a Port where the Hull and Machinery of a steamer can be repaired.*"

"*Let us see*" (says Mr. Greenlaw, para : 10) "*what under such circumstances would be the result as to the time occupied. It has been stated (note to 3th para :) that including the 2 days necessary stay at Suez, if the Mails are to be connected with the Government Malta Mails, the absence from Bombay would be 62 days. If to this be added twice the two days calculated as the increased time, in running to Galle, 66 days, the Packets by the Branch Steamer, would reach Bombay in 7, i. e. in 73 days ; and taking 7 days to go back to Galle, making 80, would give Bombay 11 days to answer their Letters. The Branch steamer to Madras and Bengal, would land the mail, &c. at the former place in four days, and the latter in nine from Galle, or in 70 days of the quarter to Madras, giving that Presidency 17 days to reply. As regards Calcutta, the Packets would arrive in 75 days, from quitting Galle, and allowing the necessary nine days to return to that place, would give 7 days to the Calcutta people to reply ; although this is little enough, it is at least very important, and would be of incalculable advantage, when it is remembered that by the Bombay scheme, linking in with the Malta Mail, they have no time at all. Of course, if the necessity for the 12 days*

*stay at Suez was done away with, that number would be added to the several periods above stated as those for replying to communications. Bombay instead of 11 would have 23; Madras would get 29, and Calcutta 19."*

10.—And here it will be right to pause and consider the general tenor of Mr. Greenlaw's observations, and recommendations, as given in the preceding extracts from his Pamphlet.

11.—It is a trite, but still a very just remark, that our zeal will sometimes outstrip our discretion; and in the present case we have an apt illustration of it's Justice: for whilst ostensibly advocating the cause of the many, Mr. Greenlaw's anxiety for the commercial Interests of the few, (Calcutta) has made him overlook the Injury he was doing to others, equally entitled to his consideration and support.

12.—The natural position of Bombay, though not exactly as described by Mr. Greenlaw "*one extreme point of our Indian Possessions*" is; as regards the Interests of its commercial community, in connexion with their Intercourse with Europe, fortunately such, as to secure to them, advantages in respect to priority of Intelligence, that nothing but a convulsion of nature, or gross mismanagement and Injustice in the application of steam to the purposes of Indian and Egyptian navigation, can withdraw from them. And it happens besides that full four-fifths of all India will be indebted to Bombay, under whatever equitable arrangements are made, for the general Interests, for a quicker receipt of their letters from England, than by any route, that has yet been brought under public consideration.

13.—It is stated by Mr. Greenlaw in a subsequent part of his work (para: 15) in reference to his latter plan of making Socotra the point of rendezvous for the

Mr. Greenlaw's plan for making Galle the port of arrival and departure for all India considered; and the oversights he has fallen into whilst endeavoring to serve his Calcutta Friends, to the Injury of a very large portion of western India and the commercial Interests of England adverted to.

Indian Steamers connected with the Red Sea navigation, and of which I shall have to treat by and by that' "*it may be premised that whether the plan is executed by Government, at their own cost, or by private Individuals on contract or otherwise, neither it, nor any other plan can be perfect by connecting the Indian Mail with that of Malta.*" His reasons for this conclusion—a just one, I think—are given in the sequel of that para: and it seems strange that in adverting to the additional period, that would accrue for reply to the residents at the three Presidencies, it should have escaped him to notice, that the removal of the protracted and objectionable detention at Suez (12 days) would afford the Calcutta people even, time to reply viâ Bombay.

14.—To establish this point, it is only necessary to say that supposing the detention in question reduced from twelve (12) days to three (3), and all Mr. Greenlaw's later arguments and plans, proceed on the assumption that three days will be the actual detention in that quarter,—nine (9) days will thereby be added to the twenty nine (29) quoted in the note to his 8th Para. giving thirty eight (38) days instead of twenty nine (29) for the conveyance of the letters to Calcutta from Bombay, and for the answers to go back,—and thus allowing the Calcutta people six days (6) to reply instead of seven (7), as exhibited in the Galle scheme, or sixteen (16) under the reduced detention at Suez just noticed.

15.—To provide this additional convenience to Calcutta, whose geographical position in respect to the Red sea, is the sole cause of the disadvantage it now labours under, and must always experience to a greater extent than almost any other part of India, in its correspondence with England, by that Route, and to obtain some increase of

time for Madras, to which the difference between eleven (11) and seventeen (17) days for reply, in the one case, and between twenty (20) and twenty six (26) days in the other, cannot be of very serious importance. The inhabitants of Bombay and its vicinity, and all who depend on that Port for the speediest means of Correspondence with Europe, are, under Mr. Greenlaw's present plan, to receive their letters nine (9) days later than they would otherwise do. The first mentioned parties (Bombay inhabitants, &c.) are also to dispatch their return letters ten (10) days earlier than would otherwise be necessary, and the last mentioned parties (persons at a distance) are to be altogether deprived of the opportunity of early reply.

16.—I support this assertion, for the most part, with Mr. Greenlaw's own data.

He has assumed the passago from Bombay to Suez and back the objectionable detention at Suez included at days..... 62

By Galle he makes it  $66+7+7$ ..... 80

---

Difference days..... 18

Equal to nine (9) days each way.—The course of Dawk from Bombay to Madras is nine (9) days, and the same being allowed for return from Madras to Bombay, we have days..... 18

Which added to..... 62

---

Will give days..... 80

as the time occupied in Correspondence from Madras to Suez and back, by the Bombay route—leaving eleven (11) days for the Madras community to reply.



By Galle Mr. Greenlaw makes the time  $66+4+4\dots 74$

---

Difference days..... 6

---

or 17 days for reply.—Add to these periods, the difference between twelve days detention at Suez and three days detention there, and we have 20 days and 26 days as stated in my preceding para. Deduct 62 days from the whole quarter of 91 days, and 29 days remain for replies from the interior to Bombay, and sufficient time is given for parties in the upper Provinces of Bengal, where extensive interests used to be vested, and where I suppose they are still vested, in the cultivation or purchase of Indigo, Silk, Sugar, &c. to answer by the return Steamer the letters of their English Correspondents:—twelve to fourteen days being the average course of Dawk from Bombay to the principal commercial marts in that quarter,—at the rate of 80 miles per diem only; which might be reduced to ten or twelve, if the Dawk were made to travel, as it certainly ought to do, 90 miles daily, without difficulty. Take from the 29 days above mentioned,—9 in the period of receipt, and 10 in the time allowed for reply;—for though the actual period of Steaming from Bombay to Galle, is only taken at 7 days, prudence requires where a junction is to take place, that due provision be made for contingencies on the way,—and that the Steamer start one day earlier from Bombay, than is absolutely necessary by Mr. Greenlaw's calculation,—together 19 days, and we have only 10 days left for the conveyance of letters to the upper provinces from Bombay, and the receipt of replies at the latter place:—thereby preventing the possibility of an answer being forwarded to England by the return Steamer, and placing the Residents in the upper provinces of the Bengal Presidency, and in all parts

of the Bombay Presidency, distant more than four days Dawk from Bombay, in the very dilemma, from which Mr. Greenlaw is seeking to extricate his Calcutta Friends.—And even if we add the nine days gained by the decreased detention at Suez, to the ten abovementioned, we shall only have nineteen days at our disposal.—A period not sufficient for the interests of the Residents in upper India, though parties somewhat nearer to Bombay, and at Bombay itself may find benefit therefrom.

17.—But whilst thus overlooking the interests and convenience of so large a part of the inhabitants of India, and of the commercial part of the upper provinces in particular, Mr. Greenlaw has also lost sight of another very important body,—the Mercantile community of Great Britain,—of which a large and daily increasing portion is deeply interested in the receipt of the latest and most authentic advices from the upper parts of Hindoostan, and the cotton districts of Guzerat, as component parts of Commercial India in general.—A Body too, whose support, it will be remembered, it has been judged desirable strongly to solicit, in a later stage of the Bengal Steam proceedings, in aid of the Red Sea plan, and who will naturally expect, under whatever arrangements that plan may eventually be carried into effect, that due regard will be had to the claims of the commercial interests of the Parent Country,—as well as to those of her Indian possessions.—

18.—Continuing his predilection for the Galle scheme Mr. Greenlaw proceeds as under,—in the para: following that, at which I stopped to make the preceding observations.

*“ Enough would seem to have been said to show the great preference, which this view of things, has over Bombay being the sole port of arrival and departure, and that the above plan*

Continuation of Mr. Greenlaw's arguments in favor of his Galle Scheme.—His ideas of the great preference

which it has over Bombay, being the sole port of arrival and departure explained.—And the means of meeting the increased expenditure, that would arise from its adoption, pointed out—from his 11, 12 and 13 paras.—

*has but one single apparent disadvantage.—It is, that of the increased expenditure which it would occasion. But before proceeding to show how this increased expenditure would be covered, it may be permitted to ask, if we are to expend some lacs annually on the project, as it will but partially operate by making Bombay our sole Port, that is confining the most important of the advantages of the communication to that place, and its immediate vicinity;—whether a few thousand of Rupees more would be ill disposed, in simultaneously spreading throughout India, from its three Presidencies, the correspondence from England, so as to allow the great part, if not the whole country, to reply by the return Steamer?—Nothing has been said, of the advantage of Galle, as regards the communication being eventually extended by a branch Steamer to the Straits, especially with reference to the opening of the China Trade. It is hoped that enough has been advanced to establish this point, namely, that if the communication is to be opened by steam by way of the Red Sea, Bombay ought not to be the sole port of arrival and departure for all India, even though another course should lead to additional expenditure to a certain extent, which however, it is presumed it would not do without a full equivalent ( Para : 11.”)*

19.—An estimate however, of this expenditure is attempted in para. 12, and I shall again let Mr. Greenlaw speak for himself.

*“ What the amount of that additional expenditure would be, cannot be stated exactly, but an estimate, as well as one of the amount of increase of profits, may be made.—It is now generally admitted, that to secure a quarterly communication even between Bombay and Suez, two Steamers are necessary, though one only need be maintained on full establishment ; so that in fixing two Steamers for the Galle communication no*

*addition to the estimate will be required on that account.—Let it be assumed that the Steamer should be of the class used in the Mediterranean, viz. 140 horse power, and of 450, or 500 tons burthen.—The increased daily consumption of Fuel, Oil, &c. wear and tear of the machinery are the only increases in the expense.—The number of days, during which the Steamer would run over and above those employed on the Bombay plan, is 144,\*—and the consumption being 18 tons† 12 cwt. per diem, the increased quantity of Coal consumed would be Tons 2678: of this, would be supplied at Calcutta of best Burdwan, all that would be required additional in the expenditure as regards Calcutta—viz. 88 out of the 144 days, or 1637 Tons at 10 Rupees per ton, or 6 annas per maund,—the cost Sa. Rs. 16,370.—The supply of the Branch Bombay Steamer would be Europe Coal, and the 941 remaining tons, would cost 20 Rupees per ton, or Sa. Rs. 18,820 making in all Sa. Rs. 35,190, and if for the sake of obviating all objections, 15,000 are added, for the wear and tear establishment of the Bombay Branch Steamer during 56 days,*

* Each voyage 4 days, two each way, between Red Sea and Galle.....	4
Each way between Galle and Calcutta ...	9
Each way between Bombay and Galle...	7
	<hr/>
	36
Voyages per annum.....	4
	<hr/>
	144
	<hr/>

† Full Rate.

Note.—It has escaped Mr. Greenlaw to notice here, that there must be a heavy charge incurred on the conveyance of a large portion of this Coal, to the Depots at Galle and Socotra, and Judda.—Though he has adverted to such additional cost in the estimate appended to his Pamphlet, where he assumes the cost all round, to be Sa. Rs. 25 per ton,—at that rate 1637 tons would cost Sa. Rs. 40,925 instead of 16,370,—and the whole supply for the voyage Sa. Rs. 59,745 instead of 35,190.—making with the sum of Sa. Rs. 15,000, assumed as the wear and tear establishment of the Bombay Branch Steamer, a total of Sa. Rs. 74,745, in lieu of Sa. Rs. 50,000.—Equal to an excess of 50 per cent nearly.

*and for Oil, &c. the whole increased expense would be Sa. Rupees 50,000."*

20.—These are long extracts, but I have vainly endeavored to reduce their substance, to a more condensed form without endangering their present claims to perspicuity, and I will therefore in my next and last quotation of the benefits to be expected from the Galle plan, again adopt Mr. Greenlaw's own words.

*"How against this, is to be set all the expence consequent on the transmission of the letters, packets and parcels from Bombay to Calcutta, Madras, and Ceylon. How much that may be, cannot be calculated, but it must be considerable. It cannot be done by the fixed establishment. Consider for a moment, the sudden influx into Bombay of all the quarterly letters, parcels, &c. from England, to be distributed throughout India. How many additional Dawk Bearers, and other means of conveyance of letters, packages, parcels of Books, &c. must be employed throughout the whole line between the Presidencies,—and the same about the period of the Vessel sailing on each occasion. It would scarcely cost less than 5000 Rupees on the arrival of the Steamer, and 3000 when the Vessel is about to leave; and that four times in the year would amount, to 32,000 out of the 50,000. But it must be obvious that by giving the very greater part, if not all India, the means of replying to letters by the same vessel, which brings them from England, as will hereafter be shown the Galle plan would do, the number of letters would be greatly increased, to what extent again cannot be said:—but further, by being able to put their letters and parcels on board the steamer at their very door, the inhabitants of Calcutta and Madras and their neighbourhood, would send each of larger dimensions, than when they had to pass them across the continent of India. They would of course pay a larger sum in proportion, more than enough with the former estimat-*

*ed 32,000, to cover the whole 50,000. But there yet remains a very principal item of additional receipt, by letting the Steamer come to Galle, and have branches to Bombay and Calcutta. The Steamers in question are calculated to take 20 passengers with comfortable accommodation. These may certainly be increased to 25. But would Bombay furnish 25 each Voyage?—and how many would go to that place, from the other presidencies, for the sake of going home in the Steamer at an enormous expense for travelling. If the means were afforded at each presidency, of joining the Steamer without difficulty and without expence there can be no doubt, that the whole number making 100 in all would go, and that out of the 100, 60 at the very least would not have gone by way of Bombay. Now, hereafter, the charge for the whole passage to England will be estimated at Sicca Rupees 2,500 each person, of which 1500,—at least, may be held to be profit, and thence alone 90,000 Rupees would be derived by the proposed plan, without taking into account the increased number of passengers, who would leave England in the Steamer for India. In fact there cannot be the least doubt, that the extension of the Steamer to Galle with branches to Bombay, Madras, and Calcutta, would more than pay any additional expenditure, beyond that incurred in landing mails and passengers, only at Bombay, independent of the immense advantages which would be conferred on all India by such a measure.”*

21.—We have now arrived at the termination of what I shall take the liberty of calling, Mr. Greenlaw's first Galle scheme, to distinguish it from his subsequent Galle, and ultimate Galle and Socotra scheme, to both which, it would appear to have been intended from the first merely as the stepping stone. And I must request it to be borne in mind, in view to the correct understanding of the remarks, that I am about to make, that Galle has, for all the purposes of

Examination of Mr. Greenlaw's arguments in favor of his Galle scheme pursued—the validity of his conclusions disputed, and shown it is believed,

from his own  
data, to be in  
many res-  
pects in cor-  
rect.

Mr. Greenlaw's argument been assumed in para: 9, as the port of the Red Sea Steamer's arrival and departure, from which branch Steamers are to proceed to Bombay on the one side;—to Madras and Bengal on the other—and that the extension of the Steamers to Galle with Branches as just mentioned, is the plan to which his concluding observations on this route, apply in the para: last quoted.—viz. para 13—as well as in all the intermediate ones.

22.—I will not follow Mr. Greenlaw into the details of his calculations on this subject, for an intimate acquaintance of nearly thirty years with the weight that is due to estimates in general, whether for public purposes, or in aid of individual undertakings, has led me to be distrustful even of the most elaborate,—and where shipping is concerned, whether as to the charges of building, or those of navigation, experience has taught me, as it has most others who have been concerned in that species of property, to place but little confidence in estimates connected with its original cost,—its expenditure or profits, by whomsoever framed. Besides, we have an easy, and sufficiently accurate mode of arriving at a knowledge of the comparative advantages of the Bombay and Galle plans in this instance, in reference to probable receipt and expenditure, without entering into perplexing, and at the best, doubtful details at this time.

The passage from Bombay to Suez, and from Suez to Bombay may, according to Captain Wilson's data, already given, and which I shall confirm by Mr. Greenlaw's hereafter, be performed, as far as actual steaming is concerned, in.....Days 24

The Steamer via Galle, will, by Mr. Greenlaw's data (note to his 12 para:) be two days longer than to Bombay, and vice versa, making

a difference of 4 days on each Voyage—and  
thus giving.....Days 46

From Galle to Madras, 4 each way, or..... 8

From Madras to Calcutta 5 each way, or..... 10

---

64

And the Branch Steamer from Bombay to  
Galle, each way 7 days.....or..... 14

---

78

Increase each voyage, as admitted by Mr. Greenlaw, days 36,  
equal to 6 | 7ths, or 85, 714285 decs. per cent.—additional  
outlay in steaming alone—which although in itself a very  
heavy increase of expenditure, is not, as I shall shortly  
show, the only one to be incurred in this Galle plan.

23.—Mr. Greenlaw has said, that to secure a quarterly  
communication, between Bombay and Suez even, two  
steamers are necessary, though one only need be maintain-  
ed on full establishment, and *therefore that in fixing two  
steamers for the Galle communication no addition to the es-  
timate will be required on that account.*

24.—Let us try how far this declaration, coincides with  
his arrangements as subsequently detailed. One Steamer  
will be required to keep up the communication between  
Galle and the Red Sea.—A second as a branch Vessel from  
Galle to Bombay : a third for the same purpose, to Madras  
and Calcutta. And if it is deemed necessary to have a re-  
serve steamer in port, to insure a regular quarterly inter-  
course between Bombay and the Red sea, when only one  
steamer is actually running, prudence surely requires a like  
provision at least, to be made against accidents, and conse-  
quent detention when three steamers are in motion. It will  
then be necessary to build four vessels for the due execu-



tion of the Galle plan instead of two, as stated by Mr. Greenlaw.

25.—Again, let us suppose the first voyage, under this scheme, to take place in November, and that the Bombay Branch Steamer, and Madras and Bengal one leave their respective ports, on the 1st of that month, so that the period of the Red Sea Steamer's departure from Galle, may be fixed for the 10th November. She may, as already shown, be expected to be 46 days under steam, which with 3 days at Suez overhauling machinery, &c. one day at Socotra, and half a day at Judda each way, together 3 days, will give 52 days as the period of her probable absence from Galle, and make her return to that place fall about the 1st January:—thereby allowing the Branch Steamers to be back at Bombay and Calcutta, about the 10th of the month, and their full establishment of crew, &c. to cease on the 15th,

26.—What is to become of these Branch Vessels during the Galle Steamer's absence? If they are to remain at Ceylon all the time, awaiting her return, we shall have each of them on full establishment, Coal expenditure alone excepted, for a period of  $2\frac{1}{2}$  months, or say from the 1st November to the 15th January, together 5 months.

The Galle Steamer will be at least

2 months on similar footing..... 2 do.

. Equal to..... 7 do.

For one Vessel, instead of the period re-

quired for the Bombay Steamer between that Port and Suez, viz..... 2 do.

---

Making a difference of 5 months expenditure each voyage on that score.

27.—But lest this view of the case should be objected

to, I will assume that the Branch Steamers, proceed immediately to their respective Ports. Return to Galle, will then be necessary, to meet the Red Sea Steamer there, and a further addition of 36 days Steaming each voyage beyond the Bombay Plan, will become chargeable to the undertaking, making the whole period of Steaming  $78 + 36 = 114$  days, from which deduct by the Bombay Plan, 42

Difference..... 72 days.  
equal to 1½, or 171.428571. Decls. per cent. additional outlay on this head.

28.—As a set off against this increased expenditure, Mr. Greenlaw has introduced the expense, consequent on the transmission of the Letters, Packets and Parcels, from Bombay to Calcutta, Madras, and Ceylon; and he is alarmed at the cost and inconvenience, that the sudden influx of such an additional mass of papers, &c, will entail on the Post Office.

29.—With respect to the former, I must confess, that I have not been able sufficiently to understand the connexion that exists, between an apprehended loss by Government, from an increased Land Expenditure of Rs. 8,000. on each voyage the Steamer from Bombay may make, and the general sailing charges of the Steamers to be employed hereafter, unless all these vessels are to navigated solely on Government account, to comprehend the grounds on which Mr. Greenlaw, has here made the removal of the one, to operate as a reduction of the other :—but it is not necessary for me to pursue this inquiry further, because if it can be shown, as I think it may be, that no such loss will arise to Government, there is at once an end of the question, as far as the set off is concerned.

30.—The Inhabitants of the Presidency stations of Cal.

cutta and Madras, and Inhabitants of Ceylon,—will doubtless have an inland Postage to pay on their letters, &c. viâ Bombay, which they would not be subject to if these were delivered at their own doors ;—but the increased charge which they will have to pay, viâ Bombay, ought not to be, as regards Calcutta and Madras, and will not be, as I shall show hereafter, so considerable as is apprehended ; whilst as respects the far greater portion of “ *all India*,” parties will receive their letters, at least as quickly, and for the most part as cheaply, as by either of the two other routes.

31.—A heavy expenditure is to be incurred by Government, in Mr. Greenlaw’s view of the case, by the despatch of these letters on arrival, and their receipt from the interior, on departure of the Steamer, each voyage ;—but he seems to have forgotten, that there will also be an increase of Revenue to Government, from those sources, by the additional number of Letters, &c. passing through the Post Office,—for unless it can be shown, that the rates of Postage, as now levied, are lower than in justice to Government they should be—a position which no one has yet ventured to advance—it should follow, that the augmented receipts from the Steamer’s packets, to and fro, will prove at least equal to the additional, but temporary outlay incurred on their account. And if the present rates are such, as to yield a profit to Government, in ordinary circumstances, may it not fairly be assumed, that an increase of business, will also produce an increase of gain ?

32.—In regard to the inconvenience expected to arise from the sudden influx of the Steamers’ augmented mails at Bombay, one observation will I think suffice, to dispel all alarm on that point. Sudden, in the common acceptance of the word, implies something unexpected ; an occurrence happening, without previous notice. And as this

will not be the case in respect to the Steamer, for her departure will be fixed for particular dates, and her arrival may be calculated on, with a degree of certainty, greater than that which attaches to almost any of the ordinary occurrences of life, every opportunity will be afforded, and means, no doubt taken, to provide against disappointment, from the influx in question.

33.—The scene changes shortly afterwards, and Mr. Greenlaw's real plan is developed in the following paragraph (14) of his Pamphlet in these words.

*“ If it is conceded that the main position is established, viz. that Galle with Branch Steamers is the best place for bringing the Steam Navigation with England to bear on all India, then as Galle does not afford means for repairing the Steamers, and Calcutta does, and as it would save the necessity for an additional Steamer, let the Steamer herself, act as the Branch for Madras and Calcutta, and as there must be two Steamers, of course the reserve one would be quite ready to start on the proper day, the one just come from her Voyage would undergo thorough survey and repair, and having only a small establishment of an Engineer and assistants would, with occasional additional assistance, be employed as a Tug in the river, as opportunities might offer during her idle quarter.”*

34.—How far Mr. Greenlaw is entitled to the concession he requires, for his main position, as a preliminary to the organization of his new Galle plan, and to what extent the corollary he has founded, on the circumstance of Galle's unfitness, as a principal Port of Steam Communication with the Red Sea, from its want of means of repairing Steamer's, is a legitimate deduction from his premises, I leave to those to determine who shall have taken the trouble to follow me, through the details of his original, or first Galle scheme: and will only add on this part of the subject,

The scene changed, and Calcutta, instead of Galle made the principal Port of arrival and departure in the Steam Communication between India and England by Mr. Greenlaw.

Reasons for not considering Mr. Greenlaw entitled to the concessions on which his new plan is founded, briefly stated.

that this second plan, will, notwithstanding Mr. Greenlaw's declaration in his 12 para. that no additional Steamer will be necessary by the Galle route, require at *least* three Steamers to be built and entertained, viz. two for Calcutta and one for Bombay, instead of the smaller two, necessary by the arrangements Capt. Wilson had recommended;—whilst the employment of the reserve Steamer, as a Tug, is open to this very serious objection,—that the *Forbes*, the favorite and most efficient Steamer in the Hooghly, had been laid up for some time previous to her being chartered by the new Bengal Steam Fund Committee, in consequence of that mode of employment, not paying her expenses, or at least not yielding a profit to the estate to which she belongs.\* I leave to Mr. Greenlaw the task of reconciling the assertion in his 14th para. already quoted, that there must be two Steamers for his new or second plan, with his previous declaration in the same para. that its adoption would save the necessity of an additional Steamer,—bearing always in mind, that two Steamers only have been fixed by him for the Galle communication in his 12th para. for I have not been able myself to accomplish it.

A further change of Plan introduced by Mr. Greenlaw, calculated in his opinion to remove all objection on the part of the Bombay Community to his Galle and Calcutta Scheme, and to insure the acquiescence of the Madras Commu-

35.—“The object of the past remarks, continues Mr. Greenlaw in his 15th para.” *“has been to establish the preference of the above plan, over that of making Bombay the sole Port of call, and it is now proposed to consider how that plan may be best brought to bear.”* The remainder of this para. is devoted to an explanation of the causes that weigh against connecting the India Mail with that of Malta, and which I have said in para. 13th, I agree with Mr. Greenlaw in thinking a very unadvisable measure.

36.—We are now approaching the Galle and Socotra

\* India Gazette, 9th May, 1834, and confirmed to me by subsequent inquiries.

plan, which is brought forward in para : 16, in the following terms:—"The above being premised, it may now be observed, the proposed plan resolves itself into this, viz. that the Steamer leaving the Red Sea, instead of going to Bombay, calls at Galle, Madras, and Calcutta—the Packets, Passengers and mails for Bombay, being despatched on a Branch Steamer from Galle.—There is however, yet one modification, by which Bombay would be a gainer in time, not only as compared with the proposed plan, but even with that of making Bombay the sole Port of call.—That modification is, that instead of the Packets &c. for Bombay, branching off from Galle, they should do so from Socotra. By this means, as the Branch Steamer would be at Socotra, waiting the arrival of the Red Sea vessel, and ready to start, the passengers, &c. for Bombay would have no detention at Socotra.—Bombay therefore, so far from having reason to object to the proposed plan, ought to second it, while Madras would be so obvious a gainer, that no doubt can be entertained of its acquiescence."

37.—The exact extent to which Bombay will really be a gainer by this amended scheme, and the advantages that are to result to Madras, in a degree so obviously beneficial, as to remove all doubt of its acquiescence, next require my attention:—before entering on those topics, it will be necessary for me to quote from some of Mr. Greenlaw's subsequent paras, in order to shew the data, on which I have arrived at an opinion, the very reverse of that which he has so confidently expressed above.

In para. 19, Mr. Greenlaw writes as follows:—"The whole distance from Calcutta to Suez is 4780 miles, which at the average rate of 6 miles, would be run in 33 days, exclusive of three (3) days and six hours stoppages on the way, —viz., 6 hours at Madras.—1 day at Galle, Socotra, and Judda going, making in all to Suez 36 days. It is unfortu-

nity. This change being founded on a modified arrangement for Bombay, by which, instead of the packets for that place, branching off at Galle, they are to do so from Socotra.

The benefits expected to result to all India, from the adoption of Mr. Greenlaw's Calcutta, Madras, Galle, and Socotra scheme, in connexion with his Branch plan for Bombay considered. The advantages insisted on by Mr. Greenlaw shown to be greatly over-rated.—And

calculations founded on Mr. Greenlaw's own data, submitted, tending to raise very considerable doubts, as to the possibility of making the receipts under this plan, keep pace with the expenditure consequent thereto,

nately necessary that the Steamer proceeding the whole way from Calcutta, must remain a few days at Suez to overhaul machinery;—three days must be given for this, making 39 days to leaving Suez — On her return 6 hours will suffice at Judda, making two days and 12 hours stoppages on her return, which being added to the 33 days steaming, makes  $35\frac{1}{2}$  days for the return, in all  $74\frac{1}{2}$  days—say 75, leaving 16 days for the Calcutta people to reply, and giving time to all stations, within 8 days dawn; and as there would be more time for the Madras and Bombay Presidencies, very near if not quite all India, would be able to reply by the return Steamer.—Doubtless the passage to Suez in May and August would be longer than in November and February, but the return would be quicker, and on the whole no time lost. The plan is practicable, and as certain as such things can be, provided all necessary arrangements are made.

Para: 23, begins thus—“ Looking at the Chart, the position of Socotra is so obviously well adapted for a depôt, that nothing but the positive impracticability of its being brought to bear in that character should be allowed to stand in the way of its adoption. It is only a short 1200 miles from Bombay. —1600 from Galle,” and Mr. Greenlaw then goes on to describe the natural advantages of the Island, as a Port of shelter and supply, which I need not here repeat.

38.—The distance from Calcutta to Suez, being on Mr. Greenlaw's data, miles..... 4780  
and the distance between Calcutta and Madras equal to five days steaming ( $144 \times 5 = 720$ ), and from the latter to Galle, four days ( $144 \times 4 = 576$ )—we have the distance from Calcutta to Galle at 1296.

To this add the distance between

Galle and Socotra..... 1600.

And we find Socotra distant from

Calcutta ..... 2896.

Very nearly equal to the whole  
distance from Bombay to Suez,  
—and we have Suez distant from

Socotra ..... 1884

---

The time required to perform the voyage  
from Suez to Socotra will be  $1884 \div 144$

days. .... 13. 08333 dls.

From Socotra to Bombay...  $1200 \div 144 = 8. 333333$

From Socotra to Galle .....  $1600 \div 144 = 11. 111111$

From Galle to Madras .....  $576 \div 144 = 4. \quad "$

From Madras to Calcutta ...  $720 \div 144 = 5. \quad "$

and on these premises, which it is of importance to recollect are all deduced from Mr. Greenlaw's own data, I now proceed to inquire, into the advantages that are to result to Madras and Bombay, in point of time, from the adoption of this new scheme, carrying forward such inquiry even to Calcutta.

39.—First as to Bombay.—Socotra as regards Bombay, will be the last port of departure, on the voyage from Suez. Mr. Greenlaw estimates the detention of the Red Sea Steamer to Calcutta, at Socotra, to complete her stock of coals at one day, and it is not unreasonable to suppose, as he allows six hours for landing Packets, and Passengers at Madras, that a like time may elapse in shifting packets, &c. to the Bombay Steamer at Socotra, which deducted from one day or 24 hours, will leave eighteen hours, as the gain in point of time, and I know not any other, that can accrue from this plan, to the Bombay community.

40.—Next as to Madras.

The time required to perform the voyage from Suez to Socotra,  
will be ..... 13. 083333.



Detention at Judda—Six hours .....	0	25
	13.	333333.
From Socotra to Bombay.....	8.	333333.

Making from Suez to Bombay,—days ....	21.	666666.
Distance from Bombay to Madras.—Per Madras General Post Office distances of the 22nd Fe- bruary, 1834, published in the new Code of Re- gulations in the Fort St. George Government Gazette, Saturday, 8th March 1834, 819 miles, which at ninety (90) miles per day, or $3\frac{1}{2}$ per hour, will give.....	9.	10.
	Days....	30. 766666.

I will add to this, the detention at Socotra of which I have spoken, in examining the advantages to Bombay, 6 hours; or so much of that period as might suffice to make an even day—Say 5 hours, 36 minutes .....	0	233334.
From Suez to Madras—viâ Bombay, days..	31.	0

From Suez to Socotra as above, detention of Jud- da included .....	13.	333333.
Detention at Socotra.....	1.	
From Socotra to Galle.....	11.	111111.
	12.	111111.
From Suez to Galle.....	25.	444444.
Detention at Galle.....	1.	
From Galle to Madras....	4.	

	5.	
	Days..	30. 444444.
Deduct from this, to render the comparison in every way unobjectionable, the difference be- tween 6 hours and 5 hours, 36 minutes al- lowed to Bombay—or say, between 25 decls. and 233334 decls.....	0	016666.
From Suez to Madras, by Steamer all the way,		

days..... 30. 427778

Making the gain in point of time to Madras by the Steamer all the way, 572222 decls. of a day, or hours 13. 733828, or as near as can be hours, thirteen and three quarters.

41.—Lastly as to Calcutta.

From Suez to Madras as already shown ..... 30. 427778.

Take so much only for detention at Madras, as shall make up an even half day..... 0. 072222.

To departure from Madras..... 30. 50000.

From Madras to Calcutta..... 5. 0.

Total from Suez to Calcutta by Steamer all the way..... days .. 35. 500000.

From Suez to Bombay as already shown ..... 21. 666666.

Add for detention at Socotra as before ..... 0. 233334.

To complete an even day..... 0. 160000.

Days... 22. 0.

Add course of Dawk, between Bombay and Calcutta, as given by Mr. Greenlaw\* ... 16 38.

Making the gain to Calcutta by Steamer all the way ..... Days... 2. 500000.

42.—The gain therefore, as regards time which will be realized to parties residing at either of the three Presidencies of Bombay, Madras, and Calcutta, as far as Letters are concerned, on the voyage from Suez to India, by the Establishment of a Steamer to Galle, Madras, and Calcutta, in addition to the one to Bombay must, under ordinary circumstances, be as under,

\* I have often received letters in Bombay from Calcutta in 15 days, and as the distance, via Nagpore, is only 1988 miles, it would give at 90 miles per day 14½ days, or more accurately 14. 539333decls. and having no doubt that the regular communication may, under proper arrangements, be brought to 19 days hereafter, I consider that the gain in time here shown, will be reduced to 1½ days at no very distant period.

	Days.	Hours.
Bombay.....	0	18
Madras.....	0	13 $\frac{3}{4}$
Calcutta.....	2	12

43.—But it is fair to suppose, that the dispatches of Government, will under any circumstances, be sent on from Bombay by express, and the liberal contribution the Hon'ble Company are to make, to the Galle and Socotra plan, creates an additional ground for this preference. Let us inquire how they will then stand in respect to the two routes? I have known an express to run between Madras and Bombay under six and a half days,—between Calcutta and Bombay in (I think) twelve and a half days,—and I suppose it will be conceded, that seven days as regards Madras, and thirteen days for Calcutta, are not unusual periods for an express.

We have allowed for the course of Dawk, from Bombay to

Madras.....	“	9	10
-------------	---	---	----

Take an express at.....	“	7	0
-------------------------	---	---	---

Difference.	2	10
-------------	---	----

Deduct the advantage which the Steamer

all the way to Madras, has over the

Bombay Route, by ordinary course of

Dawk.....	0	572222
-----------	---	--------

In favour of Steamer to Bombay and Ex-

press to Madras.....Day	1	527778
-------------------------	---	--------

We have allowed for the course of Dawk

from Bombay to Calcutta.....Days.	16
-----------------------------------	----

Take an express at.....	13
-------------------------	----

Difference	3
------------	---

Deduct the advantage which the Steamer

all the way to Calcutta has over the

Bombay route by ordinary course of

Dawk.....	2 500
-----------	-------

In favor of Steamer to Bombay, and ex-

press to Calcutta.....Day.	0 500
----------------------------	-------

which will be increased to one and a half ( $1\frac{1}{2}$ ) day, if the expresses on the Calcutta line of road can be made to approach the Madras rate.\*

44.—Mr. Greenlaw cannot, I think, complain of this view of the expectations and probable arrangements of Government, in regard to their own dispatches, since it is made a source of grave objection to the route by Bombay, in the note to his 8th para: (already given) that however important might be a dispatch to Government from home, however urgent the requisition for immediate reply, it could not, under the circumstances he had set forth, but which I have shown to have had more importance attached to them, than they were entitled to, be given from Calcutta:—thereby justifying the belief, that he would, with all who have the interests of India at heart, have every practicable facility afforded to the ruling authorities, at each Presidency, in furtherance of their regular, and early receipt of the advices which may be transmitted them from the mother country.

45.—Of the commercial advantages which are to result to us from the cession of Socotra, as noticed in Mr. Greenlaw's 24th para. I should content myself with saying from my former practical knowledge of the trade of the Red Sea, that they appear to me to be greatly overrated, did not the weight which Mr. Greenlaw attaches to the curious fact, as stated by Mr. Waghorn (but long since known

Mr. Greenlaw's view of the Commercial advantages that are to result to us from the possession of Socotra stated, and briefly discussed.

\* Madras  $819 \div 7 = 117$  miles per day. Calcutta  $1308 \div 12 = 109$  do. or a very trifle more than  $4\frac{1}{2}$  miles per hour.

to every one who had the slightest acquaintance with the trade of that quarter) of the Americans proceeding to Mocha, and other ports in the sea for Coffee, and other articles, carrying only Dollars, lead Mr. Greenlaw to deductions, much more sanguine than are, I think, warranted by the circumstances of the case.

46.—In alluding to this “ curious fact,” Mr. Greenlaw says, that “ *it shows in itself how invaluable as a mere commercial entrepôt the possession of Socotra might be made;—for instead of coming out with Dollars, the Americans might bring coal, and instead of being cooped up in the Red Sea, till the monsoon changed, they could deliver their coals, take their homeward Cargo, and be off quickly, not only saving time, but also the increased rate of insurance demanded from all vessels navigating the Red Sea.*” And he proceeds, in a very confident strain, to point out how the possession of Socotra would tend to the removal of inconveniencies connected with the vent of the produce of Africa, of which I have heard for the first time through the medium of Mr. Greenlaw’s pamphlet,—and in regard to which, it may be as well to say *en-passant*, that a more careful inquiry, would, I am sure, have satisfied him, that he had been greatly misinformed.

The impossibility of ever realizing Mr. Greenlaw’s expectation, that coals will hereafter be made the medium of outward remittance, instead of Dollars, in

47.—As respects the increased rate of premium, demanded for the insurance of vessels navigating the Red Sea, I may be permitted to observe, that the general adoption of this usage, if it really now exists, must be of recent date,—and that the calculations annexed to Mr. Greenlaw’s pamphlet, in his estimate of the expense of maintaining a communication by Steam, between India and England, *viâ* Suez, would lead me to a different conclusion, from that which he has adopted in the para : (24) just

quoted, inasmuch as insurance is taken, in the estimate in question, at 8 per cent per annum, or  $\frac{1}{2}$  per cent per mensem, which is, I apprehend, as low as insurance on time, can be done in this country, on vessels pursuing the ordinary navigation of the Indian Seas—though, I observe, that the Bengal Committee, in the calculations appended to their letter to the Supreme Government, of the 28th January, 1834, estimate insurance on the Bengal and Suez Steamers, at the still lower rate of 5 per cent per annum:—and as to the supply of Fuels, through the medium of coals at Socotra, for the provision of homeward cargoes for American ships, it need only be remembered, that these vessels are usually from 300 to 400 tons burthen, and that a full cargo of coal from a vessel of the latter size, delivered at Socotra, at Rs. 25 per ton, would only produce Rs. 10,000,\* or say drs. 5,000, to convince every one, in any degree acquainted with the value of the articles that compose the return cargoes of Ships in general, from the Red Sea, Coffee, Gums, Drugs, &c. how futile must be the hope of substituting coals for dollars, as a remittance from America or Europe in provision of homeward investments at Socotra, or its vicinity.

48.—I have stated in the 12th para: of these remarks, that four-fifths of all India, will be indebted to Bombay, under whatever equitable arrangements are made for the

provision of homeward cargoes of Coffee, Gums, Drugs, &c. from Socotra made manifest.

\* Note.—Since these observations were finished, I have accidentally laid my hand on an Invoice of Coffee, shipped from Mocha, on the Hon'ble Company's account some years ago, amounting to Bhars (of 496 lbs. each) 681 2 Frezils  $9\frac{1}{2}$  Mds or lbs. 337193. The prime cost of which, on shore, was German Crowns 41,598-75 comassiez, Duties, Boat hire, cooly hire, and other charges on board, without commission, 4506-59=46,145-54 at 210 Bombay Rs. per o | o G. Crowns. 96,905-63 $\frac{1}{2}$  equal to Rs. 32-187 per cwt.—say 32 Rs.—at which rate the ton of 18 cwt. would cost Rs. 576, and an outward cargo of coal of 400 tons, sold at Rs. 25 per ton Rs. 10,000, would provide Coffee for the homeward cargo to the extent of seventeen tons, 361 decs. (17. 361)!!!

Promise made that proof shall be afforded in examining the letter of the Committee of the new Bengal Steam Fund, and other Documents, that as respects the far greater portion of all India, parties will receive

their letters at least as quickly, and for the most part as cheaply by Bombay as by either of the two other Presidencies

general interests, for a quicker receipt of their letters from England than by any Route that has yet been brought under public consideration ;—and again in the 30th para ;—that “ as respects the far greater portion of all India, parties will receive their letters, at least as quickly, and for the most part as cheaply, as by either of the two other Presidencies,” and it will naturally be expected, that I do not rest the validity of these positions, on bare assertion only. The proofs on which I rely to support my declarations in this instance, would however, lead me into so much greater detail than would be convenient, at the conclusion of a paper, that has already greatly exceeded the limits I expected, that I must reserve them to a future opportunity. This will very shortly be afforded me, in the observations I purpose submitting, on the letters of the committee of the new Bengal Steam Fund, and other documents still before me,—and I will only therefore, now say, that in all the plans and calculations brought forward in Calcutta, it has been assumed—unreasonably I think, and certainly in opposition to all practice elsewhere—that Letters, Parcels Passengers, &c. are to be conveyed to and from Calcutta, on the Steam vessels, viâ Suez, on the same terms as to and from Bombay, without regard to the difference of distance to be run, or expense to be incurred ;—and that, if it be conceded to me, as in fairness it must that the charges made to individuals, should be proportionate to the service rendered, I shall have no difficulty in establishing that, not only all the stations under the Bombay Presidency,—but those also that will belong to the new one of Agra,—and a very large portion of the Madras presidency, even to its southern possessions on the Malabar Coast, as far as Quilon inclusive, and its northern Districts even to Ganjam itself, will be in the situation I have

Suez to  
Bombay  
about 3000  
miles. Suez  
to Madras  
about 4000  
miles. Suez  
to Calcutta  
about 4780  
miles.

described both as to celerity and cheapness in their correspondence with our native land—and thus invalidate I conceive, many of the data on which the Bengal Committee have proceeded, in their latest recommendations on the subject of Steam Navigation for “all India.”

J. H. CRAWFORD,

*Ootacamund Neilgherry Hills, 20th June, 1834.*





# **OBSERVATIONS ON THE LETTER FROM THE BENGAL NEW STEAM FUND COMMITTEE, TO THE SUPREME GOVERNMENT, &c.**

**PARA. 1.**—In continuation of my endeavours to ascertain how far the plans submitted from Calcutta are likely to secure the establishment of a permanent, and regular steam communication, between India and England, I now proceed to an examination of the data on which the recommendations of the Committee of the New Bengal Steam Fund to government, as detailed in their letter of the 28th January, 1834, are founded, believing that a careful review of those data, will lead a large majority of the Indian Public, to conclusions different from those on which the committee have relied as their guide, in the arrangements they have proposed for the future, and that the sanguine expectations indulged by the Committee, in regard to the working of those arrangements, will be found to rest on no solid basis.

**2.**—It is said in the 4th para. of the letter in question, in reference to the suggestion of the Governor General in Council, as to the expediency of substituting Calcutta for Bombay, as the port of departure for the proposed immediate re-opening of the communication, that it having been authoritatively stated, that a regular quarterly communication, so as to ensure four voyages in the year, between India and Suez, could not be made from Bombay, the committee should on that account alone, consider the permanent communication should be from Calcutta, being satisfied that during the single voyage, when it would be at all necessary to oppose the S. W. Monsoon, in the Arabian Sea, a steam vessel of proper power, would be enabled to make the voyage from Galle to Socotra, with at least as great a degree of certainty as the Falmouth Packets make their winter

**Examination of the data, on which the recommendations of the Bengal Committee are founded undertaken: and a belief expressed that a careful review of those data will lead the majority of the Indian Public to conclusions different from those which the committee have adopted. Reference also made, to Capt Wilson's reasons, for thinking the passage from India to Suez, during the S. W. Monsoon, cannot be made with advantage to those concerned, through it is not contended, that the passage at that season is impracticable.**

passages to the Mediterranean, the Bombay communication during this voyage joining on at Galle,\* in case it should be eventually proved to be impracticable to do so at Socotra ; at which place there would be no difficulty in the junction being made , during the three other voyages.

3.—I confess myself to have held at one time, nearly the same opinion as the Bengal committee, in regard to the comparative difficulties of the two voyages, but after an attentive perusal and consideration, of Capt. Wilson's supplementary observations to his original Pamphlet, on steam communication between Bombay and Suez, I have abandoned my first impression on the subject, and arrived at the same conclusion as Capt. Wilson (page 12) " that a regular steam communication during the S. W. Monsoon, between Bombay and Suez is not practicable, in a way to make the returns or advantages meet, or worth while the expense ;" and I would have it remembered, in reference to the Bengal Committee's remark, respecting a junction at Galle from Bombay, in case it should eventually be found impracticable to effect one at Socotra, that Capt. Wilson distinctly states (page 13) that it is not contended that the weather is so very bad, in the S. W. Monsoon, that a steamer

\* Note.—At a distance from all nautical persons, and without the means of referring to any nautical works, I feel considerable hesitation in saying any thing, respecting the fitness of Galle, as a Coal depot in the S. W. Monsoon, or a port of junction for the Bombay steamer. I would however, venture, if it be only to call attention to the subject, to express a doubt of its being available for either purpose, at that season. It must, I apprehend, be a lee shore from the latter part of May, till the middle of September. I have passed it myself, towards the end of May, on my passage from Bombay to China, when from the state of the weather generally, anchoring would have been attended with extreme danger, and from a recollection of like impediments to communication with the Island, in the S. W. Monsoon, when communication has been extremely desired, and ordered to be had, if practicable, I must consider the propriety of making Galle a coal Depot during the months in question, extremely doubtful.

cannot go to Suez against it, but that having to go so great a distance, (3000 miles) against strong breezes and a heavy sea, the wear and tear of the vessel, and machinery and other extraordinary expenses, would be so considerable, as to make the returns fall short of the current expenses.

4.—The experiment from Calcutta is however, still in progress by the Forbes, and it will be sufficient here to remark that it will be made against the monsoon the whole way in all probability, if prosecuted at the period at present in contemplation ; for it is, according to Capt. Wilson's experience (page 8) only between Mocha and Judda, about 800 miles, that fine weather can be expected, and this very uncertain, making, in failure of such portion of moderate weather, a voyage of 4780 miles, opposed to adverse winds and heavy seas ; and in the event of good fortune, between Mocha and Judda, still nearly 4000 miles, under the circumstances just detailed, will have to be effected, and a run of 4780 altogether. The distance from Brest to Cape Finesterre, is only about 379 miles, and though persons may find it convenient to pass from England to the Mediterranean, in the winter season on a steamer, in preference to a sailing vessel, I apprehend, that not many will be found in India, willing to embark from Calcutta, on the 15th April or 15th July, two of the periods fixed for the departure of the Bengal steamer, in the 26th para. of the Committee's letter now before me, to make a beating passage of nearly 5000 miles, with the prospect of rough weather, and consequent discomfort all the voyage nearly, before them, and of finding on arrival at Suez, after a passage made in the S. W. Monsoon, the heat of the weather too great, to admit of those, so inclined, loitering amongst the Antiquities of upper Egypt, or even to allow of their passing over the Desert of Suez, however

quickly, without serious inconvenience, whilst the rising of the Nile which commences in June, and is at its height in August, would, to use Capt. Wilson's words which I have adopted freely in other places, subject passengers from India, at the season in question, to almost all its ancient Plagues, in lower Egypt, and operate in his opinion, as in mine, as a further drawback to the adoption of the Red Sea route, during the S. W. Monsoon.

The Committee's reasons as given in their 3d. para : and repeated in the 3d : of these observations, and are further detailed in their subsequent Paras. for considering that the permanent communication should be from Calcutta briefly examined, and their validity questioned.

5.—*But this,* “continue the Committee in their 5th para. *“is not the sole ground, on which we hold, that the communication should be from Calcutta, it is scarcely the principal one. It is obvious, that the communication between India and England, if confined to Bombay, as the sole port of arrival and departure, would be greatly reduced, below that which would take place, if means were afforded for landing Passengers, Mails, parcels and packets at the three presidencies of India, and at Ceylon, AND CONSEQUENTLY THAT THE RECEIPTS WHETHER FROM THE CONVEYANCE OF PASSENGERS, NEWSPAPERS AND PARCELS, OR FROM THE POSTAGE OF LETTERS, WOULD BE COMPARATIVELY TRIFLING ; WHILE THE EXPENCES WOULD BE VERY NEARLY THE SAME, AS THOSE WHICH WOULD SUFFICE FOR INSURING SIMULTANEOUSLY, A ROAD FOR THE EASY PASSAGE BETWEEN ALL PARTS OF INDIA AND ENGLAND. The advantages of a Steamer quitting Calcutta, calling at Madras and Galle for their Passengers and Packets, and picking up those of Bombay, at Socotra, are we think incalculable, over that which confines the communication to Bombay. In support of this, we would observe that the number of letters, received at the two Presidencies of Calcutta, and Madras, are more than quadruple those received at Bombay : and those*

*exported at the two former Presidencies nearly quintuple ; \* again, as regards Passengers, the total number of all classes arriving at and departing from each Presidency, are as per margin,† each class of Passengers, namely males apparently married, and apparently single, Females, Children and Servants, arriving at Calcutta alone, is very nearly triple those arriving at Bombay, and departing double. From this, without referring to Ceylon, some idea may be gathered, of the comparative intercourse, and we would confidently ask, whether a Steam Communication restricted to Bombay, under the circumstances of the impracticability of the country for Travelers, as well as for the transit, of even small Packages or Parcels, would be in any degree, deserving the name of a Steam*

* Calcutta received, amounting .....	89189
Madras .....	4756
	<hr/> 129925
Bombay .....	<hr/> 3000
Calcutta exported .....	72892½
Madras .....	46614
	<hr/> 125511
Bombay .....	<hr/> 29000
† ARRIVALS.	
Calcutta .....	767
Madras .....	573
	<hr/> 1340
Bombay .....	<hr/> 287
DEPARTURES.	
Calcutta .....	665
Madras .....	459
	<hr/> 1124
Bombay .....	<hr/> 361

† So printed---probably 72897.—J. H. C.

*Communication with India. Whether in point of fact, it would not be a mere connection with Bombay, the other parts of India having comparatively no advantage from it, would not the result be a large expenditure with little advantage? while by the mere addition of one Steamer, the acknowledged benefit of the shortened intercourse, would be simultaneously conveyed to all the Presidencies, and instead of being confined to Bombay, flow throughout the whole country."*

6.—The conclusions which the committee have arrived at, in that portion of the foregoing para. which I have placed in capitals, and the queries they have propounded in the latter part of it, will be better answered, at a later period of my present Inquiries. I pass therefore to their 6th para. in which, after further observations, commendatory of their own more comprehensive plan, the committee thus proceed.

*"We feel that we need not dwell further on this point—the question cannot be between the relative advantages of the two places—it can only be one of Expense, and we contend, that there cannot, after due consideration, be any reasonable doubt, that the facilities afforded by the plan we recommend, for bringing on the Passengers, Packets, Parcels and Mails from Southern and Eastern India, at Socotra, by means of a single additional Steamer, would not only afford more than a sufficient profit, to cover the Expenses of that Steamer, but would add greatly to the profit of the whole concern—for it must be borne in mind, that the Expenses from England to Socotra, would be very nearly as great, for maintaining the communication with Bombay alone as with all the principal places in India. By extending the communication, to the principal seats of Government in India, the sources of profit would be at least trebled, and thus among other important advantages, the*

*permanency of the communication, would be better insured."*

7.—This is indeed a bold assertion in respect to the ratio in which the profits are to be increased by the adoption of the committee's plan, but it is an assertion without proof, and having looked in vain, for that proof throughout the remaining parts of the letter before me, I must be permitted to say, that the position the committee have advanced, is not only unsupported by any satisfactory evidence of its value, but that I apprehend it to be incapable of such support, as shall convince the Public, that it is a tenable one. My reasons for this opinion, will be forthcoming in their proper place.

8.—In the meantime, I go forward to the 13th para. of the committee's letter, where we gain a further insight into their hopes and expectations, in the following words:—

*Presuming therefore on that confirmation (i. e. of the two lakhs of Rupees annually from Government, noticed in their intermediate para. in aid of the communication between Bombay and Egypt) we proceed to observe that if carried into effect, there would be an outlay of two lakhs of Rupees annually, for five years, for the conveyance of the Government dispatches from Bombay only, added to which, there would be the charge of conveyance of the Despatches from Suez across the Isthmus to Alexandria, and thence to England.*

*We are unable to say, what would be the charge of conveyance of the Dispatches across the Isthmus, or to estimate correctly, that which is of more consequence, namely the charge which would be made by the home, on the Indian Government for their conveyance between Alexandria and Malta; and again, between that Island and England—Seeing however that the cost of a single letter by the Government Steam Packet between England and Malta is 3s. | 2d. or Sicca Rupees 1½, some idea may be formed of what the demand would be, for*

The Committee's hopes and Expectations further developed, in their 13th Para: in connexion with the charges of conveyance of Packets, across the Isthmus, of Suez to Alexandria, and thence to England; and some observations offered, towards the removal of the committee's uncertainty, as to the first mentioned charges.



*the conveyance of the Government dispatches as distinguished from the mails. We consider that on the most limited scale, the public dispatches of the three Presidencies sent to and received at Bombay would annually amount to the mass of 50,000 single letters, that is 25,000 each way, and if charged\* at the rate of a single letter, between Malta and England, although we think it more likely, that owing to the necessity of an additional Steamer, between Alexandria and Malta it would be two Rupees, but say Sicca Rupees  $1\frac{1}{2}$ , then there would be a charge by the Home, against the Indian Government, of Sicca Rupees 75,000 per annum which added to the Sa. Rs. 200,000, bonus, would be Sa. Rs. 2,75,000, independent of the expense of their conveyance across the Isthmus, and of their transit between Bombay and the other presidencies, so that the actual outlay of the Indian government, could scarcely be less than Sa. Rs. 300,000 per annum, conveying their own dispatches alone, independent of the mails from Bombay only."*

The principle contended for in the last Para. of my separate observations on Mr. Greenlaw's Pamphlet, that the charge for the conveyance of Packets Letters, &c. should be proportionate to the distance they are carried the Expense incurred, and Service rendered admitted by the committee.

9.—The expense of conveying the Government dispatches, across the Isthmus, is put so prominently forward, in the preceding para. that it may be worth while, to endeavour to arrive at some idea of what the real expense will be. The packets are to sail quarterly, each government dispatch to and from India, on the data afforded by the Committee, will therefore consist of  $(25,000 \div 4 = 6250)$  six thousand two hundred and fifty single letters—weighing at 180 grains Troy each.—Grains Troy 1125000, which divided by 7000; will give lbs avoirdupois 160,714285 decs. Mr. Greenlaw, a member of the Bengal committee, has assumed in the estimate of expence of maintaining a communication by steam, between India (running from Calcutta, Madras, Galle, and Bombay) and Falmouth, &c. appended to his para-

phlet, that the cost of conveying the public packets, across the Isthmus will be £25 or Sa. Ra. 300 each time, and Captain Wilson states in his prefatory observations (page 8) that as to the passage of the Ithmus no expensive arrangements are requisite. A Bedouin and a Dromedary, offer the speediest, cheapest, and a perfectly safe mode, of conveying packets across the Desert in that quarter, so that all apprehension of any very heavy outlay on that score, may it is hoped, be abandoned.

10.—One or two other observations, on the committee's 13th para. suggest themselves to my mind at this time, which it may be desirable to note, *en passant*—first, that the principle I have contended for, in the last para. ( 48 ) of my separate observations on Mr. Greenlaw's pamphlet that the charge for the conveyance of packets or letters should be proportionate to the distance they are carried, the expense incurred and service rendered, is admitted by the committee in their belief that the charge made by the Home Government, for dispatches from Alexandria to England, will in all probability, exceed by 33, 333 decs. per cent. or, by one third that made for dispatches from Malta; and secondly, that whatever sum may be assumed, as the annual outlay by the Indian Government, between Alexandria and England, will equally form an item of disbursement, in their charges of steam correspondence, whether the packets be conveyed in the first instance, by a steamer from Bombay or any other Port of the peninsula of India."

11.—The committee's 14th and 15th. Paras. next demand my attention, and they run thus.

*" This is what we believe would be the cost to the Indian government, of the establishment of a communication from Bombay, under the operation of the proposed bonus. But*

The committee's view as expressed in their 14 & 15 Paras. of some of the advantages of the Bengal

comprehensive scheme, and of the disadvantage of the Bombay plan, as connected with the outlay, to be incurred, and benefits secured, adverted to; and a belief expressed, that their's is rather a high wrought picture of the benefits that will belong to the one, and of the drawbacks that attach to the other.

*let us advert to the charge that would be made, by His Majesty's government, for the private correspondence of India, measuring it only by the same scale, namely Sa. Rs. 1½ between England and Alexandria, and allowing the letters going only from and to Bombay, to be limited to 50,000 each way, the charge would be Sa. Rs. 150,000 per annum, which added to the 75000, estimated as that which would be charged to the Indian government, for their own dispatches, would make Sa. Rs. 225000, levied by the King's government at home for the dispatches and mails between England and Alexandria.*

*Believing that such would be the result of a communication from Bombay only, under the operation of the proposed bonus, we have no doubt, that with the profits derivable from a well arranged comprehensive scheme, embracing a communication from all parts of India, carried on through a single agency, contractors would be found, willing to carry it into effect, on a support from government, not exceeding the amount above estimated, as the cost of the Bombay plan: that is, with such support, the contractors would undertake, to convey all the dispatches of government, and the mails, not from Bombay only, but from all parts of India. On the comprehensive scheme, we have before referred to, we consider in fact, that by the sacrifice of a similar expenditure to that which appears to us, would be involved by the proposed communication from Bombay alone, and under the disadvantages of the divided agency, the whole correspondence and intercourse between England and all parts of India, might be carried on, with more certainty and dispatch, by one agency. Nor is it the least important feature in this latter plan, that it would be the interest of the contractor to have his vessels of the largest, and therefore of the most competent class of steamers, while under the other plan, it would be his care to re-*

duce the size, to the lowest scale permitted, his returns arising solely, as we consider they would, from the bonus of two lakhs, while those of the single agency plan would be most materially aided by the profits derivable from passengers, between England and all parts of India, and the intermediate ports on both sides of the Isthmus from the freight payable on the conveyance of parcels, of various characters, each increasing in number and value, as the communication became established."

12.—It appears to me that this is rather a high wrought picture, of the disadvantages of the one plan and the advantages of the other : but as I shall have occasion to advert to these paras. again, hereafter. I will merely now say, that I have been glad to find the opinion I have always entertained, and expressed, on one part of the subject, viz. the inexpediency, if not impracticability, of undivided Agency confirmed by the high authority of the governor general, who, in his minute of the 20th March last, from this place published in the *Madras Male Asylum Herald*, of 19th April, when adverting to a plan, which had been proposed to him, by a Committee of Merchants in Calcutta, and which started, with assuming as, indispensable to success, that it should embrace the whole line from London to every part in India, thus proceeds "*That is, to use a common expression in Europe, that Passengers should be booked from London, all the way to India, (every intermediate expense being provided for by the contractor) for one given sum.*"

"*I dissented (continues his Lordship) from the justness of this calculation. My opinion was, that Travellers both going and coming, would for the great part, either prefer the Steam Packet of the government to Malta, or would choose the land route to Malta or Egypt, via the continent, or vice versa. I moreover thought, that a much simpler and less*

*expensive scheme, would be, for the contractors to confine themselves to the Indian side of the communication, that is from Suez to Calcutta. I undertook to engage for the Government at home, that the only vacant part of the line, on the European side, viz. from Malta to Alexandria, should be filled by a Government Steamer, and I also undertook, if the Hugh Lindsay should not be equal to the conveyance of the Mails, from Socotra to Bombay, that an additional Steamer from Bengal, should be furnished for that purpose. But the Committee of Merchants would not agree to these Propositions."*

13.—We are now drawing near to the point, on which I am most at variance with Mr. Greenlaw and the Bengal Committee, and I crave particular attention to the sentiments expressed, in their 16th para.

*"But the chief, source of profit exclusive of the proposed bonus, would be derived from the Postage, and here it is to be remembered, that the number of letters which pass between Madras and Calcutta and England \* more than quadruples those between England, and Bombay and that comparatively few of the former, would be dispatched by the Bombay Route, and scarcely any paying more than as a single letter, owing to the heavy overland Postage there can be no doubt that the profits derived from the letters, would under the comprehensive scheme, at least triple those from Bombay alone. The whole number of letters passing between England and India is three lakhs, that is 150,000 each way, of which number 182408 are letters paying Sea Postage, between Madras and Calcutta and England,† to which being added 38701—being the*

The Committee's idea of the great Increase of Postage that would accrue from the adoption of their comprehensive scheme, detailed in their 16th Para. to the disadvantage of Bombay, and a conviction expressed in their 21st that as regards the fitness of Bombay as the sole port of arrival and departure for the Steam Vessels, and their Packets, they have disposed of the question, and have now only to consider it, as it regards Calcutta.

Vide 5 para.	Imported.	Exported.	Total.
* Madras and Calcutta.....	129925.....	118511.....	248436
Bombay.....	30000.....	24000.....	54000
	† Imported.....	92715.	
	Exported.....	89693.	

---

182,408

*same proportion to the whole number of Bombay letters, as obtain in the Calcutta and Madras Letters—the total number of paying letters between England and India is 221,109. Now if but one half of these paying letters, were to go by the Steamer, and to pay two Rupees each letter, half collected in England and the other half in India, the total amount receivable from Postage, would be two lakhs per annum. But this is on the consideration that they are all single letters, whereas very many will be chargeable as double or treble letters, and some even higher, and it is exclusive of the charge for newspapers, so that on the whole, we think that the amount leviable through the Post Office, for letters and newspapers, would certainly not be less than 250000 Rupees, and with such prospects of return, independent of those derivable from Passengers and parcels, we feel satisfied that contractors would readily be found to undertake the project, for three lakhs premium from Government for five years, particularly as they might, seeing that the project is merely experimental, commence the undertaking with hired vessels, and be thus enabled as they went on, to determine whether or not, it would be expedient to build vessels, expressly for the purpose.”*

14.—After stating in the opening of their 18th para. that they shall have greatly failed in the exposition of their sentiments generally, as to the plan and measures, best adapted to insure a perfect communication by Steam, through the Red Sea between England and India, if any thing further is necessary to render them clear to the governor general in Council, the Committee thus shortly sum them up.

*“ We may say, that we firmly believe, the only way to establish and maintain, a perfect communication, is at once, to adopt a Scheme embracing all the points calculated to yield profit, and that this can be only done, by allowing contractors*

*free and uncontrolled agency throughout the whole line, Government yielding that pecuniary return, which the direct services of conveying the public dispatches, between the two countries, entitle them to, with a fair consideration, for the moral and political advantages, which would at any time have resulted from the successful establishment of the Communication, but which under the existing peculiar circumstances of the two countries, become so important as to be beyond all calculation."*

15.—As regards the original plan of making Bombay the Steam Port of India, and its disadvantages as compared with the benefits that are to flow from the adoption of the comprehensive scheme, of the Bengal Committee, the observations of the Committee may now be said to be closed, but the terms in which they take leave of the subject, in a subsequent para. 21, offer so strong an exemplification of the confidence they repose in their own judgment, and in the weight of the arguments by which it is supported, that it would be doing them injustice, not to give them their place here.

*In referring, "say the committee, to the special matters contained in the concluding paragraphs of Mr. Macnaughten's letter of the 5th of September, the principle of which is the restriction of the contract to this side of the Isthmus, we may premise, that as regards Bombay, we have we apprehend already disposed of the question, and that we have now under the altered circumstances of the case, only to consider it, as regards Calcutta."*

16.—With the committee's consideration of this latter question, I may have to deal hereafter. At present, I shall endeavour to explain the grounds, on which I have ventured to assert, that the far greater portion of all India, will receive their letters at least as quickly, and for the most

Reasons  
offered for  
dissenting  
from the cor-  
rectness of  
the commit-  
tee's opinion  
as just detail-

part as cheaply, by Bombay as by either of the two other Presidencies. And if I succeed in satisfactorily establishing that point, a brief enquiry into the cost at which such benefit may be procured, by Steamers from Bombay, as well as into the amount of expenditure, that will attach to the comprehensive scheme of the Bengal committee, and the increased advantages that are to result from it, may not be an unsuitable conclusion to the investigation I have undertaken.

17.—I request attention then, to the accompanying Tables No. 1, and No. 2; the former showing the distance of various places under the Presidency of Bengal, from Bombay, the course of Dawk between those places and Bombay, at the average rate of 80 miles per diem—and the rate of Postage chargeable on Letters from Suez to such places, viâ Bombay, compared with that which would be leviable viâ Calcutta, on the addition of an equitable equivalent, for the increased distance, and charge of conveyance from Suez to the latter Port—the second Table, showing the distance of various places under the Presidency of Madras, from Bombay, accompanied by information in respect to those places and their connexion with Bombay and Madras, as that afforded by Table No. 1, in regard to Calcutta.

18.—The sources from which I have derived the data, on which these Tables are founded, are mentioned at the foot of each, and are accompanied by a few observations that will, I hope, render the Tables perfectly intelligible to every one. But it may be proper to state here, in reference to the 48th para. of my former observations, and the 10th para. of my present ones, that I have considered eight (8) annas, additional to Calcutta, not more than a reasonable allowance, for the difference between 4780 miles, and 3000 miles, the

ed. Explanation given of the grounds, on which I have ventured to assert, in my former observations, that the far greater portion of all India, will receive their letters at least as quickly, and for the most part as cheaply by Bombay, as by either of the two other Presidencies. Tables of distance and Postage submitted in support of that assertion, and some principal places selected, in confirmation thereof.



respective distances of Calcutta and Bombay from Suez, and four (4) annas additional to Madras, as a like reasonable allowance for the difference between 4000 miles and 3000 miles. It may also be as well to add, that with a very few exceptions only, and these where the fraction has not exceeded the tenth part of a day,\* I have invariably taken the course of dawk at the integer, next above the number, and its fractional part, shown by dividing the actual distance by 80—thereby reducing the rate in some instances to little more than seventy miles (70) per day, and in one below seventy even, as will be seen from some examples now given.

Jeebulpore, .

Distance...  $730 \div 80 = 9 \frac{125}{80}$  say 10 = 73 miles per day.

Joudpoor.....  $492 \div 80 = 6 \frac{150}{80}$  7 = 70½ " do.

Mooradabad..  $1058 \div 80 = 13 \frac{162}{80}$  14 = 75½ " do.

Neemuch.....  $648 \div 80 = 8 \frac{100}{80}$  9 = 72 " do.

Bednore.....  $415 \div 80 = 5 \frac{167}{80}$  6 = 69½ " do.

Vizagapatam..  $810 \div 80 = 10 \frac{125}{80}$  11 = 73½ " do.

19.—It may save trouble to some, if, in confirmation of my former assertions, and illustration of the remarks I shall have occasion to make hereafter, I select a few principal places, connected with the Bengal and Madras Presidencies, in support of my views of the subject, under consideration.

Agra..... is 917 miles distant from Bombay. The dawk will reach it in days 11, 462 decls., say 12 days. The postage will be 15 annas.

	Days.	decl's.	
Bhopal.....	8	025....	8 days.
Gualior.....	10	050....	10 "
Midnapore.....	15	100....	15 "
Salem.....	10	025....	10 "
Trichinopoly..	11	037....	11 "
Salumcottah....	9	087....	9 "

It is 785 miles distant from Calcutta. The steamer to that Port will be  $18\frac{1}{2}$  days longer than to Bombay; so that parties at Agra will have their letters  $1\frac{1}{2}$  day before they would in Calcutta, exclusive of the distance then to be travelled. The postage would be Rupees 1—3 annas.

Benares.....is 1156 miles from Bombay. The course of dawk will be days 14, 450 deels, say 15 days. The postage will be Rupees 1, 1 anna.

It is 490 miles only from Calcutta, which must however be travelled in  $1\frac{1}{2}$  days to allow of letters being delivered there as soon as from Bombay. The postage would be one Rupee.

Delhi.....is 1057 miles distant from Bombay. The course of dawk will be days 13—212 deels, say 14 days. The postage one Rupee.

It is 891 miles from Calcutta. Parties at Delhi will have their letters within half a day of the period at which they would have reached Calcutta when they would have to travel 891 miles; the postage would be Rs. I. 3 annas.

Cuttack.....is 1026 miles distant from Bombay—The dawk will reach it in days 12—825. say 13 days; the postage will be one Rupee.

It is 250 miles, or thereabouts, distant from Calcutta, so that letters will be in

Cuttack viâ Bombay, half a day sooner than they would be in Calcutta, exclusive of the inland journey from the latter. The postage would be one Rupee.

Lucknow.....is 996 miles distant from Bombay—the dawk will reach it in days 12—450 decls. say 13 days. The postage will be 15 Annas.

It is 623 miles distant from Calcutta, letters will also be at this station, half a day sooner than they would be in Calcutta, without having then to travel 623 miles. The postage will be Rs. 1—2 annas.

Loodianah.....is 1250 miles distant from Bombay, the dawk will arrive there in days 15—625 decls., say 16 days. The postage will be Rs. 1—2 annas.

It is 1100 miles distant from Calcutta, which must be travelled in  $2\frac{1}{2}$  days, to put parties there in possession of their letters, as soon as they would receive them from Bombay. the postage would be Rs. 1—5 annas.

Meerut.....is 1100 miles from Bombay—The Dawk well reach it in days 13—750 decls. say 14 days. The postage will be one Rupee.

It is 896 miles distant from Calcutta, which must be run over in half a day, to allow of letters being delivered there

as quickly as from Bombay—The postage would be Rs. 1—3 annas.  
 Bangalore.....is 614 miles distant from Bombay. The dawd will arrive there in days 7—675, say 8 days—The postage will be 12 annas.

It is 211 miles distant from Madras—The Steamer to that Port, will be 9 days longer than to Bombay—Letters will therefore be at Bangalore, vià Bombay, one day earlier than they could reach Madras, whence they would have to travel 211 miles—The postage would be 11 annas.

Bellary.....is 540 miles distant from Bombay.—The course of dawd will be days 6—725. say 7 days—The Postage will be 11 annas.

It is 316 Miles from Madras, letters will be there twodays before they could reach Madras, exclusive of the subsequent inland journey from the latter place—The Postage would be 13 annas.

Calicut.....is 756 miles distant from Bombay, the dawd will be days 9—450. say 10 days—the postage will be 13 annas.

It is 441 miles from Madras; which must be travelled in one day, to place letters at Calicut, as early as they would reach it vià Bombay. The postage would be 14 annas.

Coimbatore.....is 730 miles distant from Bombay.—The

course of dawk will be days 9—125.  
say 10 days—The postage 13 annas.

It is 328 miles from Madras, which must also be travelled in one day, to allow of the delivery of letters there, as quickly as from Bombay—The postage would be 13 annas.

Coringa.....is 780 miles distant from Bombay—The dawk will arrive in days 9—750, say 10 days—The Postage will be 13 annas.

It is 419 miles from Madras, which again must be run through in one day to put parties there in receipt of their letters, as speedily as from Bombay, The postage would be 14 annas.

Ganjam.....is 1024 miles distant from Bombay—The dawk will arrive in days 12—800. say 13 days. The Postage will be one Rupee.

It is 676 Miles from Madras, which must be travelled in four days, to put letters there as quickly as from Bombay.—The postage will be one Rupee.

Jaulnah.....is 294 miles distant from Bombay. The course of dawk will be days 3—675. say 4 days. The Postage 8 annas.

It is 690 Miles from Madras, letters will be there, via Bombay, five days before they could reach Madras, exclusive of a subsequent land journey of 690 miles—The postage would be one Rupee.

**Masulipatam** is 683 miles distant from Bombay. The dawk will arrive in days 8—537, say 9 days. The postage will be 12 annas.

It is 315 miles from Madras, and letters will be at Masulipatam, on the day they would reach Madras. The postage would be 13 annas.

**Mysore** is 630 miles from Bombay. The course of dawk will be days 7—875, say, 8 days. The postage 12 annas.

It is 295 miles from Madras, letters would be at Mysore, viâ Bombay, one day earlier than they could reach Madras, without the subsequent land journey of 295 miles. The postage would be 12 annas.

**Quilon** is 918 miles distant from Bombay. The dawk will arrive there in days 11—475, say 12 days. The postage will be 15 annas.

It is 435 miles from Madras. This must be performed in three days, to allow of letters being delivered there as speedily as from Bombay. The postage would be 14 annas.

**Vellore** is 714 miles distant from Bombay. The dawk will be days 8—925, say 9 days. Parties here will have their letters on the day they would arrive at Madras. The postage 13 annas.

It is 89 miles only from Madras. The postage would be 8 annas.

Vizagapatam is 810 miles from Bombay. The course of dawlk will be days 10—125. say 11 days. The postage 14 annas.

It is 481 miles distant from Madras, which must be travelled in two days. The postage would be 14 annas. \*

20. It will hardly, I suppose, be disputed that all the Stations under the Bombay Presidency inclusive of the line beyond that Presidency to Hyderabad and Nagpore will find Bombay the best Port of arrival and dispatch for their Europe letters *viâ* Suez.—And if this point be conceded, and a careful reference made, to the position of the places, and rates of postage, cited in the preceding paragraph and of the numerous other stations noticed in the Tables that accompany these observations, I think I shall be considered, by all impartial Persons, to have made good my position, that full four-fifths of all India, or the far greater portion of all India, according to a subsequent expression of mine, will receive their letters at least as quickly, and for the most part as cheaply, via Bombay, as by either of the two other presidencies, even if a doubt should exist in their minds, which there does not in mine, as to *the quicker* transmission, under proper arrangements of letters by Bombay,

\* Note.—By an unlucky mistake in taking out the Time occupied from Suez to Madras *viâ* Bombay, 31 days, instead of that from Suez to Madras by Steamer, all the way, days 30, 4, 27778 ( para. 40 of my observations on Mr. Greenlaw's Pamphlet) and omitting to correct it, though discovered at the time, before this fair Copy was made, I have unintentionally done injustice to Madras, to the extent of half a day, by making the difference nine instead of eight and a half days, in all the comparisons here made, but as the rate of travelling is only calculated at 80 miles per day, and the integer next above the number of days and parts of days occupied at that rate is invariably taken in these comparisons, this can hardly be said to be of much consequence. At all events, this mention of the oversight will enable parties into whose hands these observations may fall to correct the error, to which it has given rise.

than by any other route, that has yet been brought under public consideration.

21. And if it be further admitted, which I believe may be done with perfect justice, that the smaller class of steamers, recommended by Capt. Wilson, vessels of about 300 tons, will afford accommodation to that portion of the Passengers from all India, twenty five altogether, allotted by Mr. Greenlaw to the large Calcutta steamers, which Bombay and its neighbourhood are supposed to furnish, say ten (10) on each voyage, then I arrive at the conclusion, that all establishments and expenditure, in excess of what would be necessary for Bombay, will be maintained for the transmission of less than one-fifth of the private correspondence of India, and the general correspondence of the Island of Ceylon, and of such portion of the Parcels and Packages to and fro, as the Public may think, after this explanation, will be transmitted to Ceylon, Madras and Calcutta; and the accommodation of fifteen additional passengers, each voyage from those places collectively;—for I have shown elsewhere, that the Government Packets, may by Express be placed in Calcutta and Madras from Bombay, sooner than they could arrive by the Calcutta steamer, and I have no doubt, at an expense below that which would attach to the transmission by steamer all the way.\*—My present distance from all the Presidency stations, prevents my establishing this point with the certainty I should desire, for the satisfaction of others, but it does not from various circumstances, admit of a question in my own mind.

22. In reference to the Bengal Committee's apprehensions, as expressed in their 16th para; that few letters from the

On the data given in the few preceding paras. the conclusion is adopted, that all establishments and expenditure in excess of what would be necessary for the Bombay Route, will be maintained for the transmission of less than one-fifth of the private Correspondence of India, &c.—

\* Note—I find by the 13th article of the Bengal Rules respecting Inland Letters and Postage that the charge for an Express to Individuals, is four annas per mile.—At this Rate an Express from Bombay to Calcutta, 1308 miles, would be S. Rs. 327—and from Bombay to Madras 819 miles S. Rs. 204. 12 annas.



**Madras or Bengal Presidencies** should be dispatched by the Bombay route, and scarcely any paying more than a single letter, owing to the heavy overland postage, and their confident assertion, that there can be no doubt, that the profits derived from the letters, would, under their comprehensive scheme, at least triple those from Bombay alone, I will merely say, that if I have been at all successful, in establishing, that to the far greater portion of all India, Bombay will afford as expeditious, and cheap a channel of communication for single letters, viâ Suez, as any that has yet been proposed, no alarm need be entertained, in regard to double or treble ones from the sister Presidencies, for the basis on which the postage for single letters rests, being the standard also, by which that levied on heavier packets, is regulated, varying only in amount, as it would by any other route, or by any other mode of conveyance, in proportion to the increased weight required to be transmitted, persons at a distance, may make Bombay the medium of their correspondence with England viâ Egypt, for their heavier letters, as freely as for their smaller ones,—and if so, the sanguine expectations which the Bengal Committee have allowed themselves to indulge, in respect to these receipts as a source of profit dependent on the adoption of their comprehensive scheme, and unattainable through any other, must, I apprehend, be abandoned.

23—One word more, on the subject of double and treble letters, as connected with the inland Postage of India. It is known, I believe, to most people, that a sheet and a half of ordinary letter paper, may be transmitted within the weight allowed to a single letter, or one Rupee of one hundred and eighty (180) grains Troy.—And this closely written, is I suspect, as much, as the general run of Indian Letter writers, will be disposed to transmit by overland

Weight of certain description of paper given in connexion with the subject of double & treble Letters, and the Bengal Committee's apprehension, as ex-

Those whose inclination, or business may lead them to forward heavier packets, will no doubt have recourse to thinner paper, as almost universally practised on the continent of Europe, where, as in this country, weight, and weight alone, regulates the charge of postage, and it may be useful to some of these, perhaps, to show the weight of different kinds of paper, taken indiscriminately from my present stock, supplied from the Parsee shops at this place. I give a memorandum on the subject therefore, in the margin, \* just observing in conclusion of my remarks on this part of the Bengal committee's letter, that parties who may desire to send double and treble letters, across the Peninsula, will have the means of doing so, without serious injury to their Packets, and that the quarterly Dispatches of the Indian Government, may extend to upwards of eight thousand (8000) sheets or nearly three hundred and fifty (350) quires of the largest sized paper, mentioned in the margin, without exceeding the weight of the 6250 single letters, which according to the committee's Estimate, will be passing to and fro quarterly, on Government account.

24.—I come next to the consideration of the expense, at which each of these plans, viz. the Bengal comprehensive, scheme, and the Bombay one, can be carried into effect; and though I do not wish it, by any means to be understood, that

\* Note.—One sheet of large sized Foolscap Bank Paper  $14\frac{1}{2}$  Inches long by 9 wide, weighs,—12 annas or grs. 135.

This sheet reduced to small sized letter paper gives two sheets measuring each 9 In: by  $7\frac{1}{4}$  which is exactly the size of the small letter Paper made for the Hon'ble Company and issued for the public service.—Of this their paper of reduced dimensions  $2\frac{1}{2}$  sheets weigh 15 annas or.... grs. 168-75

Two and a half sheets of a larger sized but thinner letter paper than the above, measuring  $9\frac{1}{2}$  Inches by  $7\frac{1}{4}$ , weigh a trifle less than one Rupee or under.... grs. 180.

One and a half sheets of ordinary Bath letter paper measuring  $9\frac{1}{2}$  Inches by 8 Inches weight, 15 annas or... grs. 168. 75  
 $6250 \times 180 = 1125000 \div 135$  will give 8333. 333 decs.  $\div 24$   
 will give 347, 513 decs.

their 16th para that few Packets, of that description from the Madras or Bengal Presidencies would be dispatched by the Bombay Route.

Comparative expense of the Bengal comprehensive Scheme and Bombay plan, considered from data furnished by the Bengal Committee.

I hold myself pledged to the correctness of the Bengal data, (indeed I consider some of them incorrect, the rate of Insurance for instance, and the omission of interest), I have used them, as the medium of comparison in this instance, and have adapted my calculations for Bombay to them, as far as practicable, in order to remove all ground for complaint in Calcutta.

In the estimate annexed to the Bengal Committee's letter of the 28th January, 1834, the cost of each of the Calcutta Steamers is taken at Sa. Rs. 250,000, or the two..... 500,000.

I assume the cost of the Bombay Branch Steamer to be..... 150,000.

Making an outlay of capital necessary in the first instance, of Sicca Rupees..... 650,000.

Two Steamers at Bombay at the above price would cost..... 300,000.

Excess of expenditure, required in the first instance by the Bengal Committee's Scheme... 350,000.

And the probable annual expenditure under that scheme will be as under.—

The Calcutta, Madras, Galle, Socotra and Suez Steamer.

Sa. Rs.

Interest on Rs. 2,50,000. at 5 per cent,  
per annum..... 12,500.

Insurance on Rs. 270000, to cover capital of Block Interest and abatement in case of loss..... 13500.

Coals, 60 days each voyage, or 240 days  
Steaming per annum, at 15 tons per day,  
3600 tons, at 30 Rs..... 108,000.

Wear and Tear, including Stores of every des-

cription, except those connected with current purposes of Machinery.....	12,000.
Tallow, Oil, Hemp, &c. at Rs. 28 per diem, for 212* days.....	8,856.
Establishment Rs. 2,000 per mensem.....	24,000.
	<hr/>
Sa. Rs.....	178,856

## SECOND STEAMER.

Interest as above on Sa. Rs. 2,50,000 at 5 per cent.....	12,500.
Insurance...do...on.....2,70,000 at do... ..	13,500.
	<hr/>
	26,000
Establishment and incidental expenses, say.....	3144
	<hr/>
	29144.
	<hr/>
Sa. Rs.....	2,08,000.
Expense of depots, say each 1200 per annum.....	3,600.
	<hr/>
	2,11,600
Add 10 per cent to be safe..... say.....	21,000
	<hr/>
Sa. Rs.....	2,32,600.

## BOMBAY BRANCH STEAMER.

Interest on Rs. 150,000, at 5 per cent...	7,500
Insurance on Sa. Rs. 1,62,500, to cover capital of Block Interest and abatement in case of loss, at 5 per cent...	8,125
Coal—to Socotra and back each voyage—days 16.666+4—66.666, say 67,	

\* There appears to be some error of the Press here.

$212 \times 28 = \text{Rs. } 5936$  .. ..  $\text{Rs. } 8856 \div 212 = \text{Rs. } 41.773$  dls.

$\text{Rs. } 8856 \div 28 = \text{Rs. } 316.825$  decs.

Rs. 8856 is the correct sum, as shown in the total amount of addition in the Committee's calculations.

at 10 tons per day, 670 tons, at

Rs. 30..... 20,100

Wear and Tear, say  $\frac{1}{3}$  of the Calcutta

Estimate..... 4,000

Tallow, Oil, Hemp, &c. also  $\frac{1}{3}$  .. 2,952

Establishment, Sa. Rs. 1500 per mensem... 18,000

60,677

Add. 10 per cent to be safe, or say, to

make an even sum..... 6,023

66,700

Total, Sicca Rs..... 2,99,300

#### PROBABLE EXPENDITURE UNDER THE BOMBAY PLAN.

##### *Bombay and Suez Steamer.*

Interest as above, on Sa. Rs. 1,50,000, at 5 per cent 7,500

Insurance do. on Sa. Rs. 1,62,500, at .....do. .. 8,125

Coal,—22 days steaming each way, will be 44 days  
each voyage + 4 = 176 days, at 10 tons per day.

1760 tons, at Rs. 30 per ton..... 52,800

Wear and Tear—2 | 3 of the Calcutta Steamer's

Estimate..... 8,000

Tallow, Oil, Hemp, &c. also 2 | 3..... 5,904

Establishment Rs. 1500 per month..... 18,000

1,00,329

Expense of Depots..... 3,600

1,03,929

Add 10 per cent to be safe, or say, to make an even

sum..... 10,271

Sa. Rs..... 1,14,200

##### *Second, or Reserve Steamer.*

Interest as above..... 7,500

Insurance as above..... 8,125

15,625

Establishment and incidental expenses,	
say.....	2,875
	<hr/> 18,500
Add 10 per cent to be safe, or say.....	1,800
	<hr/> 20300
Total, Sicca Rs.....	<hr/> 1,34,500

25.—If the foregoing calculations, founded in the one instance, on data supplied by the Bengal Committee themselves, and in the other, framed as far as practicable in consonance with those data, can be considered for the purposes of comparison, to offer any thing like a correct view of the relative expenses of the two schemes, and that my previous calculations on different matters connected with the establishment of a regular intercourse by Steam, between India and England, are entitled to any weight, little more can, I think, be necessary, to show which of the plans is likely to lead to the realization of the hopes of “all India,” by making that intercourse permanent also, or to enable every unprejudiced mind, to determine the quantum of consideration, that is due to the Bengal Committee’s declaration, quoted in my 5th para. “*that the Receipts, whether from the conveyance of Passengers, Newspapers, and Parcels, or from the Postage of Letters by Bombay, as the sole part of arrival and departure, would be comparatively trifling, while the expenses would be very nearly the same as those which would suffice for insuring simultaneously a road for the easy passage between all parts of India and England.*”

Little doubt supposed to exist from the preceding calculations and comparison, as to which of the two plans, is likely to be most beneficial to all India.

26.—A few words will suffice in respect to the probable receipts from the Bombay Plan.—The Bengal Committee in their observations, para. 14, on the charge likely to be made by His Majesty’s Government for the

The amount of private Correspondence likely to pass through

Bombay and the public dispatches sent by the same route, as estimated by the Bengal Committee, shown to be more than equal at a Postage of one Rupee per single letter to the expenditure incurred in maintaining the communication with Egypt, from that Port.

private correspondence of India, viâ Bombay, between Alexandria and England, limit the letters going only from and to Bombay, to fifty thousand (50,000) each way, together (100,000) one hundred thousand. These at a postage of one Sa. Rupee each, would produce an income of Sicca Rupees one lakh, per annum. The public Dispatches sent to, and received at Bombay, are estimated in the 13th para. of the Committee's letter, to amount, on the most limited scale, to fifty thousand (50,000) single letters, that is 25,000 each way. A like postage levied on them, for service actually performed in their conveyance to and from Egypt, would raise the receipts from postage alone, viâ Bombay, to Sicca Rupees one hundred and fifty thousand (150,000) per annum, a sum, exceeding by Rupees fifteen thousand five hundred, (15,500) per the probable expenditure shown in the calculation, connected with the establishment of steamers from Bombay: and if to this excess be added, the further receipts to be expected from passengers and parcels, I think we may reasonably hope, for a total surplus of Sicca Rupees thirty thousand (30,000) per annum, as a reserve fund, for extraordinary expenses, and the purchase of a new vessel once in ten years, as provided for in the calculations of the Bengal Committee, and which I did not notice in its place, only because it seemed that this future call, would be as properly considered, after providing for the current and unavoidable expenditure, in actual, and unceasing progress.

The objection made by some to steamers of 300 tons only, believed to rest on no

27.—It has been made an objection to Captain Wilson's plan, "*that small steamers (270 tons) will not stand bad weather, and that their machinery is more liable to break.*" The statement, "*says Captain Wilson in page 15 of his supplementary observations,*" is erroneous, for if the

machinery of the vessel is smaller, it bears proportionably less strain. A steamer of about 270 or 300 tons, at most, will for *the time she carries coal* stand any bad weather, as well or better, than the largest Steamers built, for when the weather becomes so *very bad* they would lay to, as also must the largest steamers. The Dublin packets are still about 270 tons, and they go through a great deal of rough weather." The argument that small steamers won't stand bad weather, continues Captain Wilson, comes rather singularly from Mr. Waghorn, who in his project of steaming *round the Cape*, proposed a vessel of about 280 tons.

solid foundation.

28.—The letters addressed by the Bengal Steam Committee, and their Secretary, to the different public Authorities, and private Individuals of influence in England, do not on a further attentive perusal of them, appear to require many observations at this time: though it may be as well to say, in reference to the general connexion that exists between Mr. Greenlaw's own Pamphlet, and the letters of the above committee of which he is a member, and those under his signature as their Secretary, that no very defined idea of the class of vessels that will really be desirable for the Navigation between Calcutta and Suez, appears to have been entertained, at any time, at the former place; for I find Mr. Greenlaw's first estimate, is founded on the supposition, that Steam vessels of 140 *horse power* would be sufficient for all purposes then in contemplation, and which have not been changed up to the present moment. The Committee in their letter to the Supreme Government of the 23th of January, 1834, consider vessels of 160 *horse power* desirable, and their calculations rest on the understanding, that vessels of that

The Bengal Committee do not appear to have entertained at any time any very defined idea of the class of steamers that would really be desirable for the execution of their own scheme.



power will be employed, whilst their Secretary, in his Circular Letter, No. 1, addressed to various Merchants and others in England, and dated in the same month, recommends the building of four vessels *of 200 horse power each*, one to run between England and Alexandria, the other three to be employed on this side of the Isthmus according to the plan of the Committee, for making Socotra a Coal Depot, and the point of junction for the Calcutta and Bombay Steamers.

29.—I cannot pretend to say, what will be the difference between the cost of a Steamer of 160 horse power and one of 200 horse power, but be the difference what it may, an encrease of expenditure must attach to the Bengal scheme, and thus make the comparison I have drawn with the Bombay one, more favorable to the latter.

The renewed attempt of the Forbese to get to Suez against the S. W. monsoon likely enable us to determine how far Captain Wilson's opinion that the voyage cannot be made with advantage, to those concerned, is correct, and some suggestions offered in case it should appear, that apprehensions on that

30.—The renewed attempt about to be made by the *Forbes*, to reach Suez from Calcutta, against the S. W. Monsoon, may be expected to afford us some valuable practical information, by which to judge of the correctness, or otherwise of Captain Wilson's opinion that Steam communication during the monsoon, between India and England, cannot be maintained in a way to make the returns keep pace with the expenses, inasmuch, as we shall at least arrive at a knowledge of the time occupied, and wear and tear experienced, both of Hull and Machinery, and generally of all outgoings, connected with the voyage, though it would be hardly fair to form a decided opinion in respect to the amount of future receipts from this experimental undertaking.—And here, one suggestion present itself to my mind.—If the experiment prove, as I wish it may, though my doubts on the subject outweigh my hopes, that Captain Wilson's apprehensions are unfounded, may it not be worth

while, to build one of the Bombay Steamers, of sufficient size, to carry the additional supply of coal necessary for the passage from Bombay to Socotra, and thence to Suez in the S. W. Monsoon, and run her instead of the smaller one, in the voyage to be performed during that season—or on alternate voyages with the smaller one. By this latter arrangement, the large Steamer would be the vessel to depart in January, and July, from Bombay, and would afford accommodation to the larger number of Passengers, that may be expected to be leaving India generally, in the first named month in each year. The distance from Calcutta to Socotra is but little short of 3000 miles, from Bombay it is less than 1200. If the longer distance can be performed with advantage, against the Monsoon,—the shorter one ought to be of easier and more beneficial accomplishment. From Socotra to Suez, the same ground must be run over, whether the voyage have commencement at Bombay, or Calcutta.

31.—The first outlay at Bombay, may be increased by this arrangement, from three lakhs of Rupees, to four lakhs—but it will still be less by  $2\frac{1}{2}$  lakhs than that incurred by the plan, on which the calculations of the Calcutta Committee have been founded. The annual outlay at Bombay will of course be augmented also in some degree, but there will be one vessel only, running at a time, instead of two—and the expenditure will consequently be kept much below, what we can expect it to be brought to, under the operation of the Calcutta scheme.

32.—I submit this suggestion, as it has incidentally occurred to me, at the close of my observations on the Pamphlets and papers before me, to the consideration of those, with whom the management of the Steam arrange-

score are unfounded.

Opinion expressed from the result of the examination, now conclu-

ded, that the interests of all India will, all circumstances duly considered, be best consulted by making Bombay the sole Port of Steam communication between India and Egypt, in the first instance.

ments may eventually rest, without any desire to give it more weight, than they may, in the exercise of an impartial judgment, believe it to deserve—I have been led into much more detail, than I expected, in endeavouring to make these observations intelligible to all. If I have succeeded, in doing so, and may be permitted to hope, that some, at least of them, will be found useful hereafter, I shall be amply repaid for the time and attention, I have latterly devoted to this subject.—Though a servant of the Bombay Presidency, and desirous, I freely confess, from long connexion with that Presidency and its inhabitants, of promoting its interests, whenever I can do so without compromising those of others, it is only because I firmly and honestly believe, that the Interests of “all India,” will, all circumstances duly considered, be best consulted, by making Bombay the sole Port of Steam communication with Egypt *in the first instance*, that I have been induced, to undertake this inquiry into the comparative advantages and expense of the two plans, now before the public—every step that I have advanced in it, has tended to confirm my conviction, that the returns under the Bombay plan, may be made commensurate with its expenses, and to increase my belief that this plan is the one which by success in its earlier operations will ensure the establishment of a regular and permanent intercourse by Egypt with our native land.

33.—This, once secured to India—the rest will follow in due season, and no one will rejoice more sincerely than myself, in the early realization of those expectations, of “vast and incalculable benefit to our country and mankind” from this source, which the Subscribers to the Madras Steam Fund have expressed, in their resolutions of the 31st March last—which the Governor General has warmly adopted, in his letter to their Chairman, Mr. Norton, of the 11th April,

and which the liberality of all his Lordship's measures, public and private, in aid of Steam communication with England, viâ Egypt during the last twelve months, assures us he will use his best endeavours to advance in time to come.

J. H. CRAWFORD.

*Ootacamund, Neilgherry Hills,*

*25th June, 1834.*



**Tables No. 1 and No. 2, referred to in the observations on Mr. Greenlaw's Pamphlet, and the Plan of the new Bengal Steam Fund Committee, for Steam Communication between India and England via Suez.**

**TABLE No. 1, showing the Distance of various Places under the Presidency of Bengal from Bombay the course of Dawk between those places and Bombay, at the average rate of 80 miles per day, and the rate of Postage chargeable on letters from Suez to such places, via Bombay, compared with that which would be leviable via Calcutta, on the addition of an Equitable Equivalent for the increased Distance and charge of conveyance from Suez to the latter Port.**

NAMES OF PLACES.	Distance from Bombay.	Daily rate miles.	Exact time occupied at such rate.	Time assumed.	Rate of postage, Rs. annas.	Additional Steam postage, Rs. annas.	Rate of postage from Calcutta.	Total Postage, Rs. annas.	Distance from Calcutta.
Agra, via Mhow and Poona .....	917	30	11	462	Say, 12	0	15	13	785
Allahabad, via Poona, Mhow and Saugor .....	1078	"	13	473	"	0	1	10	507
Ditto via Nagpore .....	1074	"	13	425	"	0	8	10	0
Banda, via Poona and Nagpore .....	846	"	10	375	"	0	8	12	629
areilly, via Agra .....	92	"	11	380	"	0	8	10	786
Benares, via Mhow and Cawnpore .....	1156	"	14	450	"	0	8	11	430
Bhopal, via Poona and Mhow .....	642	"	8	0-3	"	0	8	11	0
Bhopalpoor, ditto .....	621	"	7	762	"	0	8	12	0
Cawnpore .. ditto .. ditto ..	946	"	11	825	"	0	8	10	628
Chandia, via Nagpore .....	660	"	8	250	"	0	8	0	0
Chatterpoor, via Poona and Mhow .....	823	"	10	312	"	0	8	0	0
Cuttack, via Hyderabad .....	1026	"	12	825	"	0	8	0	0
Delhi, via Poona and Mhow .....	1057	"	13	212	"	0	8	0	1
Dinapore Patna, via Poona, Mhow and Benares ..	1240	"	15	500	"	0	8	0	1
Ditto, via Nagpore and Allahabad .....	1224	"	15	300	"	0	8	0	1
Muttra .....	945	"	11	812	"	0	8	0	1

Nagpore .....	560	7	0	71	0.11	0	8	0.10	1	2	0
Neemuch via Baroda .....	520	6	500	7	0.11	0	8	0.12	1	4	0
Ellichpoor, via Poona and Aurungabad .....	426	5	325	6	0.10	0	8	0	0	0	0
Fyabad or Oude ..	1090	13	625	14	1 0	560	0	0	0	0	0
Gwalior, via Poona and Mhow .....	804	10	050	10	0.14	0	8	0.10	1	2	0
Hingolee via Aurungabad .....	370	4	625	5	0.9	0	8	0	0	0	0
Hissar .....	1149	14	362	15	1 1	983	0	0.11	1	3	0
Hurdwar .....	1170	14	625	15	1 1	964	0	0	0	0	0
Hoosingabad, via Poona and Mhow .....	639	7	987	8	0.12	0	8	0.11	1	3	0
Hyderabad, via Poona .....	440	5	500	6	0.10	0	8	0.12	1	4	0
Indore, via Poona or Baroda .....	504	6	300	7	0.11	0	8	0.12	1	4	0
Jannpoor, via Mhow .....	1078	13	475	14	1 0	0	8	0	8	1	0
Jubulpoor, via Nagpoor .....	730	9	125	10	0.13	0	8	0.10	1	2	0
Jaudpoor, via Baroda .....	492	6	150	7	0.10	0	8	0	0	0	0
Jeypoor, via Baroda and Neemuch .....	750	9	375	10	0.13	0	8	0	0	0	0
Kotah, via Poona and Mhow .....	694	8	675	9	0.12	0	8	0.12	1	4	0
Loodianah, via Poona .....	1250	15	625	16	1 2	1100	0	0.13	1	5	0
Lucknow, via Poona, Mhow and Canwpore .....	996	12	450	13	0.15	623	0	0.10	1	2	0
Mooraabad, via Poona and Agra .....	1053	13	162	14	1 0	845	0	0.11	1	3	0
Mirzapoor, via Poona and Nagpoor .....	1008	12	600	13	1 0	0	8	0	8	1	0
Meerut, via Poona and Mhow .....	1100	13	750	14	1 2	890	0	0.11	1	3	0
Midnapore, via Nagpoor .....	1208	15	100	15	1 2	0	8	0	8	0	0
Mominabad, or Ambjogae .....	256	3	200	4	0 8	0	8	0	0	0	0
Oomrawty, via Aurungabad .....	429	5	362	6	0.10	0	8	0	0	0	0
Rajcepoor, via Nagpoor .....	742	9	275	10	0.13	0	8	0	0	0	0
Sagor, via Poona and Mhow .....	735	9	187	10	0.13	0	8	0.10	1	2	0
Neemuch, via Poona .....	648	8	100	9	0.12	0	8	0.12	1	4	0
Nusserabad (Ajmeer) .....	795	9	937	10	0.13	0	8	0	0	0	0
Oojein via Poona .....	540	6	750	7	0.11	0	8	0	0	0	0
Sagor, via Nagpoor and Hoosingabad .....	845	10	562	11	0.14	0	8	0.10	1	2	0



It is not pretended that this Table, No. 1, will be found strictly accurate though it is hoped that it is sufficiently so for the purpose for which it has been framed, viz. to support, in conjunction with No. 2, the declaration made in my observations on Mr. Greenlaw's Pamphlet, that as respects the far greater portion of all India, parties will receive their letters as quickly, and for the most part as cheaply via Bombay, as by either of the two other Presidencies. And here let it be borne in mind, that I have shown in those observations, that the Branch Steamer from Socotra, will be in Bombay according to Mr. Greenlaw's data, in twenty two (22) days from the date of the Red Sea Steamer's departure from Suez, and that the latter will not reach Calcutta under thirty five and a half ( $35\frac{1}{2}$ ) days, for it thence follows, that at all places mentioned in this Table which are within thirteen and a half ( $13\frac{1}{2}$ ) days Dawk from Bombay, parties will be in possession of their Letters before those letters would be in Calcutta, whilst as regards those Stations, whose distance from Bombay exceeds that number of day's dawk, let the course of dawk between them and Calcutta be added to  $13\frac{1}{2}$  days, and it will be seen how much longer the route from Suez will generally be by that Port than by Bombay.

The distance of each station from Bombay and the rate of Postage chargeable on Letters to such station, have been extracted from a "Table showing the rates of Postage on a single Letter from Bombay to different stations under the Presidency of Bengal, published in the Bombay Calandar and Almanac for 1834, Appendix, page 23, compared with a similar Table in the Bombay Register and Directory for 1833, Part 4" page 7.

The rates of postage from Calcutta to the several stations for which they are given here, are taken from the Calcutta Annual Directory and Register for 1834, part 2nd, page 37, and the additional charge of eight (8) annas placed by me on all Letters from Calcutta to the interior is assumed as an equivalent, though hardly an adequate one, for the increased expense incurred on the conveyance of all letters by the Red Sea

Steamer from Suez to Calcutta ; the distance from Suez to the two Ports in question, being as 4780 miles are to 3000 miles, or as 159 333 deels, are to 100.

It may be right to add, that as the Postage rates under the Bengal Presidency are generally speaking from 20 to 25 per cent, and in some cases upwards of 30 per cent below those in force at Bombay, the calculations in this Table will become much more favorable to Bombay than hereshown, whenever one uniform scale of postage shall prevail, as it will no doubt do at some future period throughout all our Indian Territories. A few extracts from the Bombay and Calcutta rates are subjoined in confirmation of my assertion as to existing differences.

Bombay	300 to 400 miles	9 annas	Calcutta	7 annas
	400 to 500...	"...10..."		".....8..."
	500 to 600..."	"...11..."		".....9..."
	600 to 700..."	"...12..."	}	600 to 800 10..."
	700 to 800..."	"...13..."		
	800 to 900..."	"...14..."		".....11..."
	900 to 1000..."	"...15..."	}	900 to 1100 12..."
	1000 to 1100..."	" 1 0..."		
	1400 to 1500..."	" 1 4.....		".....15..."

The distances of places from Calcutta not being given in the Calcutta Directory, I have had considerable difficulty in obtaining information on that point. With the assistance of the Road Book however, and of friends who are well acquainted with the Bengal Provinces, I have been able to fix the distance of some as given in this Table, sufficiently correct I hope, for all present purposes.

*Ootacamund, 25th June, 1834.*

**J. H. CRAWFORD.**

**TABLE No. 2, showing the Distance of various places under the Presidency of Madras from Bombay, the course of Dawk between those places and Bombay at the average rate of 50 miles per day, and the rate of Postage chargeable on Letters from Suez to such places via Bombay, compared with that which would be leviable via Madras on the addition of an equitable Equivalent for the increased distance and charge of conveyance from Suez to the latter Port.**

NAMES OF PLACES.	Distance from Bombay.		Daily rate miles.	Exact time occupied at such rate.	Time assumed.	Rate of postage, $\frac{1}{16}$ Annas.	Additional Steam postage, Rs. annas.	Rate of Postage from Madras.	Total postage, Rs. annas.	Distance from Madras.
	Day.	Hours.								
Allepee .....	899	11	80	125	12	0 14	0	0 10	0 14	478
Anjengo .....	89	11	"	125	"	0 14	0	0 0	0 0	0
Arcot .....	750	"	"	9 500	"	0 13	0	0 4	0 8	73
Bednore, via Dharwar .....	415	"	"	5 187	"	0 10	0	0 0	0 0	0
Bangalore .....	614	"	"	7 675	"	0 12	0	0 10	0 14	406
Bellary, via Poona and Dharwar .....	540	"	"	6 750	"	0 11	0	0 7	0 11	211
Calcut .....	756	"	"	9 450	"	0 13	0	0 9	0 13	316
Cannanore .....	738	"	"	9 225	"	0 13	0	0 10	0 14	441
Chicacole .....	892	"	"	11 150	"	0 14	0	0 10	0 14	423
Chittledroog .....	593	"	"	7 412	"	0 11	0	0 11	0 15	540
Chittoor .....	746	"	"	9 325	"	0 13	0	0 9	0 13	343
Cochin .....	838	"	"	10 475	"	0 14	0	0 5	0 9	109
Coimbatore .....	730	"	"	9 125	"	0 13	0	0 11	0 15	513
Cotar .....	660	"	"	8 250	"	0 13	0	0 9	0 13	328
Compta (Kamptee) .....	619	"	"	7 737	"	0 12	0	0 0	0 0	0
Coringa .....	780	"	"	9 750	"	0 13	0	0 13	1 1	749
Cumnam (Combum) .....	625	"	"	7 812	"	0 12	0	0 10	0 14	419
							0	0 4	0 8	263

Dindigul.....	516	10	200	11	0 14	0	4	0	9	0 13	322
Ellore.....	622	7	775	8	0 12	0	4	0	9	0 13	310
Ganjam.....	1024	12	800	13	1 0	0	4	0	12	1 0	676
Guntoor.....	611	7	637	8	0 12	0	4	0	8	0 12	252
Hullial.....	354	4	425	5	0 9	0	4	0	11	0 15	503
Hierryhur.....	434	5	425	6	0 10	0	4	0	9	0 13	394
Jaulna.....	294	3	675	4	0 8	0	4	0	12	1 0	690
Kuddapah.....	670	8	375	9	0 12	0	4	0	6	0 10	172
Kurnool.....	558	6	975	7	0 11	0	4	0	8	0 12	296
Madura.....	854	10	675	11	0 14	0	4	0	8	0 12	282
Mangalore, via Poona and Chittledroog.....	680	8	500	9	0 12	0	4	0	10	0 14	459
Masulipatam.....	683	8	537	9	0 12	0	4	0	9	0 13	315
Mysore.....	630	7	875	8	0 12	0	4	0	8	0 12	295
Negapatam.....	903	11	287	12	0 15	0	4	0	6	0 10	190
Nellore.....	740	9	250	10	0 13	0	4	0	5	0 9	110
Nundydroog.....	595	7	437	8	0 11	0	4	0	7	0 11	248
Nundcal.....	591	7	587	8	0 11	0	4	0	0	0 0	0
Palancotta.....	935	11	687	12	0 15	0	4	0	9	0 13	382
Quilon.....	918	11	475	12	0 15	0	4	0	10	0 14	435
Rajahmundry, via Hyderabad.....	686	8	575	9	0 12	0	4	0	9	0 13	364
Rannad.....	905	11	311	12	0 15	0	4	0	9	0 13	346
Ryacotta.....	628	7	850	8	0 12	0	4	0	9	0 13	346
Salem.....	802	10	925	10	0 14	0	4	0	7	0 11	203
Saluncotta.....	747	9	087	9	0 13	0	4	0	9	0 13	97
Sadashugur.....	428	5	350	6	0 10	0	4	0	11	0 15	569
Serah.....	536	6	725	7	0 11	0	4	0	8	0 12	295
Seringapatam.....	618	7	725	8	0 12	0	4	0	8	0 12	286
Tanjore.....	855	10	687	11	0 14	0	4	0	7	0 11	216
Tellicherry.....	744	9	300	10	0 13	0	4	0	10	0 14	416
Trichinopoly.....	883	11	037	11	0 14	0	4	0	7	0 11	242
Vellore.....	714	8	925	9	0 13	0	4	0	4	0 8	89
Vizagapatam.....	810	10	125	11	0 14	0	4	0	10	0 14	481
Wallajahbad.....	763	9	537	10	0 13	0	4	0	3	0 7	43

Referring to the observations made by me at foot of Table No. 1, which in their general bearing, are for the most part equally applicable to Madras, it will be sufficient to state here that I have also shown in my remarks on Mr. Greenlaw's Pamphlet that the Red Sea Steamer from Suez will be nearly thirty and a half days ( $30\frac{1}{2}$ ) in reaching Madras, and that therefore parties at all places mentioned in this Table (No. 2) which are within eight and a half days ( $8\frac{1}{2}$ ) Dawk from Bombay, will be in possession of their letters, as soon as those letters could arrive at Madras.

The rates of Postage and Distances from Bombay are taken from the same Publications that I have referred to in Table No. 1, and from a Table for Stations under the Presidency of Madras immediately following that for Stations under the Presidency of Bengal.

The Rates of Postage from Madras and Distances from that Place, are inserted on the authority of the Fort St. George Gazette of the 8th March 1834, where the present revised code of Post office Regulations will be found, pages 183 at 194, and the addition of four (4) annas is made as an equivalent for the increased expense on Steam conveyance from Suez to Madras, the distance exceeding that to Bombay in the proportion of 4000 miles to 3000 miles, or as 133,333 deels. are to 100.

*Ootucumund, 25th June, 1834.*

P E N I S.

# A REPLY

TO

MR. CRAWFORD'S OBSERVATIONS

ON

STEAM COMMUNICATION

BETWEEN

India and Suez,

WITH

REMARKS

ON

HIS OBSERVATIONS ON THE LETTER FROM THE BENGAL NEW STEAM FUND  
COMMITTEE TO THE SUPREME GOVERNMENT, &c. &c.

---

BY

C. B. GREENLAW.

---

CALCUTTA :

PRINTED BY WILLIAM RUSHTON AT THE ENGLISHMAN OFFICE.

1834.



## PREFACE.

When I first received Mr. Crawford's pamphlet, I purposed to reply to it in two separate publications ; the one in answer to the first portion of Mr. Crawford's, which more particularly referred to my former 'Observations'—and the other in reply to his 'Observations on the letter of the Calcutta Committee to the Governor General ;'—when, however, I had concluded all that I found it necessary to say in respect to the first. I discovered it to be so limited that it would have been ridiculous to have put it forth singly. I have therefore delayed it, until I could meet the latter portion of Mr. Crawford's pamphlet.

I have been prevented doing this before by the time necessarily occupied in making up the statement A. in the appendix ; which, being a most important document, I could not dispense with : indeed so important do I hold that document to be, that had I been in possession of it, and the following one, before I began to reply to Mr. Crawford, I think, I should have been contented to have let the matter at issue rest on a very few remarks in connexion with them.

As it is, I am afraid my readers may think that I have been unnecessarily prolix. In excuse I can only say that I have written day by day, as leisure from official duties permitted, just as I should have spoken, had I been discussing the question at the moment, and I have no time to prune or condense.

Since writing the above, the proceedings in the House of Commons on the occasion of passing the vote for £20,000 for the experiment by way of the *Euphrates* have appeared in the Calcutta papers.

On that occasion the following fell from the several speakers :—

'MR. C. GRANT. The importance of a rapid communication with India was evident—it was of the utmost consequence by these means to bring India nearer to this country, and thereby to remove the obstacles that at present existed to a closer and more advantageous connexion between England and our Indian territories. It was most desirable to do away with the obstacles which now tended to perpetuate prejudices, and which stood in the way of a free and rapid communication of improvements of all kinds. Greater security would result to our Indian empire from the course proposed to be adopted, and in short, it was equally our interest,



policy, duty, and glory, to bring India more and more intimately in contact with this country by every means in our power. (Hear, hear.) It was our duty to confer on India every possible advantage, in consequence of its connexion with Great Britain; and he appealed to the house with confidence and called upon it to lend its assistance to the accomplishment of this important object. (Hear, hear.) In conclusion he should only add, that it was equally the duty and the interest of England to watch all the modes of access to India, with a view to the political and commercial prosperity and the mutual advantage of both countries.'

'Mr. BUCKINGHAM said, that to facilitate and expedite a mutual knowledge of what was passing in India and England would be worth 10 times the sum now proposed to be devoted to that purpose. The greatest moral, political, and mercantile advantages might be expected to result from a more rapid communication between the two countries, to which as he could not see any serious impediments so he did not anticipate the least objection.'

'Mr. HUME hoped that what the committee had just heard was only a prelude to those advantages and that assistance which India had a right to expect at our hands. The state of the communication between England and India had long been a reproach to this country, and the interference of the Post-office in charging postage upon letters from India, notwithstanding there was no line of packets between the two countries, did not admit of excuse. A quick communication would be as useful to us as to the inhabitants and residents of India.'

With such sentiments as these of the value and importance of realizing 'the GREATEST moral, political and mercantile advantages,' can we for a moment doubt that the communication in its most comprehensive form will be at once established? It would be idle to say one word in proof of the utter insignificance—comparatively speaking—of confining the communication to Bombay for such a purpose as the attainment of the GREATEST advantages, instead of extending it to every port in India.

*Calcutta, December 8, 1834.*

C. B. GREENLAW.

#### ERRATA.

---

In the "REPLY" page 5, lines 11 and 12 for 'as the connecting point between Europe and India in the infancy of the undertaking at any other time,' read 'as the connecting point between Europe and India in the infancy of the undertaking,' or at any other time.

In the "REMARKS," marginal note page 1 for 2,299,300, read 2,99,300. Page 3, in the 4th para. 8th line for 'greater' read 'great.'

# A REPLY, &c.



I HAVE called the following remarks ‘A Reply, &c.’ because, although Mr. Crawford’s pamphlet is headed ‘Observations on Steam Communication between India and Suez,’ they in point of fact are avowedly an examination of the ‘Plans submitted from Calcutta,’—plans, not of a communication between *India* and *Suez*, to which Mr. Crawford’s ‘Observations’ *profess* to be confined, but between *India* and *England* (between which there is a vast difference); and as the pamphlet, which I submitted to the public of India in October 1833, has the honor of partaking more largely than any other matter of Mr. Crawford’s tardy notice, I cannot well remark on his ‘Observations’ otherwise than as a ‘Reply.’

Mr. Crawford sets out with a declaration that he has only one wish himself on the subject of Steam Communication between *England* and *India*, which resolves itself into an earnest desire for the eventual adoption of that course in regard to Steam Communication with *Suez* as shall, on full and mature consideration, promise to secure the greatest extension of the benefit of Steam Navigation to all India, that a due regard to the cost of such extension shall seem to justify,—he adds :

‘To make this benefit permanent, the returns must be, if not immediately, at least prospectively commensurate with the expense. How far they are likely to be so on the plans submitted from Calcutta, it is my present purpose to endeavour to ascertain.’

Before noticing the details into which, in furtherance of this object, Mr. Crawford has gone, I would remark that the following sentence is calculated to lead to an erroneous conclusion. Mr. Crawford says :

‘The unfortunate failure of the *Forbes* steamer to get to Suez against the early part of the S. W. Monsoon in the Bay of Bengal, affords time to all parties in India, &c.

But one conclusion can be drawn on reading this, which is, that the Steamer failed *because* she was opposed by the early part of the monsoon in the Bay of Bengal—I will not say it would have been more candid, because I am satisfied there is no want of candour on the part of Mr. Crawford, but I will observe that it would have been more correct to have said :

‘The unfortunate accident which stopped the *Forbes* at Madras in her progress towards Suez, and rendered necessary her return to Calcutta, &c.’

Mr. Crawford would seem to think that my ‘Observations’ arose out of Captain Wilson’s pamphlet; he says : at pur. 7.

'This plan was found fault with by many persons in Calcutta, as not being sufficiently comprehensive for the interests of India at large, and as conferring undue advantages on Bombay, particularly on the commercial part of its community.—A pamphlet appeared shortly afterwards, from the pen of Mr. Greenlaw, exposing the defects of Captain Wilson's proposed arrangements, according to the view entertained of the subject in Calcutta, and recommending others, of which, in connexion with his objections to Captain Wilson's plan, I shall now proceed to examine the validity.'

And again in note to par. 6.

'And in allusion to Captain Wilson's first idea of connecting the steam navigation from India to Suez, with a steamer from Alexandria to Malta, Mr. Greenlaw observes as follows, in the note appended to this para :

Now he is here entirely mistaken. It is not necessary that I should detail the history of my 'Observations.' I would only say that they were not at all written with a view to publication—that although I had read Captain Wilson's pamphlet, I had *then* done so but once, and that but cursorily; and that it was neither on my table nor in my mind when I wrote. Indeed I have been condemned at Bombay for my neglect of Captain Wilson's observations on Socotra as a depôt.

I beg distinctly to disclaim the most distant intention of derogating from the value and importance of Captain Wilson's pamphlet, by what I have just said. No one can be more sensible of the valuable practical information furnished by Captain Wilson on every point on which he treats than I am; and in common with every one interested in the establishment of the communication I confess my obligations to him, having since given it every attention; the result of which is my confirmed opinion in favor of the comprehensive scheme. But his pamphlet was expressly confined to a simple 'Steam Communication between *Bombay* and *Suez*,' while mine not only included this, but annexed to it a further communication to the other presidences, and carried the whole to England; so that had I made any use of or reference to Captain Wilson's pamphlet, it would assuredly have been brought forward rather in furtherance of my proposition than as opposed to it;—the only two points on which I should have found it necessary to have met Captain Wilson being the practicability and advantage of adopting Socotra as a depôt, and the capability of a steamer to pass across the Arabian Sea during a part of the S. W. Monsoon without too great a loss of time. On the first of these nothing need now be said, and on the latter I shall have an opportunity of remarking hereafter.

Mr. Crawford occupies \*eighteen pages, exclusive of nine devoted to Captain Wilson's pamphlet, in remarking on six and a half pages of my pamphlet, the whole of which he might have spared himself the trouble of writing;—for in para. 21, page 21, he says :

---

\* Of these five and half are filled with quotations.

' We have now arrived at the termination of what I shall take the liberty of calling Mr. Greenlaw's first Galle scheme, to distinguish it from his subsequent Galle, and ultimate Galle and Socotra scheme,\* TO BOTH WHICH IT WOULD APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN INTENDED FROM THE FIRST MERELY AS THE STEPPING STONE.'

And in para. 33, page 27, he says :

' The scene changes shortly afterwards and Mr. Greenlaw's \* REAL plan is developed in the following paragraph.'

Now would it not have been as well to have saved 26 pages devoted to the 'stepping stone,' and have gone to the real plan at once ?

But this is not all, in the 36 para. page 29, he comes to the actual plan, ADVOCATED for adoption, and he quotes it thus from me :—

' The above being premised it may now be observed, the proposed plan resolves itself into this, viz. that the steamer leaving the Red Sea, instead of going to Bombay, calls at Galle, Madras, and Calcutta—the packets, passengers, and mails for Bombay, being despatched on a branch steamer from Galle —There is however, yet one modification by which Bombay would be a gainer in time, not only as compared with the proposed plan, but even with that of making Bombay the sole port of call. —That modification is, that instead of the packets, &c. for Bombay, branching off from Galle, they should do so from Socotra. By this means, as the branch steamer would be at Socotra, waiting the arrival of the Red Sea vessel, and ready to start, the passengers, &c. for Bombay would have no detention at Socotra. —Bombay therefore, so far from having reason to object to the proposed plan, ought to second it, while Madras would be so obvious a gainer, that no doubt can be entertained of its acquiescence.'

This then is what I did actually propose for adoption—and before I proceed with Mr. Crawford in his remarks on this actual plan, I would beg to be permitted to say a few words on his bye-gone observations. In the 11 para. he says :—

' It is a trite, but still a very just remark, that our zeal will sometimes outstrip our discretion ; and in the present case we have an apt illustration of its justice : for whilst ostensibly advocating the cause of the many, Mr. Greenlaw's anxiety for the commercial interests of the few, (Calcutta) has made him overlook the injury he was doing to others, equally entitled to his consideration and support.'

Now as Mr. Crawford admits that the Galle was 'from the first merely a stepping stone' to the actual plan, and one never advocated for adoption, he might have spared himself the pain which it must have caused him to bring, among others, such a charge against me as 'overlooking an injury' I was doing to others in my anxiety for the commercial interests of the few (Calcutta). I declare I have no more anxiety for the commercial interests of Calcutta than for the those of Bombay and Madras ; and I appeal to all India, if, throughout, my views have not been directed to one general scheme, in which the interests of all are alike consulted.

The 'stepping stone' led equally to Bombay, to Madras, to Calcutta interests; it led to that plan which excluded none! Will Mr. Crawford say that his views, for *plan* he offers none, are equally comprehensive? Will he say that he is not for confining the communication to Bombay, by which even according to his own admission, the interests of at least one fifth of all India—in which is included Calcutta—are disregarded? He cannot; and I leave it to the public to say whether the charge of indiscreet zeal, leading to injury to others, best suits Mr. Crawford or myself.

There are some observations in Paras. 23 to 33 of Mr. Crawford's pamphlet, which, as they bear on the general question of the preferable plan, viz. Bombay as a sole port, or the comprehensive plan of all the presidencies, I shall leave till I come to his remarks on the Calcutta Steam Committee's Letter to the Governor General, which in point of fact alone contains the real question at issue.

In his 34th Para. Mr. Crawford, referring to the 12th and 14th Paras. in my observations, considers that he detects an inconsistency, and he leaves it to me to reconcile it. The inconsistency to which he refers is this, viz. that in the 12th para., when my foot was on the Galle 'stepping stone,' I had, with reference to its being generally admitted that two steamers would be required for the communication to Bombay alone, left it to be inferred that only two steamers would be required for the Galle plan, in these words:—

'So that in fixing two steamers for the Galle communication no addition will be required to the estimate on that account':—

while in the 14th para. it is obvious that there must be three. The explanation is easy, though at the sacrifice of a repeated acknowledgment\* that the observations were hastily put together, and that there were several inaccuracies in them, none however it was hoped calculated to weaken the arguments adduced in favor of the main object.

This is one of those inaccuracies. I ought to have said that one more steamer would be required for the Galle plan than was necessary for the Bombay exclusive plan. But it is quite obvious that the steamer going to Galle, and thence having branches to Bombay and Calcutta, three would be required; and even when, to obviate the necessity of a branch steamer to Calcutta, it was suggested that the Suez steamer might proceed on to Calcutta, the reserve steamer at the latter place is mentioned; so that no one who took the pains to consider the whole, could be misled by the inaccuracy; but if such should be the case it would not at all affect 'the main object,' which was clearly and distinctly nothing more nor less than the

---

\* Vide - *Prefatory remarks* of my observations, &c. in October 1833.

establishment of the **ACTUAL BOMBAY PLAN ITSELF**, with a steamer between Calcutta and Socotra !! Having, I believe, thus satisfactorily accounted for the inaccuracy, or inconsistency, or whatever Mr. Crawford may term it, I think I am now entitled to say that I leave to the Bombay Committee, who have adopted Mr. Crawford's "Observations" and thence made them their own, "the task of reconciling" the following paragraph in their letter to the Bombay government, written with a view to obtain the support of the Court of Directors to their exclusive plan, with the fact that it is quite clear from the whole tenor of the remarks 'ON THE PLANS SUBMITTED FROM CALCUTTA,' that there is not the smallest indication of any such purpose as adopting Calcutta in preference to Bombay 'as **THE** connecting point between Europe and India in the infancy of the undertaking at any other time.'

'The fact we have stated necessarily renders us apprehensive that the enormous additional charge, which must be incurred by adopting the distant port of Calcutta in preference to this port, as the connecting point between *Europe* and *India*, in the infancy of the undertaking, may discourage the whole design.'

The Bombay Committee cannot be permitted to explain this away by referring to the experimental voyages of the *Forbes*; because these being undertaken at the expense of a public subscription and avowedly as an experiment with reference to 'the whole design' of an ultimate permanent communication **INCLUDING BOMBAY**, and moreover being in no degree however small subject to the influence of the Court of Directors,—they could not be held to have any reference whatever to that for which the Bombay Committee, in the language of the *Times*, 'petitioned;' but moreover the Bombay Government and Committee had the power of connecting themselves with the *Forbes*, had they so chosen. One word more on this 'petition' of the Bombay Committee. The *Times* well says that there could be no necessity for such a petition; and so say I; for if any single person could be found capable of advocating for one instant the adoption of Calcutta in preference to Bombay, as **THE** connecting point between Europe and India by steam communication, he would be unanimously voted to be out of his senses. Let the Bombay Committee explain the reason of this, to say the least, incorrect representation of the views held at Calcutta.

If any doubt of the meaning and object of that para. and of the whole reasoning of the Bombay Committee's letter could exist, it would be removed by the answer of the Bombay Government: it is to the following effect:—

'2d. I am further directed to state, in reply to the latter communication, that His Lordship in Council entirely concurs in the arguments, and conclusion advanced by you in regard to Bombay being the most eligible port for the establishment of a permanent steam communication between Europe and India, and, in forwarding a copy of your letters to the Honourable the Court of Directors, will not fail to support the important object you have in view.'

What does this mean but that the Bombay Government concur with the Bombay Committee in their arguments in regard to Bombay being the most eligible port FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PERMANENT STEAM COMMUNICATION ; and what does this answer imply but that there *was* a question as to some other SINGLE port being more eligible? I ask the Bombay Committee to point out who ever raised such a question? If they cannot do so, it only remains that they have ——— dreamt it.

I would further leave to the Bombay Committee to reconcile the total absence, in Mr. Crawford's present remarks, which they have adopted, of any reference to the advantages of Bombay as a sole port for passengers for the interior of any part of India, with the following further paragraph of the same letter :—

' whilst nothing is likely to be gained in point of time nor any advantage to be derived to the public in India, which cannot be equally derived by the steamer going from Bombay, excepting so far as the conveyance of passengers to the towns of Calcutta and Madras is concerned. for those proceeding to the interior of any part of India would always find Bombay the most convenient point of debarkation.' !!!

I am now at the 86th para. of Mr. Crawford's pamphlet in which, having arrived at the actual plan as quoted above, he proceeds to ascertain the exact extent of the BENEFIT to Bombay by my proposition OVER THAT WHICH WOULD BE DERIVED TO IT FROM BOMBAY BEING THE SOLE PORT!! Mr. Crawford calculates this gain of time at 18 hours, and instead of receiving it gratefully he treats it lightly. Now as he had before taxed me in the Galle plan with injustice to others, meaning the residents at Bombay and the many who will necessarily pass their communications through that Presidency, which plan was never advanced, as he himself admits, for adoption, but was 'merely a stepping stone' to that plan by which these very parties were to benefit, even though only by eighteen hours,—which however would be near two days in practice—I put it to Mr. Crawford whether common justice did not demand that he should as conspicuously have given me credit with those parties for the *purposed* benefit, as he has charged me with injustice for an *unpurposed* injury?—However, I must myself now decline such credit, because, for purposes connected with the general advantage of the whole scheme, it is necessary that the benefit should not be accorded—that under the comprehensive scheme Bombay should *stand precisely in the matter of speedy communication* as she would do on her own exclusive plan, and surely if this is the case Bombay cannot complain with justice.

On the remainder of the remarks of Mr. Crawford on my pamphlet, as they refer to calculation of time and expense, and thence to the preference to be given to confining the communication to Bombay, or to the comprehensive scheme, I need here say nothing ; because many of them bear equally on the

plan submitted by the Calcutta Committee in the letter of the 28th January to the Governor General, and where they exclusively refer to my pamphlet I can scarcely reply to them without going into the whole question. I shall therefore pass them over here, and only notice Mr. Crawford's remarks touching 'the commercial advantages which are to result to us from the cession of Socotra,' which Mr. Crawford, from his former practical knowledge of the trade of the Red Sea, considers I have greatly overrated;—and he says that he should content himself with so saying did not the weight which I attach to the *curious* facts as stated by Mr. Waghorn, but which it seems has been long since known to every one who had the slightest acquaintance with the trade in that quarter, of the Americans proceeding to Mocha and other ports of the Red Sea for coffee and other articles, carrying only dollars, led me to deductions more sanguine than he considers warranted by the circumstances of the case. I should from this have expected from Mr. Crawford some more detailed reasons for doubting the advantages derivable from Socotra as a commercial depot. Instead of this he confines himself to the simple declaration, that in my pamphlet for the first time he has heard of inconveniencies connected with the vent of the produce of Africa,' and that he is sure a more careful enquiry would have satisfied me that I had been greatly misinformed.—Touching the extra insurance which I have stated is demanded from ships navigating the Red Sea, I stated it from the general understanding I had that such was the case; but because such might be the case in sailing vessels, it does not follow that it would be demanded on a steamer, so that Mr. Crawford's reference to my estimate, and that contained in the Calcutta Committee's letter does not bear on the point at issue. And as regards the Americans bringing coals to Socotra and taking their coffee thence, Mr. Crawford appears to think that because they might bring coals to the value of say Drs. 5000, they could not bring the remainder of the amount required to obtain their return cargo in specie; and surely Mr. Crawford will not deny that as far as the Americans are concerned they would prefer getting their coffee if they could at Socotra to going into the Red Sea for it. The question is—could it and would it be brought there and placed en dépôt? On this point, I mean the advantages to be derived from Socotra as a commercial depot, I am quite free to confess that Mr. Crawford must be far better entitled to pronounce an opinion than I can be. I consulted all possible authorities near me, and I found one universal impression, as well among Europeans as natives and Arabs, that if taken possession of by the English Government, and due security offered, it could not fail to flourish in that capacity; however, the question is now likely to be put to the test of experience, and to that test we may well leave it.

Mr. Crawford concludes his Observations by reference to his declarations that—

'Four fifths of all India will be indebted to Bombay, under whatever equitable arrangements are made for the general interests, for a quicker receipt of letters than by any route that has yet been brought under public consideration;'



And that—

‘As respects the far greater portion of all India, parties will receive their letters, as least as quickly, and for the most part as cheaply as by either of the two other presidencies.’

He admits that he has offered no proof of this; but he purposes to furnish it in the observations he intends to submit on the letters of the New Bengal Steam Fund Committee, and on other documents before him. He finally refers to the fact :—

‘That in all the plans and calculations brought forward in Calcutta, it has been assumed, unreasonably I think, and certainly in opposition to all practice elsewhere, that letters, parcels, passengers, &c. are to be conveyed to and from Calcutta on the Steam Vessels via Suez on the same terms as to Bombay, without regard to the difference of expence to be incurred ;’

And he states that if the charges should be made proportionate to the service rendered, he will have no difficulty in establishing that not only all the stations under the Bombay Presidency, but those also that will belong to the new one at Agra, and a very large portion of the Madras Presidency, will be in a similar situation as regards celerity and cheapness as before described.

It will be better to abstain from any remark on these averments until the proof is forthcoming; except that it may be here stated that if increased rates are charged for the conveyance of passengers, packets, letters, &c. by the steamer to Madras and Calcutta, it will only the more strengthen the cause of a comprehensive scheme, inasmuch as it will further aid to overcome the single acknowledged difficulty, namely the expence. I say the single *acknowledged* difficulty; for in spite of all the arguments wasted in the attempt to establish the preference of the Bombay exclusive plan, its admirers are obliged to admit that, if established, there would yet be something to come after.

---

## REMARKS, &c.

---

In the 'Reply,' as above, which I have made to Mr. Crawford's remarks on my 'observations, &c.' I have refrained entirely from entering into the merits of the question itself, on which we are at issue; which question I take to be, whether Steam Communication between England and Bombay alone is better for all India, than one which comprehends the three presidencies and Ceylon.

This I take it is the *first* question to be considered; but it is very difficult to argue this question with reference to Mr. Crawford's observations on the letter from the Bengal New Steam Fund Committee to the Supreme Government, because he no where distinctly avows, and scarcely by inference leads his readers to discover, what he really does hold the question at issue to be. The conclusions to which he has arrived are, that (*Par. 12 of 'Observations on a Steam Communication between India and Suez.'*)

'Four-fifths of all India will be indebted to Bombay, under whatever equitable arrangements are made for the general interests, for a quicker receipt of their letters from England than by any route that has yet been brought under consideration.'

And that (*Par. 30 of 'Observations on Steam Communication between India and Suez.'*)

'As respects the far greater portion of all India, parties will receive their letters at least as quickly, and for the most part as cheaply as by either of the two other presidencies.'

Consequently that (*Par. 21 of 'Observations on Calcutta Committee's Letter to the Supreme Government.'*)

'All establishments and expenditure, in excess of what would be necessary for Bombay, will be maintained for the transmission of less than one-fifth of the private correspondence of India, and the general correspondence of the island of Ceylon; and of such portion of the parcels and packages to and from as the public may think, after this explanation, will be transmitted to Ceylon, Madras, and Calcutta; and the accommodation of fifteen additional passengers each voyage from those places collectively.'

And this increase of expenditure being afterwards shewn on the data

Probable expenditure of the comprehensive plan.. Sa. Rs. 2,299,300

Probable expenditure under Bombay plan .... .. 1,34,500

Sa. Rs. 1,64,800

furnished by the Calcutta Committee to be Sicca Rupees 1,64,800, the ultimate result which Mr. Crawford appears desirous of establishing would seem to be included in the following Par. (25th) of 'Observations on the Calcutta Committee's Letter to the Supreme Government.'

' If the foregoing calculations founded in the one instance on data supplied by the Bengal Committee themselves, and in the other framed as far as practicable in consonance with those data, can be considered for the purposes of comparison to offer any thing like a correct view of the relative expences of the two schemes, and that my previous calculations on different matters connected with the establishment of a regular intercourse by steam between India and England are entitled to any weight, little more can, I think, be necessary to shew which of the plans is likely to lead to the realization of the hopes of "all India" by making that intercourse permanent also.'

These appear to be the only connected conclusions from which can be gathered either what Mr. Crawford really considers the question at issue to be, or the\* object which he is desirous to establish.

If I am right in this exposé of Mr. Crawford's conclusions, they may be thus summed up,—that as four-fifths of all India will by the Bombay exclusive plan receive their letters quicker, and for the most part as cheap as by the comprehensive one, and consequently the expenditure of this latter plan over that of the former being disbursed solely, and without adequate return, for the interests of less than one-fifth of the whole correspondence, the former is the plan most likely to lead to the realization of the hopes of 'all India' by making the intercourse permanent.

Now if we admit Mr. Crawford's conclusions to be correct, it is quite obvious that the reasons, which render the disbursement of this excess of expenditure inexpedient for the interests of less than one-fifth of India at the commencement of the intercourse, must have the same weight hereafter; and consequently that the Bombay plan once established, we may look in vain for the extension, yet Mr. Crawford concludes his 'Observations' thus (*Par. 30 of 'Observations on the Calcutta Committee's Letter to Supreme Government.'*)

' This once secured to India, the rest will follow in due season; and no one will rejoice more sincerely than myself on the early realization of those expectations of vast and incalculable benefit to our country and mankind, &c.'

\* In the 3 para: of his 'Observations on Captain Wilson's Pamphlet, &c.' Mr. Crawford would seem to indicate this object to be 'the eventual adoption of that course in regard to steam communication with Suez, as shall on full and mature consideration promise to secure the greatest extension of the benefits of steam navigation to all India, that a due regard to the cost of such extension shall seem to justify.' Why the question is thus narrowed to the communication between India and Suez, and why the communication with England, without which the communication to Suez, is useless, is thus shirked, Mr. Crawford can best tell. Doubtless the strength of his argument against the comprehensive plan is the additional cost, and that additional cost tells better in appearance by comparing it with the cost of the communication from Bombay to Suez, than it would if the expenditure from Suez to England was also taken into account. But Mr. Crawford professes himself to be opposed to the 'undivided agency,' on the ground that it is inexpedient, if not impracticable. He however assigns no reason for the impracticability; and for the inexpediency, refers only to the opinion of the Governor General, that Passengers would prefer the Malta Steam Packet and the land route to Malta via the Continent. But of this, and the inconsistency in which it involves Mr. Crawford, hereafter.

Here I should like to know what Mr. Crawford means by 'the rest will follow in due season.' Either the Bombay exclusive plan is or is not the plan in all respects best adapted *permanently* for all India. If it is contended that it is so, it ought to be broadly so stated, and its superiority maintained to the exclusion of any future extension.

On the other hand, if it is not so contended, if it is admitted that the comprehensive plan is the best eventually and permanently in all respects for all India, but that for any cause it is better that the exclusive Bombay plan should be first brought to bear, such should have been laid down as the question, and it should have been so argued. I am ready to take up either, but I should wish it to include the whole communication on to England; and I confess I should like to see the advocates for the Bombay plan leave this coquetting, and take their stand on some broad and plain ground.

However until they do so, we, who are for a plain intelligible comprehensive scheme, must meet our opponents in such manner as they think proper to come to the charge, and I therefore proceed now to meet Mr. Crawford's 'Observations on the Calcutta Committee's letter to the Bengal Government.'

The first observation of Mr. Crawford refers to the declaration of the Committee, that it having been authoritatively stated that a regularly quarterly communication could not be kept up from Bombay, they would on that ground alone consider the permanent communication should be from Calcutta, they being satisfied that during the single voyage when it would be at all necessary to oppose the S. W. monsoon in the Arabian Sea, a steam vessel of a proper power would be enabled to make the voyage from Galle to Socotra, with at least as greater a degree of certainty as the Falmouth packets make their winter passages to the Mediterranean. On this Mr. Crawford confesses that at one time he was nearly of the same opinion as the Bengal Committee; but he has abandoned his first impression, and arrived at the same conclusion as Capt Wilson, viz.

'That regular steam communication during the S. W. monsoon between Bombay and Suez, is not practicable in a way to make the returns or advantages meet, or worth while the expense.'

And referring to the Committee's suggestion touching the junction of the Bombay steamer during the S. W. monsoon, he says he would have it remembered that Captain Wilson distinctly states that it is not contended that the weather is so very bad in the monsoon that a steamer cannot go to Suez against it, but that having to go so great a distance (3000 miles) against strong breezes and a heavy sea, the wear and tear of the vessel and machinery and other extraordinary expences would be so considerable as to make the returns fall short of the several expences. Now let us see what it was that Capt. Wilson did say. He began his remarks on steam communication between Bombay and Suez in the following words:—

'From the middle of May till the end of September, the prevalence of the S. W. monsoon between the island of Socotra and the Indian Coast prevents the possibility of steam communication.'

This is what Capt Wilson originally stated in his pamphlet. In his supplementary remarks he observes, that in his pamphlet steam communication with the Red Sea during the N. E. monsoon had only been spoken of,—

‘It having been assumed that no one, possessing a competent knowledge of the weather and localities, would for a moment have entertained the notion of a regular communication with Suez during the S. W. monsoon.’

With reference however to Mr. Waghorn’s having started such a project, Capt. Wilson deemed it necessary to state the case clearly, in order that a just view might be formed on the subject.

Abandoning his former position, namely, that the prevalence of the S. W. monsoon between Socotra and the Indian coast, from the middle of May to the end of September, prevented the POSSIBILITY of steam communication during that period, Captain Wilson finally gives the following opinion :—

‘My own opinion that a regular steam communication during the S. W. monsoon between Bombay and Suez, is not practicable in a way to make the returns or advantages meet, or worth while the expence, is founded on many years. experience of the winds and weather in the Red Sea and between it and Bombay at all seasons.’

Now it is possible that this may hold good throughout the whole line as regards Bombay, but not as regards Calcutta. However, I am not called upon to contest the point as it is now put. If Capt. Wilson means ‘a regular steam communication’ at every and all times of the S. W. monsoon, I have nothing to say against his position; but I do advance this opinion, viz. that a steam communication from Calcutta to Suez and on to England, the vessel leaving on the 15th or 20th July in connection with a quarterly inter-course during the year, is practicable in a way to make the advantages equal the expence. How far it may be equally practicable to connect the Bombay communication at that period of the year, I am not so fully prepared to offer a confirmed opinion, though I am inclined to consider it is.

And first for the Calcutta steamer. I apprehend that the primary stage to Madras needs nothing to support its practicability in every respect. Horsburgh says, with reference to the land and sea breezes :—

‘In June and July these land winds often prevail, when a passage may at times be made from the Pilot to Madras in 10 or 12 days.’

Now it is true that we cannot command these breezes just as we want them, but it exhibits a state of things quite sufficient to shew there is nothing to prevent the passage being made; and I think six days for a proper steamer—by which I mean, without reference to size, one of the greatest speed—may be taken as a fair average from Kedgerree to Madras. Leaving the former place on the 20th July, she would then arrive at Madras on the 26th. A steamer capable of taking 16 days’ coal would require none at Madras, and her stay ought not to exceed 6 hours, so that she would leave that place at noon of the 26th; and I would give her to Galle four days, so that she would arrive at that place on the 30th July at noon. From

Madras to the Basses is 420 miles; and at that time of the year land and sea breezes prevailing, it may be fairly calculated that she would make that distance at the rate of 160 miles per diem; and it is only on the South coast of Ceylon from the Basses to Galle that any opposition may be apprehended. Isay apprehended, for it is by no means certain. I have passed Galle six times in June and July from England, and twice in August coming from Bombay, and off the island had moderate breezes, never even a fresh one, yet doubtless they do blow fresh at times. The statement on this point furnished to me by the kindness of Mr. Twynan, the Master Attendant at Galle, is as follows:—

MONTHS.	WIND.	WEATHER.
June, July, } Aug. & Sept. }	S. W. to W. N. W.	Heavy squalls and rain for some days about the changes of the moon, with intervals of fine weather, moderating as the season advances.

He adds,

‘ I consider Galle admirably situated for a central station for steam communication between India and the Red Sea. The harbour is secure\* at all seasons, depth of water four and five fathoms. Steamers could come in or go out at all times during day light; ships are occasionally detained a day (though not often) by a scant wind, a leading wind being necessary to enable them to leave the harbour, but this would not affect a steamer.’ The wind never blows hard right on shore, and not often from S. W. except in the early part of the S. W. monsoon; the prevailing winds being even in that season W. S. W. to W. N. W. The currents off Galle are variable, frequently running to windward several days at a time, but this does not extend far off shore nor to the eastward of Dondra Head.’

I hope there is nothing forced thus far, and we may estimate the passage to Galle at this time of the year by proper steamers, and none other would of course be employed, at ten and half days; and if we allow two days at Galle, she would leave at noon of the 1st August.

From Galle to Socotra the passage would be taken according to circumstances, either through the channels to the northward of the Maldives or through those known to exist in the group.

If the wind should be at S. W. it would be nearly fair for the direct passage; or even at W. S. W. a start might be made to the northward of Minicoy into the Arabian Sea; and when there, clear of the islands, say 500 miles from Galle, in four days she would have 1100 miles to do to Socotra. In this situation as before she must be guided by circumstances; but I think I may assume that there are none likely to occur in the beginning of August, calculated to prevent her making the 1100 miles in 9 days, either direct at five miles per hour, or when not able to make that in a direct line by keeping off the wind and making more. It can

---

\* The above may suffice to remove Mr. Crawford's doubts on the Committee's letter as to the propriety of making Galle a coal depot in the S. W. monsoon, but I may add from Horsburgh: ‘ It is considered a safe place at all seasons of the year, but with strong S. W. winds a ground swell tumbles in.’

scarcely be expected of me that I am to imagine every possible case; I can only argue this point generally; for it is one, the negative side of which is more susceptible of argument than the affirmative. I therefore say generally that, during the first half of August, I consider the monsoon between Galle and Socotra, and especially between the Maldives and the latter place, to be such that a proper steamer would at all times be able to make the 1600 miles in 13 days, leaving Galle on the 1st August. But suppose when leaving Galle she should have the wind fresh at W. N. W. so that she could not make 5 knots even going West, then I would say she should at once go away for the southern channels; and suppose she even went to the one and a half degree channel, by which she would increase the distance to Socotra to 1850 miles, I still consider that she would make it in 13 days. The distance to the one and a half degree channel is 500 miles, and she would run it at almost full speed; but let her do it at 6 knots per hour and she would be clear through in  $3\frac{1}{2}$  days, giving her  $9\frac{1}{2}$  days to run 1350 miles, or 6 miles per hour, from a situation where she might ensure a fair wind almost the whole way, the monsoon at its southern boundary hanging to the southward of S. W. while Socotra bears N. W. by W. from the one and a half degree channel. Under any ordinary circumstances therefore, I hold that a proper steamer may ensure the passage from Galle to Socotra, leaving on the 1st August, in 13 days at most.

She would then arrive at this latter place on the 14th August, when the monsoon is broken. On this point I would observe that as the S. W. monsoon sets in earlier in the neighbourhood of Socotra than it does at Bombay, so it moderates earlier; and as it is held to be moderating at the latter place towards the middle of August, it may surely be deemed to have done so completely at Socotra. Arriving at Socotra on the 14th, and leaving on the 16th August, the steamer would doubtless meet with westerly winds. But at this time of the year even sailing vessels have no difficulty in beating along the coast of Africa, and a steamer, a proper one I repeat, could have none whatever in getting into the Red Sea, nor do I consider that I am allowing too little if I give her six days from Socotra to the Straits. The distance is direct 650 miles, and, as before said, sailing vessels have no difficulty whatever in the\* middle of August, in making their passage along the African coast. Perhaps the hardest pull might be between Socotra and Cape Guardafui; but even here, if the wind should be strong at West, by passing close to the Eastward of Abdul Currim, and thence over towards Cape Guardafui—by which and following the route of sailing vessels, the distance would only be increased 50 miles—the passage might be made in the same time. From the Straits to Juddah is 590 say 600 miles, and leaving the former on the 22d August, when the force of the northerly winds at the south end of the sea

\* Horsburgh says that after the 10th of August there is a current setting to the S. W. and Westward at the rate of 2 and 3 miles per hour from Cape Felix to Zeyla.

† The Synopsis of the winds, weather, &c., by Mr. Sanders, Master of the Indian Navy, says of the winds between Mocha and Cossier in August. 'Near Mocha variable winds, towards Cossier northerly winds generally met with.'

is abated, five days would be sufficient for her reaching Juddah ; so that, allowing two days' stay there, she might leave on the 29th August, and even if six days are given to her to do the 630 miles between Juddah and Suez, she would arrive at this latter place on the 4th Sept. or 46 days from Kedgeree, and this would be reduced two days if the Bombay steamer could join on at Socotra. The Hugh Lindsay left Juddah for Suez on her first voyage on the 17th April, and made the passage in 5 days 'weather unfavorable;' in the 3d and 4th voyages in January and February she made, touching at Cossier, the former in 6 days 12 hours against 'most unfavorable weather;' and the latter in 5 days 22 hours against 'very unfavorable weather' to Cossier, and 'most unfavorable' thence to Suez.

I am aware that the latter end of August and beginning of September, at the head of the sea, are more unfavorable to a steamer proceeding up than the above months, but I consider the difference would be met by the increased power of the steamer.

On the whole I do not see any thing over-charged in what I have offered. I am open to comment and correction, but I declare my opinion to be that a proper steamer, leaving Kedgeree on the 20th July, may reasonably be expected to reach Suez in 40 days, without meeting with any of that continued violent weather and high seas, which Captain Wilson in general terms applies to the communication between Bombay and Suez during the S. W. monsoon.

With regard to a steamer from Bombay on this occasion joining on at Socotra : she ought to be there on the 12th August. I admit that this appears to me to be more difficult of execution than the passage from Galle to Socotra at this time of the year. I do not\* know the prevailing state of the winds during the beginning of August between Bombay and Socotra, that is whether they hang to the S. W. West or W. N. W. ; near the coast they seem at this time to veer to the latter point, and should they do so for any distance from the land, and on the passage not range to the southward of west, which may possibly be the case in August, I really do not see why a good steamer might not pass across from Bombay in that month, leaving the latter end of July during the neaps.

I do not think that a steamer during this period would meet with that 'heavy weather' in the open Arabian Sea which, as before observed, Capt. Wilson, speaking generally of the S. W. monsoon, attributes to the whole passage of 3000 miles between Bombay and Suez. I do not believe the weather is generally 'heavy' in the open Arabian Sea in August. I think that after leaving soundings the monsoon would be found to be regular and steady with no high sea; and although as Socotra was neared there might be a rem-

\* The Synopsis of Mr. Sanders gives the same winds as in July, only more moderate. July winds are described 'strong gales from W. S. W. to S. W. extending to Cape Guardafui.'



nant of that which obtains, certainly to excess *during the height of the monsoon*, I do not believe that by the 10th or 12th of August it would be found to be any serious obstacle to a proper steamer.

On the whole then I am of opinion that the communication may be kept open during *this period* of the monsoon, and that without having to steam '3000 miles against *heavy weather*.'

I have now only on this part of the subject to notice Mr. Crawford's remark, that not many people will be found willing to embark from Calcutta on the 15th April and 15th July for England. (*Para. 4 of 'Observations on Committee's Letter,'*—

'To make a beating passage of nearly 5000 miles with the prospect of rough weather and consequent discomfort all the voyage nearly before them, and of finding on arrival at Suez, after a passage made in the S. W. monsoon, the heat of the weather too great to admit of those so inclined loitering amongst the antiquities of upper Egypt, or even to allow of their passing over the desert of Suez, however quickly, without serious inconvenience, whilst the rising of the Nile, which commences in June and is at its height in August, would, to use Captain Wilson's words, subject passengers from India at that season in question to almost all its ancient plagues in lower Egypt, and operate, in his opinion as in mine, as a further drawback to the adoption of the Red Sea route during the S. W. monsoon.'

Now, for the April departure, Mr. Crawford cannot consider it as under the influence of the bugbear of the S. W. monsoon; for even Capt. Wilson admits that up to the middle of May the communication may be maintained between India and Socotra, and during that month southerly winds are prevalent in the lower part of the Red Sea, so that Mr. Crawford might at least have excluded that voyage from the anticipated horrors of a S. W. monsoon; and I hope that leaving Calcutta on the 15th April, passengers by the steamer would be out of Egypt before the end of May, so that the 'ancient plagues' may on that voyage be also excluded.

I have already expressed an opinion as to the S. W. monsoon horrors of the other voyage, and touching the heat of the desert and the plagues of Egypt, deterring passengers from going, I do not think they would operate much with those whose business required their presence in England. That passengers would not go in such numbers that voyage as the others is doubtless as true as that passengers now prefer a summer to a winter passage round the Cape, and to arrive in England in the summer instead of the winter; yet they are prevented neither by the winter passage round the Cape nor the entering the British Channel in winter, from proceeding hence at periods when they are unavoidable. Under proper arrangement, moreover, I imagine three or four days will be the utmost of the sojourn in passing from Suez to Alexandria.

Both Mr. Crawford and Capt. Wilson argue this part of the question with reference to the existing state of things, and not, as it ought to be argued, with reference to the facilities which would necessarily follow the adoption of the plan, recommended by the Calcutta Steam Committee, for a speedy and comfortable passage across the isthmus for those who choose to accompany the packets.

Having thus disposed of the S. W. monsoon part of the question, I may observe, even if I have failed in satisfying my readers of its practicability, that that failure would still not be in any degree conclusive against the comprehensive scheme, the main principle of which is not so much the number or periods of voyages, as the expediency of the extension of the communication to the other presidencies, whenever and how often made. Doubtless if I have shewn the practicability of that communication at the period I have mentioned, the maintenance of a *regular* quarterly communication, in opposition to that proposed by Capt. Wilson of three times a year at irregular periods, is an advantage of some consequence.

But I proceed.

In the 5th paragraph of their Letter the Calcutta Committee had stated as follows :—

‘ It is obvious that the communication between England and India, if confined to Bombay as the sole port of arrival and departure, would be greatly reduced below that which would take place if means were afforded for landing passengers, mails, parcels, and packets at the three presidencies of India, and at Ceylon ; and consequently that the receipts, whether from the conveyance of passengers, newspapers and parcels, or from the postage of letters, would be comparatively trifling ; while the expences would be very nearly the same as those which would suffice for ensuring simultaneously a road for the easy passage between all parts of India and England. The advantages of the comprehensive plan above referred to, namely, that of a steamer quitting Calcutta, calling at Madras and Galle for their passengers and packets, and picking up those of Bombay at Socotra, are, we think, incalculable over that which confines the communication to Bombay,

<i>Calcutta received amt.</i> .....	89,189	In support of this, we would observe that the number of letters received at the two presidencies of Calcutta and Madras are more than quadruple those received at Bombay ; and those imported at the two former presidencies nearly quintuple. Again, as regards passengers, the total number of all classes arriving at and departing from each presidency are as per margin. Each class of passengers, namely, males apparently married, and apparently single, females, children, and servants, arriving at Calcutta alone is very nearly triple those arriving at Bombay ; and departing double. From this, without referring to Ceylon, some idea may be gathered of the comparative intercourse ; and we would confidently ask whether a steam communication restricted to Bombay, under the circumstances of the impracticability of the country for travellers, as well as for the transit of even small packages, would be in any degree
<i>Madras, .....</i>	40,736	
	<u>1,29,925</u>	
<i>Bombay, .....</i>	30,000	
<i>Calcutta Exported, .....</i>	72,897	
<i>Madras, ....</i>	40,614	
	<u>1,13,511</u>	
<i>Bombay, .....</i>	29,000	
<b>ARRIVALS.</b>		
<i>Calcutta, .....</i>	767	
<i>Madras, .....</i>	573	
	<u>1,340</u>	
<i>Bombay, .....</i>	287	
<b>DEPARTURES.</b>		
<i>Calcutta, .....</i>	665	
<i>Madras, .....</i>	459	
	<u>1,124</u>	
<i>Bombay, .....</i>	316	

deserving the name of a 'Steam Communication with INDIA!!' Whether in point of fact it would not be a mere connection with Bombay, the other parts of India having comparatively no advantage from it? Would not the result be a large expenditure with little advantage; while by the mere addition of one steamer the acknowledged benefits of the shortened intercourse would be simultaneously conveyed to all the presidencies, and, instead of being confined to Bombay, flow throughout the whole country.'

And again:—

'We feel that we need not dwell further on this point; the question cannot be between the relative advantages of the two plans; it can only be one of expense; and we contend that there cannot after due consideration be any reasonable doubt that the facilities afforded by the plan we recommend for bringing on the passengers, packets, parcels, and mails from Southern and Eastern India at Socotra, by means of a single additional steamer, would not only afford more than sufficient profit to cover the expenses of that steamer, but would add greatly to the profit of the whole concern; for it must be borne in mind that the expenses from England to Socotra would be very nearly as great for maintaining the Communication with Bombay alone as with all the principal places in India. By extending the communication to the principal seats of government in India, the sources of profit would be at least trebled; and thus, among other important advantages, the permanency of the communication would be better ensured.

And, as summing up their views:—

'We say that we firmly believe the only way to establish and maintain a perfect communication is at once to adopt a scheme embracing all the points calculated to yield profit; and that this can be only done by allowing contractors free and uncontrolled agency throughout the whole line, Government yielding that pecuniary return which the direct services of conveying the public despatches, between the two countries, entitle them to,—with a fair consideration for the moral and political advantages which would at any time have resulted from the successful establishment of the communication; but which, under the existing peculiar circumstances of the two countries, become so important as to be beyond all calculation.'

With respect to the first of these extracts, Mr. Crawford passes it for the present, merely mentioning his purpose to answer it at a later period of the enquiry.

As to the second, he considers it to involve a bold assertion without proof, he having in vain looked for the proof; that it is incapable of proof; and he adds that his reasons for this opinion will be forth coming in their proper place. It will, however, be as well to refer at once to Mr. Crawford's observations on these parts of the Committee's Letter, and this reference will I apprehend lead us at once into the real question, which I am willing for the sake of the argument to allow to be, whether confining the communication to Bombay or extending it to the other presidencies is likely to be most conducive to its permanency; but there is

• As Mr. Crawford admits that, the Bombay Plan being once secured, 'all the rest will follow,' which can only mean that which we now seek, he appears to me to concede the point as to which of the two plans is most likely to conduce to permanency; but I suppose he means to infer—you cannot get the whole done at once, and therefore do the Bombay first; but he nowhere shews that the whole cannot be at once brought forward. I contend that it can, and more readily than the exclusive

also another view of the question to which I cannot help referring in the course of my remarks ; and that is whether the scheme proposed by the Calcutta Committee is or is not in itself practicable and expedient. And I cannot help here observing that ; admitting, as Mr. Crawford does, that the interests of one-fifth of India, including the seat of the supreme Government and a European population at least quadruple, I imagine, that of Bombay, would be comparatively neglected by the exclusive Bombay plan, while by that of the Calcutta Committee they would, as far as the nature of things admits, be included together with those of all the other parts of India ; I say, admitting this, I consider Mr. Crawford ought first to have shown the positive impracticability and inexpediency of that scheme in itself : but this he has not done, nor attempted to do, beyond the declaration that the expenditure, (without however referring to the additional receipts,) over and above what would be necessary for the Bombay exclusive plan, would be disbursed for the advantage of less than one-fifth of India. But to Mr. Crawford's remarks on the above three extracts of the Committee's Letter.

He proceeds to shew the grounds on which he asserts that the far greater portion of all India will receive their letters as quickly and for the most part as cheaply, as by either of the two other presidencies, and he adds :—

‘ And if I succeed in satisfactorily establishing that point, a brief inquiry into the cost at which such benefit may be procured by steamers from Bombay, as well as into the amount of expenditure, that will attach to the comprehensive scheme of the Bengal Committee, and the increased advantages that are to result from it, may not be an unsuitable conclusion to the investigation I have undertaken.’

Mr. Crawford then refers to two tables ; one shewing the dawk distances of various places, under the presidency of Bengal, from Bombay, the course of dawk between these places and Bombay at the average rate of 80 miles per diem, and the rate of postage chargeable on letters from such places via Bombay, compared with that which would be leviable on the addition of an equitable equivalent for the increased distance and charge of conveyance from Suva to the latter port ; the other a similar expose, as regards Madras.

I have no means of questioning the accuracy of these tables, nor am I at all desirous of so doing ; but I do question the conclusions which Mr. Crawford has deduced from them, namely ‘ that at all places mentioned in this (the Bengal) table which are within 13½ days’ dawk from Bengal, parties will be in possession of their letters, before their letters would be in Calcutta,’ and ‘ therefore parties at all places mentioned in this table (No. 2) which are within eight and a half (8½) days dawk from Bombay will be in possession of their letters as soon as their letters arrive at Madras ;’ and by consequence I dispute the priority of receipt of letters by way of Bombay to the extent contended for by Mr. Crawford. First. As by the scheme of the Calcutta Committee, the Bengal steamer is at Socotra waiting the arrival of the Bombay Steamer, and as it is now understood two days are required for purposes connected with the boilers and machinery, allowing six

hours for the transfer, the Bengal steamer will have 42 hours' start from Socotra before the Bombay steamer; and in the S. W. monsoon this will bring the Calcutta steamer, allowing both Steamers under the circumstances to average\* 200 miles per diem, to Galle 14 hours after the arrival of the

	hours.
Detention of Bombay steamer at Socotra, .....	1 18
Passage to Bombay 1130 miles at 200 per diem, ....	5 16
	<hr/> 7 10
Passage to Socotra, 1600 miles at 200 per diem, ....	8
	<hr/> hours. 14

steamer at Bombay. Allow her two days' stay there, and to be† three days going to Madras, she would arrive there five days and fourteen hours after the arrival at Bombay, instead of‡ eight days and half as assumed by Mr Crawford; and give five days to Calcutta, stopping six hours at Madras, and she would get to this presidency

in ten days and twenty hours after the Bombay steamer had reached Bombay, instead of§ 13½ days as stated by Mr. Crawford.

With regard to the N. E. monsoon, the steamer will make a better average in passing from Socotra to Galle than from Socotra to Bombay, the wind being more favorable. Say that she averaged 6. 4. to Bombay and 7. 4 to So-

Detention of Bombay steamer at Socotra, .....	1 18
Passage to Bombay 1136 at 6. 4 per hour, .....	7 6
	<hr/> 9 0
Passage to Galle 1600 at 7. 4 .....	8 21
	<hr/> hours. 3

cotra, she would arrive at Galle three hours before the steamer at Bombay, and allowing her to proceed up the Bay at 6 knots per hour she would be 5 days 13 hours instead of 8½ days at Madras,—and 11 days 19 hours instead of 13½ days at Calcutta after the Bombay steamer had reached that place.

But there is yet a question to refer to, viz. the *despatch* of letters,—and here, the steamer starting in the N. E. monsoon would run to Socotra at an average of 180 miles per diem or in eighteen days and six hours, including the stoppage of six hours at Madras and two days at Galle. Suppose that

\* This is little more than 8 knots per hour, and little enough under the circumstances; the greater the speed, the more favourable for Calcutta.

† Not 7-4 per hour.

‡ Vide Note, page 22, Mr. Crawford's Observations on the Calcutta Committee's Letter.

§ Mr. Crawford, at page 4 of his appendix, states that he has shewn 'that the branch steamer from Socotra will be at Bombay according to Mr. Greenlaw's data in twenty two (22) days from the date of the Red Sea steamer's departure from Suez, and that the latter will not reach Calcutta under thirty-five and half (35½) days' On the contrary I find the following at page 22 of Mr. Crawford's Observations on my Pamphlet:—

'The passage from Bombay to Suez, and from Suez to Bombay, may, according to Capt. Wilson's data already given, and which I shall confirm by Mr. Greenlaw's hereafter, be performed as far as actual steaming is concerned in.....days—24.'

'At his 41st para., he enters into an elaborate statement formed on an average of 6 miles per hour on the rate of the steamers going *throughout*; which average may do well for the whole distance, but it does not do so for the run between Socotra and India, especially returning in the S. W. monsoon. It is preposterous to ground an argument on a partial run, by a reference to an average obtained under the varying circumstances of the whole passage.

she left Kedgerie the 1st January, the Bombay steamer should be at Socotra on the 16th, to effect which at the same rate of going she would have to leave Bombay on the 10th\*, or only nine days after the Calcutta steamer. It would puzzle Mr. Crawford to shew that this delay of nine and five days at Bombay, as regards the steamer's departure from Calcutta and Madras, would enable four fifths, *even of the stations*, of India to write later by Bombay than by Calcutta and Madras.

But it is impossible to gather in what way Mr. Crawford fixes on one-fifth only of all India as excluded from priority of receipt of letters via Bombay, whether by number of *stations*, extent of country, or number of letters. It is quite clear this latter is the true criterion; and that, to arrive at it, it will be necessary to ascertain the boundaries round Calcutta and Madras, (for I maintain that the steamer will arrive at Madras with letters before they would reach that place via Bombay,) within which parties would receive their letters quicker by Calcutta and Madras, and be enabled to write later, than by Bombay, and then if possible learn the average number of letters sent from these places and Ceylon in comparison with the whole number sent from all India. For the first, I would take a line from Balasore N. W. to Rangur, and thence north to Patna, and N. E. to Amceerpore; and I hope it will be granted to me that all within that line may be taken as coming within Mr. Crawford's 1-5th of all India. No one station within that line is to be found in Mr. Crawford's Tables, but there are many without it which are not included by Mr. Crawford in his calculation of 1-5th; but if any one is disposed to contest this line, I am willing to taken one from Balasore North to Rajmahal and thence N. E. to Dinagepore and Rangpore. An examination of the† Statement in the appendix, marked A., will shew that such concession on my part, or even greater, may be made without fear for the result. That statement is a most triumphant refutation of Mr. Crawford's conclusion that 4-5ths of the *correspondence* of India would be delivered quicker from Bombay than through Calcutta, Madras, and Calcutta by the comprehensive scheme. The average number of Letters sent from all India annually

Calcutta, .....	72,497	through the Post Office amounts to
Madras, .....	40,614	1,43,975, and by the statement A., in
Bombay, .....	24,000	the Appendix, it appears that in 1832,
Ceylon, .....	6,464	the last year of the average, letters to
	<u>1,43,975</u>	the number of 1,43,975 were despatched
		from the Community of Calcutta

\* The steamer would leave Madras on the afternoon of the 5th, or only five days before the Bombay steamer quitted that place.

† This statement is furnished from the post office of Calcutta

‡ The Calcutta, Madras, and Ceylon averages are taken from official statements furnished from the post offices of each presidency. The Bombay one is given from a communication made by Mr. Graham to Mr. Hadow.

§ Some of these letters are unquestionably from the Mofussil - being sent to Agents in Calcutta for despatch - but they cannot amount to any great number—not more than the difference between the letters sent in the ships' private bags from Calcutta and Madras united—and from Bombay as subsequently referred to.

alone, being within 648 of ONE-THIRD of the number of letters sent to England from ALL INDIA !! To these being added the 7,470 from the stations in statement A. there will be in Bengal alone 54,814 letters\* deliverable from Calcutta, under the comprehensive scheme, or MORE than ONE-THIRD of the correspondence of all India. But this is not all. The total of Madras letters amounts to 40,614, and if we allow †15,000 of these to be deliverable at Madras by the Calcutta steamer, and add the Ceylon letters (6,464) the amount will stand thus, viz. 76,278 letters, out of 1,43,975 of the letters of all India, will be delivered quicker by the Calcutta steamer

Bengal, .....	54,814	than if they went to Bombay. So
Madras, .....	15,000	much for Mr. Crawford's assumption
Ceylon, .....	6,464	(the whole support and main stay of
	<u>76,278</u>	his argument against the Calcutta
		Committee's plan) that 1-5th only

of the correspondence would reach its destination quicker by Calcutta than Bombay; but even this, which is but a trifling consideration compared with what is to follow, will admit of yet further extension. No ship quits the port without making a private packet, and I am well assured on good authority that if I give 80 letters to each vessel I am below the mark. On an average 76 ships quit Calcutta annually for England. These would add 6,080 letters to those already given, and of course at Madras there would be an addition from this source, comparatively small to be sure, but still helping, against the similar private despatch at Bombay, to swell the comparison to a large majority even in the *number* of letters deliverable by priority from Calcutta, Madras, and Galle; and again the European foreign correspondence from Chandernagore and Pondicherry, and the correspondence connected with any relations which may obtain between this side of India and the continental ports in the Mediterranean have each a degree of consideration in this matter.

But enough. I have gone into this part of the subject to its limit, because I desire to look into the question as far as possible; but I consider that I

---

\* I have taken the *export* of letters as my guide for the correspondence, as denoting more clearly the actual state of correspondence with England; since many letters for the Mofussil are directed only to Calcutta, and it is obvious that the *delivery* to the several stations will be generally in proportion to the number of letters despatched from each.

† By statement A. it will appear that out of 73,712 letters annually sent from Bengal 47,344, or more than one-half, go from Calcutta alone; and therefore in fixing on 15,000 as going on the Calcutta steamer from Madras and its immediate neighbourhood out of 40,614, I am persuaded I am under the mark. On this point the eagerness exhibited in the last voyage of the Forbes at Madras shews the importance of a steamer starting from the 'door' of each presidency. Captain Forth writes: 'But the best proof is the anxiety to get the packets ready for us. I was continually being applied to receive packets; and letters after the post office packet was closed were brought from all parts. We have now two box packets more than on our first trip, and including all—about three times the number of letters compared to Calcutta (this trip) this is an evident sign of confidence, and 1,50,000 Rs. down to Galle is another mark that the project is getting into favor—barring the length of the passage of this, and all the casualties of last voyage.'

might even have conceded to Mr. Crawford all he has sought to establish, (always however with a saving clause as to his deductions) I say, I consider that I might have conceded to Mr. Crawford that by the communication being confined to Bombay 4-5ths of all India would be as well served in respect to quickness of receipt and to amount of charge for letters, as they would by the communication being extended to Ceylon, Madras, and Calcutta, and I hold, I might concede this to Mr. Crawford, even to the amount of the number of letters. But when the question is put, as it is put by Mr. Crawford, as to the inexpediency of the disbursement from the PUBLIC purse of any given sum (without, as I have before observed, any recognition of additional receipts) for the remaining 1-5th; a question arises as to the value, in a PUBLIC point of view, of the correspondence of that 1-5th.

Mr. Crawford's 4-5ths embrace the private '*convenience and comfort*' of the individuals involved in the 4-5ths; and conceding, for the nonce, to Mr. Crawford, that he is numerically correct, the remaining 1-5th must in their *private* relations humbly submit to Mr. Crawford's *provident* and *economical* considerations. They doubtless will readily acknowledge the strong sense of PUBLIC duty which must have influenced Mr. Crawford in thus voluntarily coming forward and deprecating any PUBLIC outlay for *their* peculiar *private* '*convenience and comfort*;' but at the same time, perhaps, if they had been allowed the opportunity, they might have submitted to Mr. Crawford's consideration whether, as the disbursement contemplated by him was to come from the PUBLIC purse, there might not be PUBLIC considerations involved in their numerical minimum, which might render that disbursement an object, in a PUBLIC point of view, of paramount importance, I had almost said—of paramount necessity—in the consideration of this question. I allude here to the commercial interests involved in the correspondence of that 1-5th.

The statement B. in the appendix, compiled from the Commercial Reports of the three presidencies of Calcutta, Madras, and Bombay, exhibits the relative value of the commercial intercourse of the presidencies with Europe. It speaks for itself; it shews in the united private commerce of Calcutta and

	Sa. Rs.	Madras a superiority over Bombay as
Calcutta and Madras, . . . .	4,11,49,941	per margin. This superiority would
Bombay, . . . . .	1,63,89,629	be greatly encreased could I compare

the trade hitherto carried on by the Hon'ble Company. This I am prevented doing by the absence in the Bombay Reports of any notice of the Govern-

Average of eight years viz. from 1825  
to 1832, both inclusive (*vide Ceylon Almanac for 1834.*)

Exports, . . . . .	Sa. Rs.	14,43,270
Imports, . . . . .		3,09,880

Total 17,53,150

Calcutta and Madras as above 4,11,49,941

Grand Total, . . . Sa. Rs. 4,29,03,091

ment imports and exports; but there is yet the value of the Ceylon commerce with England to be added to the Calcutta and Madras. This amounts to Sa. Rs. 17,53,150; so that the value of the private commercial correspondence of Calcutta, Madras, and Galle, is Sa. Rs. 4,29,03,091 or near-



ly as 3 to 1 as regards Bombay; and if to that we add the value of the commerce of the Hon'ble Company at Calcutta and Madras, which eventually must

Total of private commerce  
of Calcutta, Madras, & Galle

Sa. Rs. .... 4,29,03,091

Former trade of H. C. at  
Calcutta .. .... 1,56,35,517

Do, Madras..... 23,38,682

Sa. Rs. 6,08,290,77

necessarily fall into the hands of private merchants, there will be a total of Sa. Rs. 6,08,77,298 involved in the commercial correspondence of Calcutta, Madras, and Ceylon, or part of Mr. Crawford's lightly considered 1-5th of all India.

Is this a matter to be treated with slight, or held worthy of no consideration in the settlement of the question of a steam communication with England? Mr. Crawford seems to think it is—but I think otherwise, as I doubt not the public generally will.

I may here adduce one other measure of the relative importance of Calcutta in this matter. The total amount of paid subscriptions to the New Bengal Steam Fund is Sa. Rs. 1,57,607; of this no less than Sa. Rs. 47,989, were subscribed by the inhabitants of Calcutta, and Sa. Rs. 26,239 by parties within the line marked out for the letters, these united make a total of Sa. Rs.\* 74,198, nearly half the whole subscription of Bengal; every rupee, moreover, subscribed without the Bombay stimulus of proprietorship. What may be the amount realized to the Bombay Fund, under the operation of that stimulus, I do not know; but the large subscription of Calcutta and its neighbourhood entitles the subscribers to consideration, and may well excuse some desire on their part to partake to the fullest possible extent of the purposed communication. Doubtless it would have been more acceptable to the advocates of the Bombay exclusive plan, and especially to the "proprietors" of the "vessel of our own," to have had this Sa. Rs. 74,198 added to their CAPITAL; but it would seem little short of folly in the honors of an amount much more than equal, I apprehend, to the whole "capital" subscribed by the "proprietors," thus to foster a plan in which their interests are avowedly held by its recognized advocate to be of slight consideration. I have thus far gone on, what may be termed, the private importance of the extension of the communication to Calcutta, including Ceylon and Madras, strengthening that importance by referring to the connection which all great private interests must ever have with the public weal; and I would now consider the question as regards the intercourse between the Governments of India and the authorities at home.

I would here wish at once to cede the utmost limit that could be required by the most determined advocate for the Bombay exclusive scheme—and that is, for the argument's sake, to place the seat of the Supreme Government at Bombay.

---

\* Of the remaining sum of Sa. Rs. 83,409, no less than Sa. Rs. 42,414 were subscribed by nine individuals, native princes and others, leaving only Sa. Rs. 40,995, for all the rest of the stations outside the line.

Well, then, the sum of the matter would be that to and from the Supreme Government, the very readiest and earliest information on all points would be maintained; and unquestionably, if India was actually governed at home, such a location would afford the readiest receptacle for ORDERS.

But if such was the case, if Bombay united the advantages of propinquity with the mother country by way of the Red Sea under a course of steam navigation, and of a good position for governing India,—what still should be the object of such a communication? More than once I have been told that the considerations at home in this matter are merely political—by which I imagine I am to understand some distinction between the good of the whole —(by the whole I mean the two countries of England and British India)—I say some distinction between the good of the whole, and the immediate intercourse between the authorities of the two countries.

For my part I can conceive no such distinction in the political relations of England and India. I say if the seat of the Supreme Government was removed from Calcutta to Bombay, that political considerations should still induce the extension of the communication to Calcutta. The removal of the Supreme Government from the banks of the Hooghly cannot prevent its being the natural channel for the outlet to all parts of the world of by far the greater portion of the commerce of India. And what is India to England except through its commerce? is not every thing relating to that commerce a matter of political importance? Is not every measure relative to India called *par excellence* political, after all, but subservient to its commerce? Without commerce, and the means it affords of conveying home the surplus revenue of India, would not the possession of the country be a certain source of weakness rather than of strength? Whether therefore the seat of the Supreme Government is at Calcutta, Agra, or Bombay, the political importance of extending the communication to Calcutta is little varied; moreover each Government, even under its existing dependence on the Supreme Council, must have some *details* of importance to furnish to the home authorities. All the accounts of the several presidencies must go home. The immediate proceedings of the Governments in their voluminous details will still require transport to England; and I would ask whether the ready and speedy transfer of ALL the minute details of the several Governments of India is not an object of political importance? Is not the opportunity for reference to details a matter of consequence to a right understanding on all political questions of importance? And indeed the greater the importance the greater the necessity for the reference. Away then, I should say with Mr. Crawford's contracted estimate of the value and importance of the extended communication to Galle, Madras, and Calcutta. Will he now venture lightly to restrict that value and importance to "less than one fifth" of the private correspondence of India and the general correspondence of "Ceylon, and of such portion of the parcels and packages to and fro, as the

"public may think after this (Mr. Crawford's) explanation will be transmitted "to Ceylon, Madras, and Calcutta, and the accommodation of fifteen additional passengers each voyage from these places collectively?" Will he now thus lightly (for which we thank him as much as he deserves) treat the interests of 1-5th of all India? I cannot refrain from again here noticing Mr. Crawford's charge against me of overlooking the interests of the many in my zeal for those of the few (Calcutta,) not indeed in any plan which I recommended for adoption, but in a mere "stepping stone" to the introduction of a plan whereby these very parties would be benefitted, as Mr. Crawford himself admits. Nor can I here pass over the extension of that charge in the following words:—

'But whilst thus overlooking the interests and convenience of so large a part of the inhabitants of India, and of the commercial part of the upper provinces in particular, Mr. Greenlaw has also lost sight of another very important body,—the Mercantile community of Great Britain,—of which a large and daily increasing portion is deeply interested in the receipt of the latest and most authentic advices from the upper parts of Hindoostan, and the cotton districts of Guzerat, as component parts of Commercial India in general.—A Body too, whose support, it will be remembered, it has been judged desirable strongly to solicit, in a later stage of the Bengal Steam proceedings, in aid of the Red Sea plan, and who will naturally expect, under whatever arrangement that plan may eventually be carried into effect, that due regard will be had to the claims of the commercial interests of the Parent Country,—as well as to those of her Indian possessions.'

I would now confidently ask who it is that avowedly overlooks the interests and convenience of so large a part of the inhabitants of India—and of the commercial part in particular—I, or Mr. Crawford? I whose plan embraces that of Mr. Crawford, with an extension to all the principal ports of India; or Mr. Crawford who, with his utmost power, argues for the restriction to Bombay, whereby the interests and convenience of those engaged in half the correspondence of India are disregarded; in which restriction, commercial interests to the extent of above four crores of rupees are held as nought, although they are nearly three times more than those concerned at Bombay and in Mr. Crawford's\* plan? I may leave Mr. Crawford himself to answer. Again who is it that loses sight "of another very important body, the mercantile community of Great Britain" I, who desire that their correspondence, in the amplest detail, accompanied by musters and parcels, should be brought

---

\* I may here cursorily refer to Mr. Crawford's argument touching the interests of parties in the Upper Provinces of Bengal "wherein extensive interests used to be vested in the cultivation or purchase of Indigo, Silk, sugar, &c." in relation to their correspondence with England by Bombay—in preference to Calcutta. On this point few words are necessary. These parties do not export the produce they raise. It doubtless is important for such of those as are independent, and have the full power over the produce, to know the state of the markets at home to enable them to judge of the price which they may demand in Calcutta: but it is equally necessary for the purchasers in Calcutta to be as well informed, as ultimately the interests involved in that produce must center in Calcutta; while the principal Indigo Districts, which article forms by far the largest item in the exports, are confined within the line of Calcutta priority.

to the very doors of their correspondents in all parts of India; or Mr. Crawford who confines them to Bombay; who desires that the commercial correspondence of Calcutta, Madras, and Ceylon with the mercantile community in Great Britain, involving four, and eventually likely to include\* six crores of rupees annually, shall be confined to the expedients of "thinner paper!" for "those whose inclination or business may lead them to forward heavier packets." Let Mr. Crawford again answer.

I might perhaps here close my remarks, satisfied that I have fully shewn the value of Mr. Crawford's conclusions and deductions touching 1-5th of all India; but I wish before I conclude to make some reference to Mr. Crawford's further observations.

Mr. Crawford in the 24 par. says, that he comes to the consideration of the expenses "at which each of these plans," viz. the Bengal comprehensive scheme and the Bombay one, can be carried into effect;" but I deny that Mr. Crawford does any such thing. He curtails the Bengal comprehensive plan of its fair proportions, and compares a *part* of it with the *whole* plan as proposed at Bombay, which latter refers simply to "a Steam Communication between Bombay and Suez."

It is impossible, however, that I can quarrel with Mr. Crawford's estimate of the charge for the two Calcutta Steamers; it is rather under that of the Calcutta Committee. Yet Mr. Crawford objects to the Calcutta estimates as being too low. Indeed he considers that the charge of interest is omitted altogether, not being aware, as no regular estimate of the probable receipts is furnished, that the excess of them over the expenditure more than covers ordinary interest. However, he makes the whole Calcutta estimate of charge on this side, the Isthmus Sa. Rs. 2,99,300—and that at Bombay Sa. Rs. 1,34,500—but, although in this latter is included a fourth voyage, we are to remember that the Bombay Plan only provides for three from Bombay alone, while that of Calcutta has four from all the Presidencies—that the Bombay Steamer is small, adapted *exclusively* for ALL the wants of the Bombay Presidency, but *partially* only for those of ALL THE REST OF INDIA, and what is included in that portion I have fully shewn. I say with the Calcutta Committee, can this be called "Steam Communication with INDIA?"

\* One further strong argument in favor of the immediate extension of the communication is, that it cannot but tend most materially to bring forward that extension of the private commerce of India which must eventually arise from the cessation of the Company's trade. And who more interested in this than the Hon'ble Company? While their factories and commercial assets in this country are in the market, can it be denied, if the regular, certain, and comfortable means of passage which large Steamers would afford were now in existence, that capitalists at home would be induced personally to ascertain the expediency of investing their funds? or if it is said, that this is past; I would ask whether such a means of communication would not still introduce wealthy speculators: and I am sure I need not say one word on the expediency of endeavouring to continue the working of existing factories and to maintain the existing extent of exports and eventually to increase them rather than to suffer them to languish in the hope of their revival.

But it is also to be remembered that Mr. Crawford keeps entirely out of sight all the expenses of the further communication, which being added to the two estimates will of course greatly reduce the ratio of comparison, and then the question will be whether the difference will be repaid or not ; but Mr. Crawford avoids this the only fair view of the question in its pecuniary bearings.

Well, then, the sum of Mr. Crawford's argument is this.—It will cost you Sa. Rs. 2,99,300 per annum to effect a complete Steam Communication between all the Presidencies of India, (including Ceylon,) and Suez, in connection I must add with a scheme by which that communication is extended to England ; that is a steam communication by which ALL PARTS of India shall participate in all its advantages,—each in the degree—proportionate to its wants,—of which it is capable from its locality, embracing the transit of letters, parcels, packages of valuable goods, and passengers under arrangements calculated to promote their comforts, whether they desire to pass with the expedition of the packets, or “to loiter among the antiquities of Upper Egypt,” while on the other hand for Sa. Rs. 1,34,500—*minus* the current expences for one voyage, you may have a Steam Communication from Bombay to Suez, three times a year at irregular periods unconnected with any defined ulterior system of communication, which will be managed by other parties, by which the correspondence of a part only of all India will get to England as speedily and as cheaply as by the other more expensive plan, and all the other advantages will be confined to Bombay,—that the expence of this latter will be more than covered by the receipts to the extent of say Sa. Rs. 30,000, and therefore, without any comparison of the estimated receipts of the Bengal Comprehensive Scheme in relation to its expenditure—the Bombay Scheme Plan is more likely to be permanent than the other ; and, when this most-likely-to-be-permanent plan is once effected—then “the rest will follow in due season !” That is, the less-likely-to-be-permanent plan will eventually supersede the more likely-to-be-permanent ! I and Mr. Crawford will rejoice. Why not then aid at once in perfecting the ulterior measure ? I should be sorry to misrepresent the effect of Mr. Crawford's arguments and conclusions ; but they appear to me to be such as I have above described.

With regard to Mr. Crawford's estimate of the receipts of the Bombay Plan, I have no objection to offer to it : and what the general result of my consideration of Mr. Crawford's Pamphlet is, that is the degree in which I hold that he has successfully met the arguments and deductions of the Calcutta Committee in their letter to the Governor General, I shall defer until I have noticed some desultory observations of Mr. Crawford which appear to require explanation or remark.

I have before adverted to the difficulty of discussing the merits of the whole comprehensive scheme of the Calcutta Committee, embracing, as it does, the communication from England to all parts of India, by comparing

a detached portion of that scheme with a mere communication between Bombay and Suez; and I think before Mr. Crawford forced such a comparison in a work expressly devoted to ascertain how far the plans submitted from Calcutta are likely to secure the establishment of a permanent and regular Steam Communication between INDIA and ENGLAND, not between BOMBAY and SUEZ, he ought to have shewn as well that all India would at least be as well served in every respect by Bombay being the sole port as the "inexpediency if not impracticability" of the undivided agency through the whole line, which, in other words, is the extension of the communication from Suez to England under a single guarantee of security and speed from one end of the communication to the other.

Mr. Crawford does not attempt the first; he admits that a portion, which he considers to be one-fifth of the private correspondence of all India, including the Chief Presidency and the representatives of four crores of rupees of the commercial interests of all India, would not be so well served on the Bombay exclusive plan; and in regard to the second he declares that he has always entertained an opinion of this "inexpediency if not impracticability." But important as this undivided agency is to the due consideration of the Calcutta Committee's Plan, of which it is avowedly a first principle, Mr. Crawford, who professes to seek to ascertain "how far the plans submitted from Calcutta are likely to secure the establishment of a permanent and regular communication between INDIA and ENGLAND," contents himself with the mere expression of his opinion, referring only to a reason assigned by the Governor General, which I shall presently notice—but I would now ask why does Mr. Crawford thus lightly pass over so essential a component part of *that* plan proposed from Calcutta? Why in his advocacy of the Bombay exclusive plan does he not tell us what measures he purposes shall be adopted for the ulterior communication from Suez? Is there any hankering after a Steamer of our own under this determined restriction of the question to a Steam Communication between Bombay (or India if you please) and SUEZ? I must leave Mr. Crawford to answer.

To me, it appears to arise out of that\* narrow view in which the whole thing has been all along considered at Bombay. As a project more directly bearing on confined interests; as one of calculation, or rather of ascertain-

\* One indication of this narrow view I take to be Mr. Crawford's idea of additional 'Steam Postage' for the additional distance steamed to Galle, Madras, and Calcutta. I had certainly thought such postage might be generally calculated on between *England and India*—and if, on the one hand, Bombay had the immense advantage of priority of intelligence she might, on the other, be contented to pay the same for it as we should for the delayed intercourse; but it seems no such liberal ideas are entertained at Bombay. There the whole thing has all along been one of 'Cowries!'

ment, of the maximum of unavoidable general good, (the Lion's\* portion of which would necessarily go to Bombay,) which will be effected (no thanks to the liberal notions of the supporters of the Bombay exclusive plan) by a minimum of expenditure; and is this the view in which such a scheme as that for bringing two countries like England and India, connected as they are into close contract, for all the purposes of intercourse, moral, political and commercial, should be considered? However, to the only reason, even hinted at by Mr. Crawford in opposition to the single Agency principal. It is contained in the following extract from the minute of the Governor General on the Calcutta Committee's Letter. It refers as Mr. Crawford says to the plan proposed to His Lordship by a committee of the Merchants of Calcutta, "which assumed as indispensable to success, that it should embrace the whole line from England to every Port in India." On this His Lordship observes:

'That is, to use a common expression in Europe, that passengers should be booked from London all the way to India, every intermediate expence being provided for by the contractor for one given sum.

'I dissented from the justness of this calculation. My opinion was that travellers, both going and coming, would, for the the great part, either prefer the Steam Packet of the Government to Malta, or would choose the land route to Malta, or Egypt, viz the Continent, and *vice versa*. I moreover thought that a much simpler

\* The *Bombay Courier*, on the 20th April, 1833, says: 'Taking all these circumstances into consideration, there can, we think, be no doubt that this Island is destined to become at no very distant period the medium of communication between England and the whole of India, and also, in some measure, with China and the eastern Islands.'

The bare possibility of interference with this cherished prospect has all along been a source of uneasiness at Bombay, and hence the opposition to the comprehensive scheme.

The inconsistency of reasoning and assertion at Bombay cannot perhaps be better illustrated than by the following quotations.

*Editorial Remark, Bombay Courier, May 11, 1833.* 'The people of Calcutta, the merchants especially, will derive <sup>†</sup>JUST AS MUCH ADVANTAGE from the rapid Steam Communication by way of Suez as we shall on this side of India.'

*Report of Bombay Committee. Courier, 18th May.*—'By remaining during one intermediate trip of the Steamer to Egypt, the whole country from the wonders of Abyssinia to Aleppo, with the splendid monuments of antiquity of Syria and Egypt, Damascus, Palungra, Albuk, Jerusalem, Cairo, and the Pyramids, Dendera, Thebes, Philæ, and Mount Sinai might be visited for <sup>†</sup>ONE TENTH PART OF THE EXPENCE, WITH FAR LESS DANGER, AND IN NEARLY THE SAME PERIOD THAT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO CROSS THE CONTINENT OF INDIA FROM BOMBAY TO CALCUTTA AND BACK AGAIN.'

Hear this, ye good people of Calcutta! you are first told that you will enjoy just as much advantage 'from the establishment of a Steam Communication between Bombay and Suez, as the Bombay people themselves—and then it is intimated to THE BOMBAY PEOPLE that they may enjoy all the ravishing delights so profusely laid before them, at ONE TENTH OF THE EXPENCE AND FAR LESS DANGER than it will cost you even to get to Bombay and back again!! Pray, mark this—for this is the truth—you are precisely in the situation pointed out by the Bombay Committee in all that relates to your personal comfort and advantage in the proposed communication from Bombay only, and you cannot in any other respect be very differently situated.

and less expensive scheme would be, for the contractors to confine themselves to the India side of the communication—that is, from Suez to Calcutta. I undertook to engage for the Government at Home, that the only vacant part of the line on the European side, viz from Malta to Alexandria, should be filled by a Government Steamer; and I also undertook, if the *Hugh Lindsay* should not be equal to the conveyance of the mail from Socotra to Bombay, that an additional steamer should be furnished for that purpose; but the Committee of Merchants would not agree to these propositions.’

Mr. Crawford, when he supported himself on this, the ‘high authority of the Governor-General,’ as coinciding with his own opinion, should in fairness have added, that in the same minute his lordship, with reference to the plan of the Calcutta Committee, which involved the same principle, concluded thus :—

‘I now come in conclusion to the opinion of the Committee, recommending a contract, coinciding with the Committee of Merchants, that it will be more beneficial for the contractors, and more conducive to despatch, that the contract should embrace the whole line from England to the four principal points in India and Ceylon,—Bombay, Galle, Madras, and Calcutta; and the following terms are proposed as likely to make fair return for risk and expense.

‘1st. A bonus of three lacs per annum for five years—

‘2ndly. All profits upon passengers, parcels, &c. and postage of letters between England and India, except the Government despatches, which are to be carried free of all expense, as well by sea as through Egypt.

‘3rdly. The postage upon private letters to be two rupees for a single letter—one rupee payable in England, and one rupee in India.

‘My original proposition gave in addition to the bonus of two lacs, the postage of the Government despatches to the contractor. The calculations of the Committee show that their own scheme involves very little additional expense if any beyond my own; and, considering in every respect the very superior advantages held out to the whole of India, I cannot but second the plan of the Committee with my decided recommendation, and express at the same time a hope, if individuals may be found willing to accept the terms, that this great measure, so important to the great interests of the Empire, and to the comfort and happiness of so many thousands of our countrymen in this distant clime, may be carried into immediate operation.’

But to the objection itself: it necessarily involves a connection with the Government Malta Steam Packet; yet on this connection Mr. Crawford observes :—

‘It is stated by Mr. Greenlaw in a subsequent part of his work (para. 15), in reference to his latter part of making Socotra the point of rendezvous for the Indian Steamers connected with the Red Sea navigation, and of which I shall have to treat by and by, that it may be premised that whether the plan is executed by Government, at their own cost, or by private individuals on contract or otherwise, neither it nor any other plan can be perfect by connecting the Indian mail with that of Malta. His reasons for this conclusion, a just one I think, are given in the sequel of that para.’



And

'The remainder of this para. is devoted to an explanation of the causes that weigh against connecting the India mail with that of Malta, and which I have said in para. 13, I agree with Mr. Greenlaw in thinking a very inadvisable measure.'

I leave it to Mr. Crawford to reconcile the necessary result of his argument against the one agency principle, namely, its junction with the Malta Steam Packet, with his positive concurrence in my view that 'no plan can be perfect by connecting the Indian mail with that of Malta.'

But how far does the objection itself go? It seems to me that the parties who would not hesitate to trust themselves to the contractor's steamer on this side of India would as unhesitatingly use that on the other; and I do not see why the contractor's steamer should be in less repute than the one belonging to Government. Seeing how decidedly it would be their interest that the vessel should be in all respects of the first character. Doubtless many passengers would prefer the land route to the several ports in the Mediterranean; and many on their return from India would leave the contractor's steamer and proceed to the continent, but there are many who would prefer going and coming direct with the utmost expedition. So that the one agency principle provides for all. Parties need not be 'booked' the whole way. Many would come out in the Steamer only to Egypt: and indeed the profit arising from passengers between 'the intermediate ports on both sides the isthmus' form part of the considerations of the Calcutta Committee in their letter to the Governor General.

Of his lordship's remark, namely, that a much simpler and less expensive scheme would be for the contractors to confine themselves to the Indian side of the communication, that is, from Suez to Calcutta, I would observe that such a course would be more simple only inasmuch as it would be less extended than the one agency plan. But surely the one agency plan is more simple through the whole line, than the intervention of an agency a cross the isthmus, and a third from Alexandria to England; nay it may be said a third from Alexandria to Malta, and a fourth from that Island to England, setting aside the complexity of the junction with the Malta packet;—and as to the comparative expence, all that I may say is this, namely, that the charges made for the conveyance of the mails from and to Alexandria would be more than sufficient for an independent Steamer.

One other observation of Mr. Crawford appears to me to require notice before I refer to the result of his pamphlet as it bears on the Committee's Letter. In the 28th Para. of his observations on that letter he is pleased to say:

'The letters addressed by the Bengal Steam Committee, and their Secretary, to the different public Authorities, and private Individuals of influence in England, do

not on a further attentive perusal of them, appear to require many observations at this time; though it may be as well to say, in reference to the general connexion that exists between Mr. Greenlaw's own Pamphlet, and the letters of the above Committee of which he is a member, and those under his signature as their Secretary, that no very defined idea of the class of vessels that will really be desirable for the Navigation between Calcutta and Suez appears to have been entertained at any time, at the former place; for I find Mr. Greenlaw's first estimate, is founded on the supposition, that Steam vessels of 140 horse power would be sufficient for all purposes then in contemplation, and which have not been changed up to the present moment. The Committee in their letter to the Supreme Government of the 28th of January, 1834, consider vessels of 160 horse power desirable, and their calculations rest on the understanding, that vessels of that power will be employed whilst their Secretary, in his Circular Letter, No. 1, addressed to various Merchants and others in England, and dated in the same month, recommends the building of four vessels of 200 horse each, one to run between England and Alexandria, the other three to be employed on this side of the Isthmus according to the plan of the Committee, for making Socotra a Coal Depôt, and the point of junction for the Calcutta and Bombay Steamers.'

What I would observe on this is, that if any general connexion does exist between my pamphlet and the letters of the Committee of which I am a member, and those under my signature as their Secretary, it can have no relation to there being no defined idea at CALCUTTA of the class of vessels which will really be desirable for the navigation between that place and Suez. Either Mr. Crawford meant to imply with reference to such a general connexion, that no such defined idea was entertained by me, or he did not. If he did not, but meant his remarks to apply to Calcutta generally, I repeat his reference to any such supposed 'general connexion' was irrelevant, and as much misplaced and erroneous as if I should take occasion here to refer to the general connexion which obtains between the letters of the Bombay Committee and the Editorial remarks of the *Bombay Courier*, as evincing an unity of spirit and feeling; or to Mr. Crawford's gratuitous advocacy of the Bombay exclusive scheme in connexion with the Bombay Committee's adoption of his tardy labour, as shewing that they had nothing of themselves to produce, and that without the fertile aid of Mr. Crawford they were unequal even to an attempt to bring forth the pride of their hearts 'A STEAMER OF OUR OWN!' If he does mean to infer from the above premises, that I have no defined idea of what would be the really desirable size for a Steamer from Calcutta to Suez, I beg to say that his premises have no foundation. In my pamphlet I expressed no opinion on the point beyond assuming, as stated by Mr. Crawford, that a vessel of 140 horse power would be sufficient for all purposes; that is, that I considered it a *minimum* power: I did not say that a larger would not be 'desirable.' The Committee *avowedly* 'after due consideration being had by Capt. Forbes—with the details of which we are yet unable to furnish Government,'—but after the most careful consideration, concurred in thinking that a vessel of less than 160 horse power capable of taking at least 17 days' coal should not be employed. Will Mr. Crawford explain how this means that the Committee consider vessels of 160 horse power 'as the class

of vessel really desirable'—they only say that the vessel should not be less,—that the size is the minimum according to their opinion—but they do not say that larger would not be 'desirable.' Again, Mr. Crawford says 'their secretary, in his circular letter No. I, addressed to various merchants and others in England, and dated in the same month, recommended the building of four vessels of 200 horse power each.' Here if possible Mr. Crawford is even more in error than before. He must have read the circular in question very carelessly, for purposed misrepresentation is of course entirely out of the question.

I, as secretary, or the Committee, never recommended any such thing. The parties addressed were merely informed that a plan had been submitted to the Governor-General by a Committee of the Merchants of Calcutta entirely independent of, and unconnected with, the Committee, in which it was proposed by them to raise a capital of 12 lacs of rupees, and therewith to build 4 Steamers of 200 horse power each. Now here I admit that the Committee of Merchants do in effect avow that it is 'desirable' and expedient that the vessels should be of 200 horse power; and I am disposed to agree with them. The size of the vessel on the Bombay exclusive plan is \* 270 tons and of 80 horse power to carry 13 days' coal—but I apprehend Mr. Crawford will not say that a larger vessel is not desirable.

But I have no objection to furnish Mr. Crawford with my opinion on the subject, which he will find perhaps not very defined; but I quote from a 'circular,' a private one of my own, which I took the liberty on the first departure of the *Forbes* to send to the same parties as are referred to by Mr. Crawford. Here then is my opinion:

'The Steamers ought to be capable of carrying 16 days' coal at full power, and to have the greatest possible speed. On these data the size and power of the engines may be calculated, increasing them and the capacity with a view to accommodating passengers, to as great an extent as possible.'

I trust I have sufficiently exposed the irrelevancy, to say the least, of the 28th para. of Mr. Crawford's Observations on the Committee's letter, and I may now proceed to the consideration of what I hold he has established in opposition to that letter.

I admit then that Mr. Crawford has shewn† we are in error in assuming that the receipts from the letters would be trebled by the comprehensive plan, and this he has done by showing that Bombay would, under the comprehensive plan, distribute letters to a greater part of India than we contemplated, but not to the extent contended for by him; and for myself

---

\* I doubt much if any vessel could be built of this relative tonnage and power capable of carrying 13 days' coal of a form calculated at all for speed.

† This admission must be taken as my individual admission—utterly abstracted from any 'general connexion' with the opinions of the Committee.

I confess that the proof afforded by Mr. Crawford of the extent to which Bombay would always pass the correspondence has satisfied me of what I before very much doubted, namely, that the Bombay exclusive plan might pay itself in a quarterly communication. On the whole, therefore, I admit that Mr. Crawford has *weakened* the position of the Calcutta Committee as regards their comparison of the relative advantages of the two plans *as a mere matter of pecuniary speculation*, always on the understanding that the Bombay Plan is to be adequately completed to England. I admit that he has weakened that position, but he has not carried it; much less has he even invaded our strong hold, which is defended by the interests involved in one half of the correspondence of all India, strengthened by the incalculably important public interests included in the commercial correspondence of Calcutta, Madras, and Ceylon, whose relative importance with that of Bombay I have shewn to be nearly as three to one.

But this is not all. We have the strength involved in the correspondence of the two superior Presidencies beyond that which may be termed 'express,' or the mere conveyance of orders. By the comprehensive scheme not only may a fact be communicated, but all the circumstances in detail may at the same time be made known; in short the *whole* correspondence, including volumes of proceedings, and the multitudinous accounts of all India between the governments of the three old Presidencies and England, independent of Ceylon, may be carried on, and even, by the aid of the river steamers, that of Agra. But a most important object in my view, little so as it seems to be regarded by Mr. Crawford, is the facility which the comprehensive scheme affords for that intercourse which is, I cannot but think, all but the most desirable; inasmuch as being important in itself it at the same time necessarily involves all other descriptions of intercourse except the transit of goods. I mean the\* interchange of persons. As regards the value and importance attached at Bombay to this personal intercourse, *in one of its least essential bearings*, I beg my readers to refer to the note at page 22, and then to remember that as regards the male departures for Europe from Calcutta they are double those from Bombay. But there are to be added to the Calcutta departures those from Madras and Ceylon, making a preponderating majority of individuals excluded by the Bombay exclusive plan from enjoying the advantages so lavishly held out to the people of Bombay.

But to continue. We used to hear a great deal about the transfer of the intelligence and capital of England for the colonization of India, under the

\* Without such interchange I should like to know how the *moral* advantages of the communication by steam are to be obtained. If the object is a mere connection by a Post for letters, doubtless, the confining the communication to Bombay may to a certain extent do that—but it will still only do it partially—but if the communication is intended to embrace moral and commercial considerations it must be extended to Calcutta, or it will be comparatively useless for those purposes, and a great expence will be incurred for comparatively little benefit.

more free access afforded by the new charter. I believe I may say we have as yet no signs of such transfer. Will any one say that the lengthened voyage round the Cape is not one, and perhaps a main, reason of this dilatoriness? Will Mr. Crawford say that, under any circumstances, but especially under existing circumstances, the means of passage such as the comprehensive scheme would afford to the several seats of government are of no consideration in the question at issue? I would ask whether easy means of personal intercourse between all parts of India and England, or I may better say Europe, do not, abstracted altogether from the correspondence by letter, involve the most important interests of both, EUROPE and INDIA!! and thence in some degree of the whole civilized world?

Mr. Crawford in his 13th para. says :

' We are now drawing near the point on which I am most at variance with Mr. Greenlaw and the Bengal Committee,'

And he craves particular attention to the sentiments expressed in the 16th para. of their letter.

Whatever degree of variance may exist between Mr. Crawford and us in respect to the 'sentiments' expressed in that para. he nowhere impugns the statements beyond what I have already admitted, namely, that the receipts from\* postage would not be tripled by the comprehensive scheme. He does not contest the estimate of 50,000 letters each way as those likely to be conveyed by the comprehensive plan—being only one half the average of the present *paid* letters by the Cape of Good Hope; nor does he contend that, including double and treble letters and newspapers, the amount at two rupees per letter, for the whole, would not yield 2,50,000 on which the committee rest their conviction that, with that before them, contractors would be found willing for the three lacs per annum for five years to undertake the whole comprehensive scheme.

Not one word does Mr. Crawford say in opposition to this. No, he only goes, as I have before pointed out, into a comparison of the two plans as regards their relative expenditure from Suez, and referring to the receipts under the Bombay plan of which 50,000 letters each way (as many as are estimated by the Calcutta Committee for their plan) form the chief item, and taking no notice whatever of the receipts by the comprehensive scheme, he jumps to the conclusion that, because by his estimate Sa. Rs. 30,000 per annum will accrue from the earnings of the Steamer between Bombay and

---

\* It appears that in estimating the charge that would be made by the King's government for the conveyance of the Indian mails on the Bombay plan, the Committee in the 14th para. of their letter assumed, that the letters going by that plan would amount to 50,000 in number each way in all one Lac, while in the estimate of the receipts on the comprehensive plan in the 16th para. with the 'sentiments' of which Mr Crawford is so much at variance they have, notwithstanding the remarks, that the receipts would be tripled by that plan—only estimated the number of letters at the same account—namely 50,000 each way!! so that they can afford to give up the 'sentiments' while they retain the more important fact.

Suez, it must be the best and most permanent plan for establishing a Steam Communication between India and England. But I say that the matters discussed in the 16th para. of the Committee's letter do not form the point on which we are 'most at issue' with Mr. Crawford. I say we are not most at issue with Mr. Crawford as to whether the limitation of the communication to Bombay or its extension to the other principal ports, shall turn a penny more or less in proportion to the expenditure. Nor are we most at issue with Mr. Crawford as to whether four fifths, or more or less, of all India will receive their letters by way of Bombay on the comprehensive plan; these and such as these are minor points on which we are at variance; but we are most at variance with Mr. Crawford on this point, namely, whether the grand project of bringing England and India into close contact for ALL purposes—*social—moral—political—and commercial*, shall be suffered to dwindle down into a mere junction at Bombay, whereby, at a large expense, little beyond the transport of the correspondence of India can be effected,—*and that with faint regard to the most important part*,—or whether it shall, by a comparatively small additional expence, namely, that between Socotra and Calcutta, afford the means of conveyance to the most enlarged correspondence whereby every individual in India will benefit to the utmost extent possible,—of passage to individuals desirous of visiting India, whether for pleasure, for business, or from curiosity, and of doing so with ease and comfort,—whether in short the opportunity should not be at once afforded for the production of all the incalculable advantages which must arise from a free and uninterrupted speedy communication between England and *all parts* of India?

This is the question on which we are most at issue with Mr. Crawford;—and we who are of opinion that the latter should be the plan, are bound to shew how we propose that it shall be carried into execution. We have done so; and as Mr. Crawford cannot but admit that the comprehensive scheme is that which does confer as much as is possible advantage throughout India,—he should first shew that the scheme is impracticable in itself; for if it is practicable, certain I am that Mr. Crawford will not deny that it is preferable; and it will be quite time enough when Mr. Crawford has demonstrated the impracticability of the comprehensive scheme to sink us down to the *pis aller* of 'a steamer of our own,' between Bombay and Suez! In conclusion, Mr. Crawford has put the question of the preference which should be given to the one plan over the other on the extent of advantages which, with a given minimum of expense between Bombay and Suez, the Bombay plan will confer, as opposed to the fullest possible advantages to all India at an increased expenditure between Suez and all India.

The minimum expenditure is Sa. Rs. 1,34,550 and the contemplated advantage is only, even on Mr. Crawford's shewing, that four fifths of all India will get their letters as quick and as cheap by the Bombay plan, as they would by the Calcutta plan at an expenditure amounting to Sa. Rs. 2,99,300.

So that the difference would be expended 'for the transmission of less than one fifth of the private correspondence of India, and the general correspondence of Ceylon, and of such portion of the parcels and packages to and fro as the public may think after this explanation will be transmitted to Ceylon, Madras and Calcutta, and the accommodation of fifteen additional passengers each voyage from these places collectively,' and this expenditure of course Mr. Crawford holds to be too extravagant for the increased advantages. Mr. Crawford further refers to Sa. Rs. 30,000 as accruing from the Bombay plan over and above the expenditure, *but he no where notices the probable receipts of the Calcutta scheme as they bear on its expenditure*; yet on the ground of this increase of expenditure on the Calcutta side, and the overplus on the Bombay, he puts it, which of the two plans is most likely to be permanent? I will explain as shortly as I can how I conceive I have answered Mr. Crawford. First, then I have deprecated the narrow view in which Mr. Crawford has placed the question. I have contended, and I hope successfully, that such a question as this ought not to be based on the paltry consideration of a penny more or less gained on a given outlay. Not that I am unprepared to contend—that the whole comprehensive scheme of the Calcutta committee is at least as well calculated to repay its expenses as the more contracted one of Bombay. But I maintain that the question ought not to be primarily considered in that point of view. As however Mr. Crawford has chosen it, I have met him; and as he mainly grounds his support of the Bombay plan on the relative expense of the two in connection with their relative advantages, I have, admitting, for the argument sake, the correctness of his estimates of expenditure to Suez on both plans, shewn, that instead of the more speedy delivery from Bombay under the comprehensive scheme of four fifths of the correspondence of all India one half only would be the amount;—that in the half belonging to the Calcutta scheme is included the important interests involved in commerce to the extent of four crores of rupees, with the eventual prospect of its increasing to six crores, while in the Bombay half similar interests are limited at present to  $1\frac{1}{2}$  crore with certainly no prospect of a proportionate increase. I have noticed on the Calcutta side the incalculable advantage of a ready, easy, comfortable, and speedy means of personal intercourse for all concerned in that commerce, independent of that of a great majority of individuals passing between the two countries unconnected with commerce, as compared with Bombay; and finally, all the minor advantages of parcels, packages, &c. &c. connected with each.

I have further referred to the relative importance of the communication to the several seats of Government: and I contend I have shewn that as respects the *number* of letters they are the same; but as regards the *value* of the correspondence, which is the real guide, the advantage with Calcutta is as three to one, and the same in all other respects; and having shewn this, I have a right to expect that as Mr. Crawford allows an expenditure of Sa. Rs. 1,34,550

between Bombay and Suez, for the *peculiar* advantage of Bombay as regards passage, and of less than one-third of the real interests of India in other respects, he ought not, on his own principles, to grudge Sa. Rs. 2,99,300 between Suez and all India, for the benefit of the whole; and as Mr. Crawford has made the question of the probable permanency to depend on the relative advantages and expenditure, I hold that even on his own view, on the ground which he has himself taken, Mr. Crawford is beaten. But the two estimates of the expenses are not fairly put, they should include the whole charge from Bombay on the one hand, and all the ports of India on the other, to England—and then the difference in the expenditure would be relatively much less, and the comprehensive scheme of the Calcutta Committee be proportionably preferable for permanency even on Mr. Crawford's own view.

*FINIS.*





# APPENDIX A.

*Abstract Statement of Post Paid, Service, and Free Letters, exported by Ships to England from January to December 1832 inclusive, received at the Calcutta General Post Office from the undermentioned places.*

Names of the Stations.	Post paid.	Service.	Free.	Names of the Stations.	Post paid.	Service.	Free.
Calcutta ... ..	45,258	263	1723	Brought over,	48,102	521	2549
Barrackpore...	460	3	19	Bugoorah .....	14	"	1
Serampore ...	50	"	"	Patna ... ..	270	"	7
Chandernagore	7	"	"	Dinapore .....	359	11	361
Hooghly .....	302	61	349	Fort Gloster...	4	"	"
Caloa ... ..	3	"	"	Midnapore ...	218	"	6
Boultaally .....	1	"	"	Jellasore .....	5	"	"
Nuddea.....	126	"	6	Balasore .....	73	"	2
Santipore .....	25	"	"	Diamond Har-			
Burdwan .....	122	2	3	bour .....	10	4	4
Beerbhoom ...	121	"	5	Kedgera ... ..	99	2	1
Berhampore or				Contai .....	2	"	"
Moorsheda-				Dum-Dum ...	194	23	636
bad ... ..	592	87	400	Barraset .. ..	11	"	"
Rajmehal .....	31	1	1	Bangundie.....	16	"	"
Banleah ... ..	178	"	19	Jessore .....	81	"	4
Surdah .....	29	"	"	Backergunge...	39	1	3
Malda ... ..	100	"	6	Commercially ..	145	"	6
Purneah ... ..	48	"	"	Furreedpore ...	62	5	7
Dinagepore ...	40	1	2	Dacca ... ..	311	"	22
Rungpore .....	89	"	"	Sylhet ... ..	180	"	44
Goalparrah ...	24	2	"	Mymensing or			
Goahatty ... ..	7	"	"	Jamulpore .	123	"	3
Jorehaut ... ..	20	"	4	Bholooah .....	12	"	"
Doorhutta ...	13	"	"	Tipperah ... ..	29	"	"
Keerpoy ... ..	27	1	"	Chittagong ...	99	3	7
Bancoorah ...	208	"	6	Akyah or			
Rugoonauth-				Arracan.....	115	"	7
pore ... ..	1	"	"				
Hazareebaugh.	54	"	5	Service .....	50,573	571	3,670
Sheerghotty .	115	"	"	Free .....	571		
Gya .....	57	"	1		3,670		
	48,102	521	2549	Grand total ...	54,814		

# APPENDIX B.

*Statement of Annual Imports and Exports between Europe and the Presidencies of Bengal, Madras, and Bombay, on an average of three years, 1829-30 to 1831-32.*

	Bengal.	Madras.	Total Bengal & Madras.	Bombay.
Imports, { Great Britain, Re- 1,76,65,786		+ Re- 25,91,917	= Re- 2,02,57,703	Re- 97,35,194
{ Foreign, ..... 9,59,064		+ 2,10,045	= 11,99,709	3,11,153
Total of private Imports, ..... 1,86,55,450		+ 25,01,962	= 2,14,57,412	1,00,46,347
Exports, { Great Britain, .... 1,42,36,648		+ 29,60,516	= Re- 1,71,97,164	Re- 62,24,553
{ Foreign, ..... 23,47,801		+ 1,47,564	= 24,95,365	1,18,729
Total of private Exports, ..... 1,65,84,449			31,08,080	1,96,92,529
Total of private Imports & Exports, ... 3,52,39,899			+ 59,10,042	= 4,11,49,941
Company's Imports, ..... None.				
Ditto Exports, ..... 1,56,35,517			23,38,682	
Total Company's Exports, ..... 1,56,35,517				
Total Trade from Bengal and Madras, ..... 5,08,75,416			+ 82,48,724	= 5,91,24,140

\* Excess of the united private trade to Europe of Bengal and Madras, beyond that of Bombay.

NOTE.—I have here taken the rupee at the same value at each Presidency, of course if I had valued the commerce of Calcutta in Madras or Bombay rupees, the advantage on the Calcutta side would have been considerably greater.

**OBSERVATIONS**

ON THE

**PROPOSED STEAM COMMUNICATION**

BETWEEN

**ENGLAND AND INDIA,**

BY WAY OF THE RED SEA.

---

BY  
C. B. GREENLAW.

---

**Calcutta :**

**PRINTED BY WILLIAM RUSHTON, AT THE ENGLISHMAN PRESS.**

---

**1833.**



## PREFARATORY REMARKS.

---

The following observations have been rather hastily put together, and there are several inaccuracies in them ; none however, it is hoped, calculated to weaken the arguments adduced in favor of the main object; which is to shew in what manner the proposed Steam Committee between England and India may be *eventually* best brought to bear; when the incipient project for a communication with Bombay shall, under the auspices of the Right Hon'ble the Governor General, be established.

It may however here be noticed that the Plan developed in the observations is open to the following modification; viz. that instead of the Bombay Passengers, &c. branching off from the Red Sea Steamer at Socotra they should proceed on her to Bombay; and that the Galle, Madras, and Bengal Passengers &c. should be transferred to another Steamer at Socotra, which should drop them at their several destinations.

This modification has the great recommendation of being an addition to, not an alteration of, the established Communication with Bombay; and if the entire failure even of this more extended scheme should take place, the success of the other single and simple operation can in no respect be affected.

It is hoped, if the following observations in any degree tend to shew the course which it may hereafter be best to pursue to bring to bear the whole advantages of the proposed Communication, that they may in a greater degree act as a stimulus to the establishment of the incipient measure, without which the ulterior completion cannot be looked for.



## OBSERVATIONS, &c.

**THERE** can be little or no doubt, if the proposition of the Right Honorable the Governor General in Council to contract for Steamers to run four times per annum between Bombay and Suez receives the sanction of the Hon'ble Court of Directors, and is carried into effect, that, as regards that part of the communication, it will certainly be brought to bear; because the maximum amount proposed to be given exceeds what can, under almost any view, be calculated as the amount difference between the necessary expenditure and the receipts from other sources.

2. These remarks, therefore, are not made with any view to enter into that part of the question which bears on the profit and loss of the communication on this side of the Isthmus under this plan; the object rather is to enquire how the communication may be best applied to meet as well the exigencies of the public service, as the desires and wants of the community.

3. Let it therefore be assumed that the means of making the communication between India and England are provided;—whether by private individuals on contract, or by Government, matters not at present. Let it also be assumed that the means of communication are provided between Alexandria and England; and the transport across the Isthmus rendered as safe and commodious as under circumstances it can be.

4. Then the first question for the object above mentioned is,—in what way can the Passengers, Packets, and Mails for all India be best distributed on arrival, and collected for departure by the Steamer? Bombay necessarily first comes under consideration for this purpose. Let us then enquire into the grounds on which Bombay should be the sole port; and here its propinquity to the Red Sea offers itself as the most prominent favorable feature, so prominent indeed that it appears to be the only circumstance exclusively in its own favor. Its harbour, it is



true, is good, and easy of access and exit, except for a short period in the year. It affords every facility for repairs to the hull, and has at least the ground-work of ample means for the repairs of the machinery.

5. These are all the advantages of Bombay. I have vainly endeavoured to discover one other single ground, not of preference indeed, because Calcutta is equal as regards repairs to the hull, and preferable in regard to those for the machinery, but of mere convenience in the port of Bombay as a receptacle of the whole of the passengers and despatches from England, and the mart of collection for those of all India bound home.

6. If indeed it was simply the abstract proposition of connecting *England* with *India*, Bombay, as the nearest port in the latter, would doubtless be the place to be preferred; and it is to be regretted that the question has been hitherto considered too much in that abstract light;—that the means of simultaneously and equally spreading the benefits of that connection throughout India have been neglected or overlooked in the magnitude of the main object.

7. Bombay is situated at one extreme point of our Indian possessions. Passengers, parcels, and letters would have to be conveyed to and from that place by land from all parts of India, some more than 1000 miles distant, with means proverbially the worst in the world, and through a country impracticable to the European traveller during the day. The time occupied in most cases in reaching Bombay would be more than that of the passage to England; nor is the insuperable difficulty which this single circumstance would present to the access of hundreds of individuals and many hundreds of parcels to the place of communication, the only, though a sufficient, objection.

8. At present the intercourse is proposed to be only quarterly; and beyond that it can never be expected to pay from Bombay, whenever the bonus is withdrawn. But a quarterly communication by way of Bombay is almost useless as a means of commercial correspondence by question and answer between Calcutta and London. It is not merely that the merchants of Bombay will have the advantage of the constant earliest intelligence from England whereby to shape their commercial transactions, but they will, after the most

unfavorable voyages, have ample time to make all the necessary arrangements required by that intelligence, as well as counter-communications with their correspondents by the return Steamer, sending even musters of purchases made consequent on orders just received; whereas the merchants of Calcutta will not only have later information, but will have just thirty-two days' less time than the Bombay merchants to answer the English letters; and will not infrequently have to wait three months before they can reply.\* Of course the same inconvenience will arise to all individuals at a distance from Bombay, who desire to make speedy replies to letters received from England: to the latter it may, as regards a portion, be only inconvenient; to many it may be occasionally detrimental; but to the whole commercial interests of Calcutta, and, to a certain degree, Madras, it will be a regular, constant, irreparable injury. But there is also this great disadvantage in making Bombay the only port for the Steamer,—viz., the other two presidencies cannot receive or send their more voluminous despatches, records, and large box packets across the whole Continent of India but at an immense expense and the greatest inconvenience, and certainly not with due speed.

9. Great and overwhelming as these objections seem to be to Bombay being the sole port of receipt and despatch of the Steamers, if there was no other course which would be adopted with advantage they must necessarily be borne with; but there is a course open for adoption better adapted for the purpose of bringing the whole correspondence of India, as well that of persons as of parcels and letters, near England, and for extending to the utmost equally throughout India the advantages of such approximation. Suppose for one moment that Galle were a place of importance in the Indian Administration—that it was a Port where the hull and machinery of

\* If the communication is to be maintained by linking in with the Malta Packets, which, as I shall shew hereafter, is objectionable in the highest degree, but if it is made so to do, the merchants of Calcutta would be wholly unable to reply by the return Steamer. They would have to wait three months: for the Steamer must, to admit of the despatches reaching Malta in time, leave Bombay so as to have to wait 12 days at Suez; allowing 25 for the passage, 62 out of the Quarter, of 91 days, would be consumed during her absence, leaving only 29 for the conveyance of the letters to Calcutta from Bombay, and for the answers to go back. However important might be a despatch to Government from home, however urgent the requisition for immediate reply, it could not under such circumstances be given from Calcutta.

Steamers could be repaired,—then an increase of a short 500 miles would land the mails at Galle not more than two days later than at Bombay. Now supposing the passengers, packets,

The angular position of the winds in coming from the Red Sea to Galle would be favorable for the vessel's passage over that to and from Bombay. Captain Johnston thinks the distance between Galle and the Red Sea would be run as speedily as that between Bombay and the Sea; and many other competent individuals are of the same opinion.

and mails at Galle, how readily and easily might they be spread simultaneously to the three Presidencies by means of Branch Steamers, which would of course bring the homeward-bound pas-

sengers and mails to Galle in time for the Red Sea Steamer's departure.

10. Let us see what, under such circumstances, would be the result as to the time occupied. It has been\* stated that, including the twelve days' necessary stay at Suez if the Mails are to be connected with the Government Malta Mails, the absence from Bombay would be 62 days; if to this is added twice the two days calculated as the increased time in running to Galle, 66 days, the packets by the Branch Steamer would reach Bombay in 7, i. e. in 73 days, and taking 7 days to go back to Galle, making 80, would give Bombay 11 days to answer their letters. The Branch Steamer to Madras and Bengal would land the mail, &c. at the former place in four days, and the latter in nine from Galle; or in 70 days of the quarter to Madras, giving that presidency 17 days to reply. As regards Calcutta the packets would arrive in 75 days from quitting Galle and allowing the necessary nine days to return to that place would give 7 days to the Calcutta people to reply; although this is little enough it is at least very important, and would be of incalculable advantage when it is remembered that by the Bombay Scheme linking in with the Malta mail they have no time at all. Of course if the necessity for the 12 days' stay at Suez was done away with, that number would be added to the several periods above stated as those for replying to communications,—viz. Bombay instead of 11 would have 23, Madras would get 29, and Calcutta 19.

11. Enough would seem to have been said to shew the great preference which this view of things has over Bombay being the sole port of arrival and departure, and that the above plan has but one single

---

\* Note to 8th Par.

*apparent* disadvantage ;—it is that of the increased expenditure which it would occasion. But before proceeding to shew how this increased expenditure would be covered it may be permitted to ask—if we are to expend some lacs annually on the project as it will but partially operate by making Bombay our sole port, that is, confining the most important of the advantages of the communication to that place and its immediate vicinity, whether a few thousands Rupees more would be ill bestowed in simultaneously spreading throughout India, from its three presidencies, the correspondence from England, so as to allow the great part, if not the whole country, to reply by the return Steamer? Nothing has been said of the advantage of Galle as regards the communication being eventually extended by a Branch Steamer to the Straits, especially with reference to opening of the China trade. It is hoped that enough has been advanced to establish this point—viz. that if the communication is to be opened with England by steam by way of the Red Sea, Bombay ought not to be the sole port of arrival and departure for all India, even though another course should lead to additional expenditure to a certain extent, which, however, it is presumed, it would not do without a full equivalent.

12. What the amount of that additional expenditure would be cannot be stated exactly ; but an estimate, as well as one of the amount of increase of profits, may be made. It is now generally admitted that to secure a Quarterly Communication even between Bombay and Suez two Steamers are necessary, though one only need be maintained on full establishment ; so that, in fixing two Steamers for the Galle communication, no addition will be required to the estimate on that account. Let it be assumed that the Steamer should be of the class used in the Mediterranean ;— viz. 140-horse power, and of 450 or 500 tons burthen. The increased daily consumption of fuel, oil, &c. and wear and tear of the machinery are the only increases in the expense. The number of days during which the Steamer would run, over and above those employed on the Bombay plan, is 144,\* and the consumption being† 18 tons,

---

* Each voyage 4 days, two each way between Red Sea and Galle,.....	4
Each way between Galle and Calcutta,.....	9, 18
Each way between Bombay and Galle, .....	7, 14
	<hr/>
Voyages per annum, .....	36
	<hr/>
	4

12 cwt. per diem, the increased quantity of coal consumed would be tons 2,678 ; of this would be supplied at Calcutta of best Burdwan all that would be required additional in the expenditure as regards Calcutta,—viz 88 out of the 144 days, or 1,637 tons, at 10 rupees per ton, or 6 annas per maund, the cost Sa. Rs. 16,370. The supply of the Branch Bombay Steamer would be Europe coal, and the 941 remaining tons would cost 20 rupees per ton, or Sa. Rs. 18,820, making in all Sa. Rs. 35,190 ; and if for the sake of obviating all objections 15,000 are added for the wear and tear establishment of the Bombay Branch Steamer during 56 days, and for oil, &c. the whole increased expence would be Sa. Rs. 50,000.

13. Now against this is to be set all the expense consequent on the transmission of the letters, packets, and parcels, from Bombay to Calcutta, Madras, and Ceylon. How much that may be cannot be calculated, but it must be considerable. It cannot be done by the fixed establishment. Consider for a moment the sudden influx into Bombay of all the quarterly letters, parcels, &c. from England to be distributed throughout India ;—how many additional dawk bearers, and other means of conveyance of letters, packages, parcels of books, &c. must be employed throughout the whole line between the presidencies ; and the same about the period of the vessel sailing on each occasion. It would scarcely cost less than 5,000 rupees on the arrival of the Steamer, and 3,000 when the vessel is about to leave, and that four times in the year would amount to 32,000 out of the 50,000. But it must be obvious, that by giving the very greater part, if not all India, the means of replying to letters by the same vessel which brings them from England, as will hereafter be shewn the Galle Plan would do, the number of letters would be greatly increased ; to what extent again cannot be said : but further by being able to put their letters and parcels on board the Steamer at their very door, the inhabitants of Calcutta and Madras and their neighbourhood would send each of larger dimensions than when they had to pass them across the continent of India. They would of course pay a larger sum in proportion, more than enough with the former estimated 32,000, to cover the whole 50,000. But there yet remains a very principal item of additional receipt by letting the Steamer come to Galle, and have branches to Bombay and Calcutta. The Steamers in question are calculated to take 20 passengers with comfortable accommodation. These may certainly be increased to 25. But would Bombay furnish

25 each voyage? and how many would go to that place from the other Presidencies for the sake of going home in the Steamer at an enormous expense for travelling? If the means were afforded at each Presidency of joining the Steamer without difficulty and without expense, there can be no doubt that the whole number making 100 in all would go, and that out of the 100 60 at the very least would not have gone by way of Bombay; now, hereafter the charge for the whole passage to England will be estimated at Sa. Rs. 2,500 each person, of which 1,500 at least may be held to be profit, and thence *alone* 90,000 rupees would be derived by the proposed plan, without taking into account the increased number of passengers who would leave England in the Steamer for India. In fact there cannot be the least doubt that the extension of the Steamer to Galle with branches to Bombay, Madras and Calcutta, would more than pay any additional expenditure beyond that incurred in landing mails and passengers only at Bombay, independent of the immense advantages which would be conferred on all India by such a measure.

14. If it is conceded that the main position is established,—viz., that Galle with branch Steamers is the best place for bringing the steam navigation with England to bear on all India, then, as Galle does not afford means for repairing the Steamers and Calcutta does, and as it would save the necessity for an additional Steamer, let the Steamer herself act as the branch for Madras and Calcutta; and as there must be two Steamers, of course the reserve one would be quite ready to start on the proper day, the one just come from her voyage would undergo thorough survey and repair, and having only a small establishment of an engineer and assistants, would, with occasional additional assistance, be employed as a Tug in the River, as opportunities might offer during her idle quarter.

15. The object of the past remarks has been to establish the preference of the above plan over that of making Bombay the sole port of call, and it is now proposed to consider how that plan may be best brought to bear. And here it may be premised that, whether the plan is executed by Government at their own cost, or by private individuals on contract, or otherwise, neither it nor any other plan can be perfect by connecting the Indian mail with that of Malta. No arrangements can be made by which the Indian mail can be certain of arriving at Malta in time, without too great a sacrifice of time on the

Indian side. The Malta mail cannot wait; and if the Indian one does not arrive in time not only is the expense lost, but the inconvenience and injury may be irreparable. But there is another strong, nay almost insuperable, objection to this junction of the Indian with the Malta mail—viz., that the mail and passengers cannot be received on board the Falmouth Packet, the former without the process of fumigation, and the latter that of quarantine of 25 days, besides which there may not be room for one half of them. It is hence clear that to have a perfect, sure, and speedy conveyance, there must be an independent Steamer on the other side to convey the mail and passengers from Alexandria to England; the mail will then always be certain of finding conveyance as well as the passengers. The Steamer would take coals only on board at Malta and Gibraltar, be under quarantine while doing so, and would proceed on to England; where, on their arrival, having a clean bill of health, the passengers would have been a sufficient time from Alexandria to admit of their receiving pratique in two days after their arrival. Nor would the expense be great, not more than 5,000 £ per annum, as will be shewn hereafter.

16. The above being premised, it may now be observed the proposed plan resolves itself into this—viz., that the Steamer leaving the Red Sea instead of going to Bombay calls at Galle, Madras, and Calcutta—the packets, passengers, and mails for Bombay being despatched on a branch Steamer from Galle.—There is, however, yet one modification by which Bombay would be gainer in time, not only as compared with the proposed plan, but even with that of making Bombay the sole port of call. That modification is, that instead of the packets, &c. for Bombay branching off from Galle, they should do so from Socotra. By this means as the branch Steamer would be at Socotra waiting the arrival of the Red Sea vessel and ready to start, the passengers, &c. for Bombay would have no detention at Socotra. Bombay, therefore, so far from having reason to object to the proposed plan, ought to second it; while Madras would be so obvious a gainer, that no doubt can be entertained of its acquiescence.

17. It may not be inexpedient to shew the number of additional days' steaming which this final development of the proposed plan requires beyond that of Bombay being the sole port. It has been calculated that the Steamer would reach Galle in two days more than would be necessary to get to Bombay. This latter is 8 days from

Socotra. Ten then would reach Galle, and nine more Calcutta, making nineteen additional days each trip, and four double trips per annum would make 152 days additional steaming, or 12 more than was estimated before; occasioning additional expense for fuel of Rs. 4,469, at 20 Rs. per ton.

18. Having thus fully explained the proposed plan for simultaneously, and as equally as possible, spreading throughout India the advantages of the intended communication, it may be observed that it is of the first importance on every account that the whole communication should be carried on under one responsibility; that is, if it is to be conducted by private individuals on contract, that the contract should continue the whole route from the Port in India to that in England. For a certain fixed sum, passengers, parcels and letters should be received on board the steamer, the former fed and found the whole way, including accommodation of every description in crossing the Isthmus. The advantages of such a course are obvious, and if adopted the proposed plan would be simply this—viz. that steamers should ply between Calcutta and Suez, calling at Madras and Galle and picking up the Bombay passengers and mails at Socotra;—that the contractor should convey them all across the Isthmus, put them on board the Mediterranean steamer, and land them in England; and the same *mutatis mutandis* on the route to India.

19. Such an arrangement as this would be complete; and it is capable of being conducted to as much, if not more, advantage to a contractor, or whoever may manage it, than going to Bombay alone. The steamer would leave Calcutta every three\* months. The whole distance from Calcutta to Suez is 4780 miles which at the average rate of 6 hours would be run in 33 days, exclusive of three days and six hours stoppages on the way—viz. 6 hours at Madras, 1 day at Galle, Socotra, and Judda going, making in all to Suez 36 days. It is unfortunately necessary that the steamer, proceeding the whole way from Calcutta, must remain a few days at Suez to overhaul machinery;—three days must be given for this, making 39 days to leaving Suez. On her return 6 hours will suffice at Judda, making two days and 12 hours' stoppages on her return, which being added to the 33 days' steaming, makes 35½ days for the return, in all 74½ days, say 75, leaving 16 days for the Cal-

---

\* 1st February—1st May—1st August—1st November.



cutta people to reply, and giving time to all stations within 8 days' dawh; and as there would be more time for the Madras and Bombay presidencies, very near, if not quite, all India would be able to reply by the return Steamer. Doubtless the passage to Suez in May and August would be longer than in November and February; but the return would be quicker, and on the whole no time lost. The plan is practicable, and as certain as such things can be, provided all necessary arrangements are made.

20. Having arrived at Suez in 36 days, seven days under existing circumstances, reducible hereafter when greater facilities are afforded, would put the passengers on board the Mediterranean Steamer, whose departure would of course have been timed to meet the above arrangement. In twenty days they would be at Falmouth, in 21 in Liverpool, making 66 and 67 days from Calcutta.

21. Then comes the consideration of the cost and means of covering it. Time will not admit of a very detailed account of this. The annexed statement, however, it is hoped, will shew that the whole communication can be conducted under one responsibility to advantage, provided security is given to individuals, if it is to be conducted by contract, that obstructions shall not be thrown in their way at the necessary depôts, and in crossing the Isthmus.

22. What has hitherto been said has had no reference to these probable obstructions, nor to the difficulties which exist in the way of making the arrangements (referred to at the conclusion of the 19th paragraph) without which the communication can never be carried on in all its parts—difficulties which it is feared can be overcome by the agency of the Government alone. The first of these difficulties is the character of the country and of its inhabitants in which the depôts for fuel must be placed. In the uncertain and hazardous state of the Arabian Coast in the lower part of the Red Sea, a state against which no guarantee can be afforded, where no security can be given for the preservation of the fuel from depredation, or even its keepers from murder, how can it be expected that any individuals, however enterprising, would risk their property? Maculla, the present depôt, is not only subject to constant irruptions from the wild hordes of Arabs, as well as to intestine commotions. Nor is any part of the coast wholly free from the same objection. Even Government could

scarcely secure their coal from being seized, except by the continued presence of an armed force. It would be unwise to rely on the fears of future vengeance of such characters as we have to deal with and let the injury and inconvenience which would arise from the breaking up of the communication after it had been once fairly established be considered.

23. Looking at the chart, the position of Socotra is so obviously well adapted for a depôt that nothing but the positive impracticability of its being brought to bear in that character should be allowed to stand in the way of its adoption. It is only a short 1,200 miles from Bombay, 1,600 from Galle. It affords perfect shelter in both monsoons. It is described by Horsburgh as being about 27 leagues long East to West, and 6 or 7 broad. There are two anchoring places generally used; one on the S. W. side of the island, and Tamarida Bay on the N. E. There are however other anchoring places; particularly one in a bay at the N. W. side of the island, which would seem likely to afford security in both monsoon. Fruits can be had, and unquestionably vegetables would be soon procurable. Bullocks, goats, sheep, and fish are to be purchased at moderate rates.

21. Its situation at the entrance of the Red Sea sufficiently outside of the Gulf to allow of vessels arriving and quitting at all times of the year renders it an admirable entrepôt for the trade of the Red Sea. The curious fact, as stated by Mr. Waghorn, of the Americans proceeding to Mocha and other ports in the sea, for coffee and other articles, carrying only dollars, itself shows how invaluable as a mere commercial entrepôt the possession of Socotra might be made. Instead of coming out with dollars, the Americans might bring coal, and instead of being cooped up in the Red Sea till the monsoon changed, they could deliver their coals, take their homeward cargo and be off quickly; not only saving time, but also the increased rate of insurance demanded from all vessels navigating the Red Sea. If such trade is valuable to the Americans, it would be so to the English merchants; and there can be no doubt that in a very short time, under such circumstances, Socotra would become a most flourishing place. But independent of this, it would be an invaluable mart for the produce of the African coast, which with its aid would unquestionably greatly increase. At present the produce of the coast of Africa can only find a vent by being sent to Mocha, whence it is spread not only through Arabia but

circuitously to Bombay ; or else by means of vessels from the Persian Gulf. The whole trade would necessarily center in Socotra, if it was established as a secure entrepôt. In a political point of view also the possession of this Island would be invaluable. It is the key of the Red Sea in as great a degree as Gibraltar is that of the Mediterranean. The appearance and description of it seem to guarantee that it is easily defensible, and it may be had for a very trifle. The Island at present belongs to the Imaum of Muscat, who derives scarcely any benefit from it ; and it might, in all probability, be had for the mere asking. Being in our possession its advantages as a depôt for fuel need not be descanted upon.

25. The other chief difficulty alluded to, to overcome which arrangements would be necessary to be made by Government, is the passage across the Isthmus ; where, next to security, despatch is the object, attention should be directed to the shortest possible route. The distance directly across from Suez to the Pelusium branch of the Nile is only sixty miles ; less than that to Cairo alone. The late cession of Syria to the Pacha of Egypt will bring the whole country so completely under his vigilant control that the passage across would be as safe as to Cairo. The only difficulty would seem to be the want of a haven for the Steamer in the Mediterranean. But such a haven could without doubt be easily constructed ; and, being done, some 4 or 5 days would be gained. And here it may be permitted to observe that scarcely any outlay beyond one of enormous amount ought to be grudged for clearing the road way to shorten the distance and reduce the time. It should be borne in mind that the outlay is intended to spread over ages of time, as long as England maintains her supremacy in the East ; and it is not unworthy of consideration that the facility afforded by the outlay for maintaining the communication may be the means of prolonging and securing that supremacy.

26. One other arrangement would also be required at the hands of Government, viz.—that no molestation should occur at Juddah. The advantages which would occur to that port, particularly in the conveyance of pilgrims to and from Mecca and Medina, would seem to point out as in respect to security, the best port in the Red Sea for a depôt. This, it is to be hoped, would operate in favour of every facility being afforded, let who would be in possession of the place ; and eventually, doubtless, the Pacha of Egypt will be able to exercise so

decisive a control there as to render it as secure as Suez. In the mean time it is a point requiring attention until some satisfactory arrangement is made.

27. What then would seem to be requisite for the perfection of the scheme is that Socotra should be obtained as a British possession :— that a competent individual or individuals should be sent to report on the Island in all its details, and that a guarantee not only for safe and uninterrupted passage across the Isthmus should be obtained from the viceroy of Egypt, through Colonel Campbell, newly appointed diplomatic agent there, but that every facility should be afforded. Were it practicable at once to make arrangements for the transit being from Suez to the\* Pelusium mouth of the Nile, it would on every account be highly expedient that it should be done ; because not only will it be difficult from the nature of the thing to alter the route once taken, but the difficulty may probably be much enhanced by the advantages which the passage of individuals, &c. through Cairo and Alexandria may afford to those places respectively.

\* I am aware that, if not entirely closed, this mouth is much blocked up ; but as I have said before, a haven might doubtless be easily made for a steamer.














STEAM COMMUNICATION

WITH

INDIA.







### Delayed release of coagulation

**A V I E W**  
**OF THE**  
**PRESENT STATE OF THE QUESTION**  
**AS TO**  
**STEAM COMMUNICATION**  
**WITH**  
**INDIA.**

**WITH A MAP,**  
**AND AN**  
**APPENDIX, CONTAINING THE PETITIONS TO PARLIAMENT,**  
**AND OTHER DOCUMENTS.**

**BY CAPTAIN MELVILLE GRINDLAY,**  
**EAST INDIA ARMY AGENT,**  
**AND LONDON AGENT TO THE STEAM COMMITTEES OF CALCUTTA**  
**AND MADRAS.**

**LONDON :**  
**PUBLISHED BY SMITH, ELDER AND CO., CORNHILL ;**  
**AND SOLD BY**  
**W. GRAPEL, LIVERPOOL ; BANCKS AND CO., MANCHESTER ;**  
**OLIVER & BOYD, EDINBURGH ; D. ROBERTSON, GLASGOW ;**  
**AND W. F. WAKEMAN, DUBLIN.**

LONDON:  
PRINTED BY STEWART AND CO.  
OLD BAILEY.

# STEAM COMMUNICATION

WITH

## INDIA.

IN every age in which commerce has flourished, some one state or people has taken the lead---contributing the largest share of talent, enterprise, and capital, and deriving thence a proportionate amount of wealth, influence, and political power.

But commercial prosperity and grandeur, have rarely been of long duration in any country; and the reason of their decay has generally been either the want of foresight to anticipate approaching changes, or the want of energy and skill to meet and turn them to advantage. It is a trite remark, that the world is in a constant state of change, but in the present day, when the progress of mutation is so rapid, and so extensive, it is a truth, the recollection of which will be found most important to the success both of individuals and of communities.



The British nation is now the head of the commercial world. The length or brevity of the period during which she shall enjoy this distinction, depends, under Providence, upon herself. She has advantages which, if duly improved, may enable her long to retain her pre-eminence, and even to advance herself still higher in the scale of mercantile greatness. Her capital, her character, her mineral wealth, her nautical skill and experience, her vast colonial and dependent possessions extending into every division of the globe—afford all the materials for giving stability and permanence to her present position. The only cause for apprehension exists in the possibility, that relying too much upon her advantages, and attaching too little importance to the cultivation of them, Great Britain may neglect the resources which she so abundantly possesses, and suffer the elements of wealth and power to moulder away in her hands.

It may be answered that such a result is not to be expected, from the general character of the British people for spirit and enterprise; and their maritime and commercial triumphs may be referred to in proof. It is quite true that in general, the people of this country have not been slow, either to discern or to improve the sources of commercial greatness; but it is

equally true, that there has been at least one striking exception.

India, with its widely extended boundaries, and myriad population, has at no time occupied that place in the public opinion of England, to which it was entitled. Its interests have been too frequently regarded as altogether distinct from our own—its agricultural and commercial prosperity, as matters in which we have no concern. This feeling may have arisen in some degree from the restrictions to which its commercial intercourse with this country was so long subjected. Those restrictions, indeed, were gradually and materially relaxed during the progress of the last half-century; but it is only within four years, that the final stroke has been given to them, by the concession to Europeans of the uncontrolled privilege of residing in any part of the British dominions in India, with some few exceptions, in which the continuance of the old rule was thought to be called for by reasons of state. But while the public indifference may partly be accounted for, by the exclusive principle which formerly prevailed in our Indian possessions, it is probable, that the far greater portion of it is attributable to the great distance which intervenes between Britain and the most magnificent of her dependencies. As far as the transit of goods is

concerned, this may be regarded as of little importance, except inasmuch as the increased charge for freight may affect the price; but every one at all acquainted with the operations of commerce, must be aware that the existence of regular and rapid channels of correspondence, is to the merchant of incalculable value. This may be illustrated by reference to domestic trade. The Canal-boat, or the Stage-wagon, may, in a majority of cases, afford a conveyance of goods, sufficiently speedy; but if the post travelled only at the same rate, commercial energy would be paralysed; consumption and production would be alike reduced; the comforts of the rich would be materially diminished; while a large portion of the poor, by the cessation of the means of employment would be deprived of the means of subsistence. That which is true with regard to the intercourse between different parts of the same country, is equally so of the intercourse between different countries; and whenever it is desirable to maintain or to create commercial relations between nations, the necessity of resorting to the most efficient means of shortening the period occupied in communication, increases exactly in proportion to the distance. An illustration may again be sought at home. Between London and Northampton it is of

comparatively small consequence, whether the pace of the mail be six miles an hour or ten. In either case the distance would be traversed in a night. But the substitution of the slower for the quicker pace from London to Manchester, would protract the delivery of letters in the latter place, from the afternoon of one day to the morning of the next, while from London to Glasgow it would cause a difference of more than one entire day and night. If, therefore, the correspondence between these three places and London be alike important, there is more reason for accelerating the mail to Manchester than to Northampton, and to Glasgow than to either; and those who have an interest in the trade of the two more distant places, have the stronger motives to desire such acceleration. Commercial men well know the advantages of quick correspondence. They have, within a few years, sought and obtained various changes in the arrangements of the Post Office, with an especial view to their accommodation, and in some towns it is understood that the merchants subscribe to expedite the progress of the mail.

The effects of an exclusive policy in impeding the commerce between India and Britain are now at an end. The second cause of impediment—that arising from the distance be-

*between the two countries, still remains to be overcome, and this can only be effected by availing ourselves of the means which the discoveries of modern science have placed within our reach, and which have been so extensively and successfully employed in other parts of the world. The use of Steam as an agent of locomotion has, within a few years, effected changes of the most extraordinary kind, economizing time, counteracting the obstacles to communication imposed by distance, and giving a fresh impetus to commercial enterprize. Is India, while subject to a British Government, to be the only part of the civilized world deprived of the full advantages of this wonderful power? For the honour of our own country, and for the benefit of both that and India, we will hope not.*

Neither the advantages of Steam Navigation generally, nor the propriety of its permanent establishment, as a medium of communication with India, are matters now to be discussed. In favour of both, the question has been decided by the most irrefragable evidence. A considerable period of experiment and observation has prepared the way for acting decidedly and beneficially,—a variety of routes and plans have been suggested, and the only task remaining is to make a judicious choice.

For years the subject has excited in India the most intense interest. Difference of opinion has existed, and still continues to exist, as to some points of detail in the mode of accomplishing the object, but none whatever on its importance, — on this point unanimity is perfect. It is worthy of remark, that the desire for Steam Communication is not confined to the Presidencies—it has penetrated to almost every part of the country. It is not, as might be supposed, restricted to the European inhabitants : the natives participate in it with equal fervour. And though in this country their wishes have hitherto been met with an unaccountable degree of coldness, public feeling is obviously undergoing an important change in this respect, and the cause of Steam Communication with India is beginning to obtain the attention which it so well merits. The degree of notice which it has recently received in the public journals and periodicals, and the proposal to form a Company for carrying it into effect are proofs of this.

Even the question of route now affords little room for discussion. Of the courses which have been suggested, several may be regarded as having descended to the tomb of the Capulets, where they will probably long repose before any one of them will be thought worthy of resusci-

tation. At an early period of the enquiry, men's minds were naturally directed to the usual route by the Cape of Good Hope. It seems, however, pretty clear that, though by the use of Steam the passage from India by that course might be somewhat shortened, and be performed with a somewhat higher degree of certainty than by sailing vessels, there is no reason to expect that, either in speed or certainty, this line is at all comparable to another hereafter to be adverted to. There are various reasons why it is not adapted for Steaming, and its first friends and patrons seem now to have given it up.

Several routes have been recommended, of which the Euphrates formed part. One of them is to proceed up the Rhine, down the Danube, across the Black Sea, overland to the Euphrates, down that river to Bussorah, and thence to Bombay. The single advantage of this route appears to be its convenience for communicating with Persia. Its disadvantages are various and preponderating. In passing through the Austrian territories, the correspondence with India might be subjected to any degree of examination which the authorities might think fit to exercise, and a merchant, writing unreservedly and confidentially to his correspondent in India, could have no security that his commu-

munications, whatever they might be, would not be read by the emissaries of the Austrian Government. Other objections to this route arise from the facts, that the passage of the Danube is generally interrupted during some part of the winter by frost, and that the mouth of the river is actually in possession of Russia. The land journey, moreover, from the further side of the Black Sea, would lie through a mountainous country, and besides these permanent and certain obstacles, there is the possibility of another which might wholly close the principal part of the line against us—an European war. We should then have the work to commence *de novo*; considerable delay would of course arise, and in all probability, considerable commercial inconvenience.

To obviate this last difficulty, it was proposed to substitute for the first part of the route, that to Constantinople by the Mediterranean, to cross the Black Sea from that city to Trebizond, and thence proceed as before. The objections arising from Austrian espionage, and from the annual stoppage of the Danube, are thus removed, as well as that arising from the probability of an European war. But the land journey from Trebizond, among high and difficult mountains, forms part of this line as well as the former. Neither of them is intended especially



for the benefit of India; they embrace other objects to which a direct communication with India is, in some degree, sacrificed. Other means of approaching the Euphrates from the Mediterranean have however been suggested, and the ports of Scanderoon and Latichea have been named as affording existing facilities for this purpose, while Séleucia and the mouth of the Orontes, it has been alleged, are susceptible of such improvements as would adapt them to the end in view. But the value of these suggestions depends upon the practicability of the passage of the Euphrates, and unfortunately this is not established, nor to all appearance likely to be established. The talents and perseverance of Colonel Chesney, who has been engaged in the attempt to effect a passage by this river, are never to be mentioned without respect, and the enlarged views and public spirit of those authorities by whom his expedition was encouraged, merit all praise; but after the expenditure of a large sum of money, and the interposition of very considerable delay, we are now, as far as the Euphrates is concerned, just in the same situation as we were before this sacrifice of time and money.

The result of the Euphrates experiment, having disappointed the hope of its projectors, and the Cape route being universally abandon-

ed, as a regular means of conveyance, there is but one line remaining for adoption, and happily that is one of which the practicability and facility have been attested by satisfactory experiment. It is now certain that the only course by which a steady and rapid Steam communication with India, is to be expected, is by the Mediterranean and the Red Sea. There is some difference of opinion as to the point to which it should be at first directed, in India. Some thinking that it should be confined to Bombay, whence letters might be distributed by Dawk, to the rest of India;—others, that a more extended system of communication by Sea should be established, by forwarding the Mail from the Red Sea to some central point, whence Steamers should proceed to the three Presidencies. In the event of the latter plan being adopted, *Point de Galle*, in Ceylon, has sometimes been named as the rendezvous,—at others, Socotra. The questions opened by the difference on this head are too numerous, and involve too much discussion, to be here even adverted to. But it is satisfactory to know that their decision, whatever may be the result, will in no way affect the great principle of the plan, which is to increase the facilities of intercourse with India, by the establishment of Steam Communication by way of the Red Sea. Let this plan be once

established on a solid and durable basis, and whichever mode may be selected, the consequences must be beneficial: and if it should happen that the best should not be chosen in the first instance, the door will always be open to improvement. On the route from England to the further extremity of the Red Sea, all are agreed. It would be folly then to suffer any difference of opinion with respect to the remainder of the course, to delay the realization of a scheme which, under any modification, must be of universal benefit. At whatever point Steam communication may touch India, its effects will be felt throughout the entire country. There has been enough of procrastination—the time has now arrived to act with decision.

During the sitting of the Committee of the House of Commons, in 1832, on the renewal of the East India Company's Charter, some inquiry took place on the question of Steam communication; but the attention of the Committee was at that time directed to too many subjects of pressing interest, to admit of much time or consideration being spared to the pursuit of incidental inquiries. In 1834, a Committee was appointed specially on this subject. The Committee sat for upwards of a month and examined witnesses of every class, from whom they were likely to derive information. The result of

their investigation was recorded in twelve resolutions, reported to the House on the 14th of July. In those resolutions, the Committee expressed a strong opinion in favour of a regular expeditious communication with India, by means of Steam; and recommended that measures should immediately be taken for its immediate establishment “by the Red Sea.” The choice of the course from the Red Sea to India, was referred to His Majesty’s Government, in conjunction with the East India Company, between whom it was suggested, that the net charge of the establishment should be divided. With regard to the Euphrates, the Committee recommended further experiment, and a grant from Parliament of £20,000, to provide for the expense.

It is remarkable, that the suggestions of the Committee as to the Euphrates should have been adopted and acted upon, while their recommendation of immediate measures for establishing a communication by way of the Red Sea still remains—a recommendation of the Committee, and nothing more. On the Euphrates all was uncertainty and conjecture. The outlay recommended might produce something or nothing; if the passage were practicable, it was by no means clear that the Euphrates was to be preferred to the Red Sea; and it remained

to be shown that it was practicable; yet for this object the money was forthwith provided—and it has been spent, with much more; while the route by the Red Sea, which had been ascertained to be available, is, at the expiration of twenty-eight months, still open for occupation, either by private adventure or public enterprize.

The delay, however, has at least effected the removal of the objection to act, arising from the difficulty of determining between the claims of conflicting routes. They are all out of the field, with the single exception of that by the Red Sea; and there is, consequently, no pretence for postponing proceedings, in order to afford time for ascertaining the advantages of rival lines. It is now clear that we must have the desired communication by the Red Sea, or we cannot have it at all. All the exertions of the friends of India must therefore now be directed towards one plan, instead of being weakened by a division among several.

The only question remaining is, how is this great object to be accomplished? Is it to be by public or private means. or by a union of both?

As might be expected, where so much interest has been felt, a variety of plans have been proposed; and in some cases, their

respective advocates appear to have been disposed to regard each other with some degree of hostile feeling. This is to be lamented.—Where all have a common end, and the only difference is as to the means of attaining it, a candid construction of the motives and views of every one who is striving in the cause, may fairly be looked for. The readiest as well as the most effectual way to put a stop to any opposite feelings, will, however, be the selection and establishment of some one plan. The benefits of Steam Communication once within the reach of those who so anxiously desired them, they will no longer dispute about the means through which they are obtained.

One of the earliest plans was suggested by Lord William Bentinck, when Governor-General of India.—He proposed a Quarterly communication between Bombay and Suez, to be effected by private agency, the contractors receiving from Government two lacs of rupees (£20,000) per annum, and being permitted to appropriate the postage of letters, in consideration of which advantages they were to carry the Government Despatches. The duty of the contractors commencing and terminating at Suez, the transit of the mail between that place and Alexandria was to be provided for by other means; while its conveyance between Alexandria and England

was to be effected by the Government Steamers in the Mediterranean.

Another plan suggested by the merchants of Calcutta excited considerable attention. They proposed to establish a regular line of Packets from Falmouth, totally independent of the Government Packets in the Mediterranean,—to provide for the passage across the Isthmus of Suez, and from thence to the four great ports of India and Ceylon, Bombay, Point de Galle, Madras, and Calcutta; the communication to be quarterly.—In return for this accommodation, they required from Government a bonus of three lacs of rupees (£30,000), and an annual contribution of five lacs (£50,000) for five years; the postage remaining in the hands of Government.

A modification of the last-named plan subsequently emanated from the same quarter. The communication was to be quarterly as before, and the line, as in the previous plan, was to extend from Falmouth to the three Presidencies and Ceylon. But, in consideration of being permitted to receive the postage, the projectors were willing to forego the bonus formerly required, and to undertake the contract for three lacs (£30,000) annually, instead of five.

These are the principal plans which have been suggested in India. It will now be proper to

advert to those which have been proposed in England.

Mr. Waghorn, in his evidence before the Commons' Committee, in 1834, suggested the formation of a Company to work the complete line from Calcutta to Liverpool; and he conceived that an annual allowance of £30,000, with the postage for five years, would be sufficient to induce parties to undertake its establishment. The route to be that by the Red Sea, and the communication quarterly.

The Committee of the House of Commons, it has been seen, recommended a public establishment for Steam Communication with India by way of the Red Sea, the expense to be divided between His Majesty's Government and the East India Company. To the decision of those authorities the Committee referred the question, whether the communication should be from Bombay, Calcutta, or according to the combined plan of Bengal; though, from the use of the words "in the first instance," it may be presumed that the Committee contemplated in any case its ultimate extension to all the Presidencies. The frequency of communication was not adverted to; but from a passage in the tenth resolution, in which the Committee refer to a certain combination of circumstances, as rendering the communication "certain in every



month of the year," it may be inferred, that the opinion was in favour of a monthly communication.

From the time of the report of the Committee to the present year, the friends of a convenient system of correspondence with India, have been in expectation that the subject would be taken up by authority, and the accommodation for which they were anxious, established by the State. Nothing, however, having been done, and the failure of the Euphrates experiment having frustrated every hope in that quarter, the movement in furtherance of the great object has recommenced. A plan sanctioned and supported by a large proportion of the merchants of London, connected with India, has been issued for the establishment of a Company to undertake the accomplishment of the desired object.\* This Company propose to establish a monthly Steam communication between Falmouth and Bombay, by the Red Sea; and further to supersede the government Mediterranean establishment, by undertaking the transmission of the mail between England and Cadiz, Gibraltar, Malta, and Alexandria. The remuneration required for these services, including the conveyance of despatches to and from India, is an annual sum of 65,000*l.*, and the postage of private letters.

\* See Appendix, page 74.

A plan for effecting the same end by different means is recommended in the *Asiatic Journal* for October last.\* It proposes the transfer of the entire Post Office arrangements, between Great Britain and India, to the East India Company; his Majesty's Government to carry the India mail to Alexandria; the passage overland to Suez and the voyage to India, to be effected at the charge of the Company; merchant vessels proceeding to India to be required to carry letters for the Company as they do now for the Postmaster General; two rates of postage to be authorized, one for transmission by Steam, and a lower rate for letters forwarded by sailing vessels, and the Company's privilege of charging postage to be exclusive. The communication to be monthly, and to embrace Point de Galle, Bombay, Madras, and Calcutta.

These are some of the modes by which it has been proposed to establish Steam communication with India. In all of them the aid of Government would be required, but the amount of assistance sought, is quite trifling compared with the magnitude of the end in view. Some of the plans quoted, are not mere suggestions thrown out for the chance of adoption. The parties who brought them forward were ready

\* See Appendix, page 79.

and willing to effect that which they proposed, on receiving the necessary encouragement from Government. The expense ought therefore to be no longer a bugbear. We know its *maximum*. If the State can carry on the plan for a less sum than private projectors have stipulated for, it is the duty of Government to undertake it. If this be deemed improbable, it is no less a duty to give public sanction and support to some one of the plans by which private bodies have proposed to furnish the much-desired accommodation.

The residents in India, European and Native, join in requesting it, and it seems impossible that their united prayer can be much longer refused. Memorials\* have been forwarded, from all the Presidencies, to the Court of Directors and the Board of Control. Petitions\* to both Houses of Parliament have also arrived from all the Presidencies, and will, on the opening of the Session, be presented. The Calcutta Petition to the House of Commons has more than 7600 signatures. At Agra, Cawnpore, and other places, committees exist for the furtherance of Steam Navigation. It remains for the people of the United Kingdom to aid with their voice the call from the East, and thus to ensure the success of an application in which their own commercial interests

\* See Appendix, pages 41 to 73.

and national honour are so intimately concerned.

Is India unworthy of the boon requested, or of any which it is in the power of this country to confer? A glance at its extent, stretching from Cape Comorin to the Himalaya mountains, and from the Arabian Sea to the Birman Empire, combined with the recollection that the larger portion of the immense tract is either actually under the government of this country or subjected to its influence, may answer the question. Extending into above twenty degrees of latitude, with a longitude, of which, in some parts, a greater number may be counted, is it fitting that such a country should be deprived of advantages which are afforded to Malta and the Ionian Isles,—mere specks, scarcely discernible upon the Map of the World? The apathy too common, with regard to Indian interests, can alone account for this still remaining a question.

India is not only an extensive but, in many parts, a densely populated country. If numbers, therefore, can give a claim to the attention of Government, India has, on this ground, a pre-eminent one. The destinies of its people are in the hands of this country, and it is incumbent upon us to promote their im-

provement. The science, the arts, the learning, the civilization, the religion of the West will advance in India, in proportion as the two parts of the world are brought together by frequent and rapid communication. To the philanthropist and the Christian these considerations appeal as strongly as to the Legislature. Parts even of the same country may remain estranged from each other, and may exhibit, at the same period of time, a very different state of society, if there be a deficiency of the means of communication between them; but if these are supplied, the differences gradually disappear, and the knowledge, opinions and feelings, the habits and modes of life prevailing in the more refined and instructed divisions extend themselves into those which are less so, by removing without violence, and by merely moral force, the causes which engender and foster intellectual darkness.

The national honour demands the improvement of India, and every one alive to the feeling of patriotism, will be anxious to promote it. Half a century ago, a distinguished statesman reproached England with having done nothing for India, which afforded evidence of the benefits of her rule. It may be feared that even since that period, the progress of improvement has been more tardy than it ought to have been.

It is full time, then, to shake off the imputation and vindicate the national character.

But national interest, no less than national honour, calls for the adoption of the best and most improved means of communication in our intercourse with India. Although our policy there has been for the most part pacific, the acquisition and defence of our dominions has required a large expenditure of blood and treasure. We believe our authority and influence in the East to be worth preserving, or we should not have consented to uphold them by such means. Can we then hesitate now, when a trivial expense will not only enhance our influence in an extraordinary degree, but will add to the security of our empire, by providing for the conveyance of intelligence, and the transmission of an answer in less than the ordinary time, which one of these operations would occupy with no greater facilities than sailing vessels afford?

To overthrow our supremacy in India might not, perhaps, be an easy task; but we may be involved in very serious trouble and expense in maintaining it, unless we are prepared at all points for an attack. The application of Steam to the purposes of communication, will increase our power of preparation, and thus conduce to the permanence of our sway. The hostile designs

of a great Northern Power against our Eastern territories, have long been matter of apprehension. Russia is far nearer to India than we are, and her attempts to increase her dominions in that direction are unceasing. It would be both idle and weak to dissemble the danger. The part of wisdom is to provide against it; and the time may not be distant when Steam Communication may be the means of preserving unbroken the connection between England and India. Secure and stable as our dominion now appears, we must not flatter ourselves that the calm will always continue. Whenever it shall be disturbed, the disturbance will most likely be the result of Russian attack, or of Russian intrigue. The latter mode is, perhaps, the more probable; but whether the enemy proceed by an open demonstration of hostility, or by the more insidious but more promising course of fomenting intrigues against us among the Native Powers, and the families of dethroned Princes, we shall need all the resources with which the advanced state of knowledge can furnish us. In former emergencies, indeed, we have always had men capable of sustaining British interests against the united force of Native and European enmity; and we need not despair of again meeting with such men when circumstances demand them. It was in the hour of peril, that

the talents of a CLIVE, a CORNWALLIS, a WELLESLEY, and a HASTINGS, were developed ; and should danger again arise, the illustrious group may be swelled by the addition of some name as yet undistinguished in Indian History. But to the master-mind, wherever it may be found, to whom the future safety of British India shall be intrusted, the facility of rapidly communicating with the Government at home, will afford an increase of strength not to be calculated.

The political safety of India is intimately connected with its commercial prosperity, and consequently with its commercial value to this country. This position is by no means inconsistent with the received doctrines of political economy. It may be, that if India were separated from the dominion of Great Britain, and placed under a free, wise, and enlightened Government, her value as a commercial correspondent of this country would not be diminished, and the example of the United States of America may be quoted in proof. But while this may be admitted fully and unreservedly, it is at the same time perfectly certain, that the separation of India from Great Britain would withdraw from the latter country all participation in her commerce ; because the Government which would succeed the British, would be neither free, nor wise, nor enlightened. The breaking up of the



British dominions would be followed either by the establishment of a number of Native Principalities, or by the extension over India of the authority of the most ambitious and encroaching Power of modern times,—a Power which, within a comparatively recent period, has stretched itself Eastward, and Westward, and Southward, and which still pursues its schemes of aggrandizement with unabated ardour.

If the British territories were parcelled out among native Sovereigns, commerce would be at an end, because peace and reasonable government would be at an end. Ignorant, unprincipled, and rapacious, these Princes would be engaged in perpetual broils, and the country would return to that state from which it has been rescued by British interference. Some part of the country would always be in a state of warfare, and even the intervals of peace would be productive of no commercial advantage. Under such Governments there would be no security for property, and consequently, enterprize would be discouraged; odious and mischievous imposts of every kind, which the good sense of European rulers are gradually removing, would be forthwith revived. The Transit duties, which have been recently abolished throughout the territories of Bengal, and which will soon cease to exist throughout all

the Presidencies, we may be sure would again be levied ; for an Eastern despot never waits for the gradual accumulation of the golden eggs, nor spares the life of the bird, if he thinks that even a small amount of present advantage will reward the sacrifice. These Governments, too, would not only be rapacious but weak ; and the hordes of robbers, with which India once abounded, and which even the vigour of a European Government can scarcely hold in check, would speedily re-assume that place in Indian society, from which our Western notions have dismissed them. This would be the consequence of the re-establishment of native rule. War, and the more ignoble modes of rapine prosecuted during what would be mis-called peace, would quickly drive all commerce from the shores of India. If the other branch of the alternative be taken, and Russia supposed invested with that power which is now held by England, it will require no argument to show that the fall of our commerce will follow that of our territorial dominion. It is of our commercial and maritime greatness that the Russian Government is especially jealous ; and though that Government has seldom failed to abound in liberal professions, it has never been prone to indulge in liberal policy.

Arising from these reflections is one especially

addressed to the holders of East India Stock. Their principal and dividends are secured to them *by* the Government of Great Britain, but they are secured *upon* the territory of India. Whatever places that territory in danger, consequently impairs the security of the Stockholder; and on the other hand, every new barrier to the British authority in India, is an addition to that security. The Proprietors of East India Stock have, therefore, a direct interest in promoting the cause of Steam Communication with India. . .

Our commerce, it has been seen, will not survive the destruction of our political power, and Steam Communication will be an important agent in the preservation of the latter. But the direct advantage of such a communication to commercial intercourse, is a point not less striking and more immediately obvious. Commerce, with all the disadvantages under which it has hitherto been conducted, has flourished to an extent deserving some sacrifice for its preservation. The annual amount of the *private* mercantile transactions of Calcutta and Madras with Europe, on an average of three years, from 1829-30, to 1831-32, was nearly four millions sterling; the average of the same class of transactions during the same period at Bombay, was considerably

more than a million and a half. To these sums are to be added the amount of the trade of the Company, which, at Bengal and Madras alone, averaged nearly two millions. The trade with Ceylon was equal to nearly two hundred thousand pounds, and thus there was an average of above eight millions sterling, annually, exclusive of the Company's trade at Bombay. This, be it remembered, occurred before the expiration of the last Charter, when impediments to the freedom and extension of commerce, were in existence, which the legislature has since abolished. Freed from these embarrassing circumstances, who can doubt that the trade of India will go on and increase ! And it must be remembered, that the benefits of Steam Communication will extend themselves to other quarters besides those whose special benefit is intended. The intimate connection of the trade of China, with that of India, will render the facilities extended to one in an eminent degree beneficial to the other, and the annual amount of the trade between China and England, is five or six millions. The commerce of the Eastern Islands, will thus also be brought more directly within our reach; new channels of enterprise will be opened, and old ones improved.

These facts have reference to those branches

of India commerce, with which England is more directly concerned. But nothing that enriches India can be a matter of indifference to England, and it must not be forgotten, that the former country carries on an extensive trade with the countries bordering on the Red Sea, and that the proposed communication would be a source of great benefit to this trade. The native merchants demand it *una voce*, and protracted denial will at least bear the appearance of inattention to their wants and wishes.

The manufactures of England have in some instances superseded those of India. Of the trade which has been attended with such a result, England at least has no right to complain; and though India may have suffered thereby some temporary inconvenience, she possesses in her internal resources, the means of recovering and of converting the trade with England into a mine of wealth and prosperity. India can never again be a great manufacturing country, but by cultivating her connection with England she may be one of the greatest agricultural countries in the world. She may furnish the raw commodity, which the local advantages of England enable that nation more beneficially to work up. Here too, England will gain a double advantage by securing in India, at once a field for raising the raw material, and a market for the

consumption of manufactured goods. The Cotton and Silk of India may at some future time afford the principal, perhaps the only supply for our looms. A Continental war would cut off our supplies of Silk from France and Italy,—a war with the United States would shut up the storehouse of our Cotton. These occurrences, it may be said, are not immediately probable, but what prudent man will trust his fortune to mere probability, when he can have comparative certainty? The native merchants concerned in the Silk trade of Calcutta, know the value of English connection, and are most anxious for the establishment of the only means that can improve it to its full extent. Are the merchants of London, and Liverpool, and Bristol,—are the manufacturers of Manchester, and Macclesfield, and Nottingham, less discerning or less spirited than the natives of Bengal? Are they slower in perceiving an advantage, or less energetic in seeking to realize it? This cannot be believed.

The extent of correspondence between England and India, is generally little appreciated. It has however been ascertained in the best and most satisfactory manner, namely, from official authority. The average number of letters received at Calcutta, is 83,189—the average number of those despatched 72,397; the average of

Madras is, received 31,306; despatched 40,614. At Bombay, there are received 30,000; despatched 24,000. At Ceylon, the number despatched is 6,505, the number received not known, but it must of course amount to several thousands. Is not this an extent of correspondence worthy of an adequate establishment for its conveyance? Is it creditable to the Country to leave it to chance, or to indirect and desultory private enterprize?

A large portion of the above correspondence is mercantile. Another portion is of a different character, but, in the eye of humanity, not less important. In India, a vast number of Englishmen are secluded from the land of their birth, from the homes of their childhood, from the friends and companions of their youth, from the parents to whom they have been accustomed to look up with mingled affection and reverence, from those with whom they are united by the bonds of fraternal love, and from the children whom the climate, in which their lot is cast, compels them to educate, at the distance of half the globe, from themselves. If they have the feelings of men, their thoughts must often revert to those distant relations, and they must endure on their account many a moment of painful anxiety. The feelings of those friends in England are precisely the same, with regard to

their relations in India : they are, in fact, more anxious and more bitter, from the consciousness of the added perils which a residence in India attaches to the chance of life and health. To all thus situated, the diminution of time which Steam Communication would effect in the transmission of letters, would be a boon, the full value of which can be appreciated only by those who, under the pressure of anxiety for all that is dear to them, have watched and waited for expected tidings, till they have experienced that sickness of heart arising from "hope deferred." The separation, at best, must be painful, and it is cruel to aggravate it by unnecessary infliction.

The number of persons whose dearest feelings of attachment are thus bound up with India are not few, nor are they restricted to any particular circle of society. There is scarcely a family which has not some interest in the subject, intimate or remote, and no station in life, from the peer to the peasant, exempt from its influence ; and while the improvement sought will add to the felicity of wealth and rank, it will, in many instances, be regarded by the humbler classes as one of the most valued blessings which could be conferred on them.

The Members, both of the Civil and Military Service of India, quit their country at an early



age. The latter when mere boys; the former when only on the verge of manhood, or at most, having just attained it. It is highly important, to the characters of both, that their sympathy with their native Country and its morals should be preserved, and there is no better method of preserving it than by a frequent correspondence with their European connexions. They may be placed in circumstances where their good feelings and good principles will be in danger; if they should, the earnest and affectionate advice of an absent parent or friend will be likely to prove the best safeguard against temptation; and by multiplying the opportunities, and increasing the certainty of correspondence between England and India, we shall contribute to sustain and improve the character of those who administer the government of India in the name and on the behalf of Great Britain.

These are but a few of the advantages with which Steam Communication with India is fraught, but these are enough to justify its adoption,—they are enough to render inexcusable the neglect of it.

The question of its establishment is not a party one,—it is unconnected with any differences of political or religious opinion,—and the manifold advantages with which it is fraught to India, to Britain, and to mankind in general,

ought to unite good men of every shade of party and every variety of creed in its support. It has nothing to do with disputed questions of Political Economy, for the advocates of all systems agree in the benefit of rapid, steady and regular communication. The concession of the required boon can in no way affect any interests connected with the administration of the Government of India, except to render them all more stable and more popular, -- what then can be urged against a measure, which, to minds of every description, presents but the features of unmixed good? The settlement of the question is demanded by every consideration of public advantage: the mischievous consequences of the present uncertainty being such as imperatively call for suppression.

The expense, it is ascertained, would be trifling.\* From the Madras calculations, it appears that it would fall short of 23,000*l.* per annum;† -- further, there is the best reason to conclude, that it would be temporary, and that the plan would very shortly pay its expenses, if

\* It is understood that by an official return recently made for the Admiralty, the expense of the Mediterranean Steam Establishment has been found to be much lower than could have been anticipated.

† See Appendix to Memorial to Court of Directors from Madras. Appendix, page 57.

it did not leave a surplus. This great Country can surely bear the expense of a few thousand pounds, to bind to her more closely the richest possession which any nation ever held in dependency. The East India Company can surely contribute something to an establishment, which would return the outlay a hundred fold in the improved circumstances of the Country committed to their trust. The only valid excuse for the refusal of either, would be inability, but happily this does not exist. England is not without funds to promote all good and useful purposes, and those best informed with regard to the finances of India, declare them to be in a rapid state of improvement.

The establishment of a full and complete Steam Communication, with all parts of India, will bind that country to England more closely than any other means that human ingenuity could devise,—is this an important object? It will afford the means of promptly frustrating the machination of that Government of whose power in the East, England has most cause to be apprehensive,—is this an important object? *It will extend the Commerce of both countries,* it will tend to increase the wealth of the Capitalist in both, promote the comfort of the Ryot in India, and give bread to the manufacturer in England,—are these important ob-

jects? In India it will advance the interests of civilization, science and true religion, — are these important objects? It will preserve in our countrymen in India the British feelings and British principles with which they quit our shores,—it will abate the anxiety of husband and wife, of parent and child, by reducing the time necessary for communication one-half, and thus dispense peace and comfort to a vast number of British families, whose members are divided by the distance between Britain and India,—are these important objects? If the judgment and the heart answer all these questions in the affirmative, there is but one more to propose,—will all these advantages justify an expenditure from the public purse of a few thousand pounds? This is the question upon which the legislature and the Directors of the East India Company have now to decide, and it is for the people of Great Britain to strengthen them in the wish which they must be supposed to feel to decide aright.



## APPENDIX.

SOME of the documents here submitted to the Public will sufficiently attest the feeling which prevails in India on the subject to which they relate. The Map prefixed will make visible to the eye the advantages and facility of the plan which the Indian community has thus warmly taken up,—the two plans which have recently been propounded in this country will evince the anxiety felt on the question here,—and the memorandum will manifest how abundantly that anxiety is justified by an exhibition of the inconveniences,—the uncertainty and delay at present existing, and the practical benefits which would result from an improved system.

Resolutions of  
the House of  
Commons,  
July, 1834.

Mention has already been made of the Resolutions of the House of Commons (14th of July, 1834), approving the route by the Red Sea, and recommending its immediate adoption as a line of regular Steam Communication with India. Those Resolutions are here subjoined. The expense was then regarded as the most formidable ground of objection, but it will be seen that at that period the Committee were satisfied that the outlay which had attended former experiments, formed no sufficient criterion for judging of that which would be necessary for future operations; but that there was reason to conclude, that by judicious arrangements, the expenditure might be reduced. This has subsequently been placed beyond all doubt, and the principal difficulty has thus been removed. With regard to the passage during the South-west Monsoon, the belief of its practicability is supported by the opinion of the highest naval authorities,—that opinion being founded on what is actually performed against obstacles of greater magnitude.

Resolved, That it is the opinion of this Committee, that a regular and expeditious communication with India, by means of Steam Vessels, is an object of great importance, both to Great Britain and to India.

Resolved, That it is the opinion of this Committee.

That Steam Navigation between Bombay and Suez, having, at five successive seasons, been brought to the test of experiment (the expense of which has been borne by the Indian Government exclusively), the practicability of an expeditious communication by that line during the North East Monsoon has been established.

Resolutions of  
the House of  
Commons,  
July, 1834.

Resolved, That it is the opinion of this Committee, that the experiment has not been tried during the South-west Monsoon; but that it appears from the evidence before the Committee, that the communication may be carried on during eight months of the year: June, July, August, and September, being excepted, or left for the results of further experience.

Resolved, That it is the opinion of this Committee, that the experiments which have been made have been attended with very great expense; but, that from the evidence before the Committee, it appears that by proper arrangements, the expense may be materially reduced: and, under that impression, it is expedient that measures should be immediately taken for the regular establishment of Steam Communication from India, by the Red Sea.

The following appeal of the people of Calcutta will, it is believed, strike every reader as a paper combining statesman-like views of National interest, with that just appreciation of the beauty and value of the social and domestic affections which is so characteristic of our countrymen, wherever they may be placed. The Petition to Parliament, and Memorial to

Calcutta circular,  
April, 1836.



Calcutta circular, April, 1836.

the Board of Control and Court of Directors contain a body of facts and reasonings, the effect of which must be irresistible.

### CIRCULAR PUBLISHED IN CALCUTTA,

April, 1836.

THE accompanying copies of a Petition to the House of Commons, and of Memorials to the Board of Control and the Court of Directors of the East India Company, praying for the immediate establishment of a Steam Communication by way of the Red Sea, between the four principal parts of India, namely, Bombay, Galle, Madras, and Calcutta, and England, are circulated in full confidence that an appeal from several thousands of their fellow-subjects in this distant country, a great portion of whom are cut off from the land of their birth and their affections, by an interval between their correspondence with their friends and connexions, of ten to twelve months, will meet with sympathy and support from all classes at home.

To those who have spent any portion of their lives in this country, and have returned to their native home, nothing need be said touching the value and importance, in every point of view, of shortening that interval one-half.

To those who have never experienced the anxiety arising from such a separation from their dearest connexions, and to those who may hitherto never have had occasion to give the subject any consideration at all, it may be necessary briefly to notice the vast importance of the establishment of a thorough and complete Steam Communication between England and all parts of India.

The value of such a communication to natives of the British Isles, whose lot is cast in India, from the Governor General himself to the humblest individual, has been re-

Gyred to, and there are many in England who will, from the experience of their own anxiety, readily concur in feeling the value of such early information. Calcutta circular, April, 1836.

But great and important as may be the advantages of such a Communication to such persons, including every single individual, male and female, of British birth, they are in reality nothing in the scale of advantages which must necessarily result to both Countries, from Steam Communication between England and ALL PARTS OF INDIA, if established on those principles alone, which have in like cases been found to answer, namely, Speed, Regularity, Security, and the Junction of all Places of Importance interested in the mutual intercourse.

A reference to the incalculable benefits which have arisen in England during the last Seventy Years, from the increased facilities of intercourse, derived from—first, The Establishment of Mail Coaches, and their extension to all the most distant parts of the Country, with the consequent improvement of the Roads—then the Canals—and, finally, the establishment of Steam Vessels, as well for Coast as Inland Navigation—and, above all, that of Rail Roads is sufficient to show the truth of Lord William Bentinck's opinion, that the advantages direct and indirect, for Steam Communication between England and India are so great, that they "would be cheaply bought at any price."

If the general shortening of the time required for intercourse, personal and written, between the several places in England, having mutual relations, has been productive of such great advantages, it is easy to see that a similar reduction in the periods of intercourse between two such countries as England and British India, cannot fail to induce like advantages in the ratio of their far more extended, and far more important mutual interests and duties.

To India, England is indebted for wealth, for fame, and,

Calcutta Circular, April, 1836. in some degree, for the prominent station she holds among the Nations of the World. In return, she has a duty to perform to the countless millions subject to her sway—a duty which can never be performed as it ought to be, until the barrier which upholds their mutual ignorance, and thence fosters their mutual prejudices, is broken down.

That barrier once removed, can it be for one moment, doubted, that the Arts, the Sciences, the Civilization, the Capital of England would rapidly find their way to India? Their very nature is to extend—they only require a road, and when that is made easy to any place needing their presence they cannot but go. India does need, and England can furnish them—and it is her duty to do so.

It is her bounden duty to open wide the doors of India, for the entry and spread, EMPHATICALLY, of the knowledge of Europe. It is the one thing needed in India to enable her to advance, as, *under the dominion of England* she ought to do, in the scale of Nations, and this can only be done effectually, by approximating the two Countries in the manner proposed.

Among the advantages to England would be the more ready employment of Capital, with consequent extension of Commerce, and the greater security of the Indian Empire; but it is of course impossible, in an Address of this nature, to point out, minutely, the advantages of such a Communication; to those who give attention to it these advantages become *more and more apparent*, and nothing would appear to be wanting to ensure that Communication being established as it ought to be, on the most enlarged and perfect scale, but a similar general expression of the public desire of the British Islands, as has now been long declared through all parts of India, and in the hope of inducing that expression, this appeal is made.

## CALCUTTA PETITION,

*To be presented at the Meeting of Parliament by the* Calcutta Petition to Parliament.  
*Right Hon. Lord Wm. C. Bentinck, M.P.*

To the Honourable the Commons of the United Kingdom of  
 Great Britain and Ireland in Parliament assembled :

The Humble Petition of the Inhabitants of Calcutta and its  
 neighbourhood.

SHEWETH,

THAT the Establishment of a Steam Communication between India and England has been for several years past the ardent desire of the whole of the British Inhabitants of this country, and that this desire has of late years extended to the natives: and that the public wish of all India has been lately expressed in the strongest manner by the voluntary subscriptions of a sum exceeding three lacs of rupees, of which above one lac and a half were subscribed in Bengal alone, a great part thereof by natives, for the furtherance of this eagerly sought measure.

That, however the subscription of such a sum, without any view to pecuniary return, may evince the anxiety of all India for the establishment of such a communication, yet your petitioners feel that it is impossible to establish it, much less to carry it on, except by means of the united powers of His Majesty's Government and the East India Company; and your petitioners learned therefore with the utmost satisfaction that a Select Committee of your Honourable House had resolved under date 14th July, 1834,—

“ That a regular and expeditious communication with India by means of Steam Vessels is an object of great importance both to Great Britain and to India. That it is expedient that measures should be immediately taken for the regular establishment of Steam Communication from India by the Red Sea. That it be left to His Majesty's Government in conjunction with the East India Company to consider whether the Communication should be in the first instance from Bombay, or from Calcutta, or according to the combined plan suggested by the Bengal Steam Committee; and that by whatever line the Communication be established the net charge should be divided equally between His Majesty's Government and the East India Company.”

That Your Petitioners considered these Resolutions as a pledge that immediate measures would be taken for establishing such Com-

Calcutta Petition to Parliament.

munication in the manner best adapted for meeting the wants and wishes of all the principal ports of India.

That it is therefore with pain proportionate to the satisfaction which they felt in hearing of the pledge of your Honourable House to perfect this their anxious desire, that Your Petitioners find that up to the date of last advices from England nothing had been done in redemption of that pledge; that no steps appear to have been taken for the regular Establishment of Steam Communication from India by the Red Sea; and that no effectual consideration had been given, by His Majesty's Government in conjunction with the East India Company, to the only question which Your Petitioners understand to have been left to their decision before giving effect to the Resolutions of your Honourable House—namely—whether the Communication should be in the first instance from Bombay, or from Calcutta, or according to the combined plan suggested by the Bengal Steam Committee.

That Your Petitioners beg leave to submit to the consideration of your Honourable House the following opinion lately expressed by a Right Hon. Ruler of this country, regarding the importance of Steam Communication between this country and Europe, viz.—

“ I have been a zealous supporter of the cause of Steam Communication from the strongest conviction confirmed by every day's further reflection of its vast importance to innumerable interests both national and commercial. I cannot command the opportunity of forwarding its future success, but if within my reach you may depend upon my most earnest efforts to promote its progress, and to obtain for India an advantage so great in all its *direct* and *indirect* consequences that in my opinion it would be cheaply bought at any price.”

Your Petitioners, fully concurring in the sentiments above expressed, humbly but earnestly pray that your Honourable House will graciously adopt such measures as to your wisdom may seem requisite for the immediate carrying into effect the Resolutions of the Committee of your Honourable House for establishing a regular, expeditious, and frequent communication between the principal Indian Ports and Great Britain by means of Steam Vessels by way of the Red Sea.

And Your Petitioners will ever pray.

*Calcutta, 5th March, 1836.*

This Petition was signed by three thousand five hundred and forty-two British and Native Inhabitants of Calcutta and its neighbourhood, including the three Judges of the Supreme Court of Judicature,—the Commander-in-Chief, and three other Members of Council,—Judges of the Sudder, Dewanny, and Nizamut Adawult,—Members of all the public Boards, and generally the Heads of every public Department, — the British Merchants of Calcutta, — the highest Classes of Native Subjects,— the Native Merchants, especially those connected with the silk trade, and that carried on between Calcutta and the Red Sea. Since which, Signatures from the Interior make the total 7632. Calcutta Petition to Parliament.

## CALCUTTA MEMORIAL TO THE INDIA BOARD.

To the Right Honourable the Board of Commissioners, &c.

The Respectful Memorial of the Inhabitants of Calcutta and its neighbourhood, duly convened in the Town Hall, on Saturday, March 5th, 1836 :

**SHEWETH,**—That Your Memorialists having the greater part of them for many years, and all latterly, felt the vast importance as well to Great Britain as to India of establishing a regular and expeditious communication with England by way of the Red Sea by means of Steam Vessels, received with the utmost satisfaction the announcement of the following Resolutions of the Select Committee of the House of Commons, dated the 14th July, 1834, and afterwards adopted by the Honourable House, viz.,—

“That it is the opinion of this Committee that a regular and expeditious communication with India, by means of Steam Vessels, is an object of great importance both to Great Britain and to India. That it is the opinion of this Committee, that the experiments which have been made have been attended with very great expense ; but that from the evidence before the Committee it appears that by proper arrangements the expense may be materially reduced : and under that impression it is expedient that measures should be immediately taken for the Regular Establishment of Steam Com-

**Calcutta Memorial to the India Board.**

munication from India by the Red Sea. That it is the opinion of this Committee that it be left to His Majesty's Government in conjunction with the East India Company to consider whether the Communication should be by the first instance from Bombay, or from Calcutta, or according to the combined plan suggested by the Bengal Steam Committee. That it is the opinion of this Committee, that by whatever line the Communication be established, the net charge of the Establishment should be divided equally between His Majesty's Government and the East India Company, including in that charge the expense of the land conveyance from the Euphrates on the one hand, and the Red Sea on the other, to the Mediterranean."

That Your Memorialists have anxiously looked for the result of the consideration thus pressed upon the notice of His Majesty's Government in conjunction with the East India Company, which they confidently expected would lead to the immediate establishment of Steam Communication with England by way of the Red Sea, in the manner best adapted to meet the wants and wishes of all the principal ports in India; and that Your Memorialists were the more confirmed in their hope and expectation that no delay would be allowed to take place in giving the subject that consideration which its importance demands by the publication in the papers of this Presidency of a letter addressed to the Secretary to the Committee of the New Bengal Steam Fund by the Secretary of your Right Honourable Board under date 8th November, 1834, wherein they were informed that the subject was then under the consideration of His Majesty's Government and the East India Company, and that the result would be communicated to the Government of India.

That Your Memorialists regret to find that no effectual consideration appears to have been yet given by His Majesty's Government and the East India Company to the matters pressed upon their considerate attention by the above Resolutions of the House of Commons; and that the President of your Right Honourable Board is reported to have expressed himself in somewhat doubtful terms as to the certainty of that Communication being established, which he admitted it was the duty of the East India Company with the aid of His Majesty's Government to take steps for effecting.

That Your Memorialists have received this intimation with a degree of pain proportionate to the pleasure with which they received what they looked on as an assurance of the House of Commons that their ardent and long entertained wish would be immediately realized.

That Your Memorialists beg respectfully to press upon the consideration of His Majesty's Government, through your Right Honourable Board, the vast importance of speedily following up the recommendation of the House of Commons by establishing a regular and expeditious Communication between this country and Great Britain, by means of Steam Vessels, by way of the Red Sea; and on this point Your Memorialists beg to be permitted to lay before your Right Honourable Board the following expression of the testimony of the Right Hon. Lord William Cavendish Bentinck, the late Governor General of India, made on the eve of his departure for England.

Calcutta Memorial to the India Board.

"I have been a zealous supporter of the cause of Steam Communication with Europe from the strongest conviction confirmed by every day's further reflection of its vast importance to innumerable interests both national and commercial. I cannot command the opportunity of forwarding its future success, but if within my reach you may depend upon my most earnest efforts to promote its progress, and to obtain for India an advantage so great in all its direct and indirect consequences that in my opinion it would be cheaply bought at any price."

That Your Memorialists deem it proper to bring to the notice of your Right Honourable Board that the average number of letters received from England and despatched thither in India through the Post Offices annually may be taken as follows:—

	Received	Despatched
Calcutta ( <i>on an average of 5 years</i> )	98,189	72,397
Madras ( <i>on an average of years</i> )	31,306	40,614
Bombay ( <i>from a note of the Post Master General</i> )	30,000	24,000
Galle,— <i>the number received is not known, but say</i>	6,000	
<i>The number despatched is from official reports</i>		6,505
	<hr/> 156,495	<hr/> 143,516
• Together		300.011

That the average annual amounts of Mercantile transactions with Europe at the above places, were on an average of three years, viz., 1829-30 to 1831-32 as follows:

Calcutta,	-	-	-	-	Rs. 3,79,49,681
Madras,	-	-	-	-	„ 59,10,042
Bombay,	-	-	-	-	„ 1,63,89,629
Ceylon,	-	-	-	-	„ 18,88,007
Together,	-	-	-	-	<hr/> Rs. 6,23,37,359



Calcutta Memorial to the India Board.

That the valuable commerce just noticed was the average of the private transactions of the above places prior to the abolition of the right to trade on the part of the East India Company; and that the annual average amount of the trade of the Company during the same period from Calcutta and Madras was, Rupees, 1,91,77,493, exclusive of that from Bombay, (which is unknown to your Memorialists), which amount must eventually be involved in the private transactions of the Commercial community of the two places, making altogether a trade amounting annually to the sum of Rs. 8,15,14,852 exclusive of the late trade of the Honourable Company at Bombay, the amount of which is not known, connected with the commercial correspondence of the above places with Europe\*; and, in addition thereto, your Memorialists beg to draw to the attention of his Majesty's Government that the trade of China with England, which amounts to the value of from £5,000,000 to £6,000,000 by the year, is dependent on India during six months out of the twelve for yearly communication with Great Britain.

That the average number of Passengers annually arriving at, and departing from, the undermentioned places, may be taken as follows:—

	<i>Arrivals.</i>				<i>Departures.</i>			
Calcutta,	-	-	-	767	-	-	-	665
Madras,	-	-	-	573	-	-	-	459
Bombay,	-	-	-	287	-	-	-	316
Ceylon,	-	-	-	85	-	-	-	17

And your Memorialists respectfully draw the particular attention of your Right Honourable Board to the above statement regarding passengers; because the Committee of Merchants of Calcutta, who

Bengal, - - - - - Sa. Rs. 1,56,35,517.

Rs. 1,68,38,861  
Madras, - - - - - „ 2,03,38,632

The late trade of the Honourable Company at  
Bengal and Madras, - - - - - 1,91,77,493

Private Commerce of Calcutta, Madras, Ceylon,  
and Bombay, - - - - - 6,23,37,359

Rupees, 8,15,14,852

made a tender to the Government here to establish, on certain terms, a regular communication, by way of the Red Sea, with Great Britain, by means of Steam Vessels, gave it as their opinion, after very full and minute investigation, that the communication must depend, in a material degree, upon the support of passengers, for paying its expenses.

That your Right Honourable Board may in some measure judge of the probability of the steamers being constantly filled with passengers, when regularly dispatched, from the fact, that the *Hugh Lindsay's* accommodations were taken up months before the time at which she was advertised to sail, and that several parties travelled overland, a distance of 1000 or 1200 miles, only to be disappointed, though arriving two months prior to the time fixed for her departure.

That in regard to the expense which the establishment of a sufficient number of steam vessels would occasion to the East India Company, your Memorialists respectfully submit that the resolutions of the House of Commons, proposing that the net charge of the establishment should be divided equally between His Majesty's Government and the East India Company, appears to have very greatly reduced the force of the only objection raised against immediately putting these resolutions into execution, namely, the state of the finances of the Honourable Company, and upon this head of expense, your Memorialists beg leave to observe, that prior to the departure of the late Governor General of India, the Merchants of Calcutta, after the most ample enquiry, offered to his Lordship to establish and maintain, by means of vessels of the largest size and power, independent of the existing communication between Malta and Falmouth, a regular quarterly communication between England and the four ports, Bombay, Point de Galle, Madras, and Calcutta, including the passage across the Isthmus of Suez, provided they got three Lacs of Rupees by way of bonus, and five Lacs of Rupees annually, for five years, from the Government, the Government retaining the Postage, a calculation, which, if at all correct, your Memorialists venture to affirm, would make the annual charge to be equally borne by his Majesty's Government and the East India Company, a sum so small, as neither your Right Honourable Board, nor the East India Company would allow to outweigh the advantages.

Calcutta Memorial to the India Board.

direct and indirect, which the establishment of such a communication on an extended and liberal scale is calculated to induce.

Upon these advantages your Memorialists abstain from enlarging, satisfied that the value of such a communication must be duly appreciated by your Right Honourable Board.

That, in conclusion, your Memorialists respectfully, and most earnestly pray, that the resolutions of the House of Commons may be forthwith fully acted upon, and that steps may be immediately taken by your Right Honourable Board, in conjunction with the East India Company, to establish a regular Steam Communication between the principal Indian Ports and Great Britain, by way of the Red Sea.

Calcutta Steam Committee's letter to Lord W. Bentinck.

*To the Right Hon. Lord William Cavendish Bentinck,*  
*§c. §c. §c.*

MY LORD,

HAVING been entrusted by the inhabitants of Calcutta and its neighbourhood, with a Petition to the House of Commons, praying for the immediate establishment of a Steam Communication by way of the Red Sea, between the principal Ports of India and England, and directed to transmit it to an influential Member of the House of Commons, conversant with the affairs of India, with a request that he will present the same to the House of Commons, and support the prayer thereof, we could not for a second hesitate in our choice, if aware that your lordship had resumed your seat in the Commons House of Parliament. Sure are we that the whole of India would have alone looked to your lordship as the single individual, to whom, before all others, should be entrusted the advocacy of a measure which owes to your lordship its present advanced position.

To whom could we so consistently or so aptly apply as to him, who, placed at the head of this Empire, and qualified alike from station and talents to judge of the importance of the establishment of an efficient and comprehensive Commu-

nication, has pronounced it to be fraught with advantages, direct and indirect, so great, as to render its purchase cheap at any price.

Calcutta Steam  
Committee's  
letter to Lord  
W. Bentinck.

To you then, my lord, we consign the Petition of the Inhabitants of Calcutta and its neighbourhood to the House of Commons, praying for the immediate Establishment of a Steam Communication by way of the Red Sea, between the principal Ports of India and England, with the most perfect assurance, that should your lordship have resumed your seat in the House, it will receive at your hands all that the most ardent friends of the measure can desire.

On the other hand, should your lordship not be a Member of the House of Commons, we respectfully request the favour of your selecting such an individual Member as in your lordship's judgment may be most fitly entrusted with the duty of advocating a cause of such universal importance, as that of bringing into closer contact two parts of the world so widely separated by distance, yet so intimately connected by mutual interests. It may not be inexpedient here to state that the Petition has above 3500 signatures, including those of the Judges of the Supreme Court, the Commander-in-chief, and three other Members of Council, four of the Judges of the Sudder-Dewanny and Nizamut Awdalut, the Members of all the Public Boards, and generally the heads of all the Public Departments of every Branch of the Merchants and Traders, British and Native, of the highest classes of Native subjects, who, as known to your lordship, have of late years advanced considerably in a just appreciation of the value of extensive general information, and are convinced that such information can be best, if not alone obtained by shortening the distance between this country and the seats of European Science.

The Petition has also the signatures of the great body of Native Merchants connected with the Silk Trade, and of those who conduct the extensive Commerce of this place

Calcutta Steam Committee's letter to Lord W. Bentinck. with the Red Sea. In a word, we are satisfied that no Petition ever forwarded to the House of Commons more fairly or more fully represented the wants and desires of the Petitioners than does that now committed to your lordship's care, those of this vast Empire.

We have caused the Petition and this Letter to be forwarded to Captain Grindlay, with a request that he will present them to your lordship, and afford all the personal aid in his power towards the attainment of the object in question, and for that purpose that he will attend to any suggestions which your lordship may condescend to offer.

For ourselves, my lord, we gladly seize the opportunity of repeating the grateful sense we entertain of the uniform support which we have ever received at your lordship's hands in furtherance of the great object entrusted to us, and renew our continued sincere wishes for your lordship's health and happiness, and we are,

My lord, yours, &c.

(Signed) W. H. MACNAGHTEN,  
 „ DWARKANAUTH TAGORE,  
 „ J. PRINSEP,  
 „ W. N. FORBES,  
 „ B. HARDING,  
 „ R. H. COCKERELL,  
 „ D. M'FARLAN,  
 „ J. KYD,  
 „ THOMAS E. M. TURTON,  
 „ JOSEPH WILLIS,  
 „ JAMES H. JOHNSTON,  
 „ MOTHOORNAUTH MULICK,  
 „ CHARLES B. GREENLAW.

(True Copy) C. B. GREENLAW,

*Calcutta Town Hall,  
 31st March, 1836.*

*Secretary.*

## MADRAS DOCUMENTS.

The first of these Papers contains some calculations and statements of great importance. The probable expense, it will be seen, is reduced to a sum so inconsiderable, that it cannot any longer be regarded as offering any obstacle to the establishment of the Plan. The Report of the Meeting, with the Petition there agreed on, will be found entirely consonant with the feeling expressed in the documents from Calcutta.

TO THE HONOURABLE THE COURT OF DIRECTORS  
OF THE EAST-INDIA COMPANY.

The Respectful Memorial of the Inhabitants of Madras, Madras Memorial to the Court of Directors.  
assembled at a Meeting held on the 26th of March  
1836.

Your Memorialists being very thoroughly impressed with the important advantages which would result to the State, to the Mercantile Community, and to the Public at large, from the establishment of a regular and speedy communication between Britain and India, by means of Steam Navigation, have seen with much satisfaction that your Honourable Court have expressed an opinion, that such communication "would open the way to other improvements, and would ultimately redound to the benefit of both countries;"\* and have stated that, if the finances of India were in a flourishing condition, you might consider it a *duty* to incur even the enormous outlay which you calculated would be necessary for its accom-

\* To Bombay Government, 14th March, 1832.

**Madras Memorial to the Court of Directors.**

plishment; and that while you hesitated, on account of the magnitude of the estimated cost, to engage immediately in any project of this character, you directed inquiries to be carried on to ascertain the practicability of effecting the end in view at a reasonable expense.

Since your Honourable Court expressed the above sentiments, the Select Committee appointed by the House of Commons\* to inquire into the means of promoting Communication with India by Steam, have submitted to the House Resolutions declaring the opinion of the Committee, that the net charge of effecting this object, which is recognized as of great importance both to Great Britain and to India, should be divided equally between His Majesty's Government and the East India Company; and that by proper management, the expense which has attended the experiments hitherto made, may be materially reduced.

Your Memorialists have therefore been encouraged to make inquiries into the practicability of establishing Steam Communication at a more reasonable expense than was calculated by your Honourable Court, upon the estimates you had before you in 1832; and having compared those estimates with the probable costs at present, and calculated the probable returns from postage and passengers, the results, as exhibited in the Appendix to this Memorial, are so favourable, that they are induced to submit them to your Honourable Court, with a confident expectation that they will satisfy you, that the net expense of the establishment of Steam Communication, divided between His Majesty's Government and the East India Company, will impose a burden upon the finances of India far less than you anticipated, and inconsiderable when compared with the advantages which it is calculated to produce—advantages which the late Governor-General thought would be cheaply bought at any price.

In this expectation, your Memorialists earnestly pray that

\* Dated 14th July, 1834.

your Honourable Court will, in concert with His Majesty's Government, take efficient measures for the complete establishment of Steam Communication between Britain and India, by Monthly Packets to and from the Red Sea, to be in connection with the Line of Packets between Falmouth and Alexandria. And your Memorialists venture to suggest that from its central position, and other circumstances, the Port of Galle, in the Island of Ceylon, is the fittest place to be fixed as the point of arrival and departure for the Steam Packets in India, and that Suez is the fittest place in the Red Sea.

Madras Memorial to the Court of Directors.

### THE APPENDIX TO MEMORIAL.

In the Despatch from the Honourable Court of Directors to the Bombay Government, dated 14th March, 1832, the Annual Expense of One Steam Vessel, including the capital sunk, is estimated at £26,800; and supposing the employment of four Steam Vessels to be necessary to keep up a Monthly Communication, the total cost per annum is estimated at £107,200. This estimate was framed with reference to the cost of the *Hugh Lindsay*, and the heavy expenses incurred in her voyages to and from the Red Sea.

Appendix to Madras Memorial, and Calculations.

On examining the estimate, it appears, first, that a vessel in every way better fitted for the service, can be procured now at a much less cost. Secondly, that the charge for fuel is greatly beyond the cost at which it may now be obtained in India, and at which it is reasonable to suppose it may be supplied in the Red Sea, when the demand becomes certain. Thirdly, that as it will not be necessary to keep more than three Steamers *employed* at any time, and probably not more than two during six months of the year, although it may be expedient to *keep up* four Steam Vessels to guard against accidents, the estimate is needlessly increased by providing for them all, as if in actual employment.



Appendix to  
Madras Memo-  
rial, and Calcu-  
lations.

First, with respect to the cost of the vessel :

The Hugh Lindsay is a vessel of 411 tons, with engines of 160 horse power. Sir P. Malcolm,\* from his experience in the Mediterranean, recommends vessels of 450 tons, with two

The Estimate by Mr. Morgan, engines of 50  
given in by Sir P. Malcolm, horse power,  
is as follows :— and Morgan's

A Vessel of 435 tons, cost . . .	£8500
Two Engines 50 horse power . .	4400
Copper Boilers . . . . .	4200
	<hr/>
	17,100
	<hr/>

paddles. He estimates that three such vessels might be placed at Bom-

bay for about £55,000, or about £18,333 each.

Mr. M. Laird† states the cost of a vessel of 400 tons, suitable for this service, fitted with engines of 180 horse-power, to be £18,700. There can be no doubt, therefore, that vessels, well adapted for the service, can be procured at the cost of £20,000 each.

The following statement shews the annual charge of maintaining a vessel purchased at that cost, compared with the estimate of the Court of Directors :—

	Cost of a Vessel of 450 tons, and 180 horse power, £20,000.	Cost of Hugh Lindsay, 411 tons, and 160 horse power . . .
	<hr/>	<hr/>
Capital sunk annually on vessel and boilers, for 15 years . . .	£1333	£2369
Interest on capital at 4 per cent. the rate of the loan now open . . . . .	800	at 6 per cent. 2012
Insurance, at 7l. 10s. per cent. on half of the ca- pital . . . . .	750	1335
	<hr/>	<hr/>
	2883	5716
	<hr/>	<hr/>
		Deduct 2883
		<hr/>
		2833

\* Evid. before Select Com. p. 158, 169.

† Evid. p. 71.

It thus appears that the annual charge of maintaining a vessel of greater size, and with engines of greater power than the *Hugh Lindsay*, will be £2833 less than the estimate of the Court of Directors. It is supposed to be unnecessary to make any allowance for the cost of bringing the vessel to India, as it will, of course, be used for the conveyance of troops, or stores, the freight of which will probably cover the charge.

Secondly: as to the cost of fuel.

The estimate of the Court of Directors amounts to £13,684, (exclusive of £2312 calculated as the expense of landing, warehousing, and re-shipping on the Red Sea,) for 2628 tons, being at the rate of £5 4s. 1d. per ton, on the average. The calculation is for 182½ days' consumption, at 24 hours to the day, and 84lb. per hour for every ten-horse

If engines of 10-horse power consume  
80lb. per hour, 2 of 90-horse power  
will use 1440 lbs. per hour, which multiplied by  
24 hours per diem makes

2240lbs. 34560 (near 15 tons; which multiplied  
or 1 ton.) by 18 days per month gives

270 tons per month and  
by 12 gives

3348 tons per annum.

of which or 837 tons at 30s. is £1256  
3, „ or 2511 „ at 60s. „ 7533

£8789

power.\* But it would appear that 80lb. per hour is a sufficient allowance for this power. At this rate, the daily consumption, with engines of 180-horse power, will be about 15½ tons, which at 18 days consumption per mensem, or 216 per annum, amounts to 3348 tons. Of this, it may be assumed, according to the estimate of the Court of Directors, that one-fourth,

amounts to 3348 tons. Of this, it may be assumed, according to the estimate of the Court of Directors, that one-fourth,

\* Evidence before Select Committee. Mr. Field, p. 82. Q. 831.

Appendix to  
Madras Memo-  
rial, and Calcu-  
lations.

or 837 tons, is the proportion to be supplied in India, and three-fourths, or 2511 tons, the proportion to be supplied in the Red Sea.

From statements of actual transactions furnished by the mercantile houses here, it appears that we are warranted in taking 30s. as a fair price for coals in India at present. The general opinion of the merchants here is, that it is likely rather to fall than to rise, since, when there is a certain demand, every vessel coming to India, without a full cargo, will bring coal for ballast, in the expectation of a very small advance upon the cost in London; assuming, then, 30s. to be the price in India, there seems to be no reason to doubt, that an increase of 100 per cent., raising the price to 60s. on the average, will be sufficient to ensure a supply equal to the demand in the Red Sea. The cost of 837 tons in India will be £1256, and the cost of 2511 tons in the Red Sea will be 7533

Total      £8789 deducted from £13684 (estimate of Court of Directors) leaves £ 4895 less than that estimate.

The estimate of £2312 for landing, warehousing, and re-shipping coals in the Red Sea, appears to be larger than is likely to be necessary under a methodical arrangement; it is probable that 15s. per ton would be an ample allowance; at this rate, for 2511 tons, the charge will be £1884, or £428 less than the estimate.

Thus, under the particular heads above noticed, leaving		all the other charges in the estimate of the Court of Direc- tors untouched, it appears that
In the annual expense of maintain- ing the vessel, including the ca- pital sunk . . . . .	£2833	
In the cost of fuel . . . . .	4895	
In the charges on the Red Sea . . . . .	428	
	<hr/> 8156	

a saving may be made of £8156, reducing the estimate of		Appendix to Madras Memo- rial, and Calcula- tions.
Total of estimate for steam vessel		
per annum	£26800	
Deduct	8156	
	£18644	
		the annual ex- pense of every vessel that may be kept in <i>em- ployment</i> from £26,800 to £18,644.

Thirdly, as to the number of vessels required to keep up a monthly communication, it appears that the average of seven voyages of the *Hugh Lindsay* was 20 days 21 hours steaming, at the average rate of six miles per hour,\* while the average rate of the Mediterranean packets is seven and a quarter miles, and the difference is attributed to the unfitness of the *Hugh Lindsay*†. With a fit vessel, therefore, we may calculate upon a saving in time of about one-sixth, or say that the voyage is reduced on the average to 18 days. The stoppages amounted, on the average, to 9 days 21 hours, but with good arrangements there can be doubt that these may be reduced one-half, say to 5 days. The voyage, then, including stoppages, will be made in 23 days, and there will be 7 days to prepare for return. In the favourable season, therefore, two steamers will probably be sufficient; in the unfavourable season three will probably be necessary, but the expenses of the third, as a sea-going vessel, will continue for six months only.

It may be expedient to have a fourth in reserve, to supply the place of any of the others that may be disabled.

The estimate will then stand as follows:—

£18644 total expense of one sea-going vessel.	
Deduct	2883 expense of keeping up the vessel.
£15761 sea-going expenses.	

\* Evidence, p. 85.

† Evidence, p. 79. Q. 787.

**Appendix to  
Madras Memo-  
rial, and Calcu-  
lations.**

Four steam vessels. Cost of keeping them  
up, exclusive of sea-going expenses, at  
£2883 per annum,

4 . . . . . = . . . . . £11532

Two steam vessels employed  
throughout the year, sea-  
going expenses, at . . . . . £15761

2

= £31522

One ditto for half-year . . . . . 7881

Grand total . £50935

Estimate of Court of Directors . £107200

Revised Estimate . . . . . 50935

£56265

On the whole, it appears that the annual expense will be less by more than one-half than the estimate of the Court of Directors.

It is now to be considered what return there will be from postage and passengers, as a set-off against the expense.

Taking the number of letters, to and from Britain, which annually pass through the post offices of Calcutta, Madras, Bombay, and Galle, in Ceylon, to be 300,000, as stated in the Memorial of the Inhabitants of Calcutta, and supposing that two-thirds, or 200,000, will be sent by the steam-packet when a regular monthly communication is established, which, if the postage is fixed at a moderate rate, say twelve annas, or 1s. 6d. a letter, seems to be a fair expectation, the return, even at that low rate, will be £15,000 per annum.

## Newspapers and parcels :—

Madras, as per account for 1834-35 .	25843
Calcutta, say double of Madras .	51686
Bombay, say . . . . .	20000
	<hr/>
	97529
Deduct one-third . . . . .	32509
	<hr/>
Remainder	65020
	at 4d.
	<hr/>
	£1083

There will be a further re-  
turn for news-  
papers, parcels,  
&c., say 65000,  
at 4d. each,  
which will give  
upwards of  
£1000. The  
whole return  
then, from post-

Appendix to  
Madras Memo-  
rial, and Calcu-  
lations.

age may be reckoned at about £16,000 per annum.

Next as to passengers :—

The number annually arriving at, and departing from, Calcutta, Madras, Bombay, and Ceylon, from and to Britain, is stated in the Calcutta Memorial to be 3,160.

Now, supposing one-fifth, or 632 per annum, to prefer a passage by the steam-packets, this would give for every trip twenty-six passengers, but say only twenty, at the moderate rate of 400 rupees, or £40, the receipt will be £800, allowing £300, or three-eighths, for the cost of providing for the passengers, the net profit will be £500 per voyage, or per twenty-four voyages, £12000. That 480 passengers out of 3160 will prefer this route when the communication is regularly established, and every necessary arrangement is

Average cost of a passage by the Cape, say	£120
Cost of passage to Suez . . . . .	£40
Expense of journey to Alexandria .	20
Cost of a passage from Alexandria	
to Falmouth . . . . .	40
	<hr/>
	100
	<hr/>
Saving	£20

made for facili-  
tating their pro-  
gress, by which  
they will not  
only gain two  
months in time,  
but will save a  
sixth part of the

cost of a passage round the Cape, seems to be beyond a doubt.

Appendix to  
Madras Memo-  
rial, and Calcu-  
lations.

The above return from passengers may therefore be safely reckoned upon as the minimum.

It appears then, that there will be a return of £28,000<sup>h</sup> per annum from postage and passengers to be set against the expense of the steam vessels; the net charge will, therefore,

Revised estimate of charge . . .	£50935	be only £22935,
Deduct estimated returns . . .	28000	which divided
	<hr/>	between His
	£22935	Majesty's Go-
	<hr/>	vernment and
		the East India

Company, according to the Resolutions of the Select Committee, will make the charge upon the finances of India scarce more than £11000 per annum.

Letter of Ma-  
dras Steam  
Committee to  
Captain Mel-  
ville Grindlay.

*Extract of a Letter, dated 9th April, 1836, from the Madras Steam Committee, to Captain Melville Grindlay, explanatory of the Petition.*

Upon reference to the Appendix to our Memorial you will perceive that there is good ground for believing, as stated in Resolution 4th of the Select Committee of the House of Commons on the Steam question—"that by proper arrangements the expense may be materially reduced."

On the other hand, the inhabitants of Madras are of opinion that the returns have been under-rated, and your attention is particularly directed to the detailed estimate laid before the Select Committee of the House of Commons, at page 119 of the Report.

Among the reasons which have induced the inhabitants of Madras to suggest that Galle, in Ceylon, be fixed as the point of arrival and departure for the Steam packets between

India and the Red Sea, one of the most importance is its convenience as a centre for branch communication by steamers, with the several Presidencies which they hope to see ultimately established. Until this is accomplished, the system will be far from complete. When it is accomplished it will *ensure* the returns that are calculated upon from the main packets, and probably enhance them. This is likely, particularly with respect to postage, &c., if a branch communication to each Presidency were established.

Letter of Madras Steam Committee to Captain Melville Grindlay.

There seems no reason to doubt that instead of two-thirds the whole of the correspondence that now passes by the Cape, would pass by this channel, which would add 7,500*l.* to the estimate of receipts.

The inhabitants of Madras have thought it expedient to confine their petition at present to the grand object of the establishment of steam communication between the Red Sea and India, but the ulterior object of branch communication with the several Presidencies ought not to be kept out of view in discussing the subject.

This object appears to be perfectly feasible, and there seem to be good grounds to expect that the returns will *at least* cover the cost, and probably leave a surplus.

The following sketch estimate shows how easily the scheme proposed in the Petition and Memorial may be followed out, so as to render the system of communication with India complete.

The estimate provides for the probable expense of keeping up two steamers to run between Bombay and Galle, which will probably be sufficient.

Supposing that the cost of a fit vessel, say 300 tons and 100 horse power, will be 15,000*l.*, the annual charge will be as follows:—



Letter of Madras Steam Committee to Captain Melville Grindlay.	Capital sunk per annum for fifteen years . . . . .	£1,000
	Interest at 4 per cent. . . . .	600
	Insurance at $7\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. on half the cost . . . . .	562
		<hr/>
	Annual charge of keeping up the vessel . . . . .	2,162
	Coal, at ten tons per day, for fourteen days, at 30s. per ton,	
	210 <i>l.</i> per mens., 12 per ann. . . . .	2,520
	Establishment, stores, and repairs . . . . .	3,000
		<hr/>
	Total expense for one steamer between Calcutta and Galle,	
	via Madras . . . . .	7,682
		<hr/>
	For two . . . . .	15,364
	For one steamer between Bombay and Galle as above, 7,682	
	Add for four days coal, to make up eighteen days	
	in the number, for two trips . . . . .	720 <i>l.</i> 8,402
		<hr/>
	Total expense . . . . .	23,766

*The following is an Estimate of the probable Returns for Postage and Passengers :*

In postage, taking the number of letters according to the Calcutta memorial, and supposing that the whole pass by this channel,

		Annas.	Rupees.	£
Letters to and from Calcutta . . . . .	160,000 at 6 =	60,000	=	6,000
Madras . . . . .	70,000 4 „	17,500	„	1,750
Bombay . . . . .	54,000 5 „	16,875	„	1,687
				<hr/>
				9,437

Add one-third to the estimate of letters per general packets, or

100,000 at 1 <i>s.</i> 6 <i>a.</i> . . . . .	7,500
--	-------

Return by postage of letters . . . . .	16,937
Add for parcels and newspapers . . . . .	500
<hr/>	

Carried forward £17,437

Return for passengers		Brought forward £17,437	Letter of Madras Steam Committee to Captain Melville Grindlay.
Eight from Calcutta, a	30/.	240/.	
Six Madras	20/.	120/.	
Six Bombay	25/.	150/.	
		510/.	
		2 trips.	
		1,020/.	per mensem.
Deduct expense one-fourth	255/.		
Net return		765/.	per mensem.
		12	
		9,180/.	per annum.
Total return by postage and passengers		26,617	
Deduct charge		23,766	
Surplus of receipts		2,851	
Estimated net charge of general packets		22,985	
Deduct surplus income for branch packets		2,851	
Remaining net charge		£20,084	

To be divided between his Majesty's Government and the East India Company.

Thus it would appear, that to complete the system of steam communication by branch packets to the several Presidencies would probably render the net charge on the whole below the amount of the estimate for the establishment of steam packets between the Red Sea and *one* port in India, and make the net charge on the finances of India, only about 10,000*l.* per annum, the remainder being chargeable to his Majesty's government, according to the resolution of the select committee of the House of Commons.

You are requested to print the above observations and

Letters of Madras Steam Committee to Captain Melville Grindlay.

and estimates respecting the branch communication between Galle and the several Presidencies, and to circulate them with the other documents.

You are requested to apprise the sub-committee of the receipt of these documents by the earliest opportunity; and as Mr. Waghorn has established himself in Egypt, we beg you will make him the medium of communication.

We are, Sir, your obedient servants,

(Signed)

PETER CATER,

C. DALRYMPLE,

Sub-committee appointed for carrying into effect the views of the general meeting.

Madras, 9th April, 1836.

Madras Steam Meeting.

## MADRAS STEAM MEETING.

*The following Resolutions having been adopted by the Committee for submission to the Meeting convened by the Sheriff, are published for general information.*

Resolved I. That it is the opinion of this meeting, that nothing will so materially tend to develop the resources of India, to improve her people, to advance her general welfare, and to maintain the integrity of the empire, as being brought into the closest possible contact with Britain.

II. That it appears no effectual measures have yet been taken for the regular establishment of steam communication to and from India by the Red Sea, notwithstanding the resolutions of the select committee of the House of Commons, of the 14th July, 1834; viz.—

IV. Resolved, That it is the opinion of this Committee, that the experiments which have been made, have been attended with very great expense; but that from the evidence

before the Committee, it appears, that by proper arrangements the expense may be materially reduced; and under that impression, it is expedient that measures should be immediately taken for the regular establishment of steam communication from India by the Red Sea.

Madras Steam  
Meeting.

V. Resolved, That it is the opinion of this Committee, that it be left to His Majesty's Government, in conjunction with the East India Company, to consider whether the communication should be, in the first instance, from Bombay or from Calcutta, or according to the combined plan suggested by the Bengal Steam Committee.

VI. Resolved, That it is the opinion of this Committee, that by whatever line the communication be established, the net charge of the establishment should be divided equally between His Majesty's Government and the East India Company, including in that charge the expense of the land conveyance from the Euphrates on the one hand and the Red Sea on the other, to the Mediterranean.

III. That it is the opinion of this meeting, that the expectations expressed in the fourth resolution of the select committee of the House of Commons has been justified; inasmuch as it is now ascertained, that owing to the low price of coals in India (which is likely to continue), the reduction in the expenditure of fuel, and other advantages resulting from improvements in steam machinery; the expences of steam communication between England and India, will fall far below the estimates which were framed in 1834. \*

V. That it is the opinion of this meeting that Point de Galle in the Island of Ceylon, is the most eligible place for the arrival and departure of steam vessels to and from the Red Sea: as, independently of its central position, the voyage between that Port and the Red Sea is more practicable throughout the year, than between the Red Sea and any other Port in India.

**Madras Steam  
Meeting.**

VI. That in the opinion of the meeting the projected establishment of a Company for carrying on a communication, by steam, between Marseilles, Genoa, Naples, and Alexandria, in conjunction with the railroad, which is stated to be in progress between Cairo and Suez, cannot fail to create an active commercial intercourse between Continental Europe and India; and to afford a quick, easy, and economical conveyance for passengers between the two countries, which will enhance the importance, and eventually diminish the charge of completing the steam communication between Suez and India.

VII. That it is expedient to forward petitions to both Houses of Parliament; and Memorials to the President of the India Board, and to the Honourable the Court of Directors; embodying the resolutions of this meeting, and praying that the resolutions of the select committee of the House of Commons may be carried into effect.

VIII. That the petitions and memorials now read be adopted, and that the Chairman be requested to forward the same; the Memorial to the Honourable Court, through the Governor in Council, with an earnest application that he will be pleased to recommend the same in the strongest manner to their favourable consideration.

IX. That the Chairman be requested to convey the thanks of the meeting to the Right Honourable Lord Glenelg for his powerful support of steam communication between England and India, in 1834, with a request that his lordship will be pleased to present and support the petition to the House of Lords; and that the petition to the House of Commons be transmitted to W. Crawford, Esq., M.P., for the City of London, with a similar request.

X. That Captain Grindlay be appointed the Agent in London, for forwarding the object of this meeting, and that

a Committee be appointed to draw up and forward the necessary instructions for his guidance. Madras Steam Meeting.

XI. That the meeting view with much satisfaction the active exertions of Mr. Thomas Waghorn, in establishing himself in Egypt, for the purpose of facilitating the transit of passengers, parcels, and letters between Suez and Alexandria, and earnestly recommend his establishment to the favourable consideration of the Indian public,

## THE MADRAS STEAM PETITION,

Madras Steam  
Petition.

TO BE PRESENTED BY W. CRAWFORD, ESQ., M.P. FOR LONDON.

To the Honourable the Commons of Great Britain and Ireland, in Parliament assembled.

The humble Petition of the several Persons whose names are hereunto subscribed, being Inhabitants of Madras, in the East Indies,

SHEWETH,

That the British population of this part of India have been for a long time impressed with the conviction that nothing will tend so materially to develop the resources of India, to improve her people, to advance her general welfare, and to secure to the crown of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland the integrity of its empire over India, as the rapid and continued intercourse between the two countries by means of Steam.

That this impression has not suddenly arisen, but has been one of gradual and steadily increasing growth, in which the native population has, during these latter years, participated; that the sincerity of this impression, British and native, has

**Madras Steam  
Petition.** been proved by the large voluntary subscriptions which have from time to time been made, whenever a prospect for accomplishing this great object presented itself.

That the government in India, no less than the people, have been anxiously desirous for the establishment of Steam communication between the two countries, and that Lord William Bentinck, the Governor General, both individually and in council, zealously supported the project in 1833, and subsequently declared, "that its advantages were so great in all its direct and indirect consequences, that in his opinion it would be cheaply bought at any price."

That the public of this presidency have read with feelings of unmixed satisfaction, the resolutions which were passed by the select committee of your honourable House in 1834, with regard to Steam Communication between England and India, but they regret that no effectual measures have yet been taken for its regular establishment in conformity with such resolutions.

That your petitioners, under the impression that the delay in carrying into effect the said resolutions, has arisen from the large outlay which the undertaking was calculated to involve, have applied themselves to an examination of the estimates which were submitted to the committee of your honourable House, and find that the price of coals in India, therein mentioned, is greatly over-rated, inasmuch as they are stated to be from eighty to one hundred and forty shillings per ton, whereas the price of coals has been at Madras, during the past five years, upon an average less than thirty shillings per ton, and this price, your petitioners are assured, is more likely to fall than to rise.

That your petitioners submit, that owing to the reduction in the consumption of fuel, and other advantages resulting from improvements in steam machinery, there are solid grounds for believing that by proper arrangements, the expense attending the establishment of periodical steam communication, may be reduced greatly below the estimates,

with reference to which the resolutions of the select committee of your honourable House were framed. Madras Steam Petition.

That with a view of covering a portion of that expense your petitioners submit that it will be proper, so soon as monthly steam packets shall be established, that legislative enactments should be passed, prohibiting, subject to certain necessary limitations for the purposes of trade, the transmission of letters, or parcels, below a certain weight, by any other conveyance than those packets.

That your petitioners believe that Point de Galle, in the island of Ceylon is the most eligible place for the arrival and departure of steam vessels to and from the Red Sea ; as, independently of its central position, a voyage between that port and the Red Sea is more practicable throughout the year than between the Red Sea and any other port in India ; your petitioners, with the greatest confidence, submit all to the wisdom of your honourable House, his Majesty's Ministers, and the East India Company, confining themselves to a humble but earnest prayer, that your honourable House will be pleased to adopt such measures as may seem agreeable for carrying into effect the said resolutions of the select committee of your honourable House.

The Steam Petition from Bombay was presented in Parliament very late in the last session, Bombay Petition.  
by the Right Honourable the President of the India Board.

---

The proposals of the Company lately projected, for establishing Steam Navigation with India by way of the Red Sea, have attracted so much attention in the commercial world, that it would be improper to omit them here, and in East India Steam Navigation Company.



East India  
Steam Navigation  
Company.

introducing them it would be unfair not to point attention to the name of the chairman of the Committee, Major Head who has displayed so much acquaintance with the question, and so much zeal in promoting its interests, as must inspire general confidence in his fitness to superintend the proposed establishment.

## PROSPECTUS OF THE EAST INDIA STEAM NAVIGATION COMPANY.

Capital £500,000 in Ten Thousand Shares of £50 each.

### PROVISIONAL COMMITTEE.

MAJOR CHARLES FRANKLIN HEAD.—CHAIRMAN.

A. F. Arbuthnot, Esq.	W. Hutt, Esq. M.P.	G. Palmer, Esq.
J. Bagshaw, Esq. M.P.	C. Kerr, Esq.	Capt. Probyn, H.C.S.
Capt. J. Barber, H.C.S.	W. Lyall, Esq.	B. Roberts, Esq.
J. Bonar, Esq.	T. Larkins, Esq.	W. Scott, Esq.
C. S. Compton, Esq.	Capt. Locke, H.C.S.	Capt. Thornton, R.N.
J. Cryder, Esq.	C. E. Mangles, Esq.	R. Thurburn, Esq.
E. M. Daniel, Esq.	Capt. Nairne, H.C.S.	J. Woolley, Esq.
D. Grant, Esq.	W. Norton, Esq.	G. Wildes, Esq.

### BANKERS.

Messrs. WILLIAMS, DEACON, LABOUCHERE, THORNTON, AND Co.

Temporary Offices—No. 6, Crosby Square, Bishopsgate Street.

The important advantages to be derived from a regular and speedy intercourse by means of Steam Navigation with the Eastern World are too obvious to need comment; the present communication from its irregularity is so injurious to commerce, that any mode by which this inconvenience can be remedied, must be productive, not only of incalculable advantages to the Mercantile Interests of this Country, but also to those of British India; the Projectors of this measure, therefore, content themselves with simply calling attention to an undertaking of such National importance.

The promoters of this project have selected the route by the Red Sea, in accordance with the following resolutions of the House of Commons, of the 14th July, 1834.

Prospectus of  
East India  
Steam Navigation  
Company.

“ 1st. Resolved, That it is the opinion of this Committee, that a regular and expeditious communication with India, by means of Steam Vessels, is an object of great importance, both to Great Britain and to India.”

“ 2nd. Resolved, That it is the opinion of this Committee, that Steam Navigation between Bombay and Suez having, in five successive seasons, been brought to the test of experiment, (the expense of which has been borne by the Indian Government exclusively), the practicability of an expeditious communication by that line during the North East Monsoon has been established.”

“ 3rd. Resolved, That it is the opinion of this Committee, that the experiment has not been tried during the South West Monsoon; but that it appears from the evidence before the Committee, that the communication may be carried on during eight months of the year: June, July, August and September being excepted, or left for the results of further experience.”

“ 4th. Resolved, That it is the opinion of this Committee, that the experiments which have been made have been attended with very great expense; but, that from the evidence before the Committee it appears, that by proper arrangements, the expense may be materially reduced; and, under that impression, it is expedient that measures should be immediately taken for the regular establishment of Steam Communication from India by the Red Sea.”

It is proposed (*contingent, however, upon the co-operation and pecuniary aid of His Majesty's Government and of the Honourable East India Company, as well as a Charter limiting the personal responsibility of each Member being obtained*) to form an Association, to be called “THE EAST INDIA STEAM NAVIGATION COMPANY.”

Prospectus of  
East India  
Steam Navigation  
Company.

That the Capital Stock of the Company be 500,000*l.*, in 10,000 shares of 50*l.* each, of which 10*l.* per share deposit is to be paid on the allotment of the shares which will only take place when the proposed Charter shall have been granted or at such period as may be necessary for enabling the Company to obtain the same.

No further call to be made without one Month's notice.

One-fourth of the shares to be reserved for India.

The affairs of the Company to be managed by a Board of Directors, to be chosen from the provisional committee, with the usual powers.

The qualification of Directors to be twenty-five shares.

Four auditors to be appointed, and their qualification to be fifteen shares.

A general meeting to be held annually.

Proprietors holding 8 shares to be entitled to 1 vote.

20	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	2	„
50	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	3	„
100	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	4	„

The Directors to call special meetings of the proprietors whenever they may deem it advisable, and also upon a requisition signed by 20 or more proprietors, holding in the aggregate at least 500 shares, such requisition to state the object of the meeting, and to be left at the office of the Company not less than twenty-one days before the proposed meeting.

The pecuniary estimate and details relating to the undertaking, have been carefully considered, and examined by competent merchants and engineers. The particulars are briefly as follows:—

The gross outlay is calculated at 250,000*l.*

The annual expenditure is estimated at 136,500*l.*, and includes a charge of 25*l.* per cent. on the outlay, for wear and tear, insurance, interest to subscribers at 5*l.* per cent. on capital paid up, and a fund to perpetuate property.

In stating the probable returns, the committee have to impress on the minds of subscribers, that this undertaking is based principally on the advantages to be derived from a regularity of communication between England and India, rather than on a large profit from the immediate investment itself. The calculations have been made upon a moderate scale, and without reliance on sources of income, partaking of speculation or doubt, but yet after the above-mentioned deductions and allowances, the result shows, that with the aid relied upon from Government and the East India Company, there appears an excess of income over expenditure as follows :—

The present contemplated income has been	
reckoned at per annum . . . . .	£74,500
Allowances applied for from Government	
and the East India Company . . . . .	65,000
	<hr/>
	£ 139,500

To carry into effect the plans of the Company, the following outline has been in the first instance proposed.

That a Steam Ship shall start Monthly from India and England; the time calculated on for the performance of the route being 52 days—the following Vessels will be required.

Three Ships of 600 Tons each, of adequate power, between England and Malta.

Two Ships of 480 Tons, between Malta and Alexandria.

The route across the Isthmus to be under the superintendence of the Company.

Four Ships of 600 Tons each, between Suez and India.

The preceding estimates are calculated upon a communication with Bombay, but the Company propose to extend the intercourse by Steam Vessels, with all the Presidencies as circumstances enable them to do so.

Prospectus of  
East India  
Steam Navigation  
Company.

The Committee would earnestly urge on parties friendly to the measure, the necessity of at once stating to the Provisional Committee, the number of shares they will take in the Company, so as to place the Committee in a position to enter into arrangements with His Majesty's Government.

*London, 11th October, 1836.*

Falmouth to Cadiz and Gibraltar . . . . .	6	days.
Gibraltar to Malta . . . . .	5	
Malta to Alexandria . . . . .	4½	
Stoppages . . . . .	3½	
	<hr/>	19
Suez to Cosseir, Jiddah and Camaran . . . . .	5½	
Camaran to Mocha and Socatra . . . . .	4½	
Socatra to Bombay . . . . .	7	
Stoppages . . . . .	5	
	<hr/>	22
	<hr/>	41 days.

The Mail has been conveyed from Alexandria to Suez in fifty-six hours.

Passengers can pass with comfort in seven days.

Socotra to Maldives and Point de Galle . . . . .	8	days.
Galle to Madras . . . . .	3½	
Madras to Calcutta . . . . .	4	
Stoppages . . . . .	3½	
	<hr/>	19
Point de Galle to Acheen and Penang . . . . .	6	
Penang to Malacca, to Singapore and Batavia . . . . .	4	
Batavia to Timor . . . . .	6	
Timor to Australia (Melville Island) . . . . .	2	
Stoppages . . . . .	6	
	<hr/>	24
Singapore to Canton . . . . .	7	
Socotra to Seychelles (Mahe) . . . . .	5	
Seychelles to Mauritius . . . . .	5	
Stoppages . . . . .	2	
	<hr/>	12 days.

The following passage from an article in the *Asiatic Journal* for October, 1836, contains the outline of a Plan somewhat differing in its details from the foregoing. Public rumour attributes the paper to a very high quarter :—

Extract from  
*Asiatic Journal*,  
Oct. 1836.

“ India requires a rapid and steady mode of communication with this country. Let it be conceded to her without delay, and placed on the most efficient footing ; but let it be carried into effect by those to whom the duty more especially belongs—by the East India Company. This plan will be liable to none of the objections which lie against all private associations, however respectable the members composing them. The East India Company, long before it relinquished commerce, had ceased to be a mere association of traders, anxious only to increase their profits. They had become the rulers of one of the noblest empires upon the face of the earth, and their views had risen with their position. Now that they are altogether unembarrassed with the details of trade, they are enabled to exercise the powers of government with a single reference to the welfare of the great community over which they rule. In their hands, there could be no question as to the fulfilment of the pledges held out to the public. They would effect the communication in the best manner, for they would have no temptation to do otherwise. In their hands, too, there could be no doubt as to the permanency of the communication. Having undertaken it without any view to profit, they would not be disappointed if it produced none. Once established, it would, therefore, be continued, and the only change to be looked for would be progressive improvement. If, therefore, those who desire the communication, desire also that it should be well performed, permanent, and progressive with the progress of science and the advancement of India in commerce and ci-

Extract from  
*Asiatic Journal*,  
Oct. 1836.

vilization, the East India Company affords the best instrument for accomplishing their purpose. The deep interest which prevails, in India as well as in England, with regard to the establishment of a regular Steam Communication between the two countries—the conflicting plans to which that interest has given birth,—afford a fitting opportunity to the governors of our eastern empire for taking upon themselves the execution of a measure recommended alike by its commercial, political, and moral advantages.

“ It is obvious that Steam Communication will be established in some way: of this, no one acquainted with India can possibly be ignorant. Seeing how ardently it is desired, and how likely it is to fail in any hands but theirs, there can be little doubt of the existence of a disposition to undertake its management, in that body which alone has the power of ensuring its success.

“ Some consideration, however, must be had to expense, although this ought not to stand in the way of so important a design. It was the recommendation of the Committee of the House of Commons, that the expense should be equally divided between the Company and the British Government. This would not be an unfair arrangement; but, perhaps, another plan, equally reasonable and equitable, would be, on the whole, more satisfactory, as it would undoubtedly be more simple.

“ The entire Post-Office arrangement between Great Britain and India should be immediately transferred to the East India Company. This would not be liable to the objection which has been urged against the investment of private persons with the power of levying postage: for the East India Company are, in fact, the governors of India, and the Post-Office, by being placed in their hands, will be placed where it ought to be. The British Government

should carry the mail to Alexandria, or to such other port as might be agreed upon; and if this were accepted as the contribution of England to an object materially beneficial to the two countries, it would be, on her side, a very favourable bargain. The Packet Establishment for the Mediterranean already existing, it would, in fact, cost the country little or nothing, while it would materially reduce the expense of the entire voyage to India. The passage over-land, and the voyage from Suez to India, should be effected at the charge of the Company. All merchant vessels proceeding to India should be required to carry letters for the Company, in the same manner as they now do for the post-master general; and the Company should be empowered to levy certain rates of postage, which, of course, would be higher upon letters directed to be forwarded by steam, than upon those left to the ordinary chance of sailing vessels. To render this plan complete and effective, the privilege of the Company should be an exclusive one; and letters, with certain exceptions, analogous to those existing in the inland Post-Office of Great Britain, should be prohibited from passing by any other agency than that of the Company. This proposal would probably raise a loud, but brief, outcry. In the lack of argument, an unpopular word would be hurled at it with great energy and show of confidence. But this warfare would soon subside and die away. A similar regulation once existed as to the conveyance of letters between England and India, and still exists at home, without producing serious inconvenience to any one. The public post is an engine of vast public convenience. To mercantile men, its benefits are incalculable; and every individual, however obscure, who ever has occasion to send or receive a letter, has his share in the advantage resulting from the certainty and celerity with which the mail is forwarded. In most cases, the post is the source of profit to the government: the

Extract from  
Asiatic Journal,  
Oct. 1836.



Extract from  
Asiatic Journal,  
Oct. 1836.

sum which is thus collected beyond the expense may be regarded as a tax ; but it is a tax of which no reasonable man complains, because he feels that while, on the whole, the transmission of letters is effected cheaper than it would be in private hands, it is also performed incomparably better. The tax too, has one advantage over most others: every person contributes exactly in proportion to the benefit which he derives from the institution, and he who derives no benefit pays nothing. This last condition would not, indeed, apply to the transit of letters by steam to and from India ; for, as the income could not at first be expected to equal the expense, the difference would be a charge upon the public finances. The probable advantages, however, would be so great, that the charge ought to be incurred ; and it is very evident that those who enjoyed those advantages at less than their proper share of the cost, could have no cause to complain, and that no man ought to feel aggrieved at being expected to forward or receive his letters, through an establishment maintained solely on account of its public utility, and where he had his value, and more than his value, for his money. If the carriage of letters may, in any case, be confined to an exclusive channel, why not between England and India ? And if it *may* without wrong, *ought* it not, when a great public object is to be attained by the restriction, which cannot be so well effected in any other way ? It is to be hoped, that this view of the subject may be thought worth the consideration of both the East India Company and His Majesty's Ministers ; and if they should see reason to think it a sound one, that they will suffer nothing to shake their conviction.

“ It has been assumed that, in the event of Steam Communication being established between England and India, the route selected would be that by the Red Sea ; and this, indeed, admits of little doubt. We must learn a good deal

more of the Euphrates than is known at present, before we can venture to pronounce an opinion on the probability of a permanent communication by that route; and the passage by the Cape seems so universally given up, as ineligible for steamers, that it is scarcely worth while to discuss its pretensions. The only question of interest relating to this part of the subject is, whether the communication shall be confined to Bombay only, or, by being directed in the first instance to Point de Galle, be extended from thence to all the presidencies. The residents at Bengal and Madras are very earnest in favour of the latter plan, and its adoption does not appear likely to interfere materially with the interests of Bombay. The three points for consideration, in determining the question, seem to be,—first, the comparative facility of forwarding the mails; secondly, the convenience of passengers; and thirdly, the probable practicability of each route throughout the year.

With regard to the first, there does not appear any very decisive ground of preference as to speed. The distance between Point de Galle and Calcutta, it is calculated, may be performed by a steamer in about ten days. The usual period occupied in communicating between Bombay and Calcutta, is about twelve days; it has been performed in less, and probably might generally be effected in ten days, by suitable arrangements. If, therefore, the two passages between the Red Sea and Bombay, and the Red Sea and Point de Galle, could be effected with equal facility, the difference in point of time to Calcutta would be nothing. But then it must be recollected, that the route of the dawk lies through several of the native states, and is liable to various accidents, from which the navigation of the Bay of Bengal is exempt. For certainty, therefore, if not for speed, the latter course is to be preferred. The distance from Ceylon to Madras being much less than to Calcutta, it

Extract from  
Asiatic Journal,  
Oct. 1836.

Extract from  
Asiatic Journal,  
Oct. 1836.

is obviously better for Madras that Point de Galle should be the starting-place for the Red Sea. According to a recent statement, the number of letters arriving at, and despatched from, Calcutta and Madras, as compared with the number to and from Bombay, is in the proportion of above three to one. Where the interests of the majority and that of the minority clash, the latter, of course, must give way; but, for a reason to be assigned under the third head, it appears probable that even Bombay would not, on the whole, be a sufferer by the selection of Point de Galle. It is an important recommendation of this line that it will, at all times and under all circumstances, afford not only a direct but a safe communication with Calcutta, the seat of the Government of India. By selecting Point de Galle, also, the despatches of the British Government, to and from Ceylon, might be forwarded by steam, and, of course, without charge.

“ The conveyance of passengers is not the primary object of the proposed establishment; but it is an important part of the plan, as a source of revenue. A statement, resting on the same authority as that relating to the letters, shews the number of passengers, to and from Calcutta and Madras, to be also about three times that of persons proceeding to and from Bombay. A large proportion of them would prefer the speed and regularity of steam-conveyance to any other; but then they must have facilities for embarking or disembarking at the spot where their duty or pleasure may call them. Without altogether agreeing in the opinion of one of the witnesses, before the House of Commons, in 1834, that a passenger for Calcutta might as well be in England as at Bombay, it is certain that many would shrink from a tedious, expensive, and perhaps dangerous journey over-land. As far, therefore, as the transit of passengers is concerned, the route by Bombay would be for Bombay only; that by Point de Galle would be for all India.

“The third consideration relates to the comparative practicability of the two plans at all seasons; and, on this ground also, the preference is due to that which takes Point de Galle as a rendezvous. It is even admitted by the warmest advocates of the Bombay plan, that the south-west monsoon would, during its continuance, operate as a serious check to the navigation between that port and the Red Sea. The other route, if not altogether free from this objection, is much less open to it; the impediment to a constant communication is less serious, and there seems little reason for doubt that a steamer from Bombay, going by Point de Galle, might generally reach the entrance of the Red Sea, as early as if it proceeded by a more direct route. On this ground, then, as well as on those previously considered Point de Galle commands a preference.

Extract from  
Asiatic Journal,  
Oct. 1836.

“The only drawback on all these advantages is a small additional expense of branch steamers, from Point de Galle to Bombay and Calcutta; but this expense might be expected to be nearly reimbursed by the additional number of passengers, and the remaining deficiency, if any, ought not to weigh against the general benefit of India.

“One question remains, and this relates to the frequency of communication. Little difference of opinion now exists on the point. It seems agreed, that the communication ought to be monthly, and, indeed, if less frequent, it would be useless to establish it at all. If the mail coaches of England travelled at their present rate, but were despatched only once a-week, their speed would be useless, and the expense incurred in obtaining it might as well be saved. Rapidity of transit, without frequent despatch, is of small value. A monthly communication with India by steam would be of incalculable benefit to the mercantile interests of the two countries—to the good government of India, and by consequence, to the prosperity of its immense population.”

## MEMORANDUM ON THE PRESENT MODES OF COMMUNICATING WITH INDIA.

Present modes  
of Communica-  
tion with India.

STRICTLY speaking there are now no direct and stated means of communication between Great Britain and India ; but correspondents in the two countries are left to seek out for themselves those channels which may appear most eligible ; and, considering how little many of those upon whom the task of selection devolves, are calculated to perform it satisfactorily, it need not excite surprise if, disheartened by the apparent hopelessness of the task, they frequently decline it altogether. Many of those who have friends and relatives in India, are females—many are persons advanced in life and incapable of encountering much of either personal exertion or mental excitement — many are labouring under the infirmities of ill health—many live in a retirement so perfect as to preclude them from instituting the necessary inquiries without an entire derangement of their ordinary habits and modes of life — others, again, are resident in remote parts of the kingdom, in Devonshire or in Northumberland, in the seclusions of Wales, in North Britain, or in Ireland. To all persons thus situated, it will be of essential service to place before them a simple but complete view

of the various *media* through which they may correspond with their friends in India, under the present imperfect arrangements. That these arrangements may speedily yield to others better adapted to the existing state of society and the relative positions of England and India, is earnestly to be hoped. There is no reason why a letter from any part of the British Islands should not be forwarded to Calcutta or Bombay with as little difficulty, and as much regularity, as a letter from Bath to London. Such, however, is not at present the case, and in the interval that must elapse before an improved system can come into actual operation, it will be desirable for those interested in the subject, to possess the fullest information as to the present modes of transit. This will be an equal benefit to British residents having friends in India, and to those friends with whom they are anxious to correspond; for the real difficulties of communication, sufficiently numerous and formidable in themselves, being magnified by the fears and doubts arising from non-acquaintance with the details of business, not unfrequently tend to diminish the amount of correspondence, and even to suspend it altogether, thus seriously detracting from the happiness both of those abroad and those at home.

To facilitate correspondence with India during the continuance of the present system, the

Present mode  
of Communic-  
tion with Indi

resent modes of Communication with India. following information has been communicated by MESSRS. SMITH, ELDER & Co. whose exertions, as the London Agents of Mr. Waghorn, merit special notice. In the cause of Steam Communication with India, that firm has invariably displayed a zeal, honourable alike to their commercial intelligence and enlightened liberality; and their activity has tended very greatly to promote the advancement of this important measure.

The first and most general mode of transmission is that by Ship-Letter Bags. These are made up by the brokers of the respective vessels, who duly forward all letters which may be delivered to them, free of expense. But here it is obvious a difficulty occurs. In order to secure the chance of a tolerably speedy communication, the party writing must ascertain what vessels are about to sail, and who are the brokers. This, however, even to private persons residing in London, is no easy task, and to those residing at a distance, it is almost impossible. The assistance of an Agent to furnish the requisite information and to ensure the proper delivery of the letter to the broker, becomes therefore almost a matter of necessity.

The next mode of forwarding letters to India is by transmitting them direct through the Post Office, to London, which may be done from all parts of the country. From the metropolis they will be forwarded to India by the first vessel which clears out, provided the Ship-Letter Postage, and also the Inland Postage to the port where the letter is to be shipped be paid; and whether this shall be Deal, Portsmouth, Liverpool, or any

other port, must of course depend upon the ship selected. But wherever it may be, the previous payment of the postage cannot be dispensed with, as will be apparent by a glance at the long list of letters daily exhibited at the Post Office, "which cannot be forwarded until the postage is paid." It is clear, therefore, that very little is gained in point, either of ease or certainty, by the intervention of the Post Office; and from the mode in which this department of its business is now necessarily conducted, private agency will continue to possess superior facilities.

**Present modes  
of Communica-  
tion with India**

Those whose occupations connect them with commercial and maritime offices acquire information, and are enabled to avail themselves of resources which are not to be commanded in the routine of such a public establishment. They learn what vessels are wind-bound or otherwise detained in the Channel, and they are thus enabled, in many instances, to forward letters long after the broker's letter bags are closed and the vessels are cleared out. There are other points demanding consideration in which the superior advantages of private agency are apparent. Much depends upon the selection of a quick sailing vessel, and in avoiding such as touch at intermediate ports. By a judicious choice, the delivery of letters at the place of destination may be greatly accelerated. Whenever this is an object, the business should be committed to the care of an intelligent agent or friend, who should be authorised to incur such expense in regard to postage as may be necessary to carry the wishes of the writers fully into effect.

A third method is now open by the extension of the Government line of Steam Packets to Alexandria. This measure is highly creditable to His Majesty's Government who have thus set an example, which



Present modes  
of Communica-  
tion with India.

it may be hoped, will be speedily followed by opening, in the same manner, the whole line, to India. This communication is monthly, and letters for India are consigned to the care of His Majesty's consul in Egypt. The transmission thus far is perfectly regular, but here these advantages are at an end. When arrived in Egypt, the period during which they are to remain there is a matter of perfect chance. The East India Company are the parties naturally looked to for the means of transmission onward, but hitherto nothing has been done to place the communication on a permanent footing. The mails have sometimes been detained in Egypt for entire months from want of opportunities of forwarding them; but whenever the mails have been forwarded, the result has borne most satisfactory testimony to the advantages of the route and the expedition with which it may be traversed. The last outward mail of which we have an account was only *forty-five days from Falmouth to Bombay*. The postage of a single letter from London to Alexandria, by this route, is three shillings and twopence; if it be sent from the country, there will be the additional charge of postage to London.

There is such a numerous class in England whose dearest connections are in India, and who are consequently anxious, above all things, to obtain the means of rapid and frequent communication with that country, whatever may be the cost, that this line, if perfect and regular, would be invaluable. This, however, is unfortunately not the case,—the letters duly arrive in Egypt, but beyond that all is uncertainty.

To obviate in some degree this uncertainty, Mr. Waghorn proceeded to Egypt about twelve months since, for the purpose of taking charge of those letters for India addressed to his care, through the Post Office conveyance

to Alexandria, and of forwarding them by the best means which the circumstances of the moment might enable him to command. When any conveyance is now afforded by the East India Company, whether by steam or vessel of war, *that* mode will be resorted to; but in the absence of all such arrangements, Mr. Waghorn will forward the letters by janissaries or country boats to Mocha or Aden, where the chances of their getting forwarded to India are much better than if suffered to await the Consul's opportunities. Letters intended to receive the advantage of Mr. Waghorn's services must first be registered and paid for at his agents' in England, who will affix their respective marks to entitle them to the required care. Without this preliminary the letters will not be received by Mr. Waghorn; after it has been complied with, the letters must be forwarded to Alexandria by the Mediterranean packets, post paid.

The mail is despatched on the first day of every month.

MR. WAGHORN'S AGENTS IN ENGLAND.

MESSRS. SMITH, ELDER & Co., 65, Cornhill, London.

MESSRS. D. & T. WILLIS, Liverpool.

MR. GEORGE W. WHEATLEY, Church Street, Falmouth.

Mr. Waghorn has devoted a valuable life, at the sacrifice of his professional prospects, to the promotion of Steam Communication with India, a cause in which his heart and soul are evidently embarked. His object must be ultimately attained, and it is hoped that its attainment may ensure to his services some adequate reward. For his past exertions the Steam Committee of Madras have presented him with the sum of £700.

tracts from  
provincial  
papers.

THE following extracts from provincial journals show the feeling which exists on the subject.

(*From the Sheffield Mercury.*)

TO THE EDITOR.

SIR,—I see by the public prints that the discussion on this subject is becoming very warm and general. The people of India are addressing the Legislature, the Board of Control, the Court of Directors of the East India Company—every authority in short that has any portion of power to help them—and they are right. That for which they are asking, was sanctioned two years since by a Parliamentary Report; and it is due both to England and India, that it should be granted.

Our townsmen will probably agree in this,—they will desire that the people of India should have what they request, because it is just and right,—but they will not perhaps feel that they have any personal interest in the matter. They may be induced to ask what have we to do with the establishment or the non establishment of Steam communication with India? I answer we have much to do with it. Rapid and regular communication between countries creates mutual wants, and stimulates the industry which must supply them. In proportion as our intercourse is extended with the vast regions of Asia, will the people of those countries acquire a taste for our manufactures; and in proportion to the diffusion of such taste will be the benefit which we shall derive from administering to it. From the combined result of our local advantages, our capital, our skill, and our experience, we are enabled to compete with all the world in certain articles of utility and luxury; but this vantage ground will be useless unless we improve it. We may command the markets of the whole earth: but if we will take no pains to extend the products of our industry to places where they would be gladly received, or if we suffer their place to be

supplanted by inferior and dearer goods we have only ourselves to blame.

Extracts from  
Provincial  
Papers.

Apply these observations to the case which has given rise to them. A vast and populous territory in the East is subject to our Government, another large portion is indirectly under our control, —while in an immense tract of country in which we have no political influence, there is yet no indisposition to establish the connexions of trade, but rather the contrary. The people are, for the most part, just in that state which renders them the most desirable customers,—they are not naked savages, —they have made some progress in civilization, but their circumstances at present forbid, and will perhaps for ever forbid them rivalling us in the manufactures which flourish most in our country. They have the desire to possess, but they have not the power of producing the particular articles which they want. We can furnish them, but the communication between this country and the East is so tedious and uncertain, as to cast a damp over commercial enterprize, to impede the industry of one country and to diminish the enjoyment of the other. Steam communication will remove this evil. It will give rapidity and comparative certainty; create trade where it never existed; revive it where it is languishing, and bring into correspondence men separated indeed by a vast extent of sea and land, but calculated by the intercourse of trade to be mutually beneficial to each other.

I should regret that our town should be blind to its true interests, or backward in promoting the cause of human improvement; and I trust that the part it will take will exonerate it from either charge.

A SHEFFIELD MAN.

*(From the Liverpool Mail.)*

It is one of the proudest boasts of the “good old town of Liverpool,” that her citizens are ever foremost in promoting the cause of improvement. Looking back to the state of British commerce a hundred years ago, and comparing it

Extracts from  
Provincial  
Papers.

with what we see now, we cannot but be struck with the conspicuous part played by Liverpool, and the large additions which she has been the means of making to the wealth of England and the happiness of the world at large. There is one subject now exciting extraordinary attention in commercial circles, in which we know the enlightened merchants of this town have for some time felt a high degree of interest. We mean the establishment of a regular and permanent system of steam communication between this country and India. In India the feeling on the subject is intense, and we are persuaded that the people of that country will not long have to complain of any want of sympathy in ours.

More than two years since, a Parliamentary Committee recommended the establishment of a regular communication by way of the Red Sea, the expense to be jointly defrayed by the British Government and the East India Company. The Resolution of the committees has slept, as Parliamentary resolves often do, and if the two committees at each end of the line do not conspire to rouse it, the sleep will, probably, be eternal. The people of India are doing their duty. They have transmitted petitions to both houses of Parliament, and memorials to the Board of Control, and the Court of Directors, embodying their views, and sustaining them by financial statements, which place the practicability of establishing the desired communication beyond doubt. It becomes the duty of the British public to express their opinion with equal earnestness, and if this be done, the result will not long be doubtful.

Of the extent and importance of our Indian interests we cannot trust ourselves to say anything, because it would be impossible in our brief space to give even a superficial sketch of them; but we may ask, is it not a remarkable fact that, while it has been deemed necessary to extend the benefit of regular Steam communication to so paltry a dependency as the Ionian Islands, the vast territory of India, with its myriad population, should have been regarded as unworthy of

the same accommodation. It seem quite impossible to suppose that the good sense of the British people should suffer such a reproach to the country to continue. They must exert themselves to get rid of it. We know the opinion of the best informed members of the mercantile community of Liverpool, and we doubt not they will feel that the time is now come to speak with freedom and act with decision.

Extracts from  
Provincial  
Papers.

*(From the Manchester Guardian)*

TO THE EDITOR.

SIR,—There are subjects intimately connected with the prosperity of the great manufacturing interests of this country, which appear for a time to excite a degree of interest corresponding with their importance, and then become suddenly and unaccountably neglected. Among them is one, which, from its position two years ago, ought not at this time to be a subject of discussion. I mean a permanent system of Steam Communication between England and India. I, for one, watched the Parliamentary inquiry in 1834, with deep interest, and am ready to bear testimony to the patience and impartiality with which it was conducted. The Committee, after a very full investigation of the question in all its bearings, reported that “it is expedient that measures should be immediately taken for the regular establishment of Steam Communication from India by the Red Sea.” Here the duty of the Committee ended. They had examined and reported not only in favour of Steam Communication generally, but in favour of a certain line. But what has been done in consequence? Nothing,—or at least nothing to the purpose, which is practically the same thing. The Committee reported in favour of one route; and all that has been done has been to expend a large sum of money in experiments upon a less promising one. I should be sorry to speak disparagingly either of the promoters of the Euphrates expedition, or of the brave and enterprising men who have been employed in it, but with every wish to do

Extracts from  
Provincial  
Papers.

them justice, I am compelled, as a practical man, to ask *cui bono*? What has been done, and what is likely to be done? Some addition may have been made to our knowledge,—it may be something to *know* that the route is impracticable instead of merely *suspecting* so; but this knowledge is hardly worth so many thousand pounds. I must again assert my respect for all parties engaged in the expedition, and I have the same feeling for the adventurers into the Arctic regions; but no sensible man expects to establish a communication with India by either of these projects. Is it not strange that, while so much has been spent in trying to do that which *cannot* be done, not sixpence of the public money should be forthcoming in behalf of that which *can*.

This has not arisen from any apathy in the Indian community. Their desire for Steam Communication is intense, and they have expressed it in a manner perfectly astonishing when viewed with reference to the usual dead calm of Indian society. Their appeals in favour of the establishment of regular Steam Communication have been ardent and unremitting. The late Governor-General cordially joined in the wishes of the public, and recorded his deliberate conviction that the Steam Communication with India was “an advantage so great in all its direct and indirect consequences,” that “it would be cheaply bought at any price.” In this opinion, all who are acquainted with the subject, will agree.

Now, after all these fair appearances, here we are nearly where we were years ago. It is true that some desultory movements have taken place, some voyages have been performed, and their result has been to show the value of Steam Communication, and confirm previous impressions of its necessity and practicability. But no one can calculate upon the continuance of these attempts: what is wanted, is a system placed upon a fixed and durable basis. Lord William Bentinck, in the same minute from which his opinion on the question has been already quoted, said, and said truly, that “permanent communication can only be executed by the

Government, or by the merchants of England interested in the trade to India and China." The question now is, who will do it? Will one of the parties above named undertake it, or will they unite in the great object? I am sure that it is one well worthy the interference of Government, and that a portion of the funds of India could not be more beneficially appropriated. I mean beneficially for India as well as England, for, otherwise, I admit, such a step would not be justifiable. But India wants the means of developing her agricultural and commercial capabilities, and this Steam Communication would be an important instrument in conveying. I sincerely hope that the consciousness of this will yet have its effect upon the ruling powers.

Extracts from  
Provincial  
Papers.

But the second part of the late Governor General's suggestion is more within our own power. What will the merchants and traders of England do? India is a vast field for the production of that raw produce, which in this country may be subjected more beneficially to the processes of manufacturing art. India is now a consumer to a certain extent, and may become so to an undeniable extent, of our great staple commodities, thus bringing an increase of wealth to our merchants, and putting bread into the mouths of our labourers. But it is not to India only that we are to look for a market. Whoever has read Captain Burnes's Narrative (and all should read it who are interested in the welfare of their country) will be aware of the vast opening which Central Asia offers for our manufactures. Other nations are furnishing those regions with goods which we could supply better and cheaper. Why should we suffer this? Surely, with such a population as we have, depending for their very existence upon the prosperity of our manufacturing industry, we are not in a condition to say we have markets enough for our goods, and we want no more. Can we have too many? Is it not most desirable that when one fails we should have others to resort to? To us Manchester



Extracts from  
Provincial  
Papers.

people the possible importance of India is incalculable. Who can foretell how long our supply of cotton from America shall be uninterrupted? The quantity of the cotton in India is, indeed, with few exceptions, inferior to that of the west, and the distance increases the freight. But the quality will improve if attention be paid to the culture and packing,—and attention will be paid to these objects in proportion as our intercourse with India is extended. The expense of transit is a more serious matter; but in the event of any interruption in our relations with America, we shall find it very convenient to have a second string to our bow, even though it should be rather more expensive than the first.

But it is principally as a consumer that India is valuable to us. Our fabrics are precisely the articles which the climate and the habits of the people require. We have done much to introduce them, and why should we hesitate to do a little more when our exertions would be repaid five hundred fold? Do not let us sit down with a notion that we have nothing to do but to mind our men and our machinery. When we have means almost unlimited of manufacturing goods, it is surely of some importance to find means of selling them. India and Central Asia offer us markets; and steam communication will tend to make them available. If, then, we are worthy of the character which we have acquired, of intelligent and enlightened traders, we shall do our utmost to promote an object so intimately connected with our own interests.

I do not mean that we, or the merchants and traders of Great Britain generally, should be expected to set in motion this great engine of improvement, without assistance from the government. But let us unite with the Indian public in invoking the authorities here to take such measures as may be necessary to ensure the required communication. Petitions to both houses of parliament have been numerous signed in all the presidencies of India, and forwarded in the hope of their presentation during the last session. This was prevented by their not arriving in time; they will, however, certainly be brought forward in the next session. Memorials

from the same quarters have also been transmitted to the Board of Control for the affairs of India, and to the Court of Directors of the East India Company. These papers are able and well reasoned, and what must particularly recommend both them and their object to men of business, they are accompanied by statements and calculations, clearly demonstrating a fact which the parliamentary committee had anticipated—namely, that by proper management the expense may be very materially reduced. The main obstacle is thus, in a great degree, overcome, and surely minor difficulties ought not to be allowed to stand in the way. It is not to be supposed that the different branches of the Indian government can be indifferent on a matter of so great importance, but they probably do not feel justified in moving without some powerful expression of public opinion. That expression, as far as one of the countries is concerned, is by no means equivocal. “A voice” from India has reached us, indicating the wishes and expectations of its people, in a manner which cannot be misunderstood. Let the same course be pursued here, and the object will be accomplished. Let every great commercial town do its part, and let our own set the example. We may wish for ever, without being a step nearer the realization of our wishes. Let us speak and act—temperately but vigorously,

I have confined myself to a homely and business-like view of the subject, because it is that to which my education and habits have led me, and to which I feel myself most competent. I am not, however, insensible to the many moral and political advantages which are to be expected from the establishment of steam communication with India. These, however, I leave to be suggested by the mind of the reader, or to be pointed out by abler writers than myself. I make no pretensions to a higher character than that of a practical man of business, who tries to understand his own interest and that of the community to which he belongs.

I am, &c., A MANUFACTURER.

Nov. 26, 1836.

Extracts from  
Provincial  
Papers.

**THE AUTHOR** of this “View of the present State of the Question of Steam Communication with India,” would have been withheld by motives of delicacy from attaching to it any announcement of a personal nature, did he not feel that the establishment which he has raised with great labour and expense, was calculated to promote the general accommodation of persons interested in India, an object to which many of the best years of his life have been devoted. This conviction, combined with the high testimonials of approbation with which his Establishment has been honoured, will, he trusts, be admitted as a valid excuse for thus drawing attention to its advantages, and referring for further information on this and other subjects connected with India, *to his Offices, No. 8, St. Martin’s-place, Charing-cross; and No. 16, Cornhill.*









